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Rational Theory for Personal




For many years, courts' and commentators 2 have struggled with
the question of the personal jurisdiction' of state courts over defen-
dants who did not come within one of the traditional bases of per-
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New York;
J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1977. The writer gratefully acknowledges the substan-
tial and tireless efforts of her secretary, Judy Caporale, and the contributions of her research
assistants, Julia Kalmus and Scott Shostak, in the preparation of this article. The writer is
especially grateful to Mr. Shostak, without whose continued efforts, the footnotes to the article
never would have been completed.
I. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437 (1952); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927); Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925); Pennoyer
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v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Aycock v. Louisiana Aircraft, Inc., 617 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1980);
Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979);
H. Ray Baker, Inc. v. Associated Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1979); Capital Dredge
& Dock Corp. v. Midwest Dredging Co., 573 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1978); Pedi Bares, Inc. v.
P & C Food Markets, Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); Republic Int'l. Corp. v. Amco
Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975); United States Ry. Equip. Co. v. Port Huron &
Detroit R.R., 495 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1974); Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482
F.2d 1079 (Ist Cir. 1973); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th
Cir. 1972); Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 948, reh'g denied 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc.,
239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Logicon, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D.
I11. 1980); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Certain Lloyds Underwriters and/or London Cos., 487
F. Supp. 1115 (W.D. Wis. 1980); Ayers v. Copperweld Corp., 487 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Tex.
1980); Manufacturers' Lease Plans, Inc. v. Alverson Draughon College, 115 Ariz. 358, 565
P.2d 864 (1977); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal,
Rptr. 113 (1969); Kailieha v. Hayes, 56 Hawaii 306, 536 P.2d 568 (1975); Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Colony Press,
Inc. v. Fleeman, 17 Ill. App. 3d 14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1974); Rath Packing Co. v. Intercontinen-
tal Meat Traders, Inc., 181 N.W. 2d 184 (Iowa 1970); O.N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp.,
232 Ga. 256, 206 S.E. 2d 437 (1974); Compania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md.
237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955); Marshall Egg Transp. Co. v.
Bender-Goodman Co., 275 Minn. 534, 148 N.W.2d 161 (1967); Miller v. Glendale Equip. &
Supply, Inc., 344 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1977); McIntosh v. Navaro Seed Co., 81 N.M. 302, 466
P.2d 868 (1970); Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959); O'Brien v. Coin-
stock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.,
116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951); Zerbel v. H.L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W.
2d 872 (1970), appeal dismissed 402 U.S. 902 (1971). On the closely-related issue of obtaining
jurisdiction to determine a particular dispute involving a non-domiciliary or alien defendant
by asserting authority over the defendant's real or personal property located in the state, with
the judgment thus obtained being limited to the value of the property seized, attached or
sequestered (quasi-in-rem jurisdiction), see Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); Harris
v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968); Simpson
v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 2387 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967); Seider v. Roth,
17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966); see also Atkinson v. Superior Court,
49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
2. See, e.g., Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction:
A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv. 429 (1981); Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme
Court's New Jurisdictional Theory, 15 GA. L. Rev. 19 (1980); Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdic-
tion to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HAv. L. REv. 1121 (1966); Woods, Pennoyer's
Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 20 Apiz. L. REv. 861 (1978); Comment, Federalism,
Due Process, and Minimum Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 80 CoLUm. L.
REv. 1341 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Federalism]; Developments in the Law-
State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAgv. L. REv. 909 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments in
the Law]; Note, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson: Minimum Contacts in a
Modern World, 8 PEPPERDINE L. Rev. 783 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, World-Wide
Volkswagen]; Comment, Minimum Contacts Confused and Reconfused- Variations on a Theme
by International Shoe-Or, Is This Trip Necessary?, 7 SAN DIEGO L. Rev. 304 (1970); Note,
In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations: An Interest-Balancing Test, 20 U. FLA.
L. REv. 33 (1967). On the closely-related issue of obtaining jurisdiction to determine a par-
ticular dispute involving a nondomiciliary or alien defendant by asserting authority over the
defendant's real or personal property located in the state, with the judgment thus obtained
being limited to the value of the property seized, attached or sequestered, see Carrington, The
Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HAgv. L. REv. 303 (1962); Currie, Attach-
ment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 Mien. L. REv. 337 (1961); Silberman, Shaffer
v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33 (1978); Riesenfeld, Shaffer v. Heitner:
Holding, Implications, Forebodings, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1183 (1979); Smit, The Enduring Utility
of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 600 (1977);
Comment, The Seider Era Ends, But the Rush Isn't Over Yet, 47 BROOKLYN L. REv. 203
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction
(1980); Note, Rush v. Savchuk: Is the Seider Spoiled or Just Getting Harder?, 9 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 247 (1980); Note, Seider v. Roth Jurisdiction: A Durable Rule Dies a Slow Death
With the Advent of Rush v. Savchuk, 16 NEW ENO. L. REv. 139 (1980); Comment, Putting
the Djinni Back in the Bottle: Rush v. Savchuk and the Demise of Seider Jurisdiction, 1981
UTAH L. REV. 637.
3. The ability of a court to assert authority over persons or property usually is denominated
basis, and basis can be divided into three categories: personal, or in personam, jurisdiction,
in rem jurisdiction, and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. In rem jurisdiction is the authority of a court
to determine the rights of everyone in the entire world with respect to a piece of property
located within the territorial authority of the court and "brought before the court" in a proper
proceeding. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §30 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§59-65 (1971). As noted by one com-
mentator, "[t]he result of a proceeding in rem will affect the defendant's personal rights, but
its essential function is to determine title to or status of property subject to the court's jurisdic-
tion." Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 948. In rem actions include suits to register
title to land, see, e.g., American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911); Tyler v. Judges of
the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900),
condemnation proceedings, see, e.g., Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S.
559 (1889); Housing Authority v. Bjork, 109 Mont. 552, 98 P.2d 324 (1940), confiscation pro-
ceedings, see, e.g., The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1874), or actions to ad-
minister a decedent's estate, see, e.g., In re Estate of Nilson, 126 Neb. 541, 253 N.W. 675
(1934). See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1135-36.
Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction involves adjudication of claims not related to the defendant's prop-
erty which is located within the territorial authority of the court and which is attached at the
outset of the suit to provide both the basis for the court to adjudicate the particular controver-
sy and the source from which the plaintiff's claim can be satisfied if the plaintiff prevails
on the merits. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §32 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§66-68 (1971). See also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916);
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886); Seider v.
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). Any resulting judgment is
only binding between the parties to the adjudication and only to the extent of the property
seized; such judgment has no res judicata effect. Both in rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
are beyond the scope of this article; thus, the recent blurring of the lines between and among
in rem, quasi-in-rem, and in personam jurisdiction in cases such as Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S.
320 (1980), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), will not be addressed.
Personal jurisdiction is the authority of a court to render a decision binding on the person
of the defendant. In order to so bind the defendant, a state court must have some grounds
to assert its powers over the defendant, grounds that are not inconsistent with the limitations
imposed on the power of the court by the United States Constitution, by Federal legislation,
by the state constitution, or by any relevant state legislation. See Developments in the Law,
supra note 2, at 912. If a state court has not properly exercised this power, its judgment should
not be entitled to full faith and credit by sister states; the judgment should not be enforceable
in any other state. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. See also von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 2, at 1126; Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 912.
Sometimes, it is helpful for students to consider the personal jurisdiction of a state court
in the following way: Hypothetically, any court could assert jurisdiction over any defendant
located anywhere, whether or not the defendant had any contacts with the forum state. Wholesale
assertions of jurisdiction, however, would step all over the sovereign toes of the state or coun-
try in which the defendant was located and could create situations of extreme hardship to
the defendant. Thus, to limit abuses and to create national and international harmony, only
part of that hypothetically infinite pool of judicial power can be channelled to a particular
state. The pool of power passes through four successive funnels, those funnels established by
the U.S. Constitution, any relevant federal legislation, the state's constitution, and any relevant
state legislation. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.") Each funnel can operate to further reduce the amount of authority being
channelled to the state court or can pass through the entire amount of power that enters that
funnel, merely adding its particular imprimatur to the propriety of the state court exercise of
that power.
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sonal jurisdiction: presence in the state, domicile in the state,s or
consent to suit in the state.' The United States Supreme Court has
The limiting factor at the United States Constitutional level has been determined to be the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
Thus, while the hypothetically infinite pool of power enters the first funnel, the authority that
emerges is only those exercises of state court personal jurisdiction not inconsistent with the
fourteenth amendment. As a general rule, federal legislation does not operate to further limit
the personal jurisdiction of state courts by prohibiting state suits against certain entities or
individuals; rather, federal statutes achieve a similar purpose by giving exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction to federal courts in some areas. See infra note 19. See, e.g., Tucker Act §2, 28
U.S.C. §1346(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 28 U.S.C. §1491 (Supp. V. 1981) (contract actions);
Federal Tort Claims Act §410, 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1976). Moreover, while article Ill of the
Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal courts in suits in which the United States is
a party, the United States may be sued only when a federal statute authorizes such suit. Williams
v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
From this point, the remaining authority passes to the states, with each state determining
the extent to which it will further limit the personal jurisdiction authority of its own courts.
Obviously, a state cannot grant its courts more authority than the U.S. Constitution permits;
when the Supreme Court finds that a state has exceeded the Federal Constitutional and Con-
gressional limitations, the Supreme Court will invalidate the State statute authorizing such ex-
ercise of jurisdiction, see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219 (1977) ("1 . . . agree . . .
that the Delaware [sequestration] statute is unconstitutional on its face") (Stevens, J., concurr-
ing); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (state nonresident motorist statute invalidated
because, inconsistent with the requirements of due process, the statute did not expressly require
notice to the nonresident defendant), or will declare the application of the statute to the par-
ticular defendant to be unconstitutional. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 299 (1980) (application of Oklahoma "long-arm" statute to defendant who had "no 'con-
tacts, ties, or relations' with the State of Oklahoma" found unconstitutional). Most states have
enacted "long-arm" statutes that describe the circumstances in which their courts can assert
personal jurisdiction. Some states, such as California and Rhode Island, merely pass through
to their courts all the power that has emerged from the fourteenth amendment. The California
statute, CAL. CrV. PRoC. CODE §410.10, provides: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdic-
tion on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."
The Rhode Island Statute, R.I. GEN. LAWS §9-5-33 (1956) provides:
Every foreign corporation, every individual not a resident of this state. . . , and
every partnership or association, composed of any person or persons, not such residents,
that shall have the necessary minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island, shall
be subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island, and the courts of this
state shall hold such foreign corporations and such nonresident individuals . . . and
such partnerships or associations amenable to suit in Rhode Island in every case not
contrary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States.
Other state long-arm statutes attempt to further describe and/or limit personal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §302(a) (McKinney 1972) (excluding defamation actions from
long-arm jurisdiction authorized by the statute). For discussion of the historical development
of the present theories of state court personal jurisdiction, see infra notes 60 to 185 and
accompanying text. For discussion of the roles of the due process clause and state long-arm
statutes in respect of one another, see Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706, 713-14
(4th Cir. 1966); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432, 436-440,
176 N.E.2d 761, 763-65 (1961).
Personal jurisdiction must be distinguished from subject matter jurisdiction, which is the
authority of a court to hear a particular type of dispute. For definitions and descriptions of
the principal types of federal court subject matter jurisdiction, see infra notes 18 and 19.
4. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp.
442 (E.D. Ark. 1959); Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 3 So. 321 (1888). See also infra note
76 and accompanying text.
At the common law, the earliest and principal basis for personal jurisdiction was the presence
of the defendant within the territorial authority of the court. J. Story, Commentaries on the
Conflict of Laws § 539 (8th ed. 1883). Several theories have been advanced for this primacy:
the limited authority of the sovereign to force a judgment rendered against a non-present defen-
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attempted to strike a balance between the theory that each state is
a sovereign whose boundaries determine the extent of its authority,'
which must be respected by other states, 8 and the theory that the
Constitution requires states to afford full faith and credit to the valid
judgments of sister states9 while protecting the fourteenth amendment
dant, see Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L. REV. 427, 427-28 (1929), the basis
of most common law personal actions in trespass, O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 101 (1881);
3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 626 (5th ed. 1942), the common-law view
that "a judgment . . . is no more than a basis for an immediate levy of execution against
the defendant's person or his land." 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE §1064, at 206 (1969).
In the United States, presence coupled with valid service of process always has been upheld
as a valid exercise of personal jurisdiction, no matter how fortuitous or transitory the defen-
dant's presence in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913)
(constructive service by probate court appointing party executor binds party even after he left
jurisdiction); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (service in airplane fly-
ing over the jurisdiction); Smith v. Gibson, 3 So. 321, 83 Ala. 284 (1888) (absent fraudulent
inducement, legally served summons constitutes basis for jurisdiction no matter how transient
party's presence in jurisdiction); Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354 (1819) (service was held
valid even where the party was merely passing through the jurisdiction on route to another
country). See also J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWs §541 (8th ed. 1883).
But see Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdic-
tion, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 241, 259-72; Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction
After World-wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 730-31
(1981) (suggesting that "transient jurisdiction"-assertion of personal jurisdiction over defen-
dants based solely on service coupled with presence in the jurisdiction-be abandoned in favor
of a unified approach based upon the analysis established by the Supreme Court for cases
involving extra-territorial service of process).
5. Although the primary basis for personal jurisdiction in the Civil Law is domicile,
see generally F. SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 112 (Guthrie trans. 2d ed. 1880); J.
WESTLAKE, A TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (7th ed. 1925), the Supreme Court
did not establish domicile as a basis for personal jurisdiction in the United States until 1940.
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917) (dic-
tum). See also infra note 78 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (actual con-
sent); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (implied consent). See infra notes 85 to 89 and
accompanying text (discussing Hess). See also infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
7. Early courts and commentators viewed the several states as independent sovereigns
for purposes of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
519 (1839); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 (1918). See also infra notes 62, 69 and 73.
8. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1. The full faith and credit clause provides, in pertinent part:
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial
Proceedings of every other State. .. ."
A judgment rendered by a state court that did not have personal jurisdiction over a defen-
dant would not be entitled to full faith and credit by sister states; a sister state need not en-
force such a judgment. See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 481, 486 (1813). See also
D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850) (full faith and credit did not require en-
forcement of default judgment obtained without personal service on the defendant).
While a judgement rendered by state A is not entitled to full faith and credit in state B
if state A did not have personal jurisdiction over defendant D (i.e., state B is not required
to enforce the judgment of state A), the converse is not necessarily true; the concepts of authority
to adjudicate and recognition of out-of-state judgments are not coterminous. See von Mehren
& Trautman, supra note 2, at 1126. The Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122 (1827), U.S. Rev.
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due process rights of defendants'0 from state encroachments. In
International Shoe Co. v. Washington," the Court established the
following test for personal jurisdiction over foreign' 2 corporate
defendants:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463.
[The] demands [of due process] may be met by such contacts.. .with
the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend
the particular suit which is brought there. 3
This test, however, has been applied consistently to individual as well
as to corporate defendants. ' 4 In subsequent cases, the state and lower
Stat. §905 (1875), U.S. Comp. Stat. §2431 (1916), enacted by Congress under the full faith
and credit clause, provided, in pertinent part:
And the said records and judicial proceeding . . . authenticated [as stated above],
shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States
as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken.
The present version appears at 28 U.S.C. §1738 (1976), a version in which "acts" has been
inserted before "records and judicial proceedings." As noted by Professor Rheinstein, "[alt
an early date, it was maintained and recognized that this provision could not be literally ap-
plied." Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 775, 781 (1955).
10. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
11. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12. For purposes of this article, a "foreign corporation" is a corporation incorporated
in and having its principal place of business in a state or states other than the forum state,
in the case of state court personal jurisdiction, or the state in which the federal court is sitting,
in the case of federal court personal jurisdiction; an "alien corporation" is a corporation in-
corporated in and having its principal place of business in a country or countries other than
the United States; a "nondomiciliary" is an individual who is domiciled in a state other than
the forum state, in the case of state court personal jurisdiction, or the state in which the federal
court is sitting, in the case of federal court personal jurisdiction; an "alien" is an individual
who is a citizen of and is domiciled in a country or countries other than the United States.
13. 326 U.S. at 316-17.
14. While many of the seminal cases in this area involved personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, see, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 II1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), the
language of the Supreme Court in International Shoe is broad enough to include individual
as well as corporate defendants, and courts have consistently applied the "minimum contacts"
test to noncorporate defendants. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Calagaz v. Calhoun, 1309 F.2d 248, 254-55 (5th Cir.
1962); San Juan Hotel Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 277 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.P.R. 1967). Moreover,
no court has ruled that International Shoe should be read as inapplicable to noncorporate defen-
dants even though reasonable grounds might exist for such a limitation: the case involved a
corporate defendant and International Shoe was decided in response to the difficult problem
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction
federal courts' 5 and the United States Supreme Court' 6 have defined
and redefined the defendant contacts that would be considered
"minimum" within the meaning of the International Shoe test. While
this refining process of giving content to "minimum contacts" con-
tinues, however, a well-accepted unitary approach to the problem
clearly has been devised.' 7
The development of a personal jurisdiction doctrine for the federal
courts, however, has not received extensive treatment by courts and
commentators. No federal long-arm statute purports to prescribe federal
standards for assertion of personal jurisdiction in either diversity'8
of finding a rational theory upon which to assert personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliary
corporations doing business in the state. See also Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases
for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U. L. REv. 599, 603 (1955); Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based
on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. RV. 522, 544-45; Reese & Galston, Doing an Act
or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REv. 249, 251 (1959).
15. See, e.g., Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Products, Inc., 619 F.2d 676 (7th
Cir. 1980); Aycock v. Louisiana Aircraft, Inc., 617 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1980); Lakeside Bridge
and Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979); H. Ray Baker,
Inc. v. Associated Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1979); Capital Dredge & Dock Corp.
v. Midwest Dredging Co., 573 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1978); Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food
Markets, Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); Republic Int'l. Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc.,
516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975); United State Ry. Equip. Co. v. Port Huron & Detroit R.R.,
495 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1974); Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st
Cir. 1973); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972);
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Logicon, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Capitol Indem.
Corp. v. Certain Lloyds Underwriters and/or London Cos., 487 F. Supp. 1115 (W.D. Wis.
1980); Ayers v. Copperweld Corp., 487 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Mueller v. Steelcase,
Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959); Manufacturers' Lease Plans, Inc. v. Alverson Draughon
College, 115 Ariz. 358, 565 P.2d 864 (1977); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 II1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Rath Packing Co. v. Intercontinental Meat Traders,
Inc., 181 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1970); O.N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp., 232 Ga. 256, 206
S.E. 2d 437 (1974); Compagnia de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357
(1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955); Marshall Egg Transport Co. v. Bender-Goodman
Co., 275 Minn. 534, 148 N.W.2d 161 (1967); Miller v. Glendale Equip. & Supply, Inc., 344
So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1977); McIntosh v. Navaro Seed Co., 81 N.M. 302, 466 P.2d 868 (1970);
S. Howes Co. v. W.P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954), appeal dismissed per stipula-
tion, 348 U.S. 983 (1955); Zerbel v. H.L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W.2d 872
(1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971).
16. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See also Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd.
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). For a discussion of the develop-
ment of the "minimum contacts" test, see infra notes 106-80 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 106-80 and accompanying text.
18. Diversity cases are those cases in which the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
district court arises under 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1976), which section provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interests and
costs, and is between-
(I) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
Id.
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or federal question 9 cases.2" In cases in which a state claim is at
issue between citizens of different states, and the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of a federal court therefore is based on diversity of citizenship,
the federal courts generally have accepted the proposition that the
fourteenth amendment standard of "minimum contacts with the state"
in which the federal court is sitting should be employed to determine
the constitutionality of federal court assertions of personal jurisdiction.2
19. Federal question cases are those cases in which the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal district court arises under 28 U.S.C. §1331 (Supp. V 1981), which section provides:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. Diversity cases, see supra note 18, and
federal question cases make up the vast majority of cases over which the federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction. In both types of cases, the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
court is concurrent with that of state courts. The federal courts have been granted, either directly
or by implication, see Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State
Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 311 (1976); Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in
Private Civil Actions, 70 HARV. L. REv. 509 (1957), exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in
various areas including Admiralty, maritime and prize cases, 28 U.S.C. §1333 (1976) (although
"saving to suitors" clauses in the statute has effect of making federal jurisdiction exclusive
only in limitation of liability proceedings and in maritime actions in rein, C. WRIGHT, THE
LAW op FEDERAL. COURTS 36 (4th ed. 1983)); Bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. §1334 (Supp. V 1981);
Patents and copyrights, 28 U.S.C. §1338 (1976); cases involving fines, penalties, forfeitures,
or seizures under the laws of the United States, 28 U.S.C. §§1355, 1356 (1976); cases involving
crimes against the Untied States, 18 U.S.C. §3231; cases involving counsels and vice-counsels
as defendants, 28 U.S.C. 1351 (Supp. V 1981); cases involving the United States as a defen-
dant, 28 U.S.C. §1346 (1976) (exclusive by implication, C. WRIGHT, supra); Antitrust actions,
15 U.S.C. §§15, 26 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); cases under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§78aa (1976); cases involving violations of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §717u (1976); and
suits on bonds under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §270b(b) (1976). Finally, certain types of cases
have been reserved exclusively for the United States Supreme Court, with that court having
original as well as exclusive jurisdiction. See C. vRIGHT, supra, at 765, 767-69, 773.
Throughout this article, the term "federal question cases" will be used in a broad sense
to encompass not only cases arising under 28 U.S.C. §1331 but also those cases arising under
exclusive grants of subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts, all "nondiversity" cases that
can be heard by lower federal courts. See also infra note 195.
20. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
21. The Supreme Court never has spoken directly on the issue. But see Insurance Corp.
of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982) (Supreme
Court impliedly adopts Arrowsmith) (see infra note 481 and accompanying text; 456 U.S. 694,
711-12 (Powell, J., concurring) (concurrence expressly relies on Arrowsmith) (see infra note 482
and accompanying text)). Most federal courts have followed the analysis of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320
F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), wherein the court determined that, in a diversity of citizenship case,
as an implementation of the Erie doctrine, the federal court should adopt the state standard
to determine whether a foreign corporation would be amenable to suit in the federal court.
See infra notes 453-77 and accompanying text (discussing Arrowsmith). See also Jennings v.
McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963); Smartt v. Coca Cola Bottling Corp., 318 F.2d
447 (6th Cir. 1963). But see Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
See infra notes 434-52 and accompanying text (discussing Jaftex). While this position has some
appeal in that federal courts sitting in diversity are deciding state claims, this writer questions
the propriety of determining the authority of a federal court on the basis of limitations imposed
on state courts. See Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc. 282 F.2d 508, 516 (2d Cir. 1960)
("[h]ence our conclusion is that the question whether a foreign corporation is present in a
district to permit of service of process upon it is one of federal law governing the procedure
of the United States courts and is to be determined accordingly"); von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 2, at 1123 n.6 ("[airguably, federal courts do not require enabling legislation to
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No standard, however, consistently is applied in federal question cases, 22
those "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States ' z3 and under special grants of exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction to federal courts.24 In cases in which a federal
statute provides for nationwide or even worldwide service of process,25
most federal courts agree that a defendant's amenability to suit 26 should
be measured by the due process clause of the fifth, rather than the
due process clause of the fourteenth, amendment.27 These courts do
not concur, however, in the substance of that standard. Some argue
that a "minimum contacts" test similar to that employed under the
fourteenth amendment should apply. This test aggregates the defen-
dant's contacts with the United States as a whole, the single federal
forum of which the particular federal court is merely an arm, to
determine sufficiency of contacts for jurisdictional purposes.28 Other
federal courts in similar situations refuse to aggregate the defendant's
national contacts, choosing instead to examine the sufficiency of the
defendant's contacts with the state in which the federal court is sitting. 29
Other federal courts do not articulate clearly the standard applied.
These courts either find that no federal standard need be determined
because the defendant's contacts with the state in which the federal
court is sitting satisfy the International Shoe test, 30 or fail to find
or to announce any basis for an assertion of personal jurisdiction.3'
assume adjudicatory jurisdiction under federal standards, even in diversity litigation"); Note,
Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95
HARV. L. REv. 470 n.1 (1981) (author acknowledges the possible propriety of adopting a federal
standard in diversity cases). For further, more extensive discussion of this point, see infra notes
478-92 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 493-1359 and accompanying text.
23. 28 U.S.C. §1331 (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 19.
24. See supra note 19.
25. See infra statutes cited in note 247.
26. For purposes of this article, a defendant is said to be "amenable to suit" in a par-
ticular jurisdiction or "amenable to service of process" pursuant to the procedure established
by a particular jurisdiction if the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would
not be considered constitutionally invalid under the particular tests appropriate to the particular
assertion of personal jurisdiction.
Professor Foster defined amenability as "a statement of the grounds or conditions that link
a defendant to the forum sufficiently to justify entry of a personal judgment against him in
the action at hand." Foster, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 9,
11. He argued that notice to the defendant, "ordinarily achieved by service of a summons
or other process announcing the commencement or pendency of judicial proceedings," and
"amenability" are the two requirements for "the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-
consenting party." Id. at 10-11.
27. See infra notes 579-784 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 687-716 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 717-738 and
accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 748-53 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 769-84 and ac-
companying text.
30. See infra notes 739-47 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 587-608 and accompanying text.
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In many federal question cases, no special federal statute authorizes
service upon the alien or foreign corporate defendant or the non-
domiciliary individual defendant.32 Service of process upon an in-
dividual defendant, provided the defendant is present or domiciled
in the state in which the district court is held, can be achieved pur-
suant to Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" by
"delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally
or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of
abode." 34 Service of process upon certain corporate defendants is
authorized by Rule 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"
which provides, in pertinent part, that service be made "by deliver-
ing a copy of the summons and complaint to an officer, a managing
or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process .. ."36 Some federal courts
have ruled that when process is served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1) or
4(d)(3), amenability to service of process should be measured by a
federal, or fifth amendment, standard." Among these courts, however,
the applicability of any particular test, such as the aggregation of
national contacts, again has not been uniform.3" Some courts,
moreover, do not expressly adopt a fifth amendment standard. 9
Finally, in some federal question cases in which a federal statute
for nationwide or worldwide service of process is not available, such
as those cases in which the defendant is not present or domiciled in
the state or in which the defendant is a corporation and service can-
not be made within the state upon some corporate agent, service can-
not be achieved pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1) or Rule 4(d)(3). The plain-
tiff instead must serve the defendant by using the long-arm statute
of the state in which the federal court is sitting. Some courts have
interpreted former Rule 4(d)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,40 recently recodified, with changes, as Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i),4
32. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1). For the full text of Rule 4, see infra note 269.
35. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3). For the full text of Rule 4, see infra note 269.
37. See infra notes 799-887 and accompanying text.
38. Id.
39. See infra notes 839-51 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 278-86 and accompanying text. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7) (1981). For
the full text of former Rule 4(d)(7), see infra note 267.
41. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i). For the text of the 1983 amendments to Rule 4, as
well as extensive discussion of these amendments, see infra note 269 and notes 275 to 286
and accompanying text. All of the cases of importance to this article involved former Rule
4(d)(7) rather than present Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). Textual distinction will be made whenever any
confusion might arise.
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as authorizing such use of the state long-arm statute.42 Rule 4(d)(7)
provided, in pertinent part:
[I]t is... sufficient if the summons and complaint are served. . .in
the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district
court is held for the service of summons or other like process upon
any such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general
jurisdiction of that state. 43
In federal question cases in which extraterritorial service of process"
4
purportedly was made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(7), some federal courts
ruled that the amenability of defendants so served to the personal
jurisdiction of the federal court should be measured by a state
standard," the International Shoe "minimum contacts with the state"
test or some similar test, because service had been made "in the man-
ner" prescribed by state law. Other federal courts in similar cir-
cumstances espoused a federal standard for federal question cases,
but for a variety of reasons actually applied 6 the state standard. A
few courts adopted and tried to apply a federal standard of amenability
under the theory that while the method or mechanics of service were
being prescribed by state statute, the defendant's amenability to suit
in a federal court on a federal question should be determined by a
federal standard.47
Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for "ser-
vice upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state"
in which the federal court is sitting." Rule (4)(e) provides, in perti-
nent part:
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district
court is held provides... for service of a summons... upon a party
not an inhabitant of or found within the state,. . service may be
made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the
statute or rule. 9
Thus, Rule 4(e) expressly provides that federal courts sitting in federal
question cases as well as in diversity cases may employ the long-arm
42. See infra cases discussed at notes 915-1038.
43. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(d)(7) (1981).
44. The term "extra-territorial" will be used throughout this article to describe a federal
court's service of process beyond the territorial boundaries of the state in which the federal
court is held.
45. See infra notes 936-55 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 929 and 935 and
accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 956-1010 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 920-28 and
accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 1011-38 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
49. FED. R. Cv. P. 4(e). For the full text of Rule 4, see infra note 269.
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statutes of the states in which the federal courts are sitting.50 Many
federal courts in these circumstances have interpreted Rule 4(e) as
requiring that state standards apply both to the question of mechanics
of service and to the question of amenability to service of process."
Other courts have applied state amenability standards, but for less
compelling reasons. 2 A few courts have announced that the fifth
amendment should govern amenability even in Rule 4(e) cases, 3 while
even fewer courts actually have tried to apply some federal standard
to this question.5' When federal courts sitting on federal question cases
feel compelled to apply state amenability standards, an anomalous
situation is created in which federal courts sitting in federal question
cases must apply state standards to the exercises of their federal court
personal jurisdiction."s
While the federal courts have been faced with cases arising in each
of the categories enumerated above, no coherent or cohesive procedure
or theory has emerged either in regard to the entire question of per-
sonal jurisdiction in federal courts or in regard to federal question
cases in general or any particular category of federal question cases.
The cases and courts are in disarray, both as to when a federal stan-
dard should apply to the question of amenability to service of pro-
cess and as to what a federal standard might require. The purpose
of this article is to examine the above-outlined problem in the con-
text of the various types of cases in which it might arise and to
prescribe some consistent, sensible scheme of personal jurisdiction in
federal question cases. This scheme would embody the basic prin-
ciples of the federal judicial system while recognizing practical limita-
tions where required. Part II of this article examines the historical
development of state court personal jurisdiction limitations through
the establishment and development of the fourteenth amendment
minimum contacts due process standard56 and the historical develop-
ment of federal court personal jurisdiction limitations or standards,
including any attempts to formulate an independent fifth amendment
due process standard.57 Part III categorizes and examines the various
types of federal question cases in which the issue of personal jurisdic-
tion has arisen, analyzing particular cases in each category in light
50. See infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 1153-71 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 1123-33, 1142-52, 1172-82 and 1213-43 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 1183-1212 and 1244-1316 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 1269-1316 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 872-84 and 968-69 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 60-185 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 186-560 and accompanying text.
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of the efficacy of employing some federal standard of amenability
to suit such as the "aggregation of national contacts" test. 8 Part
IV provides the author's prediction as to the direction of the law
of personal jurisdiction in federal question cases and her own scheme
for resolving some of the current issues in this area.19
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT6"
A. State Court Personal Jurisdiction6 '-The Fourteenth
Amendment
Generally the authority of a state to render decisions personally
binding on a particular defendant, its in personam jurisdiction, arises
not from any affirmative grant of such authority by the Constitution
and/or laws of the United States, but rather from the failure of these
formulations to prohibit such exercises.6" As provided in the tenth
amendment, "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
58. See infra notes 561-1355 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 1356-64 and accompanying text.
60. For a recent, interesting description of the historical development of personal jurisdiction
theory, see generally von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and
Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REv. 279 (1983).
61. Many commentators have traced the historical development of state court personal
jurisdiction in the United States or various aspects thereof. See, e.g., Jay, supra note 2, at
429-50, Jursik; "World-Wide" Without "Minimum Contacts": An Analysis of Product Sellers
Amenability to Suit, 31 FED'W INS. Cous. Q. 233, 233-45 (Spring 1981); Kamp, supra note
2, at 19-44; Ripple & Murphy, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Reflections on
the Road Ahead, 56 NoTRE DAiE LAw REV. 65, 65-81 (1980); Seidelson, Jurisdiction Over
Nonresident Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long-Arm Statutes, 6 DUQ.
L. REv. 221, 221-35 (1967-68); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1124-63; Woods,
supra note 2, at 861-80; Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation: When is a Contract
a Contact?, 61 B.U.L. REv. 375, 375-89 (1981); Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at 134-52;
Note, Minimum Contacts as Applied to Products Liability-World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 29 DE PAUL L. REv. 1159, 1159-68 (1980); Developments in the Law, supra note
2, at 909-65; Note, The Role of Foreseeability in Jurisdictional Inquiry: Tyson v. Whitaker
& Sons, Inc., 32 ME. L. REV. 497, 501-06 (1980); Comment, Asserting Jurisdiction over Non-
resident Corporations on the Basis of Contractual Dealings: A Four-Step Proposal, 12 PAC.
L. J. 1039, 1039-49 (1981); Note, World-Wide Volkswagen, supra note 2, at 783-94; Comment,
Personal Jurisdiction over Retailers and Regional Distributors in Products Liability Litigation:
Sufficiency of a Single Contact, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 325, 327-32 (1981).
62. Some commentators have viewed this question as one essentially of appropriate and
sensible distribution of cases, with questions of sovereignty and protection of the defendant
from unreasonable exercises of jurisdiction figuring in not as primary analysis but merely as
important ciphers in the distribution equation. To one commentator,
[Personal jurisdiction] is the allocation of judicial business among the several states
of the United States, according to the relationship between the particular action and
the state of the forum-the determination of an appropriate geographical location
for the trial. . . [It] might be examined in the light of the type of action involved,
so as to require but a single determination of jurisdiction, taking into account all
those factors relevant to the choice of an appropriate place of trial within a federal
system.
Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 911-12.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
States respectively, or to the people." ' 63 This broad authorization is
the only available Constitutional source from which state court per-
sonal jurisdiction arguably emanates. The tenth amendment provides
an excellent starting point for any consideration of the development
of state court personal jurisdiction, however, because it includes the
two aspects that consistently define such authority: grant and limita-
tion. The basic inquiry, even before Pennoyer v. Neff,6' has been
to determine the scope of Constitutional limitations on state court
personal jurisdiction.65 During the course of this search, limitations
initially were defined very broadly,66 subsequently were drawn much
more narrowly, 67 and, most recently, were broadened again to some
extent. 68 While the limiting language of the Constitution has not
changed, the construction of that language has varied, partly from
the viscissitudes of developing any definition of language on a case-
by-case basis, and partly from the necessity of altering theories that
could not survive in the increasingly complex and sophisticated
transportation, communication, and industrial systems of the twen-
tieth century. 9
Pennoyer v. Neff" often is considered the cornerstone of the law
of state court personal jurisdiction.7 In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court
limited the jurisdiction of a state court to the territorial boundaries
of the state, ruling that a Court had no authority over an individual
defendant who was not a resident of the state unless he had been
served with process while present therein." This determination clear-
63. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
64. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
65. See infra notes 70-185 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 129-55 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 83 and 96 and accompanying text. As noted by one recent commentator:
The United States is an economically open, highly mobile, industrial society. It is
also a federation of fifty distinct polities, each with its own judicial system. Thus,
although the federal system allows people to move freely about the country, it also
restricts the state's exercise of jurisdiction over them.
The inability of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
has plagued our federal system since its inception.
Note, Interstate Jurisdictional Compacts: A New Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 49 FORDHAt
L. REv. 1097, 1101 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
70. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
71. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, §1064, at 208-11; see generally authorities
cited supra note 61.
72. 95 U.S. at 722. The question in Pennoyer involved the validity of an Oregon judg-
ment which had resulted in the transfer to Pennoyer of title to Neff's land in Oregon. Id.
at 719. Notice of the Oregon action against Neff, Mitchell v. Neff, had been given by publica-
tion in Oregon while Neff was outside the state. Id. at 720. Finding that the Oregon court
had not obtained personal jurisdiction over Neff, the Supreme Court determined that the Oregon
judgment was invalid, even in Oregon. Id. at 732-33.
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ly was influenced by the theory that each state is a sovereign whose
power extends only to the boundaries of its territory.73
The actual significance of Pennoyer, however, in the development
of a unified, workable theory of state court personal jurisdiction,
generally is overlooked by courts and commentators. The greatest
significance of Pennoyer was not in its recognition of traditional strict
territorial limitations on personal jurisdiction but rather in its recogni-
tion that the validity of any exercise of personal jurisdiction by a
state court is to be determined according to the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 74 Any exercise of jurisdiction consis-
73. Id. This territorial principle of viewing sister states as separate sovereignties for jurisdic-
tional purposes was embraced early by the United States Supreme Court. Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). For a discussion of the territorial theory in England
and its subsequent influence on American courts, see Hazard, supra note 4, at 252-62.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court gave careful elucidation to those jurisdictional prin-
ciples on which it rested its determination:
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent,
many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested
in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited
by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States,
and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them.
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereign-
ty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has
the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants.
. . .The other principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned;
that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory .... The several States are of equal dignity and authority,
and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And
so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State
have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity;
and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory
so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.
95 U.S. at 732-33 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court explained its decision on a "physical
power" ground: a state court had authority over persons and property within its borders and
no authority over persons and property outside its borders; thus, the Oregon court had no
authority over the person of Neff who was not present in Oregon at the time he had been
constructively served by publication in a newspaper.
The above-quoted passage is significant also for its recognition that the states, being bound
together in a federation governed by the United States Constitution, were not completely com-
parable to independent sovereigns. At various times subsequent to this decision, the Court has
suggested that notions of federalism affect the appropriate scope of state court personal jurisdic-
tion. See infra notes 111-13 and 148 and accompanying text. But see McDougal, Judicial Jurisdic-
tion: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. Rav. 1 (1982).
74. 95 U.S. at 733. The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No State
shall. . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §I. The Court stated:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .,the validity of. . .judgments
may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground
that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations
of parties over whom the court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.
95 U.S. at 733. As noted by Professors Wright and Miller, however, this "passage. . .must
be viewed as dictum because of the inapplicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to the case-
it did not become effective until after the. . .judgment [which was assertedly invalid because
of lack of valid personal jurisdiction over the defendant] had been rendered ... ." 4 C. WRIGHT
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tent with the due process clause would be valid; any exercise incon-
sistent with the due process clause would be invalid and not entitled
to full faith and credit." The due process clause, therefore, became
one of the sources of limitation by which subsequent courts would
measure exercises of personal jurisdiction. According to Pennoyer,
moreover, any attempt to exercise jurisdiction over a nonpresent non-
consenting nondomiciliary of the state would violate legitimate con-
stitutional limitations.
Certain traditional bases of personal jurisdiction, that had been
recognized and employed prior to Pennoyer, like presence76 and con-
sent to suit,77 did not prove troublesome after that decision. After
all, in Pennoyer the Supreme Court found that if the defendant were
present within the jurisdiction when served with process, then due
process was not violated. Moreover, consent to suit, either by ap-
pearing to defend or by appointing an agent for service of process,
surely would not violate the defendant's due process rights because
his consent to suit would be a waiver of any rights he might other-
wise have. A final traditional basis of personal jurisdiction, a defen-
dant's domicile in the state, was added by the Supreme Court in 1940
in Milliken v. Meyer." This post-Pennoyer basis would also seem to
provide no troublesome incursions on the defendant's due process
rights.
Another early source of limitation, frequently overlooked by com-
& A. MILLER, supra note 4, §1064, at 210. The fourteenth amendment became effective on
July 28, 1868. This dictum, however, has been followed and amplified by the Supreme Court
and other courts in innumerable subsequent decisions. See infra notes 106-85 and accompany-
ing text.
75. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, §1 Failure to satisfy the procedural aspects of due process, such
as failure to provide a defendant with proper notice of an action which has been instituted
against him, see, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), or failure to serve process on
a defendant in the manner prescribed by the appropriate service of process statute, or failure
of the statute authorizing such service to provide an adequate method for notifying the defen-
dant, see, e.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (judgment declared invalid because
service was pursuant to state nonresident motorist statute which did not expressly require notice
to non resident defendants, even though defendant actually received timely notice of suit), also
will lead to invalidation of a judgment on due process grounds and result in a refusal by a
sister state to afford the resulting judgment full faith and credit. Such questions are beyond
the scope of this article, except to the extent that a service of process statute is deemed to
be more than a mere procedural direction and instead is interpreted as determinative of a defen-
dant's amenability to suit in the jurisdiction.
76. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (personal jurisdic-
tion based on service on a nonresident defendant while in an airplane flying over the state
in which the action was brought). See supra note 4.
77. See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); Western Loan & Say. Co. v. Butte
& Boston Consol. Mining Co., 210 U.S. 368 (1908); York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890); see
supra note 6.
78. 311 U.S. 457 (1940); see supra note 5.
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mentators, is the commerce clause of the Constitution. 79 As noted
by one commentator:
Even if the due-process requirements as currently set forth are
satisfied, a state's exercise of jurisdiction might unduly burden in-
terstate commerce. The expense and inconvenience of defending a
suit may tend to increase the cost and limit the scope of commercial
operations to a defendant not engaged in substantial operations in
the forum state."
In the 1920's and 1930's, the Supreme Court based several invalida-
tions of state jurisdiction on the commerce clause;8' no recent deci-
sion, however, has been so based.82
As the United States moved into the twentieth century, the "actual
presence" limitation attributed to Pennoyer proved frustrating to plain-
tiffs and state courts. Although at the time of Pennoyer most trans-
actions had been confined to a single jurisdiction, improved technology
led to increasingly complex multistate transactions. 83 One problem that
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. The commerce clause gives Congress the power "To
regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .. " Id. In 1945, the Supreme Court described the nature of the "dormant commerce
clause":
For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the com-
merce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protec-
tion from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases,
where congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the
commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national
interest.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). Implicit in this grant of authority
to Congress, whether exercised or not, is a denial to states of the authority to regulate in-
terstate commerce. G. GUNTHER, CONsTrruT ONAL LAw 256 (10th ed. 1980).
80. Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 983.
81. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix,
278 U.S. 492 (1929); Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923). See Farrier,
Suits against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 17 MINN. L. Rv.
381 (1933).
82. In recent cases, which apply the International Shoe criteria to determine whether due
process has been violated, see infra notes 106-85 and accompanying text, burdens on commerce
are probably subsumed in the balancing process as burdens or inconveniences to the defendant.
At least one recent commentator has suggested that the commerce clause still may have a signifi-
cant role in prescribing the "permissible reach of long arm jurisdiction" in commercial cases.
Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Long Arm Jurisdiction, 49 U. Cm. L. REv.
156, 174-75 (1982). The commentator noted:
Jurisdictional standards may impair commerce in two ways. First, the threat of liability
to suit in a foreign jurisdiction discourages transactions with foreseeable foreign effects.
Second, assertion of long arm jurisdiction may frustrate the reasonable expectations
of commercial actors, thereby decreasing commercial certainty. ...
The constitutional interest in facilitating interstate commerce seems to require ad-
ditional jurisdictional limitations beyond the minimum safeguards of causation, notice,
and relevance provided by due process.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
83. As noted by one commentator:
Because of changing social conditions-including increased use of the corporate
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was of increasing concern for the states was the nonresident motorist
who drove into a state, caused injury, and fled the jurisdiction before
he or she could be served with process." In Hess v. Pawloski,85 the
United States Supreme Court upheld, as not violative of a defendant's
due process rights, a Massachusetts statute16 providing that any non-
resident motorist who drove into the state was deemed to have ap-
pointed the Registrar of Motor Vehicles as his agent for service of
process in any action arising from operation of the motor vehicle in
the state.8 7 The Court upheld this prototype long-arm statute with
its implied consent provision on the theory that a state has an impor-
tant interest in safety on its highways. The Court noted:
entity in the business world, the development of the automobile and other forms
of more rapid transportation, and the invention of far more sophisticated modes
of communication-Pennoyer's territorial view of a state's judicial jurisdiction soon
became unworkable and bore little relation to people's everyday activities.
McDougal, supra note 73, at 2. The Supreme Court recognized these changes in the structure
of American society. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., the Court, noting "the fun-
damental transformation of our national economy over the years," stated:
Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties
separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has
come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines.
At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a state where he engages in economic
activity.
355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957). The Court made a similar statement in Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958). See note 130 infra. See also Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 442-43, 176 N.E.2d 761, 765-66 (1961). See generally 4 C. WIoHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 4, §1065, at 211. At least one commentator has noted the artificiality
of territorial limitations on state courts:
People in this country, whether acting as individuals or as members of a group,
pay little attention to state boundaries. Moreover, when companies and individuals
engage in business activities, state lines are of almost no moment, since these entities
often distribute their products in many, if not all, states. . . .Because state lines
are of such little importance to the activities of the people in this country, reliance
on the territorial boundaries of states as a basic limit on the states' authority to
exercise judicial jurisdiction is destructive of relevant interests.
McDougal, supra note 73, at 8.
For a survey of the development of post-Pennoyer jurisdiction, see Kurland, The Supreme
Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts From Pen-
noyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958).
84. Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 917.
85. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
86. Id. at 357.
87. Compare Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). See supra notes 3 and 75. Hess
was preceded by Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916), wherein the Supreme Court upheld,
as not violative of due process rights, a New Jersey statute which required, prior to a nonresi-
dent's use of the state highways, the filing of an instrument actually appointing a New Jersey
agent for service of process in actions arising from such use. Id. at 169.
Hess did not expressly overrule the earlier case of Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919),
wherein the Supreme Court ruled that a state had no power to exclude a nonresident individual
from the state and, thus, could not claim that the individual had impliedly consented to suit
by doing business within the state. Id. at 293. Flexner involved a suit brought in Kentucky
against an out-of-state partnership doing business in Kentucky. Flexner, however, now is con-
sidered to have been overruled by implication. Nelson v. Miller, 11 111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d
673 (1957). See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, §1065, at 214, n.57.
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Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; and, even when skillfully
and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to
persons and property. In the public interest the State may make and
enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part
of all, residents and nonresidents alike, who use its highways. The
measure in question operates to require a nonresident to answer for
his conduct in the State where arise causes of action alleged against
him, as well as to provide for a claimant a convenient method by
which he may sue to enforce his rights.88
The Court concluded that a state could exclude nonresidents from
the use of its highways and thus could require, as a condition of
nonexclusion, the consent of the driver to service of process in related
suits.8 9
Another small jurisdictional excursion beyond the "presence" doc-
trine was made in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,9" a case
in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a state court asser-
tion of jurisdiction over a nonpresent individual who was doing
business in the state through agents.9 1 An implied consent theory again
was utilized, the court justifying its decision on grounds similar to
Hess: the defendant's agents were selling securities, a function sub-
ject to "special regulation" in the forum state.92 The Court reasoned,
therefore, that the state could require consent to a related suit as
a condition of carrying on this business.93
Despite these cases, in which traditional bases of personal jurisdic-
tion were exceeded slightly in light of the particular interests of the
forum states in regulating certain types of individual activities within
their states, 94 the Pennoyer doctrine could have continued as the
guiding principle of state court jurisdiction if jurisdiction over foreign
corporations had not caused conceptual difficulties for state courts. 95
88. 274 U.S. at 356.
89. Id. at 357. The statute upheld in Hess is really an early example of a very limited
long-arm statute. See infra notes 119 to 126 and accompanying text.
90. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
91. Id. at 628. The Court noted: "Doherty voluntarily established an office in Iowa and
there carried on business. Considering this fact and accepting the construction given to § 11079,
we think to apply it as here proposed will not deprive him of any right guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution." Id.
92. Id. at 627-28. The Court noted, "Iowa treats the business of dealing in corporate
securities as exceptional and subjects it to special regulation." Id.
93. Id. at 628. The Court noted, "The power of the States to impose terms upon non-
residents, as to activities within their borders, recently has been much discussed". Id.
94. The Supreme Court decision in Hess led to state legislative enactment of implied con-
sent statutes in regard to other "dangerous" activities such as the operation of aircraft, see,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §48.19 (West Supp. 1983); 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1410 (Purdon
1963) and the operation of watercraft. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §48.19 (West Supp. 1983).
95. As late as 1917, the Supreme Court still stuck firmly to the physical power concept
of personal jurisdiction. In McDonald v. Mabee, the Court noted:
The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although in civilized times it is
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By the early 1940's, many corporations were doing substantial business
in states other than those in which they had been incorporated, and
the question of state court personal jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions became very important. 6
Satisfaction of the need to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations was not accompanied by sound doctrine. The presence
formulation, which had worked so well for individual defendants, was
difficult to apply to corporations. According to the United States
Supreme Court and other learned authorities, a corporation was a
creature of the law and had no legal existence outside the state whose
law had created the corporation.9" Even though a corporation might
be wreaking havoc in a particular state, therefore, the corporation
could not be served with process because it did not exist in that state.
The implied consent theory, which had been so satisfactory in regard
to individuals who were engaging in state-regulated acts within a state,99
also was not satisfying conceptually as a doctrine on which to base
personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Implied consent, as
a basis for personal jurisdiction in Hess and in Henry L. Doherty,
had been grounded on the authority of a state to bar an individual
who would not consent to suit.99 In some quarters, however, the in-
not necessary to maintain that power throughout proceedings properly begun, and
although submission to the jurisdiction by appearance may take the place of service
upon the person. . . .No doubt there may be some extension of the means of acquir-
ing jurisdiction beyond service or appearance, but the foundation should be borne
in mind.
243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
96. As noted by Judge Clark:
In the late. nineteenth century, and continuing on into our own, increased use of
the corporate form, together with the greater mobility afforded by modern means
of transportation, brought about an expansion of corporate activity to a nationwide
scale; corporations simply refused to remain penned up within their own states of
incorporation. The existence of corporations which could-and did-do business on
a nationwide scale necessitated revision of older, more limited, notions concerning
jurisdiction.
Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963).
97. Louisville C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844); Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (dictum). See Young, The Nationality of a Juristic
Person, 22 HArv. L. Rav. 1 (1908). In Bank of Augusta v. Earle, Chief Justice Taney stated:
[A] corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty
by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the
law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corpora-
tion can have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot
migrate to another sovereignty.
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
For discussion of the history of doctrinal changes in the treatment of assertion of personal
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, see Farrier, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 17
MINN. L. REv. 270 (1933); Kurland, supra note 83, at 577-86.
98. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 89 and 93 and accompanying text.
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terstate commerce clause of the Constitution' 0 was interpreted as not
permitting a state to interfere in interstate commerce by excluding
corporations from operating in the state."°' Without the power to ex-
clude, from whence would a state court obtain the authority to imply
consent to suit?' 2 Moreover, the implied consent doctrine led to
anomalous results: foreign corporations that had not followed state
statutory requirements in consenting to suit in the state were often
in a better position than those complying with the law. Those cor-
porations expressly consenting, for example, were held liable to suits
on matters unrelated to their in-state activities while those impliedly
consenting by mere transaction of business in the state were held liable
only on claims arising out of that particular business. '
State courts did assert personal jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions, however, despite the difficulty in rationalizing such assertions
of authority.' 4 Regardless of whether a state court claimed to be
employing a presence analysis or whether the court claimed to be using
an implied consent theory, the measuring standard of "doing
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
101. A corporation was not a citizen for purposes of enjoying the protection of the privileges
and immunities clause of the constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2. See Blake v. McClung,
172 U.S. 239 (1898); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). In order to avoid violation
of the privileges and immunities clause in cases like Hess and Henry L. Doherty, the Supreme
Court had to find that the particular activity in which the defendant was engaging was subject
to special state regulation; the state could restrict its own citizens and, therefore, could also
restrict noncitizens.
The Supreme Court early held that reasonable restrictions could be imposed on corpora-
tions engaged in interstate commerce. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404
(1855). Subsequently, however, the Court determined that the interstate commerce clause gave
corporations a right to do interstate business and that a state constitutionally could not exclude
a foreign corporation from engaging in interstate commerce within its territory. International
Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
102. As noted by Professor Kurland: "It would seem to follow that if the state's power
to exact consent to be sued depended on its power to exclude, and it could not exclude, it
could not exact such consent." Kurland, supra note 83, at 581 (footnote omitted).
103. See Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)
(Hand, J.); I J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWs 377 n.2 (1935).
104. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882) (implied consent); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855) (implied consent); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579 (1914) (presence). In St. Clair, Justice Field stated:
The State may. . .impose as a condition upon which a foreign corporation shall
be permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall stipulate that in any litiga-
tion arising out of its transactions in the State, it will accept as sufficient the service
of process on its agents or persons specially designated; and the condition would
be eminently fit and just and such condition and stipulation may be implied as well
as expressed.
106 U.S. at 356 (footnotes omitted).
In regard to the consent doctrine, Professor Kurland noted that even after the Supreme
Court had ruled expressly that a state constitutionally could not exclude a foreign corporation
from engaging in interstate commerce within its boundaries, "the Court continued to hold that
foreign corporations were subject to the jurisdiction of state courts, even if the business they
carried on within the state was interstate commerce." Kurland, supra note 83, at 581.
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business," was the same: 0 Was the defendant foreign corporation
"doing sufficient business" in the jurisdiction to be "present" there?
Was the defendant foreign corporation "doing sufficient business"
in the jurisdiction to be deemed to have consented impliedly to suit?
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 06 the Supreme Court
devised a jurisdictional theory for foreign corporations that ignored
both legal fictions,' 1 presence and implied consent, and focused in-
stead on the defendant's contacts with the forum state. The Inter-
national Shoe case, which involved a foreign corporation whose agents
solicited orders in the forum state, was the first Supreme Court at-
tempt to establish a test by which a court might determine whether
a defendant's due process rights were being violated by the particular
assertion of personal jurisdiction.'08 The Court stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."' 0 9
The opinion by the Court in International Shoe, moreover,
demonstrated a substantial shift in focus from its opinion in Pen-
noyer, a shift from emphasis on the states as independent sovereigns"I0
to a recognition of the states as bound together, by the Constitution,
into a federal system. The Court said:
[The] demands [of due process] may be met by such contacts.. .with
the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend
the particular suit which is brought there."'
Thus, International Shoe established two criteria that must be satisfied
105. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855) (consent to suit by "doing
business"); Philadelphia & R. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917) (present in state because
"doing business"). See Kurland, supra note 83, at 584; Rothschild, Jurisdiction of Foreign
Corporations in Personam, 17 VA. L. REv. 129 (1930).
106. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
107. As stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in 1912, "The Constitution is not to be satisfied
with a fiction." Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 390 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
108. See, e.g., Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at 1341; Note, World-Wide Volkswagen,
supra note 2, at 788-89.
109. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
110. See Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at 1341. As noted by the commentator:
Under the regime of Pennoyer v. Neff, federalism played a key role in the due
process limits on state in personam jurisdiction. This federalism was tied directly
to rigid concepts of physical power and state sovereignty. Because each state's sovereign
power existed only within its own territory, a state court could not exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant absent his "presence" within the state, his domicile
there, or his express or implied consent.
Id. at 1343 (footnotes omitted).
111. 326 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added).
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in order for the forum state to assert jurisdiction over a defendant:
the exercise must be consistent with fundamental fairness to the
defendant" 12 and must be "consistent with the values of federalism
embodied in the due process clause.""' 3 Unfortunately, because the
facts of International Shoe provided an easy case for assertion of
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court never really applied the test it had
developed to the facts at hand. While noting that this kind of analysis
might require "[a]n 'estimate of the inconveniences'"" between the
defendant and other interests, the Court did not demonstrate this pro-
cess for the state courts. The task of giving content to "contacts",
or determining which "contacts" would be sufficient to be
"minimum," was left to the state courts.'' 5
State courts responded with zeal to this expanded scope of per-
sonal jurisdiction.1 6 International Shoe was read broadly' 17 to apply
to individual as well as to corporate defendants." ' State legislatures
112. Professor von Mehren describes the historical development of personal jurisdiction
doctrine as a gradual transition from a "power" theory to a "fairness" theory, von Mehren,
supra note 60, at 300-07.
113. Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at 1344 (citing Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530
F.2d 1123, 1132, 1140 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring)); Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,
78 CoLurMi. L. REv. 1587, 1589 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §24 com-
ment b (1971).
The commentator goes on to point out that "[tihe Supreme Court's emphasis on the extent
of the forum State's interest [in McGee, see infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text] clearly
suggests that principles of federalism beyond basic notions of territoriality underlie the due
process clause." Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at 1346. See also supra note 110.
114. 326 U.S. at 325 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir.
1930)).
115. It might be argued that subsequent to the establishment, in International Shoe, of
the "minimum contacts" test, courts could continue to preserve the traditional bases of
jurisdiction-presence, consent, and domicile-as separate and distinct from the International
Shoe analysis. In other words, a court need not engage in a "minimum contacts" analysis
if it could base assertion of jurisdiction on one of these grounds. To this writer, the "minimum
contacts" test, as currently defined, see infra notes 145-55 and accompanying text, should apply
to all state court assertions of personal jurisdiction, with presence, domicile and consent being
merely factors, albeit very substantial factors, which weight in the balancing process. In that
way, a defendant whose presence is quite transitory might not be subject to personal jurisdic-
tion if sufficient factors weighed against such assertion of jurisdiction.
116. See supra state court cases cited at note 1. As one commentator observed:
By 1975, state long arm jurisdiction. . .had enjoyed three decades of unimpeded
growth towards, and arguably sometimes beyond, the limits of due process. Further-
more, this inexorable growth process was one the states inherently favored and were,
therefore, unlikely to stunt voluntarily.
Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 407, 409 (1980)
(footnotes omitted).
117. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, §1067, at 234. See Bomze v. Nardis Sports-
wear, Inc., 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948); Lasky v. Norfolk & N. Ry., 157 F.2d 674 (6th Cir.
1946); Dees v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 71 F. Supp. 387 (D. Mo. 1947); Winkler-Koch
Eng'g Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 70 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); American Cities Power
& Light Corp. v. Williams, 74 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1947).
118. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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drafted long-arm statutes ' 9 authorizing their courts to exercise, to
a greater'20 or lesser extent,' 2 ' this new expanded power authorized
by the Supreme Court as not violating the fourteenth amendment rights
of defendants.' 2 2 Assertions of personal jurisdiction over nonpresent,
nondomiciliary, nonconsenting defendants were based (1) on substantial
119. See supra note 3. For further discussion of long-arm statutes, see Brilmayer, Howi
Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV.
77; Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH.
L. REv. 227 (1967); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdic-
tion in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 633; Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-A nn Statute:
Today and Tomorrow, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 61 (1965); Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction; Arti-
cle 2031B, the Texas "Long Arm" Jurisdiction Statute; and the Appearance To Challenge
Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEx. L. REv. 279 (1964); Note, Nonresident Jurisdic-
tion and the New England Experience, 48 B.U.L. REV. 372 (1968); Developments in the Law,
supra note 2, at 1002-06, 1015-17; Note, A Reconsideration of "Long Arm" Jurisdiction, 37
IND. L.J. 333 (1962); Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers
in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1965). As noted by one commentator:
"Long-arm jurisdiction can be, and has been, made to serve the ends of judicial economy
and to promote the goal of fairness and convenience in selecting a place of trial." Foster,
Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 9, 10.
120. Some states, such as California and Rhode Island, empowered their courts to exercise
all personal jurisdiction authority not inconsistent with the due process clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution. See supra note 3. Where such a long-arm statute is in effect, the established analysis
of a personal jurisdiction question-(1) has the state authorized its court to assert jurisdiction
over this defendant (statutory interpretation) and (2) if so, would such assertion of jurisdiction
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see Gray V. American Radiator
and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d 432, 435, 176 N.E.2d 761, 767 (1961)-becomes telescoped
into a single determination-would assertion of jurisdiction over this defendant violate due
process? Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 90 n.4 (1978); Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576
F.2d 779, 782, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978); In re Northern District of California "Dalkon
Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887, 904 n.62 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
Other states, in their long-arm statutes, describe those circumstances in which their courts
would be authorized to assert jurisdiction over nonpresent, nonconsenting, nondomiciliary defen-
dants. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. Civ. P. §4(e)(2) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §48.193(l)(f) (West Supp.
1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §17(l)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW
§302(a) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980-81); OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, §1701.03(a)(4) (1961); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §4.28.185 (Supp. 1981). See also supra note 3.
121. Some states have drafted long-arm statutes which restrict the scope of court jurisdic-
tion more narrowly than the limitations of fourteenth amendment due process. See, e.g., N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAW §302(a) (describing circumstances in which jurisdiction may be exercised and
specifically excluding defamation actions from the scope of long-arm authority). See also note
3 supra.
122. Other constitutional provisions besides the fourteenth amendment also may restrict
the authority of a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant. As noted
earlier, the commerce clause may limit the reach of long-arm statutes in some commercial con-
texts. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. A similar restriction might be implied
from the first amendment in regard to the activities of newspapers and other media in order
to avoid "chilling" multistate dissemination of information. See New York Times Co. v. Con-
ner, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966) ("First Amendment considerations surrounding the law
of libel require a greater showing of contact to satisfy the due process clause than is necessary
in asserting jurisdiction of other types of tortious activity"). See also Buckley v. New York
Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967); Buckley v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470,
475 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see Church of
Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1978); Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552
F.2d 316, 324 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino,
383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967).
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction
and - continuous activity in the state with the claim related 23 or
unrelated 24 to that activity, (2) on isolated acts in the state with the
claim related to the in-state conduct,'2 and (3) on acts committed
outside the state which had consequences within the state. 26
In 1957, in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 127 the
Supreme Court again addressed the question of state court personal
jurisdiction. The Court determined that the fourteenth amendment
due process clause was not violated when a California court asserted
jurisdiction over a Texas corporation that had no agents or offices
in the state and whose only contacts with the state involved an offer
to the petitioner, a California domiciliary, to assume a formerly issued
insurance policy and the receipt by it of petitioner's insurance
premiums. The Court noted:
[A] trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope
of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other non-residents.
In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our
national economy over the years ...
[W]e think it apparent that the Due Process Clause did not
preclude the California court from entering a judgment binding on
Respondent. It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit
was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that
State. . . .The contract was delivered in California, the premiums
were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of that State
when he died. It cannot be denied that California has a manifest
interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when
their insurers refuse to pay claims.28
A year later, in Hanson v. Denckla, 129 the Court seemed to retreat
from the position that due process and, therefore, minimum contacts
only required that the transaction have a "substantial connection"
with the state. 3 ' The Court invalidated a Florida state court asser-
123. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966); Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962); Pavlovscak v. Lewis, 274 F.2d 523,
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 990 (1960); Ard v. State Stove Mfrs., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 699 (D.S.C.
1967); Ostow & Jacobs, Inc. v. Morgan-Jones, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
124. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Green v.
Compagnia De Navigacion Isabella, Ltd., 26 F.R.D. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
125. See, e.g., Elkhart Eng'g Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965); In-
gravallo v. Pool Shipping Co., 247 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
126. See, e.g., Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966)
(only contact with forum state was injury caused by defendant's product in the state); Gray
v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (same).
127. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
128. Id. at 222-23.
129. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
130. McGee had been interpreted as defining due process requirements as rather easily
satisfied, with one commentator stating: "It is at least arguable that as a result of McGee
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tion of personal jurisdiction over a Delaware corporate trustee in regard
to trust property located outside Florida. The inter vivos trust in ques-
tion had been created before the decedent had moved to Florida. After
her move, she had purported to exercise a power of appointment as
to the remainder in the trust and the Trustee had remitted trust in-
come to her in Florida. The Trustee had no other contacts with the
State of Florida. The court stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with
a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact
with the forum State. . . .It is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus in-
voking the benefits and protections of its laws.' 3'
Under this standard, jurisdiction would still have been sustained in
McGee; the defendant insurer had solicited the reinsurance contract
in California. Hanson made it clear, however, that language in McGee
in regard to "substantial connection" with the forum state was mere
dictum.'32 The Court also recognized the continued significance of
some territorial limits on assertions of personal jurisdiction, stating
that "restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. . . .are
more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litiga-
tion [; t]hey are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power
of the respective states. '
The next occasion on which the Supreme Court spoke on the ques-
tion of personal jurisdiction under the International Shoe standard134
was in the case of Kulko v. Superior Court. ' 35 Kulko involved a sup-
there is now almost no constitutional limitation on a state court's assertion of jurisdiction."
Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota over Absent Defendants, 42 MINN. L. REv. 909, 922
(1958).
As in McGee, the Hanson Court noted the effects of 20th Century technology on theories
of personal jurisdiction:
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the
need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same
time, progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit
in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements
for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pen-
noyer v. Neff. . . to the flexible standard of International Shoe ...
357 U.S. at 250-51 (citations omitted). The Court continued, "But it is a mistake to assume
that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts." Id. at 251.
131. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 252-54.
133. Id. at 251.
134. The case of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), was decided before Kulko. That
case, however, dealt with the question of whether a minimum contacts analysis should be extended
to certain assertions of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and is beyond the scope of this article.
135. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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port action brought by a California resident against her former spouse,
a New York resident. The California Court had purported to assert
jurisdiction over the defendant on the ground that he had permitted
his daughter to move to California and had purchased a one-way ticket
to California for his daughter, therebyr engaging in a "purposeful act"
which had an effect in California and by which he had availed himself
of the benefits of the state and had derived economic benefits in that
he no longer had to pay for his daughter's support during the bulk
of the year.' 36 The Supreme Court reversed, noting that "[w]hile the
interest of the forum State and of the plaintiff in proceeding with
the cause in the plaintiff's forum of choice are, of course, to be con-
sidered. . .an essential criterion in all cases is whether the 'quality
and nature' of the defendant's activity is such that it is 'reasonable'
and 'fair' to require him to conduct his defense in that State."' 37
Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that the defendant had
purposefully availed himself of the benefits of California:
We cannot accept the proposition that appellant's acquiescence in
[his daughter's] desire to live with her mother conferred jurisdiction
over appellant in the California courts in this action. A father who
agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his children's
preferences, to allow them to spend more time in California than
was required under a separation agreement can hardly be said to
have "purposefully availed himself" of the "benefits and protec-
tions" of California's laws.' 38
This statement does not clearly establish that the Court found the
defendant's actions with regard to California not to be "purposeful."
The Court did reject any argument that the defendant had benefitted
from his daughter's residence in California'39 and seemed to conclude
that for due process to be satisfied, the defendant's contact with
California would have to be for the purpose of deriving benefits for
himself. 4
Kulko probably is not very important in terms of its applicability
to other cases; the case involved very attenuated contacts and a very
136. Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 524-25, 564 P.2d 353, 358, 138 Cal. Rptr.
586, 591 (1977) (en banc). Three years after the daughter moved to California, the son followed
suit, but without the father's permission. Thus, while the support and custody suit involved
both children, jurisdiction was based only on the defendant's affirmative acts with respect to
his daughter. Id.
137. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 94-97. The Court concluded that "any diminution in [defendant's] household
costs resulted, not from the child's presence in California, but rather from her absence from
[defendant's] house." Id. at 95.
140. Id. at 94 n.7.
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unsympathetic circumstance for the plaintiff.' 4' The significance of
Kulko is twofold: (1) the Supreme Court emphasized concern for
fairness to the defendant,' 2 in light of increasing emphasis by state
courts on the interests of the plaintiff, the forum state, the judicial
system, and even society in general,'4 3 and (2) the Supreme Court
recognized that in the "determination of 'reasonableness', the
'minimum contacts' test of International Shoe. . ., the facts of each
case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite 'affiliating
circumstances' are present.""'
Although the Court in Kulko emphasized a case-by-case analysis,
in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,"" the most recent determina-
tion of personal jurisdiction of state courts, the Court seemed to
establish a new, two-step test for the determination of these cases,
a test consistent with its stated emphasis on the interests of the
defendant.' 46 The plaintiffs in World-Wide had been injured seriously
when their Audi automobile was struck from behind and burst into
flames. The accident occurred in Oklahoma, while the plaintiffs, former
New York residents, were traveling to their new home in Arizona.
The plaintiffs brought suit in Oklahoma, claiming that their injuries
had resulted from a defect in the gas tank, and sought to join as
defendants the local New York dealer that had sold the automobile
to them, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., and the regional distributor of
Audi for New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. Seaway and World-Wide resisted on the ground
that the Oklahoma court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because
they lacked sufficient contacts with the state of Oklahoma to satisfy
the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.' 7
141. A case like Kulko should be distinguished from cases like Gray v. American Radiator
and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), in which the defendant's
out of state conduct resulted in a tortious injury in the state. Moreover, the Court in Kulko
recognized the sensitivity of any issue involving family relations and expressed its reluctance
to make any determination which would "impose an unreasonable burden on family relations.
• . ." 436 U.S. at 98. Finally, the Court found the position of the plaintiff-appellee to be
particularly unsympathetic:
[Ain action by [the mother] to increase support payments could now be brought,
and could have been brought when [the daughter] first moved to California, in the
State of New York. . . . Any ultimate financial advantage to [the father] thus results
not from the child's presence in California, but from [the mother's] failure earlier
to seek an increase in payments under the separation agreement ...
Id. at 95 (footnote omitted).
142. Id. at 92.
143. See infra notes 155 and 182.
144. 436 U.S. at 92.
145. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
146. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92.
147. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 286-87.
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The Supreme Court agreed, pointing out that it perceived the
minimum contacts test as serving "two related, but distinguishable
functions, [protecting]... the defendant against the burdens of litigating
in a distant or inconvenient forum [a]nd [acting] to ensure that the
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits im-
posed on them by their status as co-equal sovereigns in a federal
system."' 4 To achieve this goal, the Court seemed to devise a two-
step inquiry for due process cases: (1) Did the defendant have any
purposeful contacts ("affiliating circumstances") with the forum
state?' 9 (2) If so, were these contacts sufficient to be "minimum"? 15 °
The Court answered the first or threshold question in the negative,
finding that the defendants had, in no way, affiliated themselves with
the state of Oklahoma. 5' The second step of the analysis, therefore,
was never reached and how the Court would handle that balancing
test remains unclear: Would it balance all factors including the in-
terests of the plaintiff, the forum state, the judicial system and society,
as well as the interests of the defendant,'52 or would it merely cumulate
those factors affecting the defendant?'1 3
148. Id. at 291-92. This statement would seem to indicate that the Court considered
federalism as part of its due process analysis. See supra note 73. But see infra note 175 and
accompanying text.
149. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295. The Court has not expressed its holding in exactly
this manner; the Court found no contacts between the defendant and the forum. See infra
note 150 and accompanying text. The opinion, however, implies that the finding of some "af-
filiating circumstance" automatically would not subject the defendant to the personal jurisdic-
tion of the court. At that point at least the quality of that contact would be analyzed to deter-
mine whether "minimum contacts" were satisfied. See also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320
(1980). In Rush, the companion case to World-Wide, the Court applied a similar analysis to
a quasi-in-rem case in which the res attached at the outset of the suit was the defendant's
liability insurer's obligation to "defend and indemnify" the defendant on claims arising from
automobile accidents. The defendant had no contacts with the forum state, Minnesota, but
the defendant's liability insurer was doing business there, and thus, arguably, the "res" was
located in Minnesota. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1966). The Court denied jurisdiction, noting that "minimum contacts" referred to the con-
tacts between the defendant and the forum and not merely the res and the forum. Again,
the answer to the threshold question was "no," and, thus, what the Court would have done
had the answer been "yes" remains unclear.
150. Although the Court never reached this step in World-Wide or Rush, see supra note
149, in both cases the Court engaged in some discussion of the various interests involved, thus
implying that the second step would be pursued if necessary. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at
292; Rush, 444 U.S. at 329-33.
151. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295.
152. See infra notes 155 and 182.
153. Since the Court expressed c6ncern in Kulko, see supra notes 137-42 and accompany-
ing text, and in World-Wide, see supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text, that due process
requires "fairness" to the defendant, this latter analysis would seem more appropriate. The
Court stated:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced
to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
After World-Wide, for an individual or corporation to so cir-
cumscribe its activities as to avoid being "haled into court" in remote
jurisdictions seemed possible.'54 The Court, moreover, again was taking
some interest in the sovereign rights of the states within the federal
system and seemed to be narrowing the scope of state court asser-
tions of personal jurisdiction.'55
A recent Supreme Court decision, Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd.
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,'56 seems to reflect another shift
in emphasis by the Court, although the case probably leaves intact
the basic state court jurisdictional test that has evolved from Pen-
noyer. This case, unlike all of its predecessors in minimum contacts
of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render
a valid judgment.
444 U.S. at 294.
To this writer, however, no real difference exists between the two sorts of analyses because
the question becomes merely how one characterizes factors. Under the first analysis, one might
argue that the plaintiff is an indigent individual with a substantial interest in proceeding to
judgment in his home forum. Under the second analysis, this factor could be considered, but
would be characterized as a defendant-interest: the defendant is a large corporation that would
not be inconvenienced substantially by defending in the plaintiff's home forum.
154. The expression "haled into court" seems to have derived from the majority and a
dissenting opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The majority stated, "[M]oreover,
appellants had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware court." Id. at 216. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated, "Admittedly, when one consents to suit in a forum,
his expectation is enhanced that he may be haled into that State's courts." Id. at 227 n.6.
In World-Wide the Court used the phrase "haled into court" in reference to the type of
foreseeability necessary for a finding of minimum contacts:
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood
that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defen-
dant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.
444 U.S. at 297.
155. After the World-Wide decision, one commentator maintained:
The Supreme Court's four most recent cases on . . . jurisdiction . . . have created
a new analytical structure for the determination of jurisdictional issues. This new
analysis places more emphasis on state sovereignty than on considerations of fairness
and convenience. In so doing, it subordinates the most progressive theory of the
post-International Shoe jurisdictional era, that of "interstate venue" or "center-of-
gravity," to considerations of state sovereignty. The "interstate venue" theory look-
ed to a complex of factors such as convenience to the plaintiff and defendant, the
interest of the forum, the location of witnesses, and the choice of substantive law.
The present Court looks to a much narrower question: the quantity and quality of
the relations of the particular defendant with the forum state.
Kamp, supra note 2, at 29. But see infra notes 156-82 and accompanying text. From Pennoyer
through International Shoe to McGee and back through Hanson and Kulko to World-Wide
it seems that state court jurisdiction began as quite restricted (Pennoyer), broader considerably
(McGee), and has now narrowed again (World-Wide). The scope of personal jurisdiction under
current theory, however, is much broader than that under Pennoyer and seems to be stabiliz-
ing. But see notes 156-82 and accompanying text infra. While the application and interpreta-
tion of the due process standards must necessarily be on a case-by-case basis, as recognized
by the Supreme Court in Kulko, see supra note 144 and accompanying text, the standards
themselves are by now well established.
156. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). See Third Circuit Review-Federal Courts and Procedures, 27
VILL. L. RPv. 744 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Third Circuit Review].
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analysis, involved not a state court attempting to assert personal
jurisdiction over a nonpresent, nonconsenting defendant, but rather
a federal district court, sitting in diversity, purporting to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over certain alien corporate defendants.' 57 The facts
of the case, moreover, as well as its procedural posture, exclude it
from the mainstream of the Pennoyer - International Shoe line of cases.
Insurance Corp. of Ireland involved a suit instituted in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania by a
Delaware Corporation having its principal place of business in the
Republic of Guinea, Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, against
twenty-one alien insurance companies, the "Excess Insurers," to
recover on a business-interruption insurance policy. In their answer,
some of the defendant companies challenged the personal jurisdic-
tion of the federal court and subsequently moved for summary judg-
ment on this ground. 58 Using discovery procedures authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff sought to discover facts
that would demonstrate sufficient connections between the defendants
and the state of Pennsylvania to establish the defendants' amenability
to suit there.' 59 For more than two and -one-half years, the defen-
dants resisted discovery, failing to provide requested information, to
comply with judicial discovery orders, and to object to such requests
and orders. 6" At that point, the District Court sanctioned the defen-
dants, pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which provides that "if a party fails to obey [a discovery]
order.... the court ... may... order that the matters regarding which
the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to
be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the
claim of the party obtaining the order. . ". -,I, The sanction impos-
157. The propriety of applying fourteenth amendment due process standards in a federal
court case arising under the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, see supra note 18, will
be discussed below. See infra notes 376-492 and accompanying text.
158. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 698. The complaint was actually in two counts,
one count against Insurance Company of North America, which had provided the first 10 million
dollars of insurance coverage on the 20 million dollar business interruption policy obtained
by the plaintiff, and the other count against the 21 alien insurance companies, the "excess
insurers," which had provided the remaining or "excess" 10 million dollars of insurance coverage.
Id. at 696. Insurance Company of North America, as well as four of the 21 "excess insurers,"
did not challenge the court's personal jurisdiction. Id. at 696, 697 n.3. Moreover, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as to
three other "excess insurers." Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.
651 F.2d 877, 886 (1981). Thus, only fourteen of the "excess insurers" were involved in the
matter before the Supreme Court.
159. For a discussion of the propriety of requiring satisfaction of state amenability stan-
dards when a federal court sits in diversity, see infra notes 483-92 and accompanying text.
160. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 698-99.
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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ed was a finding that "for the purpose of this litigation the Excess
Insurers are subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this Court due
to their business contacts with Pennsylvania." ' 62 In effect, as a sanc-
tion for the defendants' failures to comply with the discovery order
of the court, the court took as established facts that would be necessary
to support a constitutionally permissible exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendants.
While the District Court also found two bases of personal jurisdic-
tion independent of the Rule 37 sanction, in its affirmance the Court
of Appeals'63 relied entirely on the sanction. The appellate court held
that the discovery orders were not an abuse of discretion by the district
court, that imposition of the sanction came within the discretion of
the district court under Rule 37(b), and that the imposed sanction
had not violated the defendants' due process rights. 6 The defendants
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that their due
process rights had been violated because a court that did not have
personal jurisdiction over them would have neither the power to re-
quire compliance with discovery orders nor the authority to impose
Rule 37 sanctions.165
The Supreme Court affirmed the assertion of personal jurisdiction,
pointing out that while the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts
is limited by article III of the Constitution and those limitations can-
not be waived by the parties, "It]he requirement that a court have
personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. III, but from the Due Pro-
cess Clause." ' 6 The Court continued:
The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an in-
dividual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power
not as a matter sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.
... Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first
of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.... 6 7
Finally, the Court concluded:
[T]he requirement of personal jurisdiction may be intentionally
waived, or for various reasons a defendant may be estopped from
raising the issue. These characteristics portray it for what it is-a
legal right protecting the individual. . . . The expression of legal
162. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 699 (citing the Joint Appendix of the parties to
the litigation).
163. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3d
Cir. 1981).
164. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 700.
165. Id. at 701.
166. Id. at 702.
167. Id. at 702-03 (footnote omitted).
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rights is often subject to certain procedural rules: The failure to
follow those rules may well result in curtailment of the rights. Thus,
the failure to enter a timely objection to personal jurisdiction con-
stitutes, under Rule 12(h)(1), a waiver of objection. A sanction under
Rule 37(b)(2)(A) consisting of a finding of personal jurisdiction has
precisely the same effect. As a general proposition, the Rule 37 sanc-
tion applied to a finding of personal jurisdiction creates no more
of a due process problem than the Rule 12 waiver .... ,68
The Court noted the International Shoe test for assertions of per-
sonal jurisdiction that do not violate due process169 and compared
the Rule 37(b)(2)(A) procedure followed by the District Court with
a standard established in another fourteenth amendment case' 71 "for
the Due Process limits on such rules."' 7 ' Finally, the Court concluded
that the Due Process Clause' 72 had not been violated.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell observed that the opin-
ion for the Court did not require minimum contacts as a prerequisite
to imposition of Rule 37 sanctions and thus might be read as reject-
ing minimum contacts as a constitutional requirement for assertion
of personal jurisdiction.' 73 Moreover, he argued:
168. Id. at 704-05.
169. Id. at 702-03. o
170. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
171. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 705.
172. While Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, carefully distinguished between the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, id. at 712-13, see infra note 482 and accompanying text, Justice White, in his opinion
for the Court, seemed deliberately to avoid any discussion of the standard to be applied to
exercises of personal jurisdiction by federal courts sitting in diversity cases-fourteenth amend-
ment or fifth amendment-by referring, throughout the opinion, to "the Due Process Clause."
Apparently, however, his reliance on cases interpreting the fourteenth amendment, see supra
text at notes 169-71, indicates that he felt a fourteenth amendment standard, a standard established
in cases involving state court interference with individual rights, should apply. For further discus-
sion of this issue, see infra notes 480-82 and accompanying text.
173. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 713. At least one commentator put a similar inter-
pretation on the Court of Appeals opinion:
The stark logic of Judge Aldisert's holding establishes the rule that in personam jurisdic-
tion may be predicted on noncompliance with a discovery order directed to that issue.
No showing of minimum contacts is required. The power of the district court rests
solely in the initial authority to inquire into jurisdiction and authority under the federal
rules to police the discovery process.
Third Circuit Review, supra note 156, at 759 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
Subsequently, Justice Powell noted that the opinion of the Court could be given an alter-
native reading, "not as affecting state jurisdiction, but simply as asserting that Rule 37 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represents a congressionally approved basis for the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction by a federal district court." Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at
714. Justice Powell went on to reject such a construction of Rule 37, basing his concurrence
instead on the "narrow basis" that the plaintiff had based his assertion of personal jurisdiction
on the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, id. at 710, that "in the absence of a federal rule or
statute establishing a federal basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction, the personal jurisdic-
tion of the district courts is determined in diversity cases by the law of the forum state,"
id. at 711 (citations omitted), see infra notes 376-476 and accompanying text, and that the
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By eschewing reliance on the concept of minimum contacts as a
"sovereign" limitation on the power of States-for, again, it is the
State's long-arm statute that is invoked to obtain personal jurisdic-
tion in the District Court-the Court today effects a potentially
substantial change of law. For the first time it defines personal
jurisdiction solely by reference to abstract notions of fair play.' 74
Justice White, in his opinion for the Court, countered in a footnote:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdic-
tion, as applied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism
and the character of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other States ...
Contrary to the suggestion of Justice Powell, . . . our holding today
does not alter the requirement that there be "minimum contacts"
between the nonresident defendant and the forum state. Rather, our
holding deals with how the facts needed to show those "minimum
contacts" can be established when a defendant fails to comply with
court-ordered discovery. The restriction on state sovereign power
described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen
as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved
by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no men-
tion of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept
operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of
the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdic-
tion requirement. Individual actions cannot change the powers of
sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers
from which he may otherwise be protected.'"
This author does not agree with Justice Powell's suggestion that
plaintiff had made a prima facie showing that the defendants had sufficient contacts with the
State of Pennsylvania to satisfy the "minimum contacts" requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 716. Justice Powell concluded:
Where the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of minimum contacts, I have
little difficulty in holding that its showing was sufficient to warrant the District Court's
entry of discovery orders. And where a defendant then fails to comply with those
orders. I agree that the prima facie showing may be held adequate to sustain the
court's finding that minimum contact exist, either under Rule 37 or under a theory
of "presumption" or "waiver."
Id.
174. Id. at 714.
175. 456 U.S. 702 n.10. At least one commentator, relying on prior Supreme Court opin-
ions, would interpret this as a reversal of prior theory:
In one sense, basic territorial restrictions underlie the minimum contacts doctrine.
Suit in a neighboring state with which a defendant has had no contact at all will
often be more convenient and less unfair for him than suit in a distant corner of
his own state, yet the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment would forbid
it. Furthermore, the identically worded due process clause of the fifth amendment
has been construed to permit legislation providing for the nationwide competence
of federal suits, a clear indication that where sister states are involved, fairness to
the defendant is not the sole criterion of due process.
Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at 1344.
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the Court has rejected minimum contacts as a prerequisite to con-
stitutional assertions of state court personal jurisdiction. First, in the
course of its due process analysis, the Court cites International Shoe,
albeit for the proposition that due process requires that "the
maintenance of the suit . . . not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."' 76 This, however, does not mean that
the Court has rejected minimum contacts as the manner of determin-
ing whether fair play and substantial justice have been offended.
Second, the majority opinion can be read fairly as merely prescribing
that in some circumstances, facts necessary to establish minimum con-
tacts can be presumed as a Rule 37 sanction. 1" The Court, therefore,
merely may be authorizing an alternative method for establishing
minimum contacts when the defendants refuse to permit discovery
on this issue. Third, the Court was not faced squarely with the ques-
tion of the due process standard applicable under the manner and
circumstances of service of process utilized in this case but with the
related but different question of whether a judicial presumption of
facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, in and of itself, would
violate the defendants' due process rights.
The Court, however, does reject explicitly the principle, which
reasonably could have been inferred from some of its earlier opinions,
that "the federalism concept operate[s] as an independent restriction
on the sovereign power of [a state court]. ' 17 The reasons of the Court
for this rejection, that limitations on state court personal jurisdiction
spring from the due process clause, which "makes no mention of
federalism concerns," and that if personal jurisdiction involved limita-
tions based on sovereignty, those limitations could not be waived,' 79
are questionable.' 80 Even if one accepts the assertions by the Court
176. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703.
177. The Court asserted: "[Olur holding deals with how the facts needed to show
"minimum contacts" can be established when a defendant fails to comply with court-ordered
discovery." Id. at 703 n.10.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. While the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has evolved into the measure
of the constitutionality of state court assertion of jurisdiction over a particular defendant, see
supra notes 70-155 and accompanying text, state court assertions of personal jurisdiction were
restricted even before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. See supra notes 4-6 and
accompanying text and note 74. If, as the Supreme Court now states, "the Due Process Clause
. . . is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement," why didn't state courts run
amok before adoption of the fourteenth amendment? In fact, as the personal jurisdiction theory
of the Supreme Court evolved from Pennoyer v. Neff, the due process clause seems to broaden
the bases of personal jurisdiction permissible in state courts. See supra notes 70-155 and ac-
companying text. Moreover, even if some limitations on personal jurisdiction spring from the
due process clause, strong arguments can be made that the orderly administration of justice
in this federation of states, in which state courts are generally courts of unlimited subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, requires that some effort be made to allocate cases throughout the system in
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on this point, however, only the source or rationale for restricting
the personal jurisdiction of state courts would be affected. The stan-
dards by which those restrictions are measured, standards that have
evolved from Pennoyer to World-Wide, should not change. As the
Court hastened to respond to Justice Powell's concurrence, its inten-
tion was not to eliminate minimum contacts with the state as the basis
for assertion of state court personal jurisdiction.' 8' Insurance Corp.
of Ireland might be viewed as a special circumstance, in which the
Court did not require a minimum contacts analysis, it might be criticiz-
ed by commentators who will adopt the concurring opinion as more
reasonable and consistent with prior doctrine, and it might be touted
as a clarification of the doctrinal basis for the personal jurisdiction
tests established to date, but it probably will not be treated as substan-
tially altering those tests. If anything, the Supreme Court seemed deter-
mined to avoid any issues that required new substantive law or
reevaluation of established tests.' 2
a reasonable manner and that this effort must come through limitations on the location of
suit (venue-controlled by the states) and on the defendants who may be haled into a par-
ticular court (personal jurisdiction-controlled, ultimately, by Supreme Court decisions).
This assertion, however, raises the other argument of the Court: If part of the reason for
limiting personal jurisdiction of federal courts is to allocate business among state courts in
a rational manner and to protect the interests of the various state sovereigns, then why can
defendants waive personal jurisdiction objections? One simple answer might be that, even before
the fourteenth amendment came on the scene, defendants always could subject themselves to
the personal jurisdiction of the state court by coming into the jurisdiction and accepting service
of process. Thus, even when physical power was the only recognized basis for personal jurisdic-
tion, surely a principle that grew from notions of sovereignty, see supra note 4, a defendant
had the "right" to empower the court to a:sert its jurisdiction over him.
Moreover, a strong argument can be made that personal jurisdiction includes both a right
of the defendant arising from his personal liberty interest and a restriction on the sovereign
power of the court arising from concepts of federalism. The defendant has the right to insist
that the power of the particular court be limited, but, if the defendant chooses to waive this
right, he is, in effect, consenting to the exercise of power. Why should he be required to step
into the territory of the forum? If he can achieve the result of empowering a particular court
to assert jurisdiction over his person by stepping into the jurisdiction, won't a symbolic act,
consent, also be sufficient?
Most statements by the Supreme Court to date have revealed a two-pronged purpose to
be served by limiting personal jurisdiction of state courts: protecting a defendant from unfair
assertions of jurisdiction and doing what makes sense in a federal system. Usually, both prongs
are served by the same limitation. But just because some notions of sovereignty have been
preserved doesn't mean that the power of the sovereign or limitations on its power are ab-
solute. Limitations give structure to the system even if the limitations are not absolute. Most
plaintiffs will not serve process on a defendant on the mere hope that the defendant will not
object even though an ironclad objection exists.
Whether the courts read the Supreme Court language as rejecting concepts of sovereignty
or federalism as bases for restrictions on state court personal jurisdiction or not, sovereignty
concepts will steal back into opinions, in discussions of personal jurisdiction or venue, because
state courts cannot function in a federal system that does not, in some way, recognize their
separateness from the courts of other states.
181. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
182. Considering the recurring emphasis by the Supreme Court on federalism concepts,
see supra notes 73, 111-13, and 148 and accompanying text, and the prior-expressed views of
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Unlike the question of federal court jurisdiction, most elements of
analysis in state court personal jurisdiction are predictable and cer-
tain. Although the scope of state court jurisdiction may increase or
decrease slightly in the future, the basic tenets have been developing
gradually since Pennoyer and are now well-rooted in jurisdictional
theory.' s3 In short, the present doctrine is the product of decades of
careful consideration and analysis, and the possibility that the scope-
pendulum will swing wildly to substantially narrow or substantially
broad state court jurisdiction seems unlikely.' 84 Instead, only further
refinements should be anticipated.' 5
some commentators that federalism might be a more fundamental underpinning of due process
than any notions of basic territoriality or personal liberty, see Reese, supra note 113 (forum
state interest analysis as nonliteral reading of due process clause); Comment, Federalism, supra
note 2, at 1346, Insurance Corp. of Ireland is more likely to draw criticism than accolades.
As noted by one commentator: "The Supreme Court's emphasis on the extent of the forum
state's interest clearly suggests that principles of federalism beyond basic notions of territoriali-
ty underlie the due process clause." Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at 1346. See also
McDougal, supra note 73. Professor McDougal has urged that the "purposefully availing
minimum contacts approach" be abandoned in favor of a "comprehensive form of interest
analysis" that would include consideration of the interests of various states as well as those
of the plaintiff and the defendant. Id. at 7, 26. But see Lewis, The "Forum State Interest"
Factor in Personal Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts,
33 MERCER L. REv. 769 (1982) (urging that forum interest should be irrelevant in state court
personal jurisdiction analysis). Professor Lewis stated his primary thesis in the following
paragraph:
The chief contention here is that interests of government should not figure at all
in decisions on personal jurisdiction. This conclusion builds on the premise that the
sole proper concern of due process in the personal jurisdiction context is to assure
the parties a fair forum. This fairness, in turn, should be exclusively a function of
the defendant's forum contacts, as leavened by the plaintiff's need for a convenient
place to sue. Giving any weight to the interests of a forum or of any other state
will inevitably disturb the correct equation of fairness between the parties.
Id. at 771.
183. See supra notes 70-155 and accompanying text. But see Lewis, supra note 182, at
769 (urging that current minimum contacts analysis improperly considers factors such as forum
interest); McDougal, supra note 73, at 7, 26 (urging that minimum contacts analysis be aban-
doned in favor of an analysis based solely on assessment of various interests); Posnak, supra
note 4, at 729 (urging abolition of transient theory of jurisdiction and adoption of a new,
two-tiered test for personal jurisdiction considering the defendant's claim-related contacts with
the forum and the reasonableness of allowing jurisdiction in the particular case); Comment,
supra note 82, at 160-61 (urging that the factors now balanced in a minimum contacts analysis
have no constitutional relevance and suggesting a new, more relevant set of factors). These
and other writings suggest both that the present formulation is subject to varying interpreta-
tions and that many legal scholars are dissatisfied with the test as it stands. Clearly, the "minimum
contacts" test is fact-dependent-it can only be applied on a case by case basis. The point
this writer is urging, however, is not that the test is rigid, uniform, and easily applied, but
rather that the constitutional underpinnings of the present test have been examined clearly by
a number of courts and commentators and that the formulation of that test has been develop-
ing over time through a vast number of cases in which the question of personal jurisdiction
in state courts has been examined carefully.
184. See supra note 155.
185. Id.
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B. Federal Court Personal Jurisdiction-Diversity Cases, Federal
Question Cases, the Fourteenth Amendment, and (Perhaps) the
Fifth Amendment
1. Introduction
Unlike state courts, which were viewed originally as judicial arms
of independent sovereigns, the separate states, federal courts always
have been considered arms of one judicial jurisdiction, the federal
forum.'16 Thus, any limitations that may exist on a particular federal
court assertion of personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant
would arise not from any doctrine of territorial limitations on power
or from any need to promote federalism but only from constitutional
limitations, Congressional limitations, and considerations of the
peculiarities of the case at hand, which probably is judged by Con-
stitutional standards and/or Congressional interpretations or limita-
tions of these standards.' 87 Moreover, one might argue strongly that
most difficulties caused by issues of fairness to the defendant could
be resolved by transferring the case within the federal system to a
courtroom that would be more conveniently located.' Finally, one
might hypothesize that whereas most jurisdictional problems in state
courts are problems of personal jurisdiction rather than subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, jurisdictional problems in the federal courts primari-
186. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 26, at 28 ("systematic unity of the federal judiciary
is commonly overlooked"); Comment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Limitations on Nation-
wide Federal Jurisdiction, 61 B.U.L. Rav. 403, 421 (1981) ("[flederal law uniformly controls
every district in the country") [hereinafter cited as Comment, Fifth Amendment]; Comment,
National Contacts As a Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction over Aliens in Federal Question
Suits, 70 CALin. L. Ray. 686, 686 (1981) ("the jurisdictional determination might be expected
to focus upon the alien defendant's 'minimum contacts' with the federal forum, namely, the
United States") [hereinafter cited as Comment, National Contacts]; Note, supra note 21, at
482 ("unlike the state courts, the district courts are part of a unified system"). In Internatio-
Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thoman, 218 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1955), Judge Parker remarked that
"courts of the United States comprise one great system for the administration of justice."
187. See supra note 3.
188. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 26, at 28-29; Note, Corporate Amenability to Process
in the Federal Courts: State or Federal Jurisdictional Standards? 48 MINN. L. REV. 1131, 1147
(1964). Professor Foster cites 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), which authorizes transfer of venue "[ffor
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice... to any... district... where
[the suit] might have been brought," arguing that "any injustice or inconvenience to a par-
ticular defendant which is insufficient to warrant a change of venue is certain to fall far short
of raising any serious constitutional question about requiring him to stand trial in the original
district." Foster, supra, note 26 at 29 (footnote omitted). Moreover, as noted by the Min-
nesota commentator:
An independent federal jurisdictional standard would mean, of course, geographical-
ly broadening corporate amenability to suit. Any unfairness and inconvenience to
the corporate defendant, insofar as they are not eliminated by the jurisdictional stan-
dard itself, should be prevented by the venue provision of section 1391 and the transfer
provision of section 1404 of title 28.
Note, supra, at 1147.
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ly would arise because of the limited subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal courts,189 with few questions involving assertions of jurisdic-
tion over the persons of defendants.' 90 Unfortunately, the above
hypothesis does not describe the situation accurately. In federal prac-
tice, many questions have arisen with regard to subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Personal jurisdiction questions are even more difficult, partly
because these issues have received very little sustained, organized treat-
ment by the courts. The question, however, has received increasing
attention by scholars' 9 and sporadic, case-by-case treatment by
courts,' 92 but has not been resolved into any readily-described,
rationally-based, uniform rule or rules of relatively simple applica-
tion. As noted by one recent commentator: "Exploration of the
methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction . . . demonstrates a lack
of uniformity in the federal courts. . . .Federal courts have also
added to the uncertainty about personal jurisdiction in federal ques-
tion cases because of their disagreement on whether and how state
due process limits should be imposed."' 93 Problems of nonuniformity
189. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 186.
191. For articles addressing the problem of acquiring personal jurisdiction in federal ques-
tion cases, see, e.g., Berger, Acquiring in Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases;
Procedural Frustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, 1982 UTAH L. REv. 285;
Green, Federal Jurisdiction in Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REv.
967 (1961); Note, Fifth Amendment Due Process Limitations on Nationwide Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 61 B.U.L. REv. 403 (1981); Note, supra note 21; Comment, supra note 186, at 686.
For articles addressing the problem of acquiring personal jurisdiction in diversity cases, see,
e.g., Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and Convenience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdic-
tion in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73 (1968).
Most federal courts have now adopted the position of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit-in Arrowsmith v. U.P.I., 320 F.2d 219 (1963), that when a federal
court is sitting in diversity, see supra note 18 and infra notes 376-99 and accompanying text,
the validity of that exercise of personal jurisdiction is to be measured by the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause and the standards which have arisen thereunder. See infra notes 376-492
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the development of the fourteenth amendment
standard, see supra notes 60-185 and accompanying text. The validity of this position, which
has the effect of relegating to state law the determination of whether a federal court sitting
in that state will open its doors to a particular matter (and which, in turn, leads to nonunifor-
mity among federal courts sitting in different states) has been questioned seriously. See infra
notes 376-492 and accompanying text. Moreover, even if the law is considered settled with
regard to diversity suits in which service is made pursuant to a state long-arm statute, questions
of amenability standards still should abound when service of process is made pursuant to some
federal statute or a wholly-federal Rule 4 procedure.
In the area of federal question jurisdiction, even less uniformity exists and even more open
questions abound. Amenability standards are at issue regardless of how service of process is
achieved. See infra notes 493-1355 and accompanying text.
192. For a discussion of cases involving the problem of acquiring personal jurisdiction
in federal question cases, see infra notes 493-1355 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of cases involving the problem of acquiring personal jurisdiction in diversity cases, see infra
notes 376-492 and accompanying text.
193. Berger, supra note 191, at 336-37.
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and uncertainty also have developed in diversity cases.' 94 Although
the primary focus of this article is personal jurisdiction in federal
question cases, 195 some space will be devoted to the related, and
perhaps unseverable, topic of personal jurisdiction in diversity cases.
2. General Historical Development
Examination of the historical development of personal jurisdiction
in the federal courts must begin with article III, section 2, of the
Constitution, which limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts' 96 "to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . to Controversies
between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States; . . ." and other cases
involving federal issues.' 97 The exercise of this limited judicial power
constitutionally is vested only "in such inferior Courts as the Con-
194. See infra notes 376-492 and accompanying text.
195. For purposes of this discussion, the important distinction is between cases in which
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court rests solely on the ground of diversity of
citizenship and those cases in which its subject matter jurisdiction rests on some ground other
than, or in addition to, diversity of citizenship. This latter group of cases should be referred
to as "nondiversity" cases, including both federal question cases arising under the general federal
question jurisdiction authorized by 28 U.S.C. §1331 (Supp. V 1981) and cases arising under
special grants of authority to federal courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §1333 (1976) (Admiralty,
maritime and prize cases); 28 U.S.C. §1334 (Supp. V 1981) (Bankruptcy matters and proceedings);
28 U.S.C. §1338 (1976) (Patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, trade-marks and unfair
competition). See supra note 19. For simplicity, throughout this discussion the term "federal
question cases" has been used broadly to encompass all nondiversity federal cases. See also
supra note 19.
196. Restrictions on federal subject matter jurisdiction serve to limit the circumstances in
which a federal court can open its doors. As noted below, see infra notes 196-210 and accom-
panying text, the First Congress was reluctant to give broad authority to federal courts; some
members sought to block completely the creation of lower federal courts.
Restrictions on personal jurisdiction also limit access to federal courts. The development
of federal court personal jurisdiction rules paralleled, in some regards, the reluctant, nondirected
attention accorded subject matter jurisdiction. See infra notes 205-72 and accompanying text.
197. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, §2, cl. 1. Clause 1 of section 2 provides, in full:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Con-
troversies to which the Untied States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizen of another State;-between Citizens
of different States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 1.
Included in this grant of power to lower federal courts is what has become diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1976) and federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 (Supp.
V 1981). See supra notes 18-19. Neither of these statutory authorizations is coterminus with
the authority which article III permits. See infra note 200.
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gress may from time to time ordain and establish." ' This Constitu-
tional language was interpreted as giving Congress the prerogative to
create lower federal courts.'99 Once Congress had decided to create
federal district and circuit courts, moreover, article III was not inter-
preted as requiring that these courts be vested with the full comple-
ment of subject matter jurisdiction authorized by the Constitution."'
As noted by the Supreme Court in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,20 ' "fj]urisdiction of the lower
198. U.S. CONsT. art. III, §1.
199. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816), Justice Story based
his decision that the Supreme Court had the jurisdiction and authority to review all state acts
under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States on the assumption that article
III of the Constitution was "not mandatory, and that Congress may constitutionally omit to
vest the judicial power in courts of the United States." 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 337. From that
position, one might argue that Congress was not required to create lower federal courts at
all. In his opinion, however, Justice Story also included several paragraphs suggesting that
article III was intended to be "mandatory upon the legislature," 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 328,
thus requiring that Congress establish lower federal courts vested with all jurisdiction authorized
by article I1.
The Supreme Court subsequently resolved the question of Congressional duty to create lower
federal courts by ruling that although the power of the courts of the United States is granted
by the Constitution, Congress had the prerogative to create courts to exercise some or all of
that power. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). Congress "could have declined
to create any such courts, leaving suitors to the remedies afforded by state courts, with such
appellate review by this Court as Congress may prescribe." Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182,
187 (1943).
200. While many commentators have taken the position that "Congress. . .was required
to establish" the lower federal courts, Symposium Proceedings, 27 Vmi. L. REv. 1042 (1981-82)
(Professor Rice); see also supra note 199, and some have argued that article III requires that
Congress establish lower courts with the full complement of subject matter jurisdiction authorized
in article III, see G. GUNTHER, supra note 79, at 57; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816) (Story, J.) (dictum suggesting that article III was "mandatory upon
the legislature"), Congress has never done so. Congress' grant to lower federal courts of original
diversity jurisdiction, now codified at 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1976), for example, is more narrow
than the authority authorized by article III of the Constitution. Exercise of diversity jurisdic-
tion is limited to those "civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of Sl0,000," 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1976), a jurisdictional threshold amount not required by article
III, and the diversity jurisdiction authorized by Congress in 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1976) requires
"complete diversity" (that no plaintiff be a co-citizen of any defendant), Strawbridge v. Cur-
tiss, 7 U.S. (Cranch.) 267 (1806), while the grant of article III requires only "minimum" diver-
sity (that at least one plaintiff be of a different citizenship from that of at least one defen-
dant). See 28 U.S.C. 1335(a)(1) (1976) (requiring only minimum diversity in interpleader actions).
When the First Congress established the lower federal courts, it did not vest any general
federal question jurisdiction in these courts. See infra notes 205-30 and accompanying text.
And even when Congress vested general federal question authority in the federal courts, this
authority was not coterminus with the maximum power permitted by the article III "arising
under" language. See infra note 230 and accompanying text. Until recently, a'jurisdictional
threshold of $10,000 "amount in controversy" was required in federal question as well as diversity
cases. 28 U.S.C. §1331 (Supp. V 1981). Moreover, Congress by separate statute has granted
federal courts jurisdiction over certain "federal" matters, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §1338 (1976)
(Patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, trade-marks and unfair competition); 28 U.S.C.
§1343 (Supp. V 1981) (Civil rights and elective franchise), thus indicating that the general federal
question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. §1331 might not include matters that clearly fall under the
"arising under" language of article III. In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court noted: "Although
the language of §1331 parallels that of the 'arising under' clause of Article III, this Court
never has held that statutory 'arising under' jurisdiction is identical to Article III 'arising under'
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federal courts is further limited to those subjects encompassed within
a statutory grant of jurisdiction." ' Thus, while such an interpreta-
tion was not required constitutionally, the subject matter jurisdiction
of federal courts is limited to those parts of the article III grant that
Congress has vested in the lower federal courts. ' As will be
demonstrated below, some courts and commentators have sought a
similar structure in personal jurisdiction authority of federal courts,
that is, some constitutional expression of authority coupled with
affirmative legislation authorizing federal courts to exercise this grant. 04
The Judiciary Act of 178905 created the first federal trial courts,
and the authority of those district courts and circuit courts, which
in some instances also were courts of original jurisdiction,0 6 was limited
to admiralty cases, some criminal cases, cases in which the United
States was a party, and diversity cases. 2 7 These courts were not vested
xwvith any authority over cases and controversies described in article
III of the Constitution as "arising under" the Constitution or laws
of the United States-general federal question cases. Federal ques-
tion jurisdiction resided solely in the state courts, and the only possib-
ility of consideration by a federal court was by appeal to the United
States Supreme Court from a decision of the highest court of the
state.20 ' In view of one of the original purposes of creating a federal
jurisdiction. Quite the contrary is true." Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct.
1962, 1972 (1983), (citing Romers v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379
(1959)). In Romers, the Court had asserted: "Of course, the many limitations which have been
placed on jurisdiction under §1331 are not limitations on the constitutional power of Congress
to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts." 358 U.S. at 379 n.5. See also Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486, 515 (1969); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 506 (1900).
While "[t]he Constitution. . .and statements in court opinions suggest a broad congres-
sional authority over lower federal court jurisdiction," G. GUNTHER, supra note 79, at 59;
see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (which has been read to support
broad power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, see, e.g., National
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissen-
ting); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. Rav. 1001, 1005 (1965)), the
Constitution limits Congress control of lower court jurisdiction. G. GUNTHER, supra, at 59-60.
See generally Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229,
263-69 (1973). For example, the fifth amendment due process clause would preclude Congress
from exercising "its Article III power over the jurisdiction of the court in order to deprive
a party of a right created by the Constitution." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 44 (1978).
201. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). See supra notes 165-87 and accompanying text.
202. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 465 U.S. at 701.
203. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g. infra notes 1215 and 1258-59 and accompanying text.
205. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (now codified in scattered sections of Title
28 of the United States Code). See infra note 211.
206. Bartels, Recent Expansion in Federal Jurisdiction: A Call For Restraint, 55 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 219, 224 (1981).
207. Id.
208. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §25, 1 Stat. 73. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 352-53 (1816). Those few federal questions that could be heard by federal
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court system, to provide a special forum for the vindication of federally
created rights,20 9 this inaction probably is explained best as a com-
promise in the struggle between the Federalists and the anti-Federalists
in the First Congress.2 1
Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 governed the questions of
service of process and venue in the federal courts,2" ' but did not ad-
dress directly the issue of a defendant's amenability to suit, tradi-
tionally one of the key factors in asserting personal jurisdiction over
a defendant.21 2 Under Section 11, valid service of process could be
courts prior to the 1875 vesting in those courts of federal question jurisdiction, Act of March
3, 1875, ch. 137, §1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified in 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1976)), concerned matters
that were peculiarly federal in nature or that involved political exigencies. See P. BATOR, P.
MISCHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 844
(2d ed. 1973).
209. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§3561 (1975); Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L.
REv. 639 (1942).
210. As noted by Professor Snepp:
When the First Congress met, the national struggle between the Federalists and the
anti-Federalists was reflected in the debates over the jurisdiction to be conferred upon
the federal courts. One group of anti-Federalists wanted no system of lower courts
at all, and would have left the enforcement of federal laws to the tribunals of the
states .... The Federalists, on the other hand, favored the establishment of a system
of federal courts clothed with all the powers granted by the Constitution.
Snepp, The Law Applied in the Federal Courts, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 165 (1948).
Professor Warren, in his work which was given such deference by the majority opinion in
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938), and in which he analyzed the debates
on the 1789 Act, Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARv. L. REv. 49 (1923), made similar observations: the final form of the Act was a com-
promise necessary to obtain the votes of those who "were insistent that the Federal Courts
be given minimum powers and jurisdiction." Id. at 62.
211. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 79. Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 provided, in pertinent part:
But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil action
before a circuit or district court .... and no civil suit shall be brought before either
of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States by any original process
in any other district than that where he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be
found at the time of serving the writ.
Id. According to Professor Foster, such an affirmative legislative grant is generally considered
essential for the exercise of personal jurisdiction:
As with other aspects of its jurisdiction, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
the district court is legislatively grounded. The generally prevailing view is that the
district court cannot, sua sponte, assert personal jurisdiction merely on the ground
that to do so would be constitutionally possible; the basis for personal jurisdiction
must be found in a statute or in a procedural rule having the force of a statute.
Foster, supra note 26, at 11 (footnotes omitted).
212. See Foster, supra note 191, at 83; Green, supra note 191, at 968. As noted by Pro-
fessor Foster:
The second concept in the Pennoyer dictum is today thought of as "amenability,"
or as a condition which "subjects" a defendant to a personal judgment. As Justice
Field saw it, a state could make a nonresident amenable to a personal judgment
in actions arising out of certain kinds of business activities within the state. Today
the constitutional scope of amenability involves an inquiry into the reasonableness
of trying the particular action against the particular defendant in the case at hand.
Foster, supra note 191, at 83.
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made when the defendant was "an inhabitant" or when he could "be
found" at the time of service, and venue was not proper except where
valid service of process had been made.2' 3 One recent commentator
has maintained:
Because process could follow a defendant and no provisions set forth
a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction, the process and venue
language suggests that the amenability basis under the Act was
physical presence. Using presence as the amenability basis, federal
district courts could assert jurisdiction over any person found within
their boundaries. 2' 4
One might argue, instead, that amenability was to exist at least in
those circumstances in which valid service of process could be made,
where the defendant resided or where he was found. Whether
amenability would somehow be more extensive was irrelevant because
a court could not proceed unless process had been served validly.2'
Under either interpretation, the effect of Section 11 of the Act was
to allow for suit wherever the defendant could be found, but not
for nationwide service of process; a defendant could be served where
he was found, but only by the federal court sitting in the particular
federal district in which he had been found." 6 The Supreme Court fre-
213. See supra note 211.
214. Berger, supra note 191, at 320. Federal courts did not seem nonplussed by the specific
relation of Section 11 only to service of process and venue; they used Section Il "as a statutory
foundation for a federal law of corporate amenability." Comment, Federal Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations and the Erie Doctrine, 64 CoLum. L. REV. 685, 690 (1964). See, e.g.,
St. Louis Wire-Mill Co. v. Consolidated Barb-Wire Co., 32 F. 802 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1887); Gray
v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 21 F. 288 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884); Merchants' Mfg. Co. v. Grand Truck
Ry., 13 F. 358 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); Robinson v. National Stockyard Co., 12 F. 361
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); Stout v. Sioux City Pac. R.R., 8 F. 794 (C.C.D. Neb. 1881).
215. In other words, while presence would be an adequate amenability basis for circumstances
covered by the Judiciary Act, other bases also might exist but would be unnecessary because
the Act restricts venue and service so that no amenability basis other than presence would
be necessary; other actions could not be brought because the defendant could not be served
and/or venue would not lie.
Another commentator, in the context of the Arrowsmith-Jaftex controversy, see infra notes
434-92 and accompanying text, has suggested a different interpretation:
Whatever significance there may be in the original conjunction of the process
and venue statutes, it is difficult to ascertain how these provisions, if they have
relevance to amenability at all, provide any more than a ceiling upon the exercise
of jurisdiction; the terms of both sections restrict the federal courts. They indicate
when jurisdiction is 'not to be asserted and are silent as to when it is to be asserted.
The problem remains one of finding an affirmative mandate, because the traditional
base of jurisdiction, physical power, is inapplicable to the abstract corporate entity.
Note, supra note 188, at 1141.
216. In United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878), the Court commented on
the Judiciary Act of 1789:
It is true that Congress has declared that no person shall be sued in a circuit court
of the United States who does not reside within the district for which the court was
established, or who is not found there. But a citizen residing in Oregon may be sued
in Maine, if found there, so that process can be served on him.
Id. at 604. In Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838), the Court made clear
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quently has expressed the opinion that "Congress has power . . . to
provide that the process of every district court shall run into every part
of the United States." '217 Although the Court, therefore, apparently
that "the process. . .is in terms limited to the district within which it is issued." See also Ex
parte Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911, 913 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 5,657) ("The manifest policy
of the judicial system of the United States, was to render the administration of Justice as
little oppressive to suitors and others as possible; and it corresponds entirely with that conclu-
sion, which confines the process of the courts within the limits of the district in which the
court is, and from which it issued").
One commentator has concluded that "the [Judiciary] Act, in practice, allowed nationwide
personal jurisdiction." Berger, supra note 191, at 320-21. This seems to be an overstatement
of the situation. No single federal court had nationwide personal jurisdiction, but only per-
sonal jurisdiction within its own federal territory. If a defendant were served with process in
a federal district in Montana, suit could proceed in a federal court in Montana, not in any
other state. Thus, the federal system paralleled the state systems, with each state court being
able to assert personal jurisdiction over individuals found within its borders. Surely, no one
would characterize that authority as "nationwide personal jurisdiction."
217. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925). See Mississippi Publishing
Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1945) ("Congress could provide for service of process
anywhere in the United States"); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569, 603
(1878) ("It would have been competent for Congress to organize a judicial system analogous
to that of England. . ., and confer all original jurisdiction on a court or courts. . .with authority
to exercise that jurisdiction throughout the limits of the Federal government. ... ); id. at
604 ("There is. . .nothing in the Constitution which forbids Congress to enact that, as to
a class of cases or a case of special character, a circuit court-any circuit court-in which
the suit may be brought, shall, by process served anywhere in the United States, have the
power to bring before it all the parties necessary to its decision"); id. ("Whether parties shall
be compelled to answer in a court of the United States wherever they may be served, or shall
only be bound to appear when found within the district where the suit has been brought, is
merely a matter of legislative discretion, which ought to be governed by considerations of con-
venience, expense, & C., but which, when exercised by Congress, is controlling on the courts");
Toland v. Sprague, 12 U.S. (Pet.) 300, 328 (1838) ("Congress might have authorized civil pro-
cess from any circuit court, to have run into any state of the Union"); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §4(2) and comment (1982). But see Abraham, Constitutional Limita-
tions Upon Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REv. 520 (1963); Seeburger, The
Federal Long-Arm: The Uses of Diversity, or "Tain' So, McGee," 10 IND. L. REv. 480 (1977).
In each of these cases, however, the statements merely were part of an analysis concluding
with recognition that Congress had not so empowered the courts, Robertson v. Railroad Labor
Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925) ("But [Congress] has not done so either by any general laws
or in terms by §310 of Transportation Act, 1920"); Toland v. Sprague, 12 U.S. (Pet.) 300,
328 (1838) ("[Congress] has not done so[;] [i]t has not in terms authorized any original civil
process to run into any other district; with the single exception of subpoenas for witnesses,
within a limited distance"), or that Congress in the circumstances before the Court, had made
limited use of its extensive authority. In United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., the Court
concluded:
Statutes [removing certain restrictions on personal jurisdiction in specific cases], if
not so common as to be called ordinary legislation, are yet frequent enough to justify
us in saying that they are well-recognized acts of legislative power uniformly sustained
by the courts. It may be said. . .that such statutes when they have been held to
be valid by the courts, do not infringe the substantial rights of property or of con-
tract of the parties affected, but are intended to supply defects of power in the courts,
or to give them improved methods of procedure in dealing with existing rights.
98 U.S. at 606. See also Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 443 (1945)
(Congress could, through Federal Rule 4(0, authorize that federal process extend beyond the
particular federal district and run to the borders of the state in which the court was held).
Utilizing these recognized broad powers to extend the personal jurisdiction of a federal court
beyond the boundaries of the federal district in which the court sits (in effect, its territorial
boundaries), Congress has enacted many special federal statutes, see infra note 247 and accom-
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finds no constitutional limitations on the territorial reach of a particular
federal court in terms of service of process and, perhaps implicitly,
in terms of amenability to suit, Congress has never authorized, as a
general matter, such a broad reach for federal courts.21 8
As noted by Professors Hart and Wechsler, under the formulation
of Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, "[v]enue and personal
jurisdiction were scarcely distinguishable conceptions in federal prac-
tice. .. ."9 In 1789, such coextensiveness probably was quite sensi-
ble for at least two reasons: (1) venue, restriction on the location
of a trial, always has been considered a restriction to protect defen-
dants from being sued in inconvenient locations 20 and, in 1789, the
most convenient sites for trial, from a defendant's point of view, would
have been the location of his residence or a location where he was
"present," ' 22 ' and (2) service of process within the district in which
suit was sought was consistent with both the convenience protected
by venue and the limited authority with which the First Congress
sought to invest the federal district and circuit courts.222
panying text, and certain provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see infra note
290 and accompanying text, authorizing federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction in cir-
cumstances in which a court of the state in which the federal court was sitting could not so
act. Even in diversity cases, this federal extraterritorial reach has been approved. As noted
above, however, Congress never has granted to the federal courts the full personal jurisdiction
power authorized by article III of the Constitution.
In a 1936 House Report on its grant of nationwide service of process in shareholder derivative
suits, Act of Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 230, 40 Stat. 1213 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §112 (1940)), the
Representatives maintained:
The power of the federal courts to maintain a suit cognizable under the judicial power
of the United States in any district and to issue process for service anywhere in the
United States is a matter of legislative discretion, controlled by Acts of Congress
based upon considerations of convenience to litigants, expense, and promotion of
justice.
H.R. REP. No. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936). This statement is noteworthy in at least
two respects: (1) it indicated a Congressional attitude that authority for nationwide service of
process was a serious matter and that such authority would not be granted incautiously, and
(2) it listed factors affecting its decision to grant nationwide service, "considerations of conve-
nience to litigants, expense and promotion of justice", factors similar to those weighed by
courts in exploring the fourteenth amendment due process limitations on state court exercises
of personal jurisdiction. See supra notes 106-85 and accompanying text.
218. See Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925); Toland v. Sprague,
12 U.S. (Pet.) 300, 328 (1838). See also supra note 217. Congress has authorized nationwide
service of process in certain specific circumstances. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
In some circumstances, Congress has the power to provide for service of process in foreign
countries. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, §§1133-36.
219. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, Tia FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 948 (1953).
220. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., CIvIL PROCEDURE 603 (2d ed. 1977).
221. As noted by one commentator:
As cast in 1789, Section 11 probably served the needs of the late 18th Century
reasonably well. The business organizations of the day were generally small, not cor-
porate in form, and their activities-and most other activities likely to lead to
litigation-tended to be local in character.
Foster, supra note 191, at 76.
222. See supra note 210 and 220 and accompanying text.
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As interstate contacts and travel increased and became less harrowing
and hazardous, and as state boundaries became less formidable bar-
riers to such activities,223 the requirements for venue, service of pro-
cess, and amenability to suit, all prerequisites for maintenance of a
suit in a federal court of competent subject matter jurisdiction,224
diverged,225 with venue remaining the most restrictive requirement.2 6
The pattern established in the Judiciary Act of 1789, however, of
dealing expressly with the purely procedural matters of service and
location of trial, while dealing by inference or implication with the
question of amenability to suit in federal courts, has continued to
be the pattern followed in subsequent jurisdictional enactments.2 27
In the 1860s, Congress began to expand the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts. 8 Congress acted in a piecemeal way, gran-
ting, bit by bit, some of the power authorized by article III of the
Constitution. 229 General federal question jurisdiction, as authorized
by the "arising under" language of article III, finally was vested by
Congress in the lower federal courts in 1875.230 Congress did not,
223. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
224. see supra note 212 and accompanying text.
225. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 219, at 948-49.
226. At present, the general venue requirements for the federal courts are codified in 28
U.S.C. §1391 (1976). For actions "wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizen-
ship," venue lies "only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside,
or in which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. §1391(a) (1976) (emphasis added). In federal question
cases, venue lies "only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim
arose, except as otherwise provided by [special venue statutes]." 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) (1976)
(emphasis added). First, it is noteworthy that venue in federal question cases is more limited
than venue in simple diversity cases, a real puzzle since the primary purpose of creating federal
courts was to provide a forum with particular expertise in federal matters. As observed by
Professors Hart and Wechsler, "Neither the legislative history nor the decisions yield any answer
to the enigma." H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 219, at 949. Moreover, under modern
provisions, a defendant may be served with process wherever he is present; venue would not
lie, however, unless he and all other defendants reside there, the action arose there, or (in
diversity cases) all of the plaintiffs reside there. Thus, venue often seriously restricts the plain-
tiff's choice of forum unless the defendant is willing to waive objections to venue.
227. See infra notes 228-72 and accompanying text. See also Berger, supra note 191, at 321.
228. See Bartels, supra note 206, at 224.
229. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, §5, 12 Stat. 756 (enlarging removal jurisdic-
tion in some cases involving federal officers); Act of April 9, 1866, Ch. 31, §3 14 Stat. 27
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §1443 (1976)) (extending removal jurisdiction in certain cases involving
civil rights of the newly freed slaves); Act of Feb. 5, 1867, Ch. 28, §1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §2241 (1976)) (granting federal courts certain review authority through writs of
habeas corpus); Act of March 1, 1875, Ch. 114, §3, 18 Stat. 336 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1343(4)
(Supp V. 1981) and 42 U.S.C. §2000(a) (granting district courts jurisdiction over civil rights
suits alleging denial of equal access to public accommodations); Act of April 20, 1871, Ch.
22, §1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) (Supp. V 1981) (granting district courts
jurisdiction over civil rights suits alleging deprivation of rights by State action); Act of May
31, 1870, Ch. 114, §8, 16 Stat. 142 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1343(4) (Supp. V 1981) (granting
district courts jurisdiction over civil rights suits alleging interference with voting rights).
230. Act of March 3, 1875, Ch. 137, §1, 18 Stat. 470. The current version of this enact-
ment appears at 28 U.S.C. §1331 (Supp. V 1981): "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.
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however, give the matter extended consideration,23" ' thus again
demonstrating a seeming reluctance or perhaps even a lack of interest,
which has been illustrated both by its haphazard treatment of the
question of amenability in the federal courts232 and by its consistent
failure to address carefully and directly the federal question subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.233 The nonchalance of Con-
gress with respect to both of these questions seems to reveal a strong
desire to limit the authority of federal courts. Federal court power
can be limited by failing to grant federal courts the authority to hear
certain types of cases and controversies, restrictions on subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, or by failing to permit federal courts to exercise
authority over large classes of defendants, restrictions on personal
jurisdiction and amenability.
In 1872, Congress enacted the Conformity Act, which provided:
[t]hat the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding
... in the circuit and district courts ... shall conform, as near as
may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding
existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State
within which such circuit or district courts are held. .... 234
The federal courts thus were bound to follow state practice in regard
to most modes of proceeding such as forms of process and methods
of service. 2" The Conformity Act, however, did not apply to ques-
tions of personal jurisdiction,236 and, as noted by one commentator,
"the independence of the federal judiciary was frequently asserted
in the maxim that federal jurisdiction could not be enlarged or abridged
by state statute. ' ' 237
231. Chadbourne & Levin, supra note 209, at 643-45.
232. See supra notes 211-27 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 205-31 and accompanying text. Perhaps Congress' failure to engage
in extended debate or discussion of the 1875 Act's grant of federal question jurisdiction was
caused by time pressure or by some general agreement that federal question jurisdiction should
be granted. On the other hand, perhaps debate was limited in order not to reopen the earlier
arguments in favor of limiting federal court authority. See supra notes 205-10 and accompany-
ing text. Perhaps it was thought better to treat the general grant of federal question jurisdic-
tion as essentially a fait accompli.
234. Act of June 1, 1872, Ch. 255, §5, 17 Stat. 196.
235. See, e.g., Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 301, 304 (1889); see also Barrett, Venue and
Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608, 611
n.17 (1954).
236. See, e.g., Munter v. Weil Corset Co., 261 U.S. 276 (1923); Mechanical Appliance
Co. v. Castleman, 215 U.S. 437 (1910); Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194 (1893);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202 (1892).
237. Comment, supra note 214, at 692. See, e.g., Mechanical Appliance Co. V. Castleman,
215 U.S. 437, 443 (1910); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, I11 (1898); Goldey v. Morning
News, 156 U.S. 518, 523 (1895); Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 453 (1874);
Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170, 175 (1858);.Union Bank v. Jolly's Adm'rs., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 503, 507 (1856); Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 67, 74-75 (1840).
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In 1887, Congress extensively amended the Judiciary Act of 1789,238
eliminating service of process based solely on a defendant's presence
239
and creating a new venue provision for cases in which subject matter
jurisdiction was based solely on diversity of citizenship. 240 Suit was
now authorized only in the district in which the defendant resided
unless subject matter jurisdiction was based solely on diversity of
citizenship; in such cases, suit also could be brought in the district
in which the plaintiff resided. Examination of the legislative history
of the amendment reveals that a motivating Congressional concern
was "to diminish the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and the Supreme
Court of the United States, to promote the convenience of the people,
and to lessen the burden and expense of litigation."' 24' Again, neither
in the amendments nor in its debates did Congress address the ques-
tion of amenability to suit or even the effect that the severe limita-
tion on service of process would have on the personal jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 24 2 The substantial curtailment of service of pro-
cess, coupled with limitations on venue in all federal question cases,
clearly resulted in dramatic limitations on the effectiveness of the
federal courts under their new federal question subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Suit only could be maintained where the defendant resided, and,
in the case of multiple defendants who did not all reside in the same
federal district, no federal court would be an appropriate forum. Such
federal question cases necessarily would be relegated to the state courts.
Following the pattern established in its enactment of the Judiciary
Act of 1789,243 Congress did not respond with any comprehensive
treatment of federal court personal jurisdiction. Instead, it dealt with
particular jurisdictional problems by stopgap, piecemeal amendments
and enactments.2" ' As Judge Hufstedler has observed:
238. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, §1, 24 Stat. 552.
239. Id. The amended section provided that "no civil suit shall be brought before either
of [the lower federal courts] against [an inhabitant of the United States] by any original pro-
cess. . .in any other district than that where of he is an inhabitant." Id. Compare Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §11 1 Stat. 73, 79, quoted supra at note 211.
240. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, §1, 24 Stat. 552. The new venue statute provided:
"[W]here the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of
different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff
or the defendant." Id.
241. 18 CONG. REc. 613, 613 (1887) (Rep. Culbertson).
242. See Berger, supra note 191, at 321.
243. See supra notes 205-22 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 19, 1922, ch. 345, 42 Stat. 849 (War frauds cases: service
of process "from the district court of the district wherein such suit is brought shall run in
any other district and service . ..upon any defendant may be made in any district within
the United States or the territorial or insular possessions thereof .. "; venue wherever a
single defendant resided or where "the cause of action or any part thereof arose"); Credit
Mobilier Act, ch. 226, §4, 17 Stat. 485, 509 (1873) (Credit Mobilier scandal: service of process
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[C]ongressional reaction to issues of federal jurisdiction has always
been fitful and . . . the fits are usually induced by strong pressures
imposed by particular events or by powerful constituencies that seek
to influence results in particular causes that concern them. Congress
has rarely undertaken a comprehensive reexamination of federal
jurisdiction. Indeed, it has not made the attempt for almost 100
years.2"'
In addition to the general grant of federal personal jurisdiction
authority included in the Judiciary Act, as amended and as
supplemented,2"6 Congress has enacted specific statutes that authorize
nationwide or even worldwide service of process in regard to certain
areas of particular federal concern.2" 7 As with the Judiciary Act, most
as the court in which the action was pending "shall deem necessary to bring in new parties
or the representatives of parties deceased, or to carry into effect the purposes of this act,"
such service to "run into any district;" venue "in the circuit court in any circuit"); Act of
Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 230, 49 Stat. 1213 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §112 (1940) (current version at
28 U.S.C. §1695 (1976)) (stockholders' derivative suits: service of process in any district "wherein
such corporation resides or may be found").
245. Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal Judiciary,
47 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 841, 842-43 (1972) (footnote omitted).
246. See supra notes 228-45 and accompanying text. The Judiciary Act of 1789 and its
amendments was displaced as a general jurisdiction and venue statute when the Judicial Code
was revised formally in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 945 (codified as amended
at 28.U.S.C. §§1391, 1693, 1695 (1976)). 28 U.S.C. §1693 (1976) provides: "Except as other-
wise provided by Act of Congress, no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another
in any civil action in a district court." This language virtually is identical to the service of
process language of the Judiciary Act of 1789, see supra note 211, and Judge Clark argued,
with substantial support from legislative history, that 28 U.S.C. §1693 is a codification of the
process and venue provisions of the 1789 Act. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d
219, 234 (2d Cir. 1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d
508, 512 (2d Cir. 1960). But see Comment, Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations
in Diversity Actions: A Tiltyard for the Knights of Erie, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 752, 759-60 (1964).
Current general venue provisions, codified at 28 U.S.C. §1391, see supra note 226, are more
generous than those under the 1789 Act, as amended; suit now also may be brought in the
district "in which the claim arose." This has eliminated some of the difficulties in finding
a suitable federal forum for federal question cases in which the defendants did not all reside
in the same federal district. See supra note 226.
247. Credit Mobilier Act, 17 Stat. 485, ch. 226 (1873) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §88
(1976) (mandamus actions against Union Pacific Railroad); Commodity Exchange Act of 1974,
7 U.S.C. §13a-I (1976) (action brought by Commodities Futures Trading Commission); Plant
Quarantine Act, 7 U.S.C. §150dd(c) (action brought by Secretary of Agriculture); Federal Ar-
bitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §9 (1976) (confirmation of arbitrator's award); Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. §105(a) (1982) (bankruptcy court jurisdiction); Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion Act, 12 U.S.C. §1455(b) (1976) (action brought by Federal Home Mortgage Corporation);
National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §1725(c)(4) (creation of Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Corporation); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§5, 10 (1976) (joinder of additional parties); Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. §22 (1976) (action brought by United States against a corporation); Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. §25 (action to restrain violation of the Act); Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. §49 (1976) (action by Federal Trade Commission to enforce a subpoena); Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77v(a) (action to prosecute violation of the Act); Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §77vvv(b) (action to enforce the Act or to prosecute violation of the
Act); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78u(b)(C) (subpoena of witnesses); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa (1976) (action to enforce the Act or to prosecute viola-
tion of the Act); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §80a-43 (1976) (action to en-
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of these statutes do not address directly the question of amenability,
but instead prescribe the circumstances that would trigger expanded
authority to serve process. 248 Often, the service of process, venue,
and amenability provisions are so intertwined as to be indistinguish-
force the Act or to prosecute violation of the Act); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§80b-14 (1982) (action to enforce the Act or to prosecute violation of the Act); Antitrust Civil
Process Act, 15 U.S.C. §1312(d)(1), (2) (1982) (demand by the United States Attorney for an-
titrust investigation); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §1719 (action to
enforce the Act or to prosecute violation of the Act); Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §375 (1976) (determination of heirship of deceased members of cer-
tain Indian Tribes); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §1330 (1976) (nonjury civil
action against non-immune foreign country); Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C.
§1391(e) (1976) (action against federal officers); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
28 U.S.C. §1608 (1976) (actions against foreign sovereign); 28 U.S.C. §1655 (1976) (lien en-
forcement); 28 U.S.C. §1695 (1976) (shareholder derivative action); Interstate Commerce En-
forcement Act, 28 U.S.C. §2321 (1976) (action by United States under Interstate Commerce
laws); Interstate Commerce Enforcement Act, 28 U.S.C. §2413 (1976) (execution in favor of
United States); Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §1132(e)(2)
(1976) (actions to enforce pension plans); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §293 (1976) (worldwide service
in patent suit if suit is filed in District of Columbia); 38 U.S.C. §784(a) (1976) (action on
United States government insurance); Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §270(b) (1976) (action on payment
bond for private contractor's labor on public project); Atomic Energy Damages Act, 42 U.S.C.
§2210(n)(2) (1976) (public liability action by Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
248. Section 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. §1391(e) (1976), for
example, provides:
A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States
or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority,
or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise
provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the
action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved
in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved
in the action. Additional persons may be joined as parties to-any such action in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue
requirements as would be applicable if the United States or one of its officers,
employees, or agencies were not a party.
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and com-
plaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified
mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.
Id. This statute has been interpreted as authorizing the court to assert personal jurisdiction
over the defendant if he has been served within the United States pursuant to the statute.
See, e.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds,
Colby v. Driver, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) (statute permits jurisdiction based on defendant's presence
in federal district where served (see infra notes 641-74 and accompanying text)); United States
v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (statute permits jurisdiction based on
defendant's having "requisite 'minimum contacts' with the United States"). But see Kipper-
man v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 871 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (28 U.S.C. §1391(e) describes only
the mechanics of effective extra-territorial service but does not provide an amenability basis
for exercise of personal jurisdiction). Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §22 (1982)
provides:
Any suit, action or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may
be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in
any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such
cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may
be found.
Id.
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able."4 9 In other circumstances, venue or personal jurisdiction expressly
depend on proper service of process and the satisfaction of subject
matter jurisdiction criteria, in effect rendering the additional re-
quirements of personal jurisdiction and venue quite valueless.2"'
249. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for example, provides:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any Ter-
ritory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and
of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal pro-
ceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or transaction constituting
the violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created
by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder or to enjoin any violation of
such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in
the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business,
and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant
is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found ...
15 U.S.C. §78aa (1976). This provision has been interpreted as authorizing nationwide service
of process and amenability to suit if defendant is present in or is a resident of the federal
district in which he is served. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir.
1979) (infra notes 630-36 and accompanying text); Mariash v. Morill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1139-40
(2d Cir. 1974) (infra notes 622-29 and accompanying text); Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp.
909, 911 (D. Md. 1971) (infra notes 616-21 and accompanying text).
250. Section 2 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §1330 (1976) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section
1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which
the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under section 1605-1607 of this
title or under any applicable international agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief
over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service
has been made under section 1608 of this title.
Id. In a recent opinion, Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983), the
Supreme Court found that the subject matter authority granted by Congress in subsection (a)
did not exceed the scope of article III of the Constitution, even though, on its face, it authoriz-
ed a suit by a foreign (alien) plaintiff against a foreign sovereign in federal court, so long
as the substantive requirements of the Act were satisfied. See infra notes 520-46 and accompa-
nying text. The Court did not directly address the question of personal jurisdiction under subsec-
tion (b) but noted, in a footnote, that if the criteria for subject matter jurisdiction are not
satisfied, then neither are the criteria for personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1967, n.5.
Moreover, the Court stated, in the midst of its discussion of the subject matter authority
available under article III:
By reason of its authority over foreign commerce and foreign relations, Congress
has the undisputed power to decide, as a matter of federal law, whether and under
what circumstances foreign nations should be amenable to suit in the United States.
Id. at 1971 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that Congress had protected against the
danger of federal courts being "turned into 'small international courts of claims"' in which
non-U.S. citizens could routinely bring suit by "enacting substantive provisions requiring some
form of substantial contact with the United States." Id. at 1969. Thus, although the Court
never directly addressed the "world-wide" amenability to suit programmed into subsection (b)
of the Act, it did make some references, in its analysis of the subject matter question, to
personal jurisdiction concepts-amenability and contacts. The opinion by the Court is subject
to several distinct interpretations on the personal jurisdiction question, including the following:
(1) that the Court included the personal jurisdiction analytical references in its discussion because
the statute conditions personal jurisdiction on subject matter jurisdiction plus service of pro-
cess and, thus, some consideration of amenability standards should be made; (2) that the Court
did not intend those references to support any conclusion that personal jurisdiction would be
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Not until the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,25' which "superseded . . . the practice under the Confor-
mity Act of adhering to different state procedures," 2-2 did Congress
attempt to give more general latitude to federal courts on the ques-
tion of service of process. 2 3 Professors Wright and Miller maintain
that Rule 4, which "governs service of process in the federal courts
. was designed to provide maximum freedom and flexibility in
the procedures for giving all defendants ... notice of the commence-
ment of the action and to eliminate unnecessary technicality in con-
nection with service of process. ' 254 Rule 4 provides the only general
statement of federal policy with regard to those defendants over which
the federal courts are empowered to assert their authority. Yet, even
though Rule 4 is often cited as "govern[ing] the assertion of personal
jurisdiction in most civil actions brought in federal court"2" ' or as
being "the principal guide to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
the District Courts" 2 6 or even as containing "[tihe general federal
measure of amenability. ... -" Rule 4 does not address directly
the issue of amenability, but rather is concerned expressly with "the
methods of service through which personal jurisdiction may be
obtained.""25 In his concurring opinion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland
appropriate, concluding that a remand was required in order to determine whether the subject
matter criteria (nonimmunity) were satisfied; (3) that the Court intended, in its discussion of
amenability, to reassert its position that Congress constitutionally can provide for extraterritorial
service of process by the federal courts; or (4) that the Court, deliberately or otherwise, fused
elements of personal jurisdiction into its discussion of subject matter jurisdiction. For further
discussion of the Verlinden case in regard to its significance on the question of personal jurisdic-
tion in federal question cases, see infra notes 520-60 and accompanying text.
251. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first promulgated under the authority of
the Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §2072 (1976)) (Rules
Enabling Act). The Rules became effective September 16, 1938. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER,
supra note 219, at 586-89.
252. Comment, supra note 214, at 692.
253. See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, §1061; Berger, supra note
191, at 286.
254. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, §1061, at 198.
255. Berger, supra note 191, at 286.
256. Foster, supra note 191, at 92.
257. Note, supra note 21, at 471 n.6.
258. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 715
n.6 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). In Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l,
320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), see infra notes 453-82 and accompanying text, Judge Friendly
countered the argument that in a diversity case the constitutionality of service which provides
for a purely federal method of service, was to be measured by a federal amenability standard
by pointing out that "F.R. Civ. Proc. 4(d)(3) ... relate[s] to the manner of service and leave[s]
open the question whether the foreign corporation was subject to service in any manner." Id.
at 224. Amenability, he maintained, was "[to be] determined in accordance with the law of
the state where the [federal] court sits .. " Id. at 223. See also Note, supra note 188, at
1142 ("Rule 4.. . is not concerned with amenability"). But see Mississippi Publishing Corp.
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1945) ("the service of summons is the procedure by which
a court having venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over
the person of the party served").
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v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee,23 9 Justice Powell addressed this
issue in the following footnote:
Although Rule 4 deals expressly only with service of process, not
with the underlying jurisdictional prerequisites, jurisdiction may not
be obtained unless process is served in compliance with applicable
law. . . . For this reason Rule 4 frequently has been characterized
as a jurisdictional provision. 260
The question of the extent to which Rule 4 codifies a congressional
position on the question of amenability26' to service of process in suits
initiated in federal courts is central to many of the problems to which
this article is addressed. As will become clear, Rule 4 may have in-
creased "freedom and flexibility" in service of process in the federal
courts, but it has not aided in the establishment of uniform stan-
dards of personal jurisdiction in diversity and/or federal question cases.
Instead, it has operated as an obstacle to any such goals.262
In original form, Rule 4 expanded the territorial reach of federal
process from the federal district within which the federal court was
sitting to the boundaries of the state in which the federal court was
held.263 The Rule also permitted a federal court, in some circumstances,
259. 456 U.S. at 709.
260. Id. at 715 n.6. In a recent opinion, Justice Stewart addressed a related question-
whether 28 U.S.C. §1391(e), see supra note 248, which authorizes extraterritorial service of
process in some circumstances, affects personal jurisdiction:
The petitioners . . . argue . . . that §1391(e) does not confer personal jurisdiction.
It is the petitioners' position that §1391(e) was designed only to govern venue and
service of process, not to confer personal jurisdiction. The flaw in this argument
is that, as a general rule, service of process is the means by which a court obtains
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and in the cases before us the petitioners have
failed to demonstrate that there was any defect in the means by which service of
process was effected.
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553 n.5 (1979) (dissenting opinion). Justice Stewart failed
to address the issue of amenability, preferring, instead, to rely on the formula that jurisdiction
is obtained by non-defective service of process. Perhaps his analysis depends on an assumption
that a valid service is one that would not violate the defendant's due process rights and that
the protection of those rights was programmed into the provisions for service of process, Con-
gress only has authorized that process be served in circumstances in which assertion of personal
jurisdiction would not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. For further discussion of
Stafford, see infra notes 665-75 and accompanying text.
261. As noted over 25 years ago by one writer:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the manner in which service of pro-
cess may be made on a foreign corporation.... However, there is no rule or statute
which informs the courts when foreign corporations are amenable to process so that
in personam jurisdiction may be had over them in diversity and most nondiversity suits.
Note, Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts over Foreign Corporations, 69 HARV. L. REv.
508, 508 (1956). While Rule 4 twice has been substantially amended since the publication of
the article quoted above, see infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text, the statement remains
true.
262. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 191, at 286-98.
263. FED. R. CIrv. P. 4(f) provided:
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits
of the state in which the district court is held, and, when a statute of the United
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to adopt service procedures utilized by the courts of the particular
state in which service was to be made.2"' In 1963, Rule 4 was amended,
and the service of process rules were made more liberal. Professors
Wright and Miller note:
These changes were in large part a codification of liberal interpreta-
tions given to the original provisions of Rule 4 by the federal courts
and a recognition of the important changes that had taken place
since 1938 in state practices regarding jurisdiction and service of pro-
cess. They also incorporated some of the reforms suggested by
various writers over the years and made an attempt to 'meet some
of the exigencies of litigation in a modern and mobile society.26
The amendments authorized the following: service outside the bor-
ders of the state in which the federal court was sitting but within
100 miles of the courthouse; 216 service "under the circumstances and
in the manner prescribed" by a statute of the state "in which the
district court is held, ' 267 and several procedures for service in a foreign
Staies so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state. A subpoena may be
served within the territorial limits provided in Rule 45.
In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1945), the Supreme Court upheld
this statewide authorization of service of process, arguing (1) that "Congress could [constitu-
tionally] provide for service of process anywhere in the United States," id. at 442, (2) that
Rule 4(f) did not violate the Rule 82 proscription of enlargement of federal court venue or
subject matter jurisdiction by a Federal Rule but only "serve[ed] to implement the jurisdiction
over the subject matter which Congress has conferred by providing a procedure by which the
defendant may be brought into court at the place where Congress has declared that the suit
may be maintained," id. at 445, and (3) that Rule 4(f) was "in harmony with the Enabling
Act which, in authorizing [the Supreme] Court to prescribe general rules for the district courts
governing practice and procedure in civil suits in lav and equity, directed that the rules 'shall
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant."' Id.
264. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(d)(7) provided that service could be made "in the manner prescrib-
ed by the law of the state in which the service is made .. " This provision was amended
in 1963 to authorize service according to the law of that state in which the "district court
1s held" rather than the state "in which the service is made .... FED. R. Crv. P. 4(d)(7) (1963).
265. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, §1061, at 199.
266. The amended Rule 4(f) provided:
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits
of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a statute
of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state.
In addition, persons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as addi-
tional parties to a pending action or a counter-claim or cross-claim therein pursuant
to Rule 19, may be served in the manner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6) of subdivision
(d) of this rule at all places outside the state but within the United States that are
not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is commenced, or to
which it is assigned or transferred for trial; and persons required to respond to an
order of commitment for civil contempt may be served at the same places. A sub-
poena may be served within the territorial limits provided in Rule 45.
Id.
267. The amended Rule 4(e) provided:
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides
for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon
a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court
is held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed
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country." 8
Further, extensive amendments to Rule 4 became effective on
by the statute or order, or, if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner
of service, in a manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of
the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons,
or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant
of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear
and respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment, or garnishment
or similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case
be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
Id. Rule 4(e) was captioned, "Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State."
Rule 4(d)(7), under the 1963 amendments, apparently described an alternative method of ser-
vice for individuals and corporations that were inhabitants or found within the state in which
the district court was held. The amended Rule 4(d)(7) provided:
Upon a defendant of any class referred to in paragraph (1) [individual] or (3) [cor-
poration] of this subdivision of this rule, it is also sufficient if the summons and
complaint are served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United States
or in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district court is
held for the service of summons or other like process upon any such defendant in
an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state.
Id. Professor Kaplan, Reporter for the 1963 amendments, felt that 4(d)(7) and 4(e) really were
not intended to be mutually exclusive (with 4(e) applying only to "nonpresent" individuals
and corporations and 4(d)(7) applying only to "present" individuals and corporations), but
that the two sections merely were intended to encompass state law on service of process. Kaplan,
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963(1), 77 HARV. L. REV. 601,
619-23 (1964). Rule 4(d)(7) is noteworthy, however, because it authorized service "in the man-
ner prescribed by the law of the state," thereby suggesting to some commentators that the
state law was not being incorporated into the federal rule but that the federal rule merely
prescribed the adoption of the state "technique" for service of process, see, e.g., Comment,
Choice of Law in the Federal Courts: Use of State or Federal Law to Determine Foreign Cor-
poration's Amenability to Suit, 1964 DuKE L. J. 351, 357 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Choice
of Law] (better view is that 4(d)(7) provides "only for the more mechanical aspects of service
of process, rather than containing, by inference, differing indicia as to when a defendant becomes
amenable to such service"); Note, supra note 188, at 1135 ("absence of . . . language ['under
the circumstances'] in Rule 4(d)(7) may indicate that when service is made within the state
in a state-prescribed manner, the federal courts need not imply a state standard for in per-
sonam jurisdiction from 'manner' or be concerned with the appropriateness of the situation
for use of the state service, but only the mechanics of state service"); but see Walker v. General
Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963) (state standard applied to service under Rule
4(d)(7)), while Rule 4(e) authorized service "under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed
in the [state] statute or rule," thereby suggesting that the state law was being incorporated
into the federal rule, including all substantive elements of the state statute such as state court
interpretations of the criteria necessary to trigger the statute. See, e.g., Comment, Return to
the Twilight Zone-Federal Long-Arm Jurisdiction and Amenability to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(f) Bulge Service of Process: Sprow v. Hartford Insurance Co., 41 OHIo ST. L.
J. 685, 701 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Return to the Twilight Zone] ("[s]ince state
long-arm jurisdiction is subject, to the fourteenth amendment due process constraints of the
International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine, it follows that a federal court borrowing the
state long-arm power is also bound by the dictates of International Shoe"). But see Arrowsmith
v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1963) (whether service is made under Rule
4(d)(3) or Rule 4(d)(7), question of amenability is separate and does not depend on language
of the Rule).
268. Rule 4(i), Alternative Provisions for Service in a Foreign Country, provided:
(1) Manner. When the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule
authorizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in
which the district court is held, and service is to be effected upon the party in a
foreign country, it is also sufficient if service of the summons and complaint is made:
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that
country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or (B) as directed
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February 26, 1983.269 Most changes involved issues outside the scope
by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory, when service in either case
is reasonably calculated to give actual notice; or (C) upon an individual, by delivery
to him personally, and upon a corporation or partnership or association, by delivery
to an officer, a managing or general agent; or (D) by any form of mail, requiring
a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the
party to be served; or (E) as directed by order of the court. Service under (C) or
(E) above may be made by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18
years of age or who is designated by order of the district court or by the foreign
court. On request, the clerk shall deliver the summons to the plaintiff for transmis-
sion to the person or the foreign court or officer who will make the service.
(2) Return. Proof of service may be made as prescribed by subdivision (g) of this
rule, or by the law of the foreign country, or by order of the court. When service
is made pursuant to subparagraph (1)(D) of this subdivision, proof of service shall
include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee
satisfactory to the court.
Id.
269. Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527. On January 15, 1982, the Advisory Committee
on Federal Civil Rules submitted its proposed amendments to Rule 4. Siegel, Practice Com-
mentary on Amendment of Federal Rule 4 (Eff. Feb. 26, 1983) With Special Statute of Limita-
tions Precautions, 96 F.R.D. 88, 90 (1983). The Supreme Court adopted the proposal, which
was then to take effect August 1, 1982 unless Congress acted to delay or amend the proposal.
Id. at 91. In response to many objections to the proposed amended Rule 4, Congress post-
poned the effective date to October 1, 1983 (Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246). 96 F.R.D.
at 91-92. Congress substantially revised the proposal. The amendment was signed by the Presi-
dent on January 12, 1983 and became effective, according to the enactment, on February 26,
1983 (Pub. L. No. 97-462). 96 F.R.D. at 92. Rule 4, as effective on February 26, 1983, is
reproduced in its entirety below.
Rule 4.
PROCESS
(a) Summons: Issuance. Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith
issue a summons and deliver the summons to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney,
who shall be responsible for prompt service of the summons and a copy of the com-
plaint. Upon request of the plaintiff separate or additional summons shall issue against
any defendants.
(b) Same: Form. The summons shall be signed by the clerk, be under the seal of
the court, contain the name of the court and the names of the parties, be directed
to the defendant, state the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, other-
wise the plaintiff's address, and the time within these rules require the defendant
to appear and defend, and shall notify him that in case of his failure to do so judg-
ment by default will be rendered against him for the relief demanded in the com-
plaint. When, under Rule 4(e), service is made pursuant to a statute or rule of court
of a state, the summons, or notice, or order in lieu of summons shall correspond
as nearly as may be to that required by the statute or rule.
(c) Service.
(1) Process, other than a subpoena or a summons and complaint, shall be served
by a United States marshal or deputy United States marshal, or by a person specially
appointed for that purpose.
(2)(A) A summons and complaint shall, except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and
(C) of this paragraph, be served by any person who is not a party and is not less
than 18 years of age.
(B) A summons and complaint shall, at the request of the party seeking service or
such party's attorney, be served by a United States marshal or deputy United States
marshal, or by a person appointed by the court for that purpose, only -
(i) on behalf of a party authorized to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Title
28, U.S.C. § 1915, or a seaman authorized to proceed under Title 28, § 1916,
(ii) on behalf of the United States or an officer or agency of the United States, or
(iii) pursuant to an order issued by the court stating that a United States marshal
or deputy United States marshal, or a person specially appointed for that purpose,
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is required to serve the summons and complaint in order that service be properly
effected in that particular action.
(C) A summons and complaint may be served upon a defendant of any class referred
to in paragraph (1) or (3) of subdivision (d) of this rule -
(i) pursuant to the law of the State in which the district court is held for the service
of summons or other like process upon such defendant in an action brought in the
courts of general jurisdiction of that State, or
(ii) by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint (by first-class mail,
postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of a notice
and acknowledgment conforming substantially to form 18-A and a return envelope,
postage prepaid, addressed to the sender within 20 days after the date of mailing,
service of such summons and complaint shall be made under subparagraph (A) or
(B) of this paragraph in the manner prescribed by subdivision (d)(1) or (d)(3).
(D) Unless good cause is shown for not doing so the court shall order the payment
of the costs of personal service by the person served if such person does not com-
plete and return within 20 days after mailing, the notice and acknowledgment of
receipt of summons.
(E) the notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons and complaint shall be
executed under oath or affirmation.
(3) The court shall freely make special appointments to serve summonses and com-
plaints under paragraph (2)(B) of this subdivision of this rule and all other process
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule.
(d) Summons and Complaint: Person to be Served. The summons and complaint
shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with
such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering
a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies
thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and
of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service
of process.
(2) Upon an infant or an incompetent person, by serving the summons and com-
plaint in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the service is made
for the service of summons or other like process upon any such defendant in an
action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state.
(3) Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other unincor-
porated association which is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering
a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general
agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service
of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant.
(4) Upon the United States, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the com-
plaint to the United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought
or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United
States attorney in a writing filed with the clerk of the court and by sending a copy
of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the Attorney
General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia, and in any action
attacking the validity of an order of an officer or agency of the United States not
made a party, by also seniling a copy of the summons and of the complaint by
registered or certified mail to such officer or agency.
(5) Upon an officer or agency of the United States, by serving the United States
and by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or cer-
tified mail to such officer or agency. If the agency is a corporation the copy shall
be delivered as provided in paragraph (3) of this subdivision of this rule.
(6) Upon a state or municipal corporation or other governmental organization thereof
subject to suit, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
chief executive officer thereof or by serving the summons and complaint in the man-
ner prescribed by the law of that state for the service of summons or other like
process upon any such defendant.
(e) Summons: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State. Whenever
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a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service
of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party
not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court is held,
service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the
statute or order, or, if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of ser-
vice, in a manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the
state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or
of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of
'or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear and
respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment of garnishment or similar
seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case be made
under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
(f) Territorial Limits of Effective Service. All process other than a subpoena may
be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court
is held, and when authorized by a statute of the United States or by these rules,
beyond the territorial limits of that state. In addition, persons who are brought in
as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as additional parties to a pending action or a
counterclaim or cross-claim therein pursuant to Rule 19, may be served in the man-
ner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6) of subdivision (d) of this rule at all places outside
the state but within the United States that are not more than 100 miles from the
place in which the action is commenced, or to which it is assigned or transferred
for trial; and persons required to respond to an order to commitment for civil con-
tempt may be served at the same places. A subpoena may be served within the ter-
ritorial limits provided in Rule 45.
(g) Return. The person serving the process shall make proof of service thereof to
the court promptly and in any event within the time during which the person served
must respond to the process. If service is made by a person other than a United
States marshal or deputy United States marshal, such person shall make affidavit
thereof. If service is made under subdivision (c)(2)(C)(ii) of this rule, return shall
be made by the sender's filing with the court the acknowledgment received pursuant
to such subdivision. Failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity
of the service.
(h) Amendment. At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just,
the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless
it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of
the party against whom the process issued.
(i) Alternative Provisions for Service in a Foreign Country.
(1) Manner. When the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule
authorizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in
which the district court is held, and service is to be effected upon the party in a
foreign country, it is also sufficient if service of the summons and complaint is made:
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that
country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or (B) as directed
by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory, when service in either case
is reasonably calculated to give actual notice: or (C) upon an individual, by delivery
to him personally, and upon a corporation or partnership or association, by delivery
to an officer, a managing or general agent; or (D) by any form of mail, requiring
a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the
party to be served; or (E) as directed by order of the court. Service under (C) or
(E) above may be made by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18
years of age or who is designated by order of the district court or by the foreign
court. On request, the clerk shall deliver the summons to the plaintiff for trans-
mission to the person or the foreign court or officer who will make the service.
(2) Return. Proof of service may be made as prescribed by subdivision (g) of this
rule, or by the law of the foreign country, or by order of the court. When service
is made pursuant to subparagraph (1)(D) of this subdivision, proof of service shall
include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the ad-
dressee satisfactory to the court.
(j) Summons. Time Limit for Service. If a service of the summons and complaint
is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and
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of this article.27 The amendment, however, might have some effect
on the question of federal court service of process as it relates to
personal jurisdiction of the federal courts: certain language from
subsection 4(d)(7) was dropped from the statute and other language
inexplicably was changed; the section also was moved to subsection
(c) of Rule 4 and renumbered as 4(c)(2)(C)(i). 27' These changes will
be discussed below where appropriate.2"2
3. Current Rule 4
Before discussing .the issue which has been so studiously ignored
by Congress-amenability standards in the federal courts, and, more
particularly, in federal question cases in the federal courts-this writer
must examine the various methods by which federal courts may effect
service of process under Rule 4. After considering the amenability
issue in general, the writer will turn to. the particular cases on which
this article is focused: federal question cases in federal courts.
Rule 4(d)(1) authorizes a federal court to serve individual defen-
dants who are either domiciled in, or present in, the state in which
the federal court is held by personal service on the defendant or
by substituted service "at his dwelling house or usual place of abode
.. .or by deliver[y]. . .to an agent authorized by appointment or
by law to receive service of process." '273 Rule 4(d)(3) provides a similar
the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why
such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to
that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such
party or upon motion. This subdivision shall not apply to service in a foreign coun-
try pursuant to subdivision (i) of this rule.
Id.
270. The primary stated purposes of the 1983 amendments to Rule 4 included "taking
the federal marshalls almost entirely out of summons service, allowing mail as a service method
with some qualifications, and introducing for the first time a limit for serving the summons
after the filing of the complaint." Changes in Federal Summons Service Under Amended Rule
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 96 F.R.D. 81, 81 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Changes
in Federal Summons Service]. The only changes of significance for the question of personaljurisdiction in the federal courts is the elimination of references in old Rule 4(d)(7) (new Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(i)) to service pursuant to federal statutes, compare Rule 4(d)(7), F.R.C.P. (1963) (quoted
supra in note 267) with Rule 4(C)(2)(C)(i) (1983) (quoted supra in note 269), and the change
in the text of Rule 4(d)(7) which authorized service "in the manner prescribed by the law of
the State in which the district court is held," see supra note 267, to the language "pursuant
to the law of the State in which the district court is held." See supra note 269. These changes
were not addressed in the practice commentary provided by Professor Siegel, see generally Changes
in Federal Summons Service, supra at Appendix A-Congressional Record. For further discus-
sion of this issue, see infra notes 1094-1102 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 270 and infra notes 1094-1102 and accompanying text.
272. See infra notes 1094-1102 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 269. As noted by Professors Hart and Wechsler, this rule "tells how
service of process is to be made upon a corporation which is subject to service, but it does
not tell when the corporation is so subject." H. HART AND H. WECHSLER, supra note 219,
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federal procedure for service upon domestic or foreign corporations,
partnerships or other unincorporated associations: "by deliver[y within
the state in which the district court is held].. .to any... agent authorized
by appointment or by law to receive service of process ... "I"
New Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) provides an alternative federal method for
serving 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) defendants: mailing service and an
acknowledgment form by first class mail if "such form is received
by the sender within 20 days after the date of mailing. ... "275 Other
federal means of service are authorized for service upon the United
States (Rule 4(d)(4)), service upon an officer or agency of the United
States (Rule 4(d)(5)), and service upon a state or municipal corpora-
tion or other governmental organization (Rule 4(d)(6)).276 The remain-
ing provisions for service of process involve incorporation into the
federal rule of some procedure authorized by state rule or statute
or by some federal statute. Under Rule 4(d)(2), for example, federal
service upon an infant or incompetent is to be "in the manner prescribed
by the law of the state in which service is made for service. . .upon
any such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general
jurisdiction of that state."27 As an alternative to the federal methods
of service provided in Rules 4(d)(1), 4(d)(3) and 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), such
defendants also may be served "pursuant to the law of the State
in which the district court is held for. . .service. .. upon such defen-
dant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of
that state" (Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i)).278 The version of this subsection that
was in effect prior to the 1983 amendments, former Rule 4(d)(7) (now
omitted), also provided that "it is also sufficient if [service is made]
. . .in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United States"
and described the alternative state service as "in the manner pre-
scribed by the law of the state, etc. ' 2 79 The legislative history on
these recent amendments does not shed any light on these particular
at 959. Must the court then utilize state law to determine amenability, or is amenability implicit
in the grant of authority to serve process?
274. See supra note 269.
275. Id. One of the primary reasons for amending Rule 4 was to enact a federal method
for making valid service of process by mail. See Changes In Federal Summons Service, supra
note 270, at Appendix A-Congressional Record. The changes in Rule 4 approved by the Supreme
Court permitted service by certified mail, return receipt requested. Id. This proposal was criticized
on the grounds that certified mail is not an effective method of providing actual notice to
defendants of claims against them because signatures may be illegible or may not match the
name of the defendant, or because it may be difficult to determine whether mail has been
"unclaimed" or "refused", the letter providing the sole basis for a default judgment. Id.
276. See supra note 269.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See supra note 267.
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changes.28 The incorporation of other federal methods of service pro-
bably was dropped because the new federal procedure of service by
mail was considered a sufficient federal alternative for service upon
defendants "of any class referred to in" 4(d)(1) or 4(d)(3). 8 ' The
change from "in the manner prescribed by" state law to "pursuant
to" state law is both puzzling and provocative. 82 The draftsmen possibly
intended that this change eliminate emphasis on the word "manner",
which had been interpreted as limiting former Rule 4(d)(7) to incor-
poration of the procedure or technique utilized by the courts of the
state but not to incorporation of the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess standards by which such state service was measured.283 By chang-
ing this language to the ambiguous phrase "pursuant to" state law,
however, no real clarification has been achieved. Moreover, the change
from "in the manner" to "pursuant to" has not aided in the con-
struction of the related Rule 4(e) which, in certain circumstances,
authorizes service "under the circumstances and in the manner prescrib-
ed" in a state statute or rule.284 Rule 4(e), by employing quite dif-
ferent language from Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), now might be interpreted to
mean that when a federal court utilizes a state long arm statute to
serve process on a nonpresent defendant, the federal court is not
acting under the state statute, as if it were a state court using the
statute, but is instead adopting only the technique and circumstances
of such service.2"' On the other hand, because of the silence of the
280. See generally Changes In Federal Summons Service, supra note 270. This writer has
found no references in the legislature history or Professor Siegel's commentary to these changes.
281. At least, one can argue rather forcefully that the part of Rule 4(d)(7) that permitted
utilization of available federal statutory methods for service on nonpresent defendants was
rendered unnecessary by the adoption of a workable general federal method-service by first
class mail. Dropping reference to other federal methods of service would seem to promote
uniformity among the federal courts with respect to the question of techniques for making
valid service. See Berger, supra note 191, at 286-98 (disturbing lack of uniformity among federal
courts on the question of personal jurisdiction).
282. Compare text of Rule 4(d)(7), supra note 267, with text of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), supra
note 269. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
283. Many courts and commentators have suggested that the language in former Rule 4(d)(7),
permitting service "in the manner prescribed by" state law, was to be interpreted as permitting
the federal court to adopt any technique of service used by the state in which the federal court
was held but not requiring the federal court to apply state substantive law to the question
of amenability." See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 269.
285. This might be too fine a distinction. Under prior law, by comparing the language
in former Rule 4(d)(7) with that in Rule 4(e), see supra note 267, however, courts and com-
mentators argued that when a federal court made service of process by using the state long-arm
statute, the language of Rule 4(e)-"under the circumstances" (which was added to Rule 4(e)
in the 1963 amendments)-established that the court was bound to follow not only the technical
tenets of the statute in regard to manner of service and to the persons on whom such service
could be made, but also was bound by any state substantive law interpreting the statute and
by any state standards of determining whether a particular defendant would be amenable to
suit-fourteenth amendment due process analysis. See, e.g., 4 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER,
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legislative history on this question, one might argue that the change
in language was unintentional or nonpurposive or that a similar change
to Rule 4(e) erroneously was omitted from the amendment. The ques-
tion of the relationship among former Rule 4(d)(7), new Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(i), and Rule 4(e) will be reexamined in the discussion of
amenability standards in federal question cases.286
Rule 4(e) deals with the problem of serving "a party not an in-
habitant of or found within the state in which the district court is
held." This section authorizes the federal court to make service "under
the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by" any pertinent
federal statute providing for extraterritorial service of process.287 If
no federal statute exists, then Rule 4(e) authorizes the federal court
to utilize any state long-arm statute for extraterritorial service, again
"under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by the state
statute. 188
Rule 4(i) provides several methods for service in a foreign country
and reiterates that the Rule 4(e) procedure of adopting a federal or
state statutory procedure includes any such authorization to make ser-
vice outside the country. 89 Rule 4(f) provides that, as a general matter,
federal process runs to the borders of the state in which the federal
court is sitting or, in some procedural settings, outside those borders
within a radius of 100 miles from the courthouse in which the case
is to be heard, unless extraterritorial service is "authorized by a statute
of the United States or by these rules." 29
While, as noted above, Rule 4 provides many different procedures
for validly serving process on a defendant, the Rule does not deal
expressly with the question of amenability. 9' This lack of an
amenability standard raises a number of questions, including the
following: Does the mere fact that Rule 4 authorizes a particular type
of service automatically subject the person or corporation thus served
to the personal jurisdiction of the federal court? Or, must the at-
supra note 4, § 1075, at 312-13; Edward J. Moriarity & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co.,
289 F. Supp. 381, 390-92 (D. Ohio 1967) (see infra notes 1253-65 and accompanying text);
U.S. v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The change in Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i)
to the language "pursuant to" state statute might be interpreted as demonstrating that Con-
gress knew how to express the concept of a federal court actually acting under a state statute
as opposed to the court merely adopting some procedural aspects of the statute. Under this
analysis, that Congress did not amend Rule 4(e) to change "in the manner and under the cir-
cumstances" language to the "pursuant to" language included in 4(c)(2)(C)(i) would be significant.
286. See infra notes 893-914, 1062-73, and 1094-1102 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 269.
288. Id. See also supra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 269.
290. Id.
291. See supra notes 251-62 and accompanying text.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
tempted assertion of jurisdiction survive some additional test similar
to the fourteenth amendment due process standard imposed on state
court assertions of personal jurisdiction? And, if some standard of
amenability must be satisfied, would that standard be the same
regardless of the manner of service? Moreover, what would be the
source of any standard or standards? Because of Congress' unwill-
ingness to directly address the question of amenability,292 courts and
commentators have been required to make law in this area,293 and
the law that they have made is often nonuniform and not always
rational in terms of the purported underpinnings of the federal court
system.294
4. Amenability Standards in the Federal Courts
a. The Problem
As noted above, the Supreme Court often has expressed the opin-
ion that Congress, consistent with the United States Constitution, could
authorize nationwide or even worldwide service of process. 2" The
Court, however, has not dealt directly with the question of whether
such authority also would include amenability to suit.2 96 The argu-
ment can be made that the ability of Congress to authorize service
would be useless if the service cannot meet amenability standards.
On the other hand, however, a federal statute authorizing nationwide
service of process might be quite appropriate in the abstract. Each
purported exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to the statute might
be examined by some standard of amenability just as state exercises
of judicial power authorized by state long arm statutes still are
examined to determine whether the defendant is amenable to suit.
Would assertion of personal jurisdiction over this defendant violate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment? "97
Commentators and courts generally have taken a number of dif-
ferent positions and have made varying generalizations concerning the
question of amenability to suit in federal courts. In a recent article
proposing a shift from a "contacts" analysis to an "interest" analysis
in state court personal jurisdiction cases, Professor McDougal noted:
[Allthough the discussion in this Article is about the states' authority,
it also applies, in most cases, to a federal court's authority to exer-
292. See supra notes 205-50 and accompanying text.
293. See infra notes 295-1355 and accompanying text.
294. Id. See also Berger, supra note 191, at 286-98.
295. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
296. See infra notes 400-92, 515-55, 579-86, and 637-75 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 106-85 and accompanying text.
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cise jurisdiction over a defendant who is not a resident of the state
in which the federal court sits.298
Professor McDougal also noted some circumstances in which Con-
gress had expanded federal court jurisdiction by authorizing service
of process beyond the boundaries of the state in which the district
court was held.299 He did not, however, distinguish between federal
question and diversity cases, nor did he consider any standard that
might apply in general to federal court assertions of personal jurisdic-
tion or, at least, to those situations of expanded federal court jurisdic-
tion. On the contrary, he implied that the fourteenth amendment
analysis generally would be determinative in federal courts.
In another recent article, Professor Weintraub asserted: "The outer
limits of personal jurisdiction are marked by the due process clause
of the fifth (federal courts) and fourteenth (state courts) amendments
of the United States Constitution. ' ' 30 0
Although failing to distinguish between diversity and federal ques-
tion cases, Professor Weintraub raised the question whether a federal
court using a state long-arm process also must follow state limits on
amenability imposed when the statute was used by state courts and
argued that a "suggestion that [the] federal court need not follow
state limits on personal jurisdiction. . .seems very questionable." 3 '
He also mentioned the possibility of "a special federal statute grant-
298. McDougal, supra note 73, at 7-8 (footnotes omitted). See also Kamp, supra note
2, at 53-54 (stating that limitations on the jurisdictional reach of state courts also apply to
federal courts employing the long-arm of the state court pursuant to Federal Rule 4(e) and
suggesting, by citation of both diversity and nondiversity cases, that these limitations would
apply to all cases in which service had been made according to the state statute).
299. McDougal, supra note 73, at 8 n.49.
300. Weintraub, Jurisdiction Over the Foreign Non-Sovereign Defendant, 19 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 431, 432 (1982). See also Comment, supra note 82, at 163 n.43 ("fifth amendment's
due process clause should limit federal jurisdiction . . . and the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause should limit state jurisdiction. . . .); Foster, supra note 26, at 31 ("In theory,
at least, the due process clause of the fifth amendment, not the fourteenth, should control
the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a district court"). As Professor Green observed more
than 20 years ago:
A great deal has been written about the personal jurisdiction of state courts and
particularly about the applicable due process requirements. Much less has been con-
tributed by commentators on the subject of due process requirements applying in
personam jurisdiction of a United States district court. Perhaps the reason is the
difficulty of finding a rationale in the pertinent decisions. These fail to distinguish
between the conditions necessary for valid service of federal court process as con-
trasted with those essential to the proper service of state process. They also fail to
explain why the constitutional provision brings about the result which they announce.
Green, supra note 191, at 967 (footnotes omitted). From the time of his writing to the present,
very little has changed: commentators and courts still make bald, unsupported assertions in
regard to personal jurisdiction in federal courts, with few even making a genuine effort to
sort out the significant questions, let alone setting about, in an organized fashion, to resolve
some or all of these issues. See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
301. Weintraub, supra note 300, at 437.
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ing jurisdiction over the defendant," 3 2 but did not discuss standards
in those situations. Thus, while asserting that the fifth amendment
and the fourteenth amendment would apply in federal and state courts,
respectively, Professor Weintraub did not define any fifth amendment
standard nor describe when such a standard would be appropriate.
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court touched on the
question in a different way in Atkinson v. Superior Court,3"3 in which
he employed a "center-of-gravity" test to assert jurisdiction over a
nonresident trustee of a California employees' trust fund. In the course
of his opinion, he argued that if federal courts were constitutionally
entitled to nationwide service of process in some cases, state courts
also should have such an entitlement:
It is doubtful whether today the United States Supreme Court would
deny to a state court the interstate interpleader jurisdiction that
federal courts may exercise. A remedy that a federal court may pro-
vide without violating due process of law does not become unfair
or unjust because it is sought in a state court instead.""
In this statement which displays a definite rejection of any doctrine
requiring recognition of the separate sovereignties of separate states,3 °0
Justice Traynor apparently recognized no distinction between "due
process of law" as it would be applied in federal courts or state courts.
He suggested, moreover, that limitations on states should be coexten-
sive with those imposed on federal courts. Furthermore, like the com-
mentators noted above, he did not distinguish between diversity and
federal question cases.
Professor Peterfreund recognized one aspect of the federal court
personal jurisdiction problem:
Unfortunately, the courts have not yet decided what the due process
limits of federal jurisdiction are. As applied to foreign corporations,
does the International Shoe formula, prescribing the limits of state
jurisdiction, likewise control federal jurisdiction? Here, too, basic
302. Id.
303. 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed sub nom. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
304. Id. at 348, 316 P.2d at 966.
305. Professors James and Hazard have described such a concept of "reverse" sovereignty:
Instead of thinking of the states as independent sovereigns between which peaceful
relations must be maintained through the Due Process Clause, the state court systems
taken as a whole can be conceived as the primary mechanism for adjudicating cases
domestic to the country as a whole, other than those based on federal law. As such,
they have not only the power but the duty to extend their process, in the form of
notice, to all parties who should or might be joined under modern concepts of party
joinder.
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §12.30, at 661-62 (2d ed. 1977). Cf. Note, Interstate
Jurisdictional Compacts: A New Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1097
(1981) (suggesting expansion of the personal jurisdiction of state courts by interstate compacts).
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considerations are different. State sovereignty is limited by its boun-
daries, and minimum contacts with the forum state may properly
be required under the fourteenth amendment; but for federal actions
Congress could, consistent with the fifth amendment, provide for
nationwide service as it has done in various special situations. The
solutions to such problems are none too clear .... "I
Since this statement was written, little or no ground has been gained
in the establishment 0 7 of a fifth amendment standard different from
the standard applied in state courts under the fourteenth amendment.3"8
As Professor Peterfreund sensibly noted, such a distinction seems
justified because the positions taken by various courts are
nonuniform.3 "9
Professors Hart and Wechsler have asserted that state law might
control some aspects of federal court personal jurisdiction:
When federal service is sought to be justified. . .by reference to
state law, it is clear, is it not, that the limitations of state law are
controlling?... By the same token, federal constitutional limitations
upon the acquisition of jurisdiction by state courts may also be con-
sidered relevant, not because they apply directly to federal courts,
but because federal consequences cannot properly be attached to an
unconstitutional state law.
310
They noted, however, that "[t]he cases. . .seem largely to have pro-
ceeded on the assumption that state law, and the due process restric-
tions on acquisition of jurisdiction by state courts, are controlling
upon the federal district courts in all situations. ' '31 ' Finally, they sug-
gested that uniform federal standards might be appropriate in all cases
in federal courts or, at least, in federal question cases.
312
306. Peterfreund, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 491, 499 (1957)
(footnotes omitted). this position assumes that state courts are restricted by notions of sovereignty
and would not be entitled, as federal courts could be, to national service of process. This
is contrary to the position taken by Justice Traynor. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying
text.
307. See infra notes 329-1255 and accompanying text. Some commentators and courts have,
implicitly or explicitly, taken the position that the due process clauses are coterminus. See,
e.g., supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text and infra notes 739-47, 823-38, and 866-71
and accompanying text. Others have argued that while some distinction should exist, four-
teenth amendment standards would be more strict than fifth amendment standards and since
the case in point satisfied fourteenth amendment standards no fifth amendment test needed
to be formulated therein. See, e.g., infra notes 969-71, 1199-1200, and 1209-10 and accom-
panying text. Finally, others have urged that different standards apply to state and federal
courts, but then have failed to formulate any such standards. See, e.g., infra notes 834-38
and 920-28 and accompanying text.
308. See infra notes 329-1355 and accompanying text. See also supra note 300.
309. Id.
310. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 219, at 959.
311. Id. at 960.
312. Id.
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Professors Wright and Miller recognized many of the distinctions
that are important for the question of personal jurisdiction in the
federal courts:
As a general rule the broad principles [applying to state courts] apply
with equal force to the United States district courts in the absence
of a federal statute extending or contracting the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. An interesting issue. . .is whether in the absence of
an applicable federal statute a federal court is limited by and is
obliged to follow the particular jurisdictional principles of the state
in which it sits or whether it is free to develop a federal test of
amenability to suit. . . .The law is quite clear that when suit is
brought in a federal court on a federally created right, the terms
of any applicable federal statute, general federal law, and the con-
cepts of due process... provide the guidelines as to whether a foreign
corporation is amenable to process. However, if the right sued on
is state-created and subject matter jurisdiction rests on diversity of
citizenship, the question becomes more complex. When the federal
court is sitting in a state that has extended its jurisdictional reach
to or near the limits permitted by the Constitution, it probably makes
little difference whether state or federal law controls, since the two
will be virtually identical. . .[T]he states are not required to assert
jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause if
they do not choose to do so. Thus, when suit is brought in a federal
court sitting in a state that has decided to stop short of the con-
stitutional limits, the question whether a federal court is at liberty
to go further than the state standard would permit a state court
to go in exercising jurisdiction is a matter of somewhat greater
significance. '1 3
This statement falls far short, however, of distinguishing all signifi-
cant issues. First, the writers assume that the due process clauses are
coextensive and that any territorial limitation to be recognized when
a federal court relies on state methods of service would be that of
the state in which the federal court is held. Second, they maintain
that the "law is quite clear" with regard to federal rights, with "ap-
plicable federal statute[s], general federal law, and the concepts of
due process" providing amenability guidelines.3 " This assertion fails
to recognize that most applicable federal statutes are silent on the
issue of amenability, providing only for service of process beyond
the borders of the state in which the federal court is sitting. 3t5 This
313. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, §1075, at 302-04 (footnotes omitted).
314. The cases cited for this proposition support an assertion that some federal standard
should apply, but the perimeters and parameters of that standard are not established in those
cases.
315. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
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gives rise to a conflict as to whether amenability is implicit if process
can be served on the defendant or whether an amenability standard
also must be satisfied.3 '1 6 Third, little, if any, "general federal law"
seems to exist on the question of amenability, which hardly is startling
considering the nonchalant and haphazard way in which Congress and,
by necessity, the courts, have dealt with all aspects of federal court
jurisdiction." 7 Reliance on "the copcepts of due process," moreover,
begs the question of whether these concepts are the same when ap-
plied in federal courts as they are when applied in state courts. Finally,
while Professors Wright and Miller recognize that diversity cases might
be treated differently from nondiversity cases, these writers neglect
to distinguish between those diversity cases in which service is achieved
pursuant to some state long-arm statute and those in which service
is made pursuant to a federal procedure.
Professor Wright, in his treatise on the federal courts, has recently
taken the following position:3 '8
The due process limitations on the amenability of a foreign cor-
poration to suit within a state are not peculiarly, nor even
particularly, a problem for the federal courts ...
There is an aspect of the problem, however, that is peculiar to
the federal courts. The principles discussed so far [-procedure for
service of process under Rule 4,319 presence and/or domicile in a
state as a basis for state court personal jurisdiction and for federal
court jurisdiction "if the procedure for service satisfies due process
requirements by providing a means reasonably calculated to give him
notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard,"32 and
the development of limitations on state court assertions of jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations32' - ] represent federal constitutional
limitations. If suit in federal court is on a federally-created right,
these federal general law concepts are the sole guide as to whether
a foreign corporation is amenable to process.322 The matter is not
so simple, however, where the right sued on is state-created and
jurisdiction rests on diversity. The landmark jurisdictional decisions
of the Supreme Court show the extent to which the states may go,
316. See infra notes 561-798 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 205-50 and accompanying text.
318. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §64, at 419-20 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
319. Id. at 411-15.
320. Id. at 415.
321. Id. at 417-19.
322. Many other commentators have made similar bald, unsupported assertions. See infra
note 329. Courts also have followed the procedure of "pronouncing" the law to be as described
by Professor Wright. See, e.g., Singleton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 20 F.R.D. 15, 17
(1956) (dictum: "It seems clear that, where a federally-created right is being asserted in a federal
court, federal law governs whether a foreign corporation is doing business within the district
in which that federal court is sitting."). See also infra note 497.
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consistent with due process, in making foreign corporations suable
in their courts, but due process does not compel the states to go
this far if they do not choose to do so. If a corporation cannot
be sued in state court, because the state has not gone as far as the
Constitution permits, is it consistent with the Erie doctrine for a
federal court to entertain a diversity action against the corporation
in that state?
While Professor Wright recognizes a possible distinction between diver-
sity and federal question cases, he fails to address any possible dif-
ficulties with federal question cases, assuming both that a federal stan-
dard would apply and that a federal standard does exist. Contrary
to his assertion that he had discussed "federal general law concepts"
which "represent federal constitutional limitations," Professor Wright
merely addressed cases involving limitations on state court assertions
of personal jurisdiction and Federal Rule 4 procedures for serving
process.323 He therefore never reached the significant and troubling
issue of the definition of a truly federal standard. Moreover, he failed
to recognize that methods of serving process, whether state or federal,
might affect the personal jurisdiction of the federal court in question.324
Instead, he separated federal question cases from diversity cases, pro-
nouncing personal jurisdiction in federal question cases a purely federal
323. One might argue that implicit in his analysis is the assumption that Rule 4 includes
federal amenability standards as well as procedures for service of process. This simplistic and
conclusory approach, however, obscures the difficult issue involved and creates the false im-
pression that some well-defined federal standard has been established. An examination of the
cases cited in support of Professor Wright's assertion that "federal general law concepts are
the sure guide" of amenability in federal question cases reveals that the question was anything
but settled. See Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry, 397 F.2dI (2d Cir. 1968) (discussed infra
at notes 823-33 and accompanying text), and Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & 0.
R.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954) (discussed infra at notes 856-65 and accompanying text).
324. Often in federal question cases no special federal statute authorizes extraterritorial
service of process, and process must be served, pursuant to Rule 4(e), "under the circumstances
and in the manner prescribed" in a statute or rule of the state in which the court is held.
See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1915) (Rule 4(e) applies to
federal question as well as diversity cases); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D.
216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (same). Did Professor Wright include these as cases in which "federal
general law concepts [would be] the sole guide?" Of course, one might argue that Rule 4(e)
has "absorbed" or "incorporated" the state statute into federal law and that, therefore, the
state statute, with or without its various substantive interpretations, has become part of "federal
general law." Professor Wright, however, does not raise such a possibility. This question does
not arise too frequently because of the substantial limitations, under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b), on
venue in federal question cases. Moreover, in some diversity cases, service of process is achieved
by wholly federal means such as service upon an individual "by leaving copies . . . at his
dwelling house or usual place df abode" (FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (d)(1)) or upon a corporation
"by delivering a copy . . . to an officer" of the corporation (FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3)) or upon
either "by mailing a copy . . . to the person to be served, together with two copies of a
notice and acknowledgement." (FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)). Should the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a federal court be limited to those exercises granted by state legislatures to state
courts of the state in which the federal court is held even though no state statute for service
of process had been utilized? Again, Professor Wright did not address this distinction.
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matter of simple solution and personal jurisdiction in diversity cases
''not so simple."
Finally, in an article written almost twenty years ago, Professors
von Mehren and Trautman commented:
25
We do not deal separately with problems of adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts of the United States, but nothing in the
situation of these courts renders our analysis inapplicable in princi-
ple to them. The analysis does not take into account the perplexities
and the opportunities that derive from the ambiguous situation of
our federal courts which, in one aspect, function as parts of a unitary
legal system but, in another, are fragmented and function as organs
of the distinct legal orders of the several states. Insofar as the federal
judiciary functions as a unitary system, the problem of adjudicatory
jurisdiction disappears internally, and determination of the place of
trial might well be handled administratively .... 326 At least with
respect to diversity jurisdiction, however, it is hard to imagine such
a development within the foreseeable future. Instead, the federal
system is likely to continue to combine elements of unity and
diversity.
They continued:
In any event, in enforcement of claims arising under federal law,
there is little reason for a federal court to refuse to proceed merely
because the courts of the state in which it is sitting would not claim
jurisdiction.
Perhaps because of a traditional reluctance to prescribe federal
standards in the case of diversity litigation as well as an instinct
for symmetry, federal law does not today directly prescribe general
and comprehensive jurisdictional regulations for the federal courts
in either type of litigation. Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.. .applies without distinction to federal-question and diver-
sity litigation. The rule provides for the use of federal jurisdictional
standards to the extent these are furnished by "a statute of the United
States." The rule further adopts jurisdictional provisions contained
in "statute[s] or rule[s] of court of the state in which the district
court is held. . ....
This approach incorporating state jurisdictional provisions is fully
understandable for diversity cases. . . .In the absence of a complete
jurisdictional scheme provided by a federal statute, the approach also
seems clearly necessary and proper for federal question cases...
.Rule 4(e)'s incorporative approach can, however, produce perplex-
ities when federal claims are to be litigated. The difficulties derive
325. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1123.
326. As observed by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in U.S. v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 387-88 (1964), "But 'jurisdiction' is not synonymous with naked power.
It is a combination of power and policy."
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from the fact that any given state necessarily views the jurisdictional
problem from the perspective of its community, but, insofar as
federal-law questions are concerned, the appropriate community may
become the nation as a whole. Jurisdiction to adjudicate may well
be properly assumed from the latter perspective though refused from
the former. 327
Professors von Mehren and Trautman discussed a federal question
case in which the defendant's connections with the entire United States
were far more significant, for the federal claim, than its connections
with the state under whose long-arm statute service had been made.
They continued:
Perhaps it would be useful when state provisions are used, as it
were by default, in the enforcement of federal claims, to recognize
that some aspects of the state law can be disregarded .... That clearly
should occur with restrictions in the state-law provisions that are
irrelevant in the federal context. .... 328
These statements reveal a clear understanding of some of the prob-
lems of personal jurisdiction in federal courts, recognizing possible
distinctions between federal question and diversity cases and between
state and federal court assertions of personal jurisdiction. Although
the authors suggest the inappropriateness of employing a state
amenability standard in federal courts in some circumstances, they
do not, nor do they intend to, address the issue of exactly what federal
standard would be sufficient. They nevertheless clearly recognize signifi-
cant distinctions between state and federal courts and the ways in
which those distinctions might affect the analysis of personal jurisdic-
tion questions.
b. The Fifth Amendment
Most courts and commentators generally agree that federal courts
are limited in their assertions of personal jurisdiction by the fifth
amendment due process clause of the Constitution and that state courts
are subject to fourteenth amendment proscriptions.3"9 Almost no one,
327. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1123-24 n.6.
328. Id. at 1125 n.6.
329. Commentators: See, e.g., Green, supra note 191, at 968 (quoting (Tent. Draft No.
3 1956) Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws §38: "The rendition of a judgment by
a federal court when the United States has no judicial jurisdiction is a violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution; similar action on the part of the
state violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Weintraub, supra note
300, at 432 ("The outer limits of personal jurisdiction are marked by the due process clauses
of the fifth (federal courts) and fourteenth (state courts) amendments of the United States
Constitution")); Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Out- Foreign Corporations, 35 COLUM. L. REv.
591, 598-99 (1935) ("[j]urisdiction of a particular district court over foreign corporations may
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however, seems to be able to enunciate a fifth amendment standard.33
The assumption is that the limitation would be less restrictive than
that on state courts,33' because state territorial boundaries should be
less significant in a federal context than in a state context." 2 Finding
become flexible in the hands of Congress [but] there are . . . intimations that this power is
restricted by the Fifth Amendment"); Note, supra note 261, at 516-17 ("Whereas inconve-
nience may be relevant in determining whether the territorial power of a state has been exceed-
ed, it can only be a fifth amendment criterion, applicable to the federal courts, if there is
some limit to arbitrary assignment of jurisdiction within a single national sovereignity"). See
also Abraham, supra note 217, at 531 ("Aside from Erie, another possible source of constitu-
tional limitations upon the territorial reach of federal process is the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment"); Victor & Good, Personal Jurisdiction, Venue and Service of Process in
Antitrust Cases Involving International Trade: Amenability of Alien Corporations to Suit,
46 ANTTRUST L.J. 1063, 1076 (1977) ("In federal question cases, such as those under the an-
titrust laws, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment technically controls") Comment,
National Contacts, supra note 186, at 697-98 ("The due process clause of the fifth amendment
represents the only constraint upon a federal court's in personam power where the claim arises
under federal law"); Comment, Choice of Law, supra note 267, at 355 n.18 ("One possible
explanation for the deference given to International Shoe by the [federal] courts . . . is that
the constitutional proscriptions set forth there may be binding on the federal courts under the
fifth amendment due process clause"); Note, The Limits of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Under
Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 268, 296-97 (1979)
("Fifth amendment due process limitations on personal jurisdiction of the federal courts im-
port the same considerations of fairness as those applicable to the states by virtue of the four-
teenth amendment [hereinafter cited as Note, Limits of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction]); Note,
supra note 261, at 516 ("it can only be a fifth amendment criterion, applicable to the federal
courts"); 10 SETON HALL L. REv. 699, 717 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Jurisdiction]
("Although it is clear that Congress has extensive power in designing the federal judicial system,
it is not clear what exact limitations the due process clause of the fifth amendment place on
the exercise of that power"); Comment, Return to the Twilight Zone, supra note 267, at 697
("The due process considerations controlling on the federal courts are those found in the fifth
amendment"). Courts: See infra note 497 and accompanying text. But see Insurance Corp.
of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). In Insurance
Corp. of Ireland, a diversity case, the Supreme Court failed or refused to distinguish between
the fifth and fourteenth amendments, stating: "The requirement that a court have personal
jurisdiction flows not from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause." Id.
330. As one recent commentator noted:
Given [the] distinction between the constitutional due process authority of state and
federal courts to exert personal jurisdiction, the question remains what due process
standard is to govern federal courts' power. In the context of state in personam jurisdic-
tion, the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine has evolved as the standard
by which fourteenth amendment due process is to be measured. No comparable due
process doctrine has been unequivocally developed for implementation of the fifth
amendment's constraints on the federal courts, presumably because Congress generally
has not structured the federal judicial power in a manner that would allow federal
court assertion of personal jurisdiction to the nationwide limits permitted by the
Constitution.
Comment, Return to the Twilight Zone, supra note 267, at 699. Professor Berger describes
some of the different judicial approaches to this question:
Some federal courts duplicate the state court fourteenth amendment due process
analysis. Others purport to apply a fifth amendment due process test, while in reality
applying fourteenth amendment standards. Still others apply a fifth amendment test,
examining the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts with the United States. Although
federal courts all espouse one of those three approaches, several courts actually rely
on federal venue or transfer of venue statutes to ensure fairness to a defendant.
Berger, supra note 191, at 310-11 (footnotes omitted).
331. See, e.g., infra notes 969-71, 1199-1200 and 1209-10 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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that federal limitations should be "looser" than those on the states,
courts and commentators often fall back on the state standard, argu-
ing that .if a particular assertion of personal jurisdiction satisfies the
fourteenth amendment, or the even more restrictive grant of personal
jurisdiction by the states to their courts, the fifth amendment also
must be satisfied.333 Clearly, such "definition by overinclusion" has
not helped resolve the question of an appropriate, workable fifth
amendment standard.
In seeking to define a fifth amendment limitation, others have at-
tempted to parallel the test developed for fourteenth amendment due
process limitations on state courts.334 An immediate problem in any
consideration arises, however, because earlier limitations on state courts
were purely territorial in nature, allowing states to assert jurisdiction
over anybody or anything within their borders. People or things out-
side state borders were off-limits to the early state court.335 To truly
parallel the development of the fourteenth amendment standard, a
territorial limitation of federal courts first must be defined. As sug-
gested by Professor Barrett:336
On the one hand, [Congress] might have treated the continental United
States as a single jurisdiction. On this basis service of process would
have been permitted throughout the United States .... On the other
hand, Congress might have treated the individual federal districts as
independent states. On this basis service of process would have been
restricted to the district in which suit was brought. .... "I
The Judiciary Act of 1789, 331 as construed,339 adopted the second alter-
333. See, e.g., infra notes 969-71, 1199-1200, and 1209-10 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., infra notes 683-784 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 4 and 76 and accompanying text. As noted by one early writer, reliance
on any territorial notions may be wholly inappropriate: "The power of state courts is limited
by territorial sovereignty; the distribution of power among the federal district courts, however,
is derived from the will of Congress." Note, supra note 261, at 509.
336. Barrett, supra note 235, at 608.
337. As to venue, Professor Barrett argued that, under the first alternative, "venue rules
would have been designed to channel litigation into the most convenient district, and provision
would have been made for a motion for change of venue to be granted wherein the suit was
commenced in a district which did not have venue," while, under the second alternative, "venue
of transitory actions would have been made proper in any district in which the defendant could
be found for service of process." Barrett, supra note 235, at 608.
338. See supra notes 205-22 and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., Ex parte Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 5657). In
Graham, Mr. Justice Washington commented:
The absence of ... power [to issue process outside the district], would seem necessarily
to result from the organization of the courts of the United States. . . . This division
and appointment of particular courts, for each district, necessarily confines the jurisdic-
tion of the local tribunals, within the bounds of the respective districts, within which
they are directed to be holden.
Id. at 912. See also Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.E.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134)
(effectiveness of writ limited to judicial district because of "organization" of the federal court
system).
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native by treating the judicial districts as separate jurisdictions.3"' This
choice clearly limited the personal jurisdiction of federal courts even
more substantially than did similar limitations on state courts; often,
federal judicial districts were smaller than the states in which the federal
district courts sat.3"' With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938, the authority of federal courts to serve process
was extended to the boundaries of the states in which the federal
district courts were situated. 342 Therefore, the territorial reach of a
federal court in 1938 was coextensive with that of the courts of the
state in which it sat, and, in any analysis based on paralleling develop-
ment of fourteenth amendment standards, the parallel lines
converged. 343 Meanwhile, however, Congress had authorized federal
courts to serve process extraterritorially in certain limited
circumstances 344 and to exceed territorial boundaries when necessary
to resolve some multiple party problems. 345 Apparently, therefore, the
fifth amendment does not impose territorial limits other than, perhaps,
the boundaries of the United States, on the federal courts; otherwise,
Congress would have exceeded those limits in enacting the aforemen-
tioned statutes.
The inference cannot be made, however, that the fifth amendment
imposes no limitations on federal court exercises of personal jurisdic-
tion. At least one commentator maintains, for example, that nation-
wide service of process for federal courts in all circumstances might
not go unchallenged; that is, present Congressional authorizations of
nationwide service of process have not been seriously challenged
because the statutes have been very narrowly drawn. 34 6 This reason-
ing, in turn, ties in with the goal of "reasonableness" that has been
pursued so fervently in the development of fourteenth amendment
due process standards. 347
Others have sought to parallel fourteenth amendment analysis by
applying a "minimum contacts" test to determine the reasonableness
340. Foster, supra note 26 at 9; Note, supra note 188, at 1143. See Philadelphia & Reading
Ry. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
341. See Foster, supra note 26, at 9.
342. See infra note 363 and accompanying text. Thus, federal process was still generally
limited by state lines.
343. As one commentator noted: "Thus in a sense the federal courts have remained local
courts, and a jurisdictional standard such as International Shoe evolved for the territorially
limited jurisdiction of the state, is not without relevance for the federal courts." Note, supra
note 188, at 1144.
344. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
345. 28 U.S.C. §2361 (1976) (Interpleader); 28 U.S.C. §1695 (1976) (Shareholder's deriva-
tion suits); 49 U.S.C. §11705(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (Interstate Commerce Commissions Act).
346. Foster, supra note 26, at 37.
347. See supra notes 106-85 and accompanying text.
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of an assertion of jurisdiction by a federal court over a particular
defendant.3"8 In turn, this leads back to the question of territoriality.
If a defendant's contacts are to be examined in order to determine
whether they are sufficient to satisfy a "minimum contacts" analysis,
the territorial entity with which the defendant's contacts are to be
measured must be identified. In some recent cases,3"9 particularly those
in which process was served according to a federal statute authoriz-
ing nationwide service of process,"' the territorial entity-the
sovereign-has been defined as the United States, with the defendant's
contacts with the country as a whole being examined for sufficiency."'
In sum, those commentators and courts that actually have attempted
to describe or define some Fifth Amendment standard of due process
usually have argued: (1) that Congress can authorize nationwide ser-
vice of process, and (2) where Congress has done so, the defendant's
contacts with the United States should be examined under a minimum
contacts analysis. This solution, however, falls short of resolving the
entire fifth amendment question. First, one might argue that such
reliance on notions of territoriality would be misplaced. Instead of
rotely following the fourteenth amendment minimum contacts test into
a larger jurisdiction, some argue that, "[iln the context of the fifth
amendment,. . due process should limit the exercise of federal in
personam jurisdiction to what is fair and reasonable."" ' 2 Aggrega-
tion of a defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole,
moreover, might not be "fair and reasonable," especially since a defen-
dant would be amenable to suit in every federal district which could
serve him with process, no matter how inconveniently located, if he
had sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole."3 As noted
below, any unfairness in this regard could be eliminated by limita-
348. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 1966) ("the constitu-
tional limitation upon service of process from a state court ...provides a helpful and often-
used guideline").
349. See infra cases discussed at notes 687-738, 872-87, and 1269-1316.
350. See infra cases discussed at notes 687-738.
351. See, e.g., Note, Limits of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 329, at 297 ("due
process requires minimum contacts with the territory of the sovereign exercising judicial power
[, and wihen process is served pursuant to the bulge provision of Rule 4(f), the sovereign exer-
cising judicial power, even in a diversity case, is the United States") (footnotes omitted); Com-
ment, Return to the Twilight Zone, supra note 267, at 699-700 ("In the few cases that have
addressed a standard of fifth amendment due process constraints on the federal courts, the
majority of lower federal courts have analogized to the International Shoe fourteenth amend-
ment minimum contacts doctrine and held that a federal court can assert personal jurisdiction
over a party if that party is present within the territorial limits of the United States or has
a sufficient nexus (i.e. minimum contacts) with the United States").
352. Note, Jurisdiction, supra note 329, at 718. See Foster, supra note 26, at 36; Oxford
First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 198-204 (1974) (appropriate test of
fifth amendment due process should be based on fundamental fairness to the defendant).
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tions on the location of trial.354 One writer has suggested a modifica-
tion of the "national minimum contacts" test which might be more
fair to defendants: 35
5
Defining [the fifth amendment] standard in the realities of the federal
system should not. . .result in the same test which has been
established for the exercise of state court jurisdiction-minimum con-
tacts. On the other hand, the fair and reasonable standard in the
federal context should not be satisfied solely by the procedural due
process requirement of notice. While notice should be one of the
factors considered, other factors worthy of consideration are: (1)
the defendant's contacts with the forum; (2) the inconvenience to
the defendant resulting from distant litigation; (3) the likelihood of
multiplicious litigation; (4) the probable situs of discovery; and, (5)
the nature of the activity upon which the litigation is based, especially
in regard to the scope of the activity outside of the particular
forum.
3 56
A second problem with the "national minimum contacts" test as
a measure of fifth amendment due process requirements is that it might
be limited to cases in which a defendant had been served with pro-
cess pursuant to some federal statute authorizing nationwide service.357
The test most aptly parallels the fourteenth amendment test in only
those circumstances. If that were the result, it is clear that the goal
of devising a single fifth amendment amenability standard would not
be achieved.
Efforts to define a workable fifth amendment test for federal court
exercises of personal jurisdiction have been far from satisfactory. This
353. The only amenability standard would be "presence where served."
354. See infra notes 657, 693, 880-82, and 1086 and accompanying text.
355. Note, Jurisdiction, supra note 329, at 718-19 (footnotes omitted).
356. One commentator has recently proposed as a federal amenability standard the defen-
dant's presence in the jurisdiction in which valid process is served pursuant to one of the methods
available to a federal court. See Berger, supra note 191. Professor Berger's suggestion deals
rather neatly with the difficulties of rationalizing federal cases involving all of the myriad methods
for service of process available to federal courts. The amenability standard moreover, could
be employed in diversity as well as federal question cases because the test is completely in-
dependent of the grounds on which the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court is based
and the means by which service is made. While proposing a plan which would go a long way
toward making order out of the federal court personal jurisdiction chaos which she so aptly
describes in her article, Professor Berger does not address the question of a fifth amendment
due process standard. See Berger, supra at 286-98. If suich standard is based, in part, on fairness
or reasonableness to the defendant, her proposal completely ignores these issues, for what she
suggests really eliminates any requirement of a separate evaluation of amenability; personal
jurisdiction would exist whenever the defendant could be validly served. Using "presence" as
an amenability standard would really be redundant with the requirement that the defendant
be served; the bottom line of such a proposal would be that implicit in the authority of a
federal court to serve process is the authority to assert personal jurisdiction over the person
so served.
357. See infra notes 687-738 and accompanying text.
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is understandable in the context of the following circumstances: (1)
Congress has expended little concentrated, organized effort in defin-
ing the personal jurisdiction of federal courts; 358 (2) no federal statute
comparable to state long-arm statutes exists;359 (3) federal statutes that
specifically authorize extraterritorial service of process usually cover
only service of process and do not include any affirmative grant of
personal jurisdiction authority to accompany proper service of pro-
cess, nor do these statutes refer, in any way, to amenability;360 (4)
the only federal rule dealing with personal jurisdiction speaks
specifically to service of process alone and, like the statutes, does
not include any affirmative grant of personal jurisdiction authority
to accompany proper service of process nor does it refer, in any way,
to amenability; 36' (5) the methods of service of process available to
a federal court under Rule 4 include both purely federal methods and
state methods; depending, therefore, on interpretation of Rule 4 and
the subsection of Rule 4 under which service is made, the service
methods, including any due process limitations imposed on state courts
utilizing the same statutes, either are incorporated into federal law
or merely provide the technique for achieving service of process with
amenability to be determined in an independent federal analysis;'6 2
(6) the Supreme Court, in its majority opinion in a recent diversity
case, Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee,363 refused to distinguish between the fifth and fourteenth
amendments or discuss the appropriate amenability standard in this
diversity case involving service pursuant to a state long arm statute
in which the District Court, in response to repeated failures of the
defendants to comply with discovery orders in regard to jurisdictional
facts, sanctioned the defendants by assuming such facts. The Supreme
Court referred throughout its opinion to "the Due Process Clause 364
and cited International Shoe,36 a case establishing a fourteenth amend-
ment due process standard for state courts.366
Obviously, a workable and theoretically sound fifth amendment stan-
dard can be devised only after careful consideration of all of the dif-
ferent contexts in which federal courts are called upon to assert per-
358. See supra notes 205-50 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 273-94 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 267.
363. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). See supra notes 156-85 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 329.
365. 456 U.S. at 703.
366. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
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sonal jurisdiction. The examination of these contexts begins with diver-
sity cases.
c. Federal Court Cases.
When Professor Green suggested that federal court personal jurisdic-
tion should be measured by a standard different from state court per-
sonal jurisdiction,367 the courts were still divided on the question of
amenability standards in diversity cases.368 Professor Green thought
the federal courts should be judged according to the fifth amendment 369
which, in his analysis, required only that a particular corporate defen-
dant have sufficient contacts with the United States in order that asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant be constitutionally
permissible.370 Professor Green therefore could analyze all federal court
367. Green, supra note 191, at 967-68. As an earlier commentator observed, "In the absence
of congressional guidance [on the issue of amenability], the federal courts have traditionally
held that the constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of state courts are relevant to the standard
for federal jurisdiction." Note, supra note 261, at 508. Many federal courts accepted the Inter-
national Shoe formula as applicable to questions of federal court personal jurisdiction. See
supra notes 106-85 and accompanying text. Diversity cases: See, e.g., Latimer v. S&A Industries
Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 823 (1958); Back v.
Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 167 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1948), Clover Leaf Freight Lines, Inc.
v. Pacific Coast Wholesalers Ass'n., 166 F.2d 626 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 823 (1948);
Hanley Co. v. Buffalo Forge Co., 89 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Smith v. Hall, 79 F.
Supp. 473 (N.D. Tex. 1948). Federal question cases: Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954) (Carmack Amendment); Consolidated Cosmetics v.
D-A Pub. Co., 186 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1951) (trademark action); Winkler-Koch Eng'g Co. v.
Universal Oil Prods. Co., 70 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (antitrust action). This enthusiastic
adoption of a standard developed in a state court context might be explained by the lack of
any congressional or judicial direction to federal courts to develop different standards. See
infra notes 476-77 and accompanying text. While International Shoe was not binding precedent
on federal courts, it did provide a jurisdictional formula which had been developed and ap-
proved by the Supreme Court.
368. As Professor Green observed in a footnote, as of the date of publication of his arti-
cle, "[tihe lower courts [were] in conflict as to whether state law determines what constitutes
doing business." Green, supra note 191, at 980 n.86. This was really a question of whether
state or federal law would govern amenability in diversity cases in which process had been
served pursuant to a state long-arm statute which required that the defendant be "doing business"
in the state in order to be amenable to suit.
369. Green, supra note 191, at 968.
370. Green, supra note 191, at 969-70. Professor Green argued:
The principle laid down in the International Shoe case . . .when applied to the
service of federal process in the light of the fifth amendment appears to require only
that the defendant have contacts of the described character with some part of the
United States.
Id. at 970. In another line of reasoning, he concluded:
If due process does not require presence in the state where suit is brought nor in
the state where service is made as a basis for personal jurisdiction of a state court
it certainly does not for a national court. What it requires for service of a summons
from a federal court are sufficient contacts with the territory of the United States.
Id. at 972. Professor Green is usually credited as the progenitor of the "National Contacts"
or the "Aggregate Contacts" test or theory of federal court personal jurisdiction, a theory
"under which a defendant's contacts throughout the United States are considered in the analysis
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personal jurisdiction cases together, arguing that "[t]he Supreme Court
has never said that the Erie doctrine affects the in personam jurisdic-
tion of the district courts." 37 ' Many subsequent cases have addressed
the particular question of personal jurisdiction in diversity cases as
a distinct issue.372 More recent commentators have focused either on
personal jurisdiction in diversity cases373 or on personal jurisdiction
in federal question cases. 371 While many basic principles may overlap,
therefore, the discussion must be divided according to the grounds
for subject matter jurisdiction in the particular case. The treatment
of diversity jurisdiction necessarily will be brief because it is produc-
ed here more for historical than for analytical purposes. Wherever
possible, particular issues such as service of process pursuant to par-
ticular provisions of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the amenability standards appropriate in each of those cases will
be addressed in the discussion of federal question cases, 3" even though
such procedures for service of process also might be followed in diver-
sity cases. Many of the same issues, however, are significant in the
context of diversity cases in which service of process is achieved in
some manner other than pursuant to the long-arm statute of the state
in which the federal court is situated.
i. Diversity Cases
Diversity cases are those cases in which federal subject matter
jurisdiction is based under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 on the diversity of citizen-
ship of the parties to the suits."' This discussion is concerned only
with those cases in which there exists no other ground for the federal
court assertion of subject matter jurisdiction.377
A primary reason for conferring diversity jurisdiction on the federal
courts was to protect, in suits involving citizens of different states,
against "home court advantage," or local prejudice against
of personal jurisdiction." Note, supra note 21, at 470. See Comment, National Contacts, supra
note 186; Comment, Fifth Amendment, supra note 186. See also Berger, supra note 191.
371. Green, supra note 191, at 980.
372. See infra notes 434-92 and accompanying text.
373. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 26; Comment, supra note 214; Note, Diversity Jurisdic-
tion of the Foreign Courts over Foreign Corporations, 49 IoWA L. REV. 1224 (1964); Note,
supra note 188; Comment, supra note 246.
374. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 191; Note, supra note 21; Note, Fifth Amendment, supra
note 186; Comment, National Contacts, supra note 186.
375. See infra notes 561-1355 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 18.
377. Those cases involving meore than one ground of federal subject matter jurisdiction
necessarily will involve a federal question, either under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or under some special
federal jurisdictional statute. See supra note 19.
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nonresident. 3 's Thus, if plaintiff (P), a citizen of State A, sued defen-
dant (D), a citizen of state B in state B because P could only get
personal jurisdiction over D in B, P might be prejudiced by the hostility
of the B judge and jury to an A-ite. Contrariwise, if P was able to
bring suit against D in A, D might be prejudiced by the hostility
of the A judge and jury to a B-ite. To protect against potential in-
justices, federal courts were created as a neutral alternative. If P could
get personal jurisdiction over D only in B, P could institute suit in
the federal district court held in B. 379 If, on the other hand, P could
and did get personal jurisdiction over D in A and instituted suit in
the A courts, D could remove the action to the federal district court held
in A. 380 Of course, diversity jurisdiction also applied if P brought suit
378. See Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1856); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816); Bank of the United States v. Deveaus, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
61, 87 (1809); Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc. 688 F.2d 328, 330 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982); Aerojet-
General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 716 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 968 (1975).
See also Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 407, 409 (1956);
Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 869,
880 (1931).
379. This assertion entails the assumption that, if personal jurisdiction can be obtained
over D by a B court, a federal district court sitting in B could also obtain personal jurisdiction
over D. This assumption is really not at issue: if D is present in state B when served with
state process, Rule 4(d)(1) would authorize federal service on D by delivery to D of a summons
issued by the federal court sitting in B; if D is not present, service by B courts would be
pursuant to B's long-arm statute and Rule 4(e) authorizes the federal court sitting in B to
adopt the B long-arm statute. Of course, amenability in the federal court suit would still be
required. Assuming D is present in B, however, federal courts also have used presence in the
federal district (and, later, the state in which the federal court is sitting), as an amenability
basis, and, assuming D was served extraterritorially pursuant to the B long-arm statute, because
such service satisfies the amenability standards of B it should also satisfy whatever standards
apply to the federal courts sitting in B using the B long-arm statute. In other words, the con-
sensus is that if state amenability standards are satisfied, federal standards also would be satisfied.
The question at issue in this article is whether, if the amenability standards of the state
in which the federal court is sitting are not satisfied, federal amenability standards still might
be satisfied, thus allowing a federal court sitting in state B to assert personal jurisdiction over
persons and/or entities not amenable to suit in the B courts: Can a fe(c ral court assert per-
sonal jurisdiction where a state court could not? In Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100
(1898), a New York statute would have barred a foreign cause of action against an English
corporation on ground that the defendant was not amenable to suit in New York. The Supreme
Court upheld the jurisdiction of the federal court, apparently negating the then current notion
that amenability in state courts was essential to federal court jurisdiction. 170 U.S. at 110.
See, e.g., Maxwell v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 34 F. 286 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1888); United States
v. American Bell Tel. Co., 29 F. 17 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1886); Boston Elec. Co. v. Electric Gas
Lighting Co., 23 F. 838 (C.C.D. Mass. 1885); Easton v. St. Louis Shakespear Mining & Smelting
Co., 7 F. 139 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1881). The Supreme Court ruled that the personal jurisdiction
of federal courts "is not created by, and does not depend upon, the statutes of the several
states." Barrow, 170 U.S. at 110. After the Supreme Court decision in Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the question of federal court personal jurisdiction in diversity
cases was reopened, with the apparent current result that federal courts sitting in diversity are
limited by the amenability standards of the states in which they are sitting. See infra notes
407-92 and accompanying text.
This is only one of several ways in which the question arises as to whether state door-
closing should also close federal doors. The problem has also surfaced where state courts bar
certain individuals as plaintiffs, see, e.g., Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949)
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against D in states X, Y, or Z. In those circumstances, potential state
court unfairness to nonresidents probably would not favor one party
over the other,38" ' and, therefore, no real policy reason exists for this
(state statute barred out-of-state corporations which had failed to comply with local requirements
for qualification to do business from instituting suits in state courts), and where states refuse
to permit certain types of remedies. See, e.g., Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947) (state
statute barred recovery in state courts for deficiency judgments on foreclosure sales). In both
Woods and Angel, the Supreme Court, arguing from the Erie decision, ruled that the doors
of the federal court also should remain closed. Venue restrictions, on the other hand, may
close federal court doors where state court doors would remain open.
380. The action could be removed to a federal court sitting in state A, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1441(a) & (b), so long as the defendant was not a citizen of state A (an impossibility
under the proposed hypothetical facts).
§1441(a) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdic-
tion, may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action
is pending.
28 U.S.C. §1441(a) (1976).
§1441(b) provides:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on
a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any
other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. §1441(b) (1976). The limitation on removal in potential diversity cases to situations
in which no defendant is a citizen of the state in which the case was instituted presumably
is a recognition that diversity jurisdiction is intended to protect nonresidents from local pre-
judice, a situation not pertaining when a defendant is sued in his home state. The plaintiff,
who has selected the state B forum rather than a federal forum, clearly does not fear local
prejudice. See supra text at note 379. This creates an anomalous lack of symmetry, however,
between the original jurisdiction of federal courts and the removal jurisdiction of federal courts
because P, a citizen of A, may institute a diversity action against D, a citizen of B, in a federal
court sitting in B.
Removal jurisdiction is really a particular type of federal court subject matter jurisdiction
which derives from the state court's subject matter jurisdiction over the case. A case therefore
cannot be removed to the federal court unless the state court had proper jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. Most commentators, moreover, take the position that because
authority of the federal court in removed diversity cases derives directly from the state, state
amenability standards must be applied when considering personal jurisdiction questions. That
result, however, is not required by any doctrine of removal jurisdiction. While federal subject
matter jurisdiction is derivative and the defendant presumably was served with process pur-
suant to state law, a federal amenability standard still might apply to the question of the defen-
dant's federal liability to service of process. Since federal courts generally may assert personal
jurisdiction in all circumstances in which courts of the states in which they are sitting may
assert personal jurisdiction, with the only real question being whether federal courts might have
a broader reach, and since the defendant chooses to remove to federal court, there seems no
reason why a less strict federal standard of amenability should not apply to him. If the defen-
dant wished to challenge the personal jurisdiction of the state court, he could have done so
in that forum. He selected instead to remove the case to what he perceived to be a more favorable
forum. That choice entailed submission to the particular rules and procedures of the federal
forum and one of those rules and procedures might be a federal amenability standard. In sum,
there seems no reason to treat removal cases any differently than those cases originally brought
in federal courts in which service of process is achieved by some state method.
381. In Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111 (1898), the Supreme Court stated:
The object of the provision of the constitution and statutes of the United States,
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broader scope of diversity jurisdiction.382
When a federal court is sitting on a diversity case, the matter in
controversy between the parties involves state-created rights and
liabilities.383 Courts and commentators have expressed the opinion that
a federal court sitting in diversity is actually just a state court because
it is performing a state court function.3 84 This premise leads to the
following argument and conclusion: federal courts sitting in diversity
perform the same function as state courts, adjudication of state-created
rights; therefore, federal courts sitting in diversity in state X should
not adjudicate any action which a state court could not adjudicate
because of lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant; therefore,
federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state amenability stan-
dards. In other words, whenever a state court would close its doors
in conferring [diversity jurisdiction] . . . was to secure a tribunal presumed to be
more impartial than a court of the state in which one of the litigants resides.
Id. (emphasis added).
382. Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332 sweeps more broadly than is necessary
to achieve the purpose of protecting nonresidents from local prejudice. One might suppose,
for example, that a state C judge and jury would be equally hostile and/or indifferent to P
and D, citizens of states A and B, respectively, if P brought suit against D in a C state court.
Yet, the P v. D litigation could be brought in a federal court sitting in state C. On the other
hand, of course, one might argue that unless P and D are citizens of the same state, the judge
and jury of state C's court might, for reasons of prejudice based on citizenship, be more favorably
disposed to one litigant than to the other.
The original institution of diversity jurisdiction also might reflect a certain federal skep-
ticism about the quality of justice afforded in state tribunals. In most circumstances which
did not involve a purely parochial dispute, like a suit between citizens of the same state on
a state-created right, the defendant was afforded the choice of a federal forum if the plaintiff
had brought suit in a state court. The exception to this would be a "diversity action" instituted
in the defendant's home state. See supra note 380. Even under this suggestion, some cases
just do not fit, like those cases involving residents of state A where suit is brought in state
B. This case could not be removed by the defendants because there is no diversity of citizen-
ship, regardless of any hypothetical incompetence of the B court. Any local prejudice, however,
would be directed equally at the plaintiff and the defendant.
383. If it involved substantial federally-created rights and liabilities, the case would in-
volve a "federal question", and the case would be a federal question rather than a diversity
case. For a discussion of federal question cases, see infra notes 493-1355 and accompanying text.
384. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945). See also Com-
ment, supra note 214, at 705. The Columbia commentator noted:
The organization of federal districts along state lines and the notion that the federal
courts are localized forums for the adjudication of state-created rights suggest that
they should not extend their jurisdiction beyond the limits imposed on the states
in which they sit, in the absence of a valid federal statute or rule; constitutional
guarantees that could be invoked in a state court should not be forfeited merely
because the action is brought in an alternative federal tribunal.
Id. (footnote omitted).
What these statements fail to recognize is that, except for areas of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion, see supra note 19, state courts may adjudicate cases based on federally created rights
and liabilities and yet no one argues that the state courts so acting are, in effect, extra federal
courts.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
because of lack of personal jurisdiction, a federal court sitting in the
state should be required to do likewise.38
Although most federal courts now have taken the position that federal
courts sitting in diversity should apply the amenability standards of
the state in which the federal court is situated,386 the matter is not
so simple. First, the lack of a readily definable federal court standard
of amenability387 makes one wonder whether the determination to app-
385. Relying on the Erie decision, the Supreme Court has so determined in some other
"door-closing" contexts. See supra note 379. On the other hand, federal courts sitting in diver-
sity have opened their doors to parties who could not be included in similar actions brought
in a state court. Under Rule 4(f), a third party defendant who bears an appropriate relation-
ship to the territory of the federal district in which service is made may be served with process
within 100 miles of the federal courthouse in which the case is being heard even though the
third party defendant is served in a state other than the state in which the federal court is
sitting. See supra note 269. A state court hearing the same action would not be able to join
the third party defendant unless he was amenable to the process of the state in which the
suit was brought. Therefore, although a federal court sitting in diversity might be adjudicating
a state-created right, because of Rule 4(f) the federal court can adjudicate a third party claim
which a state court could not adjudicate. This creates some uniformity among federal courts
but not between federal and state courts sitting in the same state.
Moreover, in a federal interpleader action brought pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Act,
28 U.S.C. §1335, a particular type of diversity action in which only "minimum diversity" is
required, see supra note 200, nationwide service of federal process is authorized by 28 U.S.C.
§2361 (1976), which provides:
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335
of this title, a district court may issue its process for all claimants and enter its order
restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United
States court affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved in the interpleader
action until further order of the court.
Id. Again, a federal court may extend its jurisdictional reach beyond the territorial limits of
the state in which it is sitting even though the grounds of its subject matter jurisdiction is
diversity of citizenship and a state court could not necessarily, because of limitations on the
extent of its personal jurisdiction, entertain the same action with the same configuration of
parties. Again, while in interpleader the federal court is usually adjudicating some state created
right, it is not an alter-ego of state courts; it can open its doors when state courts cannot.
From the above it is clear that federal courts sitting in diversity may, in some circumstances,
exert personal jurisdiction over individuals over whom state courts may not exert personal jurisdic-
tion. Such extensions of federal court jurisdiction clearly implement federal policy favoring
adjudication of an entire case or controversy in one lawsuit. See Note, Federal Courts, 77
HARV. L. Rav. 559, 561 (1964). They also, however, preclude the argument that, in all cir-
cumstances, federal courts sitting in diversity can have no more extensive jurisdictional reach
than can state courts sitting on similar matters; where federal policy is clear, Congress and
courts have not required identity of jurisdiction between state courts and federal courts sitting
in diversity in those states. Whatever basis is urged for the proposition that federal courts
sitting in diversity should, as a general matter, follow the amenability standards of the state
in which they are sitting, such a result, as demonstrated above, is not required by the United
States Constitution. Otherwise, Rule 4(f) and other federal "outreach" statutes could not be
used in diversity cases.
386. See infra notes 434-92 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 295-351 and accompanying text. The argument that "[tihe absence
of a fully developed federal standard . . . should not preclude a ruling in favor of the ap-
plicability of federal law [in diversity cases]" is persuasive. In the absence of such a standard,
however, courts have seemed reluctant to rule that one should be prescribed and then devise
it, preferring, instead, to rely on the well-developed state standard. Even most courts and com-
mentators that urge an independent federal standard under the fifth amendment fall back on
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ly state amenability standards was induced partly by the absence of
a federal standard. 8 Second, while the authority of the federal courts
generally has been circumscribed by territorial boundaries,"' such limita-
tions do not flow from the nature of federal courts as do such limita-
tions on state courts,39 and Congress could eliminate territorial limita-
tions on federal courts even in diversity cases. Third, adoption of state
amenability standards in diversity actions leads to nonuniformity in
the federal system.39' Fourth, while the Supreme Court early took the
position, in a diversity case, that federal court personal jurisdiction
"is not created by, and does not depend upon, the statutes of the
several States, ' 3 92 the Court has, in a recent case, impliedly adopted
the position that amenability standards in diversity cases are establish-
ed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.393 Fifth,
the state standard of "minimum contacts" and "fundamental fairness" as describing the federal
standard as well. See, e.g., K. Shapiro, Inc. v. New York Central R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722
(E.D. Mich. 1957) (suggesting that the Supreme Court, in Riverbank Labs v. Hardwood Prods.
Corp., 350 U.S. 1003 (1956), directed federal courts to apply International Shoe as a federal
amenability standard in diversity cases).
388. The analysis really should involve two questions: (1) whether federal courts sitting
in diversity should apply a federal rather than a state amenability standard, and (2) what the
provisions of such a federal standard would be. Often, however, courts have answered ques-
tion (1) in favor of a state standard because such a standard existed and Congress and the
courts had not devised a federal standard. At least one commentator has pointed out the fallacy
of this analysis:
It would seem that the question whether jurisdictional rules have been formulated
by Congress is not relevant. If such rules do not now exist, they can be made, and
a determination of what standards apply is not beyond the scope of judicial con-
sideration. . . . The absence of a fully developed federal standard . . . should not
preclude a ruling in favor of the applicability of federal law. The crucial issue is
whether a federal standard, if it were to exist, should be applied to diversity cases
or whether the policy of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins precludes its use.
Note, Federal Courts, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 320, 322 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
389. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
391. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 191, at 286-98; comment, supra note 214, at 706; Note,
supra note 385, at 561. See also Note, supra note 188, at 148 (advocating development of
a federal amenability standard to enhance federal court uniformity). But see Note, supra note
388, at 324 (application of federal law in diversity cases "would tend to discriminate against
those not qualified to bring a diversity action, accentuate conflicts between federal and state
policy, and only to a small degree promote uniformity. .. ").
392. Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 108 (1898).
393. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694 (1982). See supra notes 156-85 and accompanying text. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, although
an unusual case on its facts, was a diversity case, and the Supreme Court, in discussing the
"test for personal jurisdiction" applicable in such a case quoted the International Shoe test
of "minimum contacts." Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702-03. The Court studiously
avoided the direct question of an amenability standard, using the term "Due Process Clause"
throughout its opinion without specifying whether the reference was to the fifth amendment
or the fourteenth amendment clause. By citing International Shoe and by its strenuous argu-
ment, in a footnote, that its holding "[did] not alter the requirement that there be 'minimum
contacts' between the nonresident defendant and the forum state [but rather dealt] with how
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while Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins394 was decided in 1938, and several
subsequent Supreme Court cases have "clarified" the Erie doctrine,"'
the question remains whether Erie requires a federal court sitting in
diversity to apply state amenability standards or whether those stan-
dards might be incorporated into the federal law by Rule 4(e), which
authorizes federal courts to serve non-resident defendants "under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the" state long-arm
statute.396 Sixth, although in many diversity cases process is served pur-
suant to Rule 4(e), by using the long-arm statute of the state in which
the federal court is sitting,397 some involve service under a purely federal
rule such as 4(d)(3).398 Should state amenability standards apply in both
circumstances? 399
the facts needed to show those 'minimum contacts' can be established when a defendant fails
to comply with court-ordered discovery," id. at 702 n.10, the Court seemed to imply that
is was applying the state amenability standard to the question of establishing personal jurisdic-
tion in a diversity case. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell maintained:
[I]n the absence of a federal rule or statute establishing a federal basis for the asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction of the district courts is deter-
mined in diversity cases by the law of the forum State.
Id. at 711 (citing Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Co., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1975); Wilker-
son v. Fortune Corp., 554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977); Poyner v.
Erma Werke GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1980); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Corp. v. Moun-
tain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); Lakota
Girl Scout Council v. Havey Fundraising Mgmt., Inc., 519 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1975); Arrowsmith
v. United Press Int'l., 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978); Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358 (10th
Cir. 1974)). In footnote 6 of his concurrence Justice Powell made it clear that he did not
feel that Federal Rule 4 was itself a jurisdictional provision. Justice Powell therefore adopted
Arrowsmith with almost no discussion. See infra notes 453-92 and accompanying text. As Justice
Powell's citations indicate, the Supreme Court has declined to review the question of amenability
in diversity cases. Now, Justice Powell, directly, and the Court's opinion, by implication, accept
the Arrowsmith result almost as a fait accompli.
A recent case has cited Justice Powell's concurrence for the proposition that, "[iun the absence
of a federal rule or statute establishing a federal basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction,
the personal jurisdiction of the district courts is determined in diversity cases by reference to
the law of the state in which the federal court sits." Kendall v. Overseas Dev. Corp., 700
F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1983).
394. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See infra notes 407-14 and accompanying text.
395. See infra notes 415-33 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 267 and accompanying text and infra note 1156 and accompanying text.
397. See infra notes 1103-1316 and accompanying text.
398. See infra notes 799-887 and accompanying text.
399. The language of Justice Powell's concurrence in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd.
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982), suggested that state amenability
standards might not apply where "a federal rule or statute establish[es] a federal basis for
the assertion of personal jurisdiction." Id. at 711. He went on to note, however, that Rule
4 does not prescribe any amenability basis, id. at 715 n.6, and, as described above, see supra
notes 247-49 and accompanying text, federal statutes authorizing extra-territorial service of process
never include amenability standards. Was Justice Powell merely ruminating that if Congress
were to establish federal standards of amenability by Rule or statute, such standards might
take precedence even in diversity cases? In other words, was he merely recognizing the authority
of Congress to establish such standards in the future, or was he suggesting that some such
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In order to unravel this problem to some extent, to describe the
present state of the law, and to comment thereon, perhaps it is best
to trace the chronological development of personal jurisdiction stan-
dards in diversity cases. As noted above, the Supreme Court, in Bar-
row S.S. Co. v. Kane,400 adopted the position that personal jurisdic-
tion of federal courts did not depend on the existence or non-existence
of state statutes.40' In a circumstance in which a state court would
have applied a "door-closing" statute precluding the state court from
asserting jurisdiction over the defendant, the Supreme Court ruled
that the federal courts were still free to open their doors. One should
note, however, that the Court merely authorized the lower federal
courts to ignore a state statute which barred assertion of personal
jurisdiction; the Court did not define some federal standard for
amenability0 2 nor did it comment on the efficacy, in federal courts,
of any state statutes affirmatively authorizing personal jurisdiction.0 3
One must remember, moreover, that, at the time of the Barrow deci-
sion, states did not have long-arm statutes. State court assertions of
jurisdiction were limited severely by territoriality, with the most signifi-
cant amenability questions involving whether a foreign corporation
could be sued on a consent or presence theory.0 The situation after
Barrow is well-described, in the context of corporate amenability, in
the following passage:4"5
[T]he independence of the federal judiciary was frequently asserted
in the maxim that federal jurisdiction could not be enlarged or
abridged by state statute. Thus, determination of the scope of
jurisdiction over foreign corporations devolved upon the federal
courts. In the absence of congressional direction and binding restric-
tions of state law, the organization of districts along state lines with
no general provision for extraterritorial process apparently suggested
reference to the due process limitations binding under the fourteenth
standards did exist, implicit in federal statutes, or was he merely "hedging his bets" because
no such federal rule or statute was applicable here? Why, moreover, did he limit the creation
of such a standard to Congress? After all, the Supreme Court and other judicial bodies established
the state amenability standards now generally applicable. See supra notes 60-185 and accom-
panying text. See also Note, supra note 388, at 322 (suggesting that lack of federal standard
of amenability can be remedied by judicial action).
400. 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
401. Id. at 108.
402. Id. at 108.
403. See generally 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
404. See supra notes 60 to 105 and accompanying text.
405. Comment, supra note 214, at 692 (footnotes omitted).
406. Again, a possible argument is that only one standard of amenability was available,
and, since federal courts looked so much like state courts, no reason existed not to adopt
the available standard.
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amendment on the states. Thus, the same standard of corporate
amenability was applied without discrimination to circumscribe the
state and federal courts.406
With the 1938 promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure"0 7 came several federal methods of service of process but
no particular amenability standards.40 ' In the same year, however,
the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, °9 in which the Court reversed 100 years of federal prac-
tice by ruling that federal courts were to apply state law in diversity
cases rather than applying "federal common law" to the substantive
issues of the case. ' In 1938, therefore, prior practice in diversity
cases was almost totally reversed. Under the Conformity Act, the
federal courts had been required to "conform, . . . to the practice,
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding" of the states in which
they had sat.4"1 The federal courts now were required to follow the
uniform federal procedure provided in the Federal Rules. Under the
earlier decision of Swift v. Tyson,412 the federal courts sitting in diver-
sity had been free to apply "general federal common law" to substan-
tive issues. They were now required, under Erie, to follow the substan-
tive law of the states in which they sat.
In Erie, the question at issue was clearly "substantive," whether
the plaintiff, who had been walking on a footpath adjacent to railroad
tracks, was a "trespasser" and therefore entitled to recover only for
willful or wanton conduct on the part of the defendant, or whether
he was a "licensee," entitled to recover for negligence." 3 Subsequent.
cases, however, posed more difficult questions which could not be
resolved by reference to the "talismanic" labels of "substance" and
"procedure."4 4
407. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 253-94 and accompanying text.
409. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For comprehensive discussion of Erie and its progeny, see Clark,
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE
L.J. 267 (1946); Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762 (1941); Hart, The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954); Hill, Tile Erie Doc-
trine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1958); Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day,
Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L. Q. 494 (1949); Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power,
49 VA. L. REv. 1082 (1963); Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336
(1938); Comment, supra note 214.
410. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
411. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
412. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
413. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69-71.
414. In Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court,
noted, " 'Outcome determination' analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman." Id.
at 466-67. See also infra notes 434-35 and accompanying text.
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In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,4"5 the Court came very close to
describing a weighing process," 6 similar to that later settled on in
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-op.," but instead relied on
a "shorthand" description of its decision: state law, including state
procedural rules, must be followed if "outcome-determinative" because
"the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substan-
tially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litiga-
tion, as it would be if tried in a State Court." ' This decision substan-
tially seemed to make federal courts into state courts, for any rule
which differed from a state rule in any genuine manner could affect
the outcome of a litigation."1 9
The effect of Erie on questions of personal jurisdiction was raised
in Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co.42 In Pulson, the First Cir-
cuit laid down the following two-step analysis to determine whether
a federal court had personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation:4 2 '
(1) whether the state had "provided for bringing the foreign corpora-
tion into its courts under the circumstances of the case presented;"
and (2) if so, whether such an assertion of personal jurisdiction by
a state court would violate federal due process. The Pulson court did
not cite Erie or Guaranty Trust. The Court, therefore, did not clarify
whether the rule flowed from the Erie doctrine and was a
415. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
416. Id. at 108. The court stated:
Matters of "substance" and matters of "procedure" are much talked about .. .
as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law. But,
of course, "substance" and "procedure" are the same keywords to very different
problems. Neither "substance" nor "procedure" represents the same invariants. Each
implies different variables depending upon the particular problems for which it is used.
Id.
417. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). See infra notes 430-33 and accompanying text.
418. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109.
419. Whenever a procedural rule, such as manner of service of process, would bar suit
in the state because the rule had not been satisfied, whereas the method utilized was sufficient
under federal procedure so that a federal court suit would not be barred, the "outcome" of
the litigation would be affected if the federal court employed its own seemingly procedural
rule; the suit could continue in the federal court but could not continue in the state court.
To satisfy the "outcome determinative" language of Guaranty Trust, therefore, the federal
courts would have to defer to state court practice whenever a distinction existed. See, e.g.,
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Ragan v. Merchants, Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949);
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). As one commentator noted: "If
the York outcome-determinative test is applied . . . to its literal extreme, very few Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would have any effect in a federal court action in which subject-
matter jurisdiction is grounded on diversity of citizenship." Comment, Return to the Tivilight
Zone, supra note 267, at 705.
420. 170 F.2d 193 (lst Cir. 1948).
421. Id. at 194.
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constitutionally-required result,422 or whether Pulson represented a deci-
sion that when service was made under former Rule 4(d)(7) accord-
ing to some state method, then the state jurisdictional standard also
should be applied. 23 As noted by one commentator:
In the great majority of appellate decisions that have chosen be-
tween federal and state jurisdictional standards, service has been made
422. In Erie, the majority took the position that the result was mandated by the Constitu-
tion. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938). Many scholars have struggled
to determine the Constitutional source of the Court's assertion. See generally C. Wright, Law
of Federal Courts 359-364 (4th ed. 1983). If Erie is constitutionally required, and if, as rea-
soned by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Com-
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 709-16 (1982), Erie requires the result in
Arrowsmith, id. at 711-12, then one might argue that a different federal standard of amenability
for diversity cases is precluded by the Constitution.
This argument, however, sweeps too broadly. Justice Powell recognized the potential for
application in diversity of "a federal basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction," such
basis being established by "a federal rule or statute." Id. at 711. Under Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, (1958), see infra notes 430-33 and accompanying text, a
federal court may balance the state interests in application of the state rule against federal
interests in application of a conflicting federal rule or statute. Justice Powell therefore recognized
the possibility of a federal amenability standard for diversity cases, which standard would be
established by Congress. He did not, however, recognize the equally justifiable possibility of
a judicially created federal standard which would conflict with a state standard. Erie did not,
as many believe, eliminate federal common law. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). It merely eliminated the prior federal practice of apply-
ing "general federal common law" in defining state-created rights and liabilities, a practice
which had caused nonuniformity in vindication of state-created rights and obligations as well
as creating a substantial problem of state-federal forum-shopping within the borders of a particular
state. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
The creation of new federal common law by federal courts also did not terminate upon
the decision in Erie. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
(federal law governed application of act-of-state doctrine in a federal diversity case); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal law governed issue regarding effec-
tiveness of guarantee of prior endorsements on a government check). See also Mishkin, The
Variousness of "Federal Law". Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and
State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 798-800 (1957). A federal court therefore
need not rely on some established federal law, statute, or rule in order to Byrd balance but
may actually determine first whether some uniform federal law would be preferable to applica-
tion of the state rule before it and then set about to establish that federal common law. The
question of personal jurisdiction would not seem to be, as a general matter, so bound up in
the vindication of state-created rights and liabilities that Erie requires application of state law
without resort to Byrd balancing. This writer believes that the reasons federal courts have not
taken the initiative to develop a separate federal amenability standard are because state stan-
dards had already been well-established, no federal standard had been suggested by the Supreme
Court, and federal rules and statutes do not expressly provide for an amenability standard.
Reliance on well-established state amenability standards that have received extensive Supreme
Court treatment is easier than pioneering a separate federal standard. For a discussion of the
types of state interests that should supervene federal interests absolutely as opposed to those
state interests that should merely be considered in the Byrd balancing process, see Comment,
supra note 214, at 703-06; Note, supra note 385, at 561-62.
Finally, this discussion presumes that the Arrowsmith case and result flow from the Erie
doctrine. If, instead, they arise from some incorporation of state amenability standards, under
former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e), into federal law, then the above analysis would not pertain.
423. See infra notes 893-1102 and accompanying text.
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pursuant to Rule 4(d)(7), and in those cases the choice was over-
whelmingly in favor of the state standard, although the cases are
unclear as to whether state standards were used because of Rule
4(d)(7) or because of Erie.'
Angel v. Bullington"25 and Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. 426 were
two cases subsequent to York that involved jurisdictional questions,
although not the issue of amenability, to which the Supreme Court
applied the Erie doctrine in following state "door-closing" policies.
In Angel, recovery would have been unavailable in a state court because
of a state statute that barred certain types of relief. 427 In Woods,
the suit would have been barred from a state court because of a state
statute that precluded suits by foreign corporations that had not com-
plied with state qualification requirements.425
After Woods, federal courts sitting in diversity were truly becoming
the alter-egos of state courts." 9 In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Co-op., 43° however, the Supreme Court picked up again the thread
that it had been pursuing in Guaranty Trust prior to its "shorthand"
statement of the "outcome determinative" test. In Byrd, a case in-
volving the question of whether a judge or jury should decide the
issues of whether the plaintiff had been an "employee" of the defen-
dant within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the
Supreme Court decided in favor of the "federal" method of decision
by jury.43' The Court ruled that except in those areas where the state
rule is "bound up with [the state-created rights and obligations sought
424. Note, supra note 188, at 1134.
425. 330 U.S. 183 (1947). See also supra note 379.
426. 337 U.S. 535 (1949). See also supra note 379.
427. The Supreme Court also closed the doors of the federal court sitting in diversity,
doors which ordinarily would have been open to such a litigation, on the ground that Erie
had "drastically limited the power of the federal courts to entertain suits in diversity cases
that could not be brought in the respective state courts. . . ." Angel, 330 U.S. at 192.
The dissenting justices responded: "[l]n diversity litigation the federal courts are not simply
courts of the state. They are so far as the enforcement of the substantive laws of the state
are concerned, but not when procedure or power to act is involved." Id. at 200 (Reed, J.,
dissenting).
428. Again the majority of the court found the result compelled by Erie and the "out-
come determinative" test of Guaranty Trust in order to preserve uniformity among the state
and federal courts sitting in the state. Woods, 337 U.S. at 538. Again the dissent argued that
the upshot of Erie and Guaranty Trust was not that federal courts in diversity cases were merely
other courts of the states in which they sat. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 560 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting in both Woods and Cohen). Moreover, Justice Rutledge
argued that the "outcome determinative" test should be replaced, in these quasi-procedural
areas, by some sort of weighing test. Id.
429. See supra dissenting opinions cited in notes 427 and 428; Merrigan, Erie to York
to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 711, 720-21 (1950).
430. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). For discussion of the effect of Byrd, see Smith, Blue Ridge
and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TutL. L. REv. 443 (1962).
431. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.
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to be enforced] in such a way that its application in the federal court
is required," 3 2 the federal court must consider the interests of the
state in having its rule applied, including the effect of application
on the outcome of the suit, against any "affirmative countervailing
considerations" which would favor application of the federal rule or
procedure.433 The technique for deciding "borderline" questions after
Byrd, therefore, was to "Byrd balance" state and federal interests.
Subsequent to the decision in Byrd but before the Supreme Court
decision in Hanna v. Plumer,43" which, in effect, established the
precedence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over any conflict-
ing state procedures regardless of "outcome" or "policy," 4 3" the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Jaftex Corp. v.
Randolph Mills, Inc.", and in Arrowsmith v. United Press
International,"37 considered the question of amenability standards in
diversity cases. Although early cases had applied a federal standard, '38
almost all diversity cases subsequent to Erie had applied a state
amenability standard, although not all such courts had based their
decisions on the Erie doctrine.439 In Jaftex, a diversity action for per-
sonal injuries, the third party defendant, a North Carolina corpora-
tion on which service had been made by serving its "selling agent"
432. Id. at 535.
433. Id. at 537-38.
434. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). For discussion of the effect of Hanna, see McCoid, Hanna
v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884 (1965); Note, Choice of
Procedure in Diversity Cases, 75 YALE L.J. 477 (1966).
435. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-74.
436. 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960). For favorable commentary on Jaftex, see Comment,
supra notes 214; Note, supra note 373; Note, supra note 188; Comment, supra note 246.
437. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
438. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Barrow
S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
439. See, e.g., Jennings, v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963); Walker v. General
Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963); Smartt v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 318 F.2d
447 (6th Cir. 1963); Mutual Int'l. Export Co. v. Napeo Indus., Inc., 316 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir.
1963); Connor v. New York Times Co., 310 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1962); Waltham Precision In-
strument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 310 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1962); Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962); Ark-La Feed & Fertilizer Co. v.
Marco Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1961); Edwin Raphael Co. v. Maharam Fabrics
Corp., 283 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1960); Iliff v. American Fire Apparatus Co., 277 F.2d 360 (4th
Cir. 1960); Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1959); Westcott-
Alexander, Inc. v. Dailey, 264 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1959); Roberts v. Evans Case Co., 218 F.2d
893 (7th Cir. 1955); Smith v. Ford Gum & Mach. Co., 212 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1954); Partin
v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953); Canvas Fabricators, Inc. v. William
E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952); Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co.,
179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949); Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir.
1948). But see Berlanti Constr. Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 190 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(applying federal standard); Kennedy v. Long Island R. Co., 26 F.R.D. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(same). See also Hart, supra note 409 (favoring federal standard); Hill, supra note 409 (same);
Meador, supra note 409 (same).
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in New York, sought to vacate service for lack of proper service,
arguing that it was not "doing business" in New York and hence
was not amenable to suit in the federal district court sitting in New
York. 4 ' The district court had granted the dismissal of the third
party defendant on the following reasoning:' while Randolph Mills
was "doing business" in New York so that service would be valid
under federal law, it was not "doing business" under state law to
permit valid state service, and, under Erie, the state law must be ap-
plied. The district court determined, therefore, that in a diversity ac-
tion Erie required that amenability to suit be measured by a state
rather than federal standard.
Writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, Judge Clark, the chief draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, found two alternative grounds for refusal to dismiss the
third-party complaint: (1) ". . service was valid under either New
York or federal law, ' 44 2 and (2) ". . the question whether a foreign
corporation is present in a district to permit service of process upon
it is one of federal law governing the procedure of the United States
courts. .. -4,3 In his argument developing the second alternate ground,
Judge Clark noted that federal rule 4(d)(3) and former federal rule
4(d)(7) "deal with the manner of service upon corporate defendants,
rather than with their amenability to process" and found "the man-
ner of service . . . was sufficient under either rule." 44 After finding
440. Jaftex, 282 F.2d at 508-11.
441. Id. at 509-10.
442. Id. at 510.
443. Id. at 516. Judge Clark apparently seized the opportunity to make clear his position
on the issue of amenability in diversity cases. Judge Friendly, in Arrowsmith v. United Press
International, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), seemed even more anxious to have a "go" at the
matter, framing his response as advice to the district court on a remand to consider, ab initio,
amenability of a particular foreign corporation to service of process in a diversity action in
a federal district court sitting in Vermont. See infra note 461 and accompanying text.
444. Jaftex, 282 F.2d at 511-12. Many commentators have noted the absence of an
amenability standard in either the federal rules or in federal statutes authorizing extraterritorial
(beyond the territory of the state in which a federal court is sitting) service of process. One
commentator has argued for a presence standard (presence where service is authorized), a posi-
tion that in effect, makes amenability coextensive with valid service of process and therefore,
implicit in the authorization for extraterritorial service of process. See supra note 356 and ac-
companying text. Other commentators have argued that where a federal court is authorized
by Federal Rule 4 to adopt methods of service of process available to the state courts of the
state in which the federal court sits, the effect is to incorporate into the federal rule not only
the state procedure or technique for service of process but also any state amenability standards
pertaining to the procedure or technique. Justices Black and Douglas commented with disap-
proval on the apparent reliance, under the then-proposed Rule 4(e), on state long-arm statutes:
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas object to the changes in Rule 4, which
for the first time permit a Federal District Court to obtain jurisdiction over a defen-
dant by service of process outside the State . . . under the circumstances and in
the manner prescribed by state law. We . . . see no reason why the extent of a
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no Supreme Court direction on the question, Judge Clark found, in
the historical development of federal process and venue statutes, "a
deliberate and long-avowed federal practice with reference to the basis
of federal judicial action." 4 ' Using the Byrd approach, he examined
the state and federal rules on amenability, finding them "not so
mutually at odds that the federal decision will seriously damage state
policy." '446 He argued, moreover, that "so long as Congress opens
the national courts to cases 'between citizens of different States,'
Federal District Court's personal jurisdiction should depend upon the existence or
nonexistence of a state "long-arm" statute.
Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, 374 U.S. 865, 869 (1963). Implicit
in this statement is recognition that federal courts should have some separate grant of personal
jurisdiction authority and that the authority of federal courts over defendants, whether in diversity
or federal question cases, should depend on some uniform federal law. If one rejects presence
as federal amenability standard yet recognizes no standard implicit in federal authorizations
for extraterritorial service of process, one must admit that no federal amenability standard
has yet been devised and that federal courts, faced with this absence, have understandably
turned for guidance to state standards.
445. Jaftex, 282 F.2d at 513. On the historical point, Judge Clark argued:
The requirement of personal service in the district (except for the special exceptions
made by Congress) is an old one going back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, §11, 1
Stat. 79, and continued in Rev. Stat. §739, Judicial Code §51, and the former 28
U.S.C. §112. During all this period the requirements as to service and venue were
treated together, a not unnatural course in view of their close connection. With the
revision of Title 28, United States Code, the provisions were separated, the venue
requirements going to 28 U.S.C. §1391 and the service requirements going to 28 U.S.C.
§1693. The latter act seems particularly important as bringing the original requirements
of 1789 down into modern law [by preserving the wording of Section 11 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789]. At any rate the requirement has been steadily applied and
as yet has been changed by Congress and the Rules in only limited and particular
ways .... Wholly consistent and apparently required by this background is the parallel
condition that a corporation must be "present," i.e., doing business, within the district
in order to be subject to suit there.
Id. at 512 (footnotes and citations omitted). Judge Clark used this as evidence of a continuing
federal policy in regard to amenability to suits in federal courts. He did not, however, describe
the federal amenability standard nor did he note how it differed, if at all, from the state standard.
Still, Judge Clark's argument is convincing. Before Erie, federal courts were charged with
the determination of federal court jurisdiction according to federal standards, including deci-
sions as to when a foreign corporation (one not incorporated in the state in which the federal
court was sitting) would be "doing business" within the federal district so as to be amenable
to suit in the federal courts. While these courts may have relied on state standards, they did
so not because compelled by law so to do but as an independent choice of standard by a
federal court.
Many of the problems discussed here clearly would have been obviated if Congress had not
chosen to organize the federal judicial system territorially, first with each lower court having
authority within a single federal district that was either coextensive with a single state or that
lay entirely within a single state and later by extending general authority of these courts only
to the boundaries of the state in which they sat. If the federal system had not been structured
on a territorial basis similar to that of the states, a wholly federal standard of amenability
would have been easier to establish. On the other hand, Congress permitted the federal courts,
in certain limited circumstances, to reach beyond the territorial boundaries of the state in which
they were held and to do so in ways not available to those state courts. Therefore, exclusive
reliance by federal courts on state amenability standards also would be inappropriate.
446. Id. at 513.
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. .. it would seem that they are entitled to the essentials of a trial
according to federal standards." '447 He also urged federal uniformity
of procedure rather than state-federal uniformity, noting authority
against the position that federal courts sitting in diversity are merely
extra state courts. 4 8
Judge Friendly, in his concurring opinion, took issue with the alter-
nate ground of the opinion, noting that he knew "of no . . .federal
standard [of corporate presence] except the Constitutional one,"4 4 9
citing Pulson and other circuit court opinions in favor of the pro-
position that a federal court needed federal statutory authority to apply
a federal amenability standard. 40 He found no such grant of authority
either in federal statutes or in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
nor did he find any "practice of considering this question as one
of federal law [which has] become so well established that it must
be deemed to be sanctioned by the Judicial Code or the Federal Rules,
even though both are silent on the subject."'4 '' He concluded, therefore,
that Erie required the federal court to adopt the state amenability
standard.5 2
Three years later, in Arrowsmith v. United Press International,4 13
the positions of Judges Clark and Friendly were reversed, with Judge
Friendly writing the majority opinion which overruled the alternative
ground in Jaftex and with Judge Clark writing a strong dissent. The
issue was whether, in a diversity action, the presence of a foreign
corporation in a district for purposes of amenability to suit was to
be determined by a state or federal standard.5 The underlying suit
was for defamation, clearly instituted in a federal court sitting in Ver-
447. Id. This argument could proceed directly from Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., see
supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text, in which the Supreme Court ruled that one of
the "essentials" of a federal trial, an "essential" which had its roots in the seventh amend-
ment, was that certain questions of fact, in a jury trial, were triable to a jury rather than a judge.
448. Jaftex, 282 F.2d at 513-14.
449. Id. at 516.
450. Id. at 516-17. Judge Friendly continued:
[T]his matter falls in the zone where, subject to the due process guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment, Congress may validly direct, or authorize the Supreme Court to
direct, the federal courts to fashion their own standards even in diversity of citizen-
ship cases. . . . Valid inferences from article III, §8, support action by Congress
or the rule-making power within this "twilight zone," . .. in derogation of state
law, even when federal jurisdiction rests solely on diversity of citizenship. The ques-
tion is whether such a direction has been given as to the subject here at issue; I
think it has not.
Id. at 518.
451. Id. at 520.
452. Id.
453. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
454. Id. at 221.
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mont because Vermont had a particularly long statute of limitations
in regard to such matters. '55 The defendant's contacts with Vermont
had been insubstantial. The defendant wire service, U.P.I., had eleven
subscribers in Vermont and one employee in Vermont.116 Service of
process had been made upon the employee pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3),
as service upon an "agent" of the defendant corporation.4"' The defen-
dant made a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, inter alia, for lack of
personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.458 The district court dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and
did not rule on the personal jurisdiction or venue issues.459
The Court of Appeals remanded, finding that the District Court
had erred in ruling on the sufficiency of the complaint before first
determining the procedural questions of personal jurisdiction and
venue. 46  The Court, however, in what might be described as an "ex-
cess of zeal," proceeded to "decide what standard should govern the
judge's determination as to the jurisdiction of the District Court for
Vermont over the person of the foreign corporation defendant-in
particular, whether a 'state' or a 'federal' standard should here be
applied. '461
After citing an overwhelming number of cases in which circuit courts
455. Id. and n.2.
456. Id. at 222.
457. Id. See supra note 269.
458. Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 221.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. ld. One cannot resist the inference that Judge Friendly had been merely biding his
time, anxiously awaiting an opportunity to "correct" the error he perceived in the alternative
ground in Jaftex. Clearly, Jaftex was the law of the Second Circuit at the time when the
Arrowsmith case first arose. The court of appeals had been called upon to decide one matter:
whether the district court had erred in determining that the complaint was legally insufficient
before the district court had decided whether it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant
and whether venue had been properly laid. Only about a page of the opinion was devoted
to that question. The court of appeals then proceeded, in approximately 13 pages of analysis,
to determine the standard by which such personal jurisdiction would be judged. This would
have been appropriate if no standard had been established in the Second Circuit. Jaftex, however,
clearly presented the lower court with a Second Circuit position on the question of whether
a state or federal amenability standard should apply. The more appropriate time for the court
of appeals to speak, therefore, would have been on appeal from the district court decision
on personal jurisdiction.
At least two possible explanations can be offered for this rather singular procedure: (1) Judge
Friendly wished to overrule the alternative ground in Jaftex and was afraid that the opportunity
might not be presented on appeal; (2) Judge Friendly, as noted in his opinion, felt that no
federal amenability standard existed, and, thus, he was determined to correct Jafiex rather
than present the district court with the paradoxical problem of being required by Jaftex to
apply a federal standard but having no clue as to ivhat that standard might be. Either way,
it seems the court of appeals (Judge Friendly) wanted "first licks" at the problem rather than
being required to begin from a district court opinion.
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had advocated state standards"6 2 and dismissing Judge Clark's argu-
ment that all but two of those cases were inapposite because service
had been achieved, pursuant to Rule 4(d)(7), by state long-arm
statute, 63 Judge Friendly proceeded to overrule the alternate ground
in Jaftex.464 First, he noted that no federal statute or federal rule
provided an express or implied amenability standard. 65 Despite Erie,
he recognized the authority of Congress to establish such a standard
but found "no federal policy that should lead federal courts in diver-
sity cases to override valid state laws as to the subjection of foreign
corporations to suit, in the absence of direction by federal statute
or rule."46 6 The court, moreover, found little relevancy of Byrd because
it was "aware of no federal policy of similar strength or constitu-
tional basis [to that at issue in Byrd] that would justify disregard
of state laws as to when a foreign corporation may be held to answer
in a suit like the present. 4 67
In a lengthy and comprehensive dissenting opinion, Judge Clark
reiterated and elaborated on his arguments in Jaftex.4 61 He criticized
the majority for incorrectly applying Erie to require application of
state law to questions such as "how the federal courts shall be
organized and how one is brought before them. 41 69 He continued,
"[I]ndeed to put this in the hands of the states would be to destroy
all reason for having a federal tribunal (in which the litigant has more
confidence ) enforce a litigant's rights accorded by state law." 7° Judge
Clark argued that Erie would be satisfied in either case because the
ultimate issues of the libel action would be determined according to
462. Id. at 222-23.
463. Id. at 224.
464. Id. at 224-25.
465. Id. at 225. Judge Friendly therefore rejected implication of any federal amenability
standard from a federal statute or rule. This rejection served the purposes of his major theme,
that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state amenability standards. His rejection,
however, provided a problem in federal question cases in which process is served pursuant
to a federal statute authorizing extraterritorial service of process. He found no stated or im-
plicit amenability standards in such statutes yet he admitted that in federal question cases "the
considerations favoring the overriding of state policy would be far more persuasive than in
an ordinary diversity suit." Id. at 228 n.9. Perhaps the material result of Judge Friendly's
remarks are that he found no federal amenability standard but considered it not inappropriate
to establish-create-devise-formulate such a standard for federal question cases.
466. Id. at 226. One inference from this statement might be that Judge Friendly assumed
that federal amenability standards properly incorporated in federal statutes or rules would
supersede state amenability standards, even in diversity cases. Byrd-balancing, see supra notes
430-33 and accompanying text, however, would still require a balancing of state and federal
policies favoring application of their respective rules or statutes. But see infra text at note 467.
467. Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 230. See also supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text.
468. 320 F.2d at 234-44.
469. Id. at 235.
470. Id.
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Vermont law. 7 ' He again found historical support for a federal stan-
dard of corporate amenability,472 which standard was "quite well
known and reasonably precise." '73 He noted that state law might easily
apply in cases in which service of process had been achieved under
Rule 4(d)(7), 74 but that in a case like the one before the court, where
service had been made through a wholly federal method, a federal
standard would be appropriate. 75 Avoiding any real articulation of
the "quite well known and reasonably precise" federal standard, Judge
Clark settled on the following formulation:
[T]he federal law is shaped by statutory enactment based on easily
understood principles, which reflect still important and widely held
views of common sense and fairness that a person should not be
forced into litigation at a distance from his home."76
One commentator has called this articulation "little more than a
paraphrase of International Shoe. ' '4 17
Although many commentators have been in sympathy with Judge
Clark's position,4 " federal courts sitting in diversity have followed
Arrowsmith4" overwhelmingly, and the Supreme Court, in its majority
471. Id.
472. Id. at 238-39.
473. Id. at 239.'
474. Id.
475. Id. Because process had been served in this case pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3), which pro-
vides for a wholly federal method of service of process upon a foreign corporation, the Ar-
rowsmith decision might be interpreted as necessarily grounded on Erie. If application of a
state standard is justifiable merely as an incorporation into federal law of the state standard
pertaining to the state statute under which service is made, such an argument would apply
only to cases in which service had been made pursuant to a state rule or statute. Arrowsmith
was not such a case.
476. Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 238.
477. Note, supra note 388, at 321.
478. See, e.g., Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent, 40 TEx. L. REV.
509, 619, 635-38 (1962) (federal courts should control own organization and procedure); Carr-
ington, supra note 2, at 318-21 (same); Green, supra note 191, at 979 (same); Smith, supra
note 430 (same).
479. See, e.g., Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, S.A. Paris, 707 F.2d 395, 396
(9th Cir. 1983); Chatanooga Corp. v. Klinger, 704 F.2d 903, 905-06 (6th Cir. 1983); Pearrow
v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 1068 (8th Cir. 1983); Talbot Tractor
Co., Inc. v. Henomoto Tractor Sales, USA, 703 F.2d 143, 144-47 (5th Cir. 1983); Kendall
v. Overseas Dev. Corp., 700 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1983); Hahn v. Vermont Law School,
698 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1983); Froning & Deppe, Inc. v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 695 F.2d 289, 291-92 (7th Cir. 1982); Adden v. Middlebrooks, 688 F.2d 1147, 1155-56
(7th Cir. 1982); Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 688 F.2d 328, 331-32 (5th Cir. 1982); Wyatt
v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 1982); Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo,
Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1982); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State
Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); Southern
Machine Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1968); Pujol v. U.S.
Life Ins. Co., 396 F.2d 430, 431-32 (1st Cir. 1968); Tetco Metal Prods., Inc. v. Langham,
387 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1968); Drapulse Corp. of America v. Birtcher Corp., 362 F.2d
736, 740 (2d Cir. 1966); Edwards v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. Co., 361 F.2d 946, 956-57
(7th Cir. 1966); Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847, 852-54 (5th
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opinion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Baux-
ites de Guinee,480 recently adopted by implication the Arrowsmith
result 48' while Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, expressly
adopted that position. 482 Federal courts sitting in diversity, therefore,
will apply state amenability standards, at least to corporate defen-
dants, unless or until Congress enacts a statute or rule creating a federal
amenability standard.
Unfortunately, for almost twenty years after Arrowsmith, the
Supreme Court refused to address the issue of amenability standards
in diversity cases and now the Court seems to adopt the result without
analysis. 83 Many issues raised in Jaftex and Arrowsmith could stand
closer examination. For example, as one commentator argues, why
did Judge Friendly base his argument on the lack of a federal stan-
dard rather than focusing on whether such a standard is required? 84
If a federal standard would be required, such a standard could always
be devised. Since Judge Friendly admitted the possibility of federal
case law that would supervene state amenability standards, then why
did he concentrate so stolidly on the absence of affirmative Congres-
sional authority? Moreover, although he based his decision on Erie,
Judge Friendly cited Pulson with approval, a case that was not
Cir. 1966); Aftansa v. Economy Boiler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 189 (8th Cir. 1965); Mechanical
Contractors Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of N. Cal., Inc., 342
F.2d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1965); Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317, 319, (2d
Cir. 1964); Velandra v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 294 (6th Cir. 1964);
Simpkins v. Council Mfg. Corp., 332 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 1964); Cook v. Bostitch, 328
F.2d 1, 2-3 (2d Cir. 1964); Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. Tarnowski, No. 82 Civ. 1815 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 23, 1983); Maiocca v. Walt Disney World Co., Slip Op. Civ. Act. No. 80-958-S (D.
Mass. Apr. 22, 1983); V.I.P. Personal Systems Int'l v. Luce & Co., No. 82 Civ. 7550 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 21, 1983); Robb Container Corp. v. Sho-Me Co., No. 82 Civ. 6313 (N.D. III. 1983);
Kass, Goodkind, Wechsler & Labaton v. Finkel & Martwick, P.C., No. 83 Civ. 1226 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Bromfield Systems Corp. v. Schuler & Assoc., Inc., No. 82 Civ. 1174-75 (D. Mass.
1983); Pederson Fisheries, Inc. v. Patti Indus., Inc., 563 F. Supp 72 (W.D. Wash. 1983); Empire
Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hebrew Nat'l Kosher Foods, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 917, 919 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Trafalgar Capital Corp. v. Oil Producers Equip. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, 553 F. Supp. 328,
331 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Gianna Enterprises v. Miss World (Jersey) Ltd., 551 F. Supp. 1348, 1356
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Lacovara v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 551 F. Supp.
601, 603-04 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Western Union Tel. Co. v. T.S.I., Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 329, 332-36
(D.N.J. 1982); Carter Oil Co., Inc. v. Apex Towing Co., 532 F. Supp. 364, 367-68 (E.D.
Ark. 1981); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F.
Supp. 887, 903-05 (N.D. Cal. 1981). Cf. Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 694 F.2d 104, 105-06
(5th Cir. 1982) (court states that "[i]n a diversity action, the reach of federal jurisdiction over
persons is measured by the law of the forum state subject, however, to Federal Due Process
claims" and applies, to the Due Process issue, only cases involving state court exercise of its
personal jurisdiction).
480. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). See supra notes 156-85 and accompanying text.
481. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702-03.
482. Id. at 711-12.
483. See supra note 481 and accompanying text.
484. Note, supra note 388, at 322.
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necessarily based on Erie at all." s5 Further Judge Friendly admitted
that Erie, under the Byrd refinements, would permit federal law of
some form to control. Factors that preclude application of a uniform
federal standard, like service pursuant to a federal rule that incor-
porates state amenability standards, might lead to such a result. In
Arrowsmith, where process was served by a wholly federal method,
Judge Friendly could not have relied on any incorporation theory but
had to rely on Erie for his analysis.
One must also ask to what extent the result in Arrowsmith and
subsequent cases can be explained by the absence of a genuine federal
amenability standard."8 6 Judge Friendly found no federal standard,
thus preordaining his resulting application of state law if only from
lack of choice. Moreover, Judge Clark, for all his enthusiastic asser-
tions, seemed ill put to describe a standard. 8 '
In sum, despite Arrowsmith and Insurance Corp. of Ireland, little
reason exists to apply state amenability standards in diversity cases,
particularly where process is served by a wholly federal method. The
absence of an articulable federal standard is hardly a compelling ground
for adoption of a policy which leads to nonuniformnity among the
federal courts. Several commentators have suggested that a uniform
federal standard be developed and that is applicability be determined
by the Byrd balancing technique.488 When the state has substantial
policy reasons for limiting personal jurisdiction, such as some policy
on corporate activity, 8 " then federal courts might be required to respect
that policy. When, however, state limitations seem designed only to
reduce court congestion49 or to preclude suits in which the doctrine
of forum non conveniens might be raised, "9 ' federal courts should
be free to implement important federal concerns, such as federal court
uniformity and protection of out-of-staters, by employing its own
amenability standard. In Byrd, the Supreme Court rejected the view
that a federal court sitting in diversity is just another state court.492
Moreover, federal courts sitting in diversity can employ special federal
amenability standards in specific situations in which implementation
of strong federal policy so requires. No compelling reason, therefore,
485. See supra notes 420-24 and accompanying text.
486. See supra notes 476-77 and accompanying text.
487. See id.
488. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 191, at 96-97 n.76; Comment, supra note 214, at 702-09;
Note, supra note 188, at '1147-48; Note, supra note 385, at 562-63; 25 OHIo ST. L.J. 119,
121-22 (1964).
489. See Comment, supra note 214, at 704.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 704-05.
492. Byrd, 356 U.S. 525. See Comment, supra note 214, at 703.
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precludes development of a general federal standard when appropriate
under a Byrd analysis.
ii. Federal Question Cases
The applicable amenability standard in cases in which federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is not based entirely on diversity of citizen-
ship-for purposes of this article, federal question cases 49 3-should
not be determined according to the Arrowsmith doctrine. That stan-
dard necessarily followed from the interpretation of the Second Cir-
cuit of the requirements of Erie R.R v. Tompkins;4 9 the decision
in Erie applies only to diversity cases. '95 Even Judge Friendly admit-
ted in Arrowsmith that "the considerations favoring the overriding
of state policy would be far more persuasive [in a federal question
case] than in an ordinary diversity suit." 4 96 Innumerable courts4 97 and
493. See supra notes 19 and 195.
494. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See supra notes 415-77 and accompanying text.
495. See, e.g., Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D. Mich. 1973);
Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 232, 236 n.34 (D.N.J. 1966).
See also Foster, supra note 191, at 96-97 n.76. Cf. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
4, §1075, at 302-06 (personal jurisdiction question no problem in federal question cases; Erie
creates problems in diversity cases).
496. Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 228 n.9.
497. The majority of courts making an unconditional statement to this effect have been
deciding nondiversity cases in which process was served pursuant to a federal statute authoriz-
ing nationwide or worldwide service of process under the circumstances of the case. See, e.g.,
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U S. 527, 554 (1980) (service pursuant to the Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. §1391(e), see supra note 248) (application of "Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment [to] limit the exercise of congressional power to provide for nation-
wide in personam jurisdiction") (Stewart, J., dissenting); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Jim Walter
Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 255-56 (5th Cir. 1981) (service pursuant to Section 9 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 215 U.S.C. §49) (court recognizes fifth amendment standard to determine
amenability); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
313-14 n.36 (2d Cir. 1981) (service pursuant to §1608 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §1608, see supra note 250) (court implies that the due process standard
to be satisfied is that of the fifth amendment); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir.
1978) (service pursuant to the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. §1391(e), see
supra note 248) ("Congress is, of course, limited in the actions it can take by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . ."); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir.
1974) (service pursuant to Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa,
see supra note 249) ("Congress in providing for nationwide service of process, remains subject
to the constraints of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment"); Leasco Data Process-
ing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972) (service pursuant to both
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa, see supra note 249, and
the New York State long-arm statute, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§301 and 302(a)(1), (2) and (3))
("it is reasonable to infer that Congress meant to assert personal jurisdiction over foreigners
not present in the United States to but, of course, not beyond the bounds permitted by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment"); Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 391 (D.R.I.
1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978) (service
pursuant to the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. §1391(e), see supra note 248)
("the due process limitation on national service of process is found by ... an inquiry man-
dated by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause"); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating
Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 198-205 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (service pursuant to Section 27 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa, see supra note 249) (after reviewing various authorities,
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commentators '98 have expressed the position that "whatever the view
court concluded that fifth amendment due process clause limits congressional grant of nation-
wide service of process and that those limitations are not necessarily coextensive with the Inter-
national Shoe test); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24-25 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(service pursuant to Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa, see
supra note 249) ("Citizens of foreign countries are entitled to . . .protection under the Fifth
Amendment"); Securities and Exch. Comm. v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 748 (D. Md. 1968)
(service pursuant to Section 214 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §806-14)
("the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents by the district courts considering federal ques-
tions is limited by the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment"). See also Engineering
Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 709 & n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (service of complaint
pursuant to Rule B(t) of the SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY AND MARITIIE
CLAIMS to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by attachment) ("Rule B(l) grants us power to render
a judgment binding on the parties to the extent of [the] value of the attached property [and
t]he constitutionality of the Act of Congress must be tested under the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment"). Even where service of process was not made pursuant to a federal
statute authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of process, some federal courts have asserted
that the Fifth Amendment should govern amenability in their particular federal question cases.
See, e.g., Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d
200, 203 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (trademark infringement action; service, under Rule 4(e), pur-
suant to District of Columbia long-arm statute) ("the outer boundaries of a court's authority
to proceed against a particular person or entity is set for federal tribunals by the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment"); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137,
1143 (7th Cir. 1975) (patent infringement action; service, under Rule 4(e), pursuant to Illinois
long-arm statute) ("[ifn this litigation . . . a federally created right is at issue, and due process
is properly a matter for examination in light of the fifth amendment"); Vest v. Waring, 1983-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,419 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (antitrust action; service, under former Rule 4(d)(7)
and Rule 4(e), pursuant to Georgia long-arm statute) ("[w]hen this court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion is predicated . . . upon the presence of a federal question .... a nonresident defendant's
amenability to personal jurisdiction is a matter of federal law ...[;] 'the appropriate inquiry
lies with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,"' quoting Laplyrouse v. Texaco,
Inc. 693 F.2d 581, 585 (5th Cir. 1982)); Graham Eng'g Corp. v. Kemp Prods. Ltd., 418 F.
Supp. 915, 920 n.6 (N.D. Oh 1976) (patent infringement action; service, under Rule 4(e), pur-
suant to Ohio long-arm statute) ("[s]ince this case presents a federal question in a federal court,
technically it is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth . ..Amendment that requires construc-
tion"); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 356-57 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (admiralty
action; service, under Rule 4(e), pursuant to Michigan long-arm statute) ("the court must ex-
amine the facts in light of the constitutional proscriptions of the due process clause of the
Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment"). See also Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson
Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 232 (D.N.J. 1966) (declaratory judgment action for patent invalidity
and nonenfringement; service, under Rule 4(e), pursuant to New Jersey Rule 4:4-4(d)) ("[i]nsofar
as due process is concerned, this Court's power to assert jurisdiction in a Federal question
matter is tested, technically speaking, under the Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment").
In cases in which federal process was served, under Rule 4(e), pursuant to the long-arm
statute of the state in which the court was sitting, some federal courts have taken the position
that, while a federal standard should, as a general matter, govern federal court personal jurisdic-
tion in federal question cases, use of state long-arm statutes requires a fourteenth amendment
rather than a fifth amendment analysis. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc.,
654 F.2d 280, 282, 284 (3d Cir. 1981) (admiralty action; service, under Rule 4(e), pursuant
to New Jersey long-arm statute) ("In any event, even in nondiversity cases, if service of pro-
cess must be made pursuant to a state long-arm statute . .. , the defendant's amenability
to suit in federal district court is limited by that statute . . . [since in] enacting its long-arm
rule, . . .New Jersey is limited by the due process constraints of the fourteenth amendment.
Therefore, we believe that [the defendant's] amenability to suit in the District of New Jersey
must be judged by fourteenth amenament standards.") See also Hartley v. Sioux City & New
Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 379 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1967) (admiralty action; service, under
Rule 4(d)(7), pursuant to Pennsylvania long-arm statute) (fifth amendment analysis only ap-
propriate for federal means of service of process).
498. See, e.g., supra note 329 and accompanying text.
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one takes toward diversity, . . . Fifth Amendment considerations would
appear to be the appropriate ones for testing amenability where sub-
ject matter jurisdiction rests on a federal question or other head of
federal jurisdiction."4 99 While this position seems uniform, various
judicial and scholarly responses or attempts to "practice what they
preach" have been disconcertingly nonuniform in practice and in
rationale."' One stumbling block has been, of course, the absence
of an articulable fifth amendment standard that has been accepted
generally.5"' Partially or wholly inseparable from this problem-
perhaps, one might say, "inextricably intertwined" with this problem
of definition-are the difficulties entailed by the various ways in which
a federal court is authorized to serve process on individual and/or
corporate defendants.5"2 The result has been nonuniform treatment
of cases, both intercategory and intracategory.5 05
Before embarking on a detailed consideration of lower federal court
and scholarly treatment of the issue of federal court personal jurisdic-
tion in federal question cases, this would be an appropriate point at
which to consider Supreme Court treatment of this question. That
any federal amenability standard or limitation in federal question cases
springs from the fifth amendment due process clause generally is
accepted.5" ' The Court, moreover, consistently has acknowledged in
dictum the authority of Congress to authorize nationwide service of
process for all federal courts in all matters over which those courts
would have subject matter jurisdiction. 50 5 No court or commentator
has taken serious issue with the proposition that the Constitution would
not preclude Congress from so extending the process of federal courts.
Some courts and commentators have gone further, accepting' this dic-
tum as established law, 506 and others even have given this dictum such
expansive reading as to establish the capacity of Congress not only
to authorize "extraterritorial" reach for federal process, but also to
render defendants served, pursuant to such statutes, amenable to the
personal jurisdiction of the federal court serving process .507 These
499. Foster, supra note 191, at 96-97 n.75.
500. See infra notes 573-1355 and accompanying text.
501. See supra notes 476-77 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 273-94 and accompanying text and infra notes 561-72 and accom-
panying text.
503. See infra notes 573-1355 and accompanying text.
504. See supra notes 329 and 497 and accompanying text.
505. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
506. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 191, at 320-21.
507. See, e.g., Hilgeman v. National Ins. Co. of N. Am., 547 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1977)
(infra notes 602-08 and accompanying text); Sohns v. Dahl, 392 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Va.
1975) (infra notes 592-601 and accompanying text); Arpet, Ltd. v. Homans, 390 F. Supp. 908
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (infra notes 587-91 and accompanying text).
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authorities go too far. The Supreme Court has never equated authority
to serve process with amenability to suit. In fact, in his concurring
opinion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Baux-
ites de Guinee,0 8 Justice Powell painstakingly distinguished between
authority to serve process and authority to assert jurisdiction over
the defendant so served.5 0 9 While both are limited by either a fifth
or fourteenth amendment due process clause, service of process is
a technical procedure necessary to apprise the defendant of the penden-
cy of litigation against him510 and due process requires that process
be served in the manner calculated to maximize the possibility that
the defendant will have actual notice of the suit.5 12 Proper service
of process is thus necessary to "trigger" the personal jurisdiction of
a court over a defendant if the court properly may assert jurisdiction
over such defendant. Proper service of process, however, does not
render the defendant amenable to suit; a separate amenability basis,
such as presence, must exist. Justice Powell observed that because
personal jurisdiction cannot be asserted without proper service of pro-
cess, commentators and judges often incorporate amenability into
service. 52 Amenability, however, is a separate requirement. Therefore,
even if the prior Supreme Court cases definitely established the con-
stitutional power of Congress to authorize federal district court pro-
cess to run nationwide, or even worldwide, some additional inquiry
as to whether due process standards were satisfied would be required.
In some federal cases the question of whether a corporation will
be amenable to the personal jurisdiction of a federal court sitting in
a particular state depends on whether the defendant corporation is
508. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
509. Justice Powell stated:
Jurisdiction over the person generally is dealt with by Rule 4, governing the methods
of service through which personal jurisdiction may be obtained. Although Rule 4
deals expressly only with service of process, not with the underlying jurisdictional
prerequisites, jurisdiction may not be obtained unless process is served in compliance
with applicable law. . . . For this reason Rule 4 frequently has been characterized
as a jurisdictional provision. ...
Id. at 715 n.6 (citation omitted).
510. As one court stated:
Personal jurisdiction refers to the Court's ability to assert judicial power over the
parties and bind them by its adjudication. Service of process is the corollary require-
ment which sets the Court's personal jurisdiction in gear. That is, someone amenable
to the assertion of jurisdiction cannot be subject to its exercise until he has been
properly served. Both that assertion of power and the subsequent service must be
statutorily and constitutionally permissible.
Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 224 (D.N.J. 1966).
511. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
512. See supra note 509.
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"doing business" in the state."s 3 Arrowsmith and its progeny establish-
ed that in diversity cases the question of whether a corporation is
doing business for purposes of personal jurisdiction is to be deter-
mined by the law of the state in which the federal court sits.5"' The
Supreme Court, however, has not addressed any question of a federal
standard to be pursued in federal question cases.
In United States v. Scophony Corporation of America,"5 a suit
in which process had been served pursuant to Section 12 of the Clayton
Act," t6 the Court determined that the defendant corporation had
"transact[ed] business" within the Southern District of New York as
required by the venue provision of Section 12 and had been "found"
within that district as required by the service of process provision
of Section 12.1'" The Court, however, declined to rule as to the cir-
cumstances under which a defendant corporation that had been
properly served pursuant to Section 12 would be amendable to suit.
The Court stated:
We deal here with a problem of statutory construction, not one of
constitutional import. Nor do we have any question of the exercise
of Congress' power to its farthest limit. The issue is simply how
far Congress meant to go, and specifically whether it intended to
create venue and liability to service of process through occurrence
within a district of the kinds of acts done here on Scophony's
behalf." '
In a footnote, the Court refused to apply International Shoe to the
case, not because it found the standard inappropriate, but because
"[T]here [was] no necessity for doing so." 5 '9 When provided with
the opportunity to establish a federal amenability standard, the
Supreme Court declined to do so.
A very recent Supreme Court case, Verlinden v. Central Bank of
513. See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795 (1948); Arrowsmith,
320 F.2d 219; Jaftex, 282 F.2d 508.
514. See supra notes 434-87 and accompanying text.
515. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
516. Id. at 796. For the text of Section 12 of the Clayton Act, see supra note 248.
517. Scophony, 333 U.S. at 818.
518. Id. at 804.
519. Id. at 804 n.13. The court stated:
Appellee makes no suggestion of a constitutional issue. The Government, however,
suggests that, in view of our recent decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, which was concerned with the jurisdiction of a state over a foreign
corporation for purposes of suit and service of process, and in view of aspects of
similarity between that problem and the one now presented, we extend to this case
and to § 12 the criteria there formulated and applied. There is no necessity for doing
so. The facts of the two cases are considerably different and, as we have said, we
are not concerned here with finding the utmost reach of Congress' power.
Id.
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Nigeria,520 provided a limited context in which to address this issue.
The decision, however, has contributed little to the question, at least
little that is not susceptible of differing interpretations. Verlinden,
a Dutch Corporation, instituted suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York against the Central Bank of
Nigeria, "an instrumentality of Nigeria," for anticipatory breach of
a letter of credit.12' The only connection between the parties, the matter
in litigation, and the Southern District of New York was that in con-
nection with a contract with Verlinden to deliver cement to Nigeria,
the Central Bank of Nigeria "improperly established an unconfirmed
letter of credit payable through Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
in New York." '22 Both subject matter and personal jurisdiction were
asserted under §2 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA). 2 3 This section provides that district courts shall have subject
matter jurisdiction over any nonjury civil suit against a foreign state
that is not entitled to immunity under certain sections of the FSIA
or "under any applicable international agreement" and shall have per-
sonal jurisdiction over the foreign state so sued so long as the court
has subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and "service has been
made under section 1608 of this title." 2 " Section 1608 of Title 28
of the United States Code prescribes methods of serving process "upon
a foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state" or "upon
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.""52 If properly served
pursuant to section 1608, therefore, "a foreign state is subject to
district court in personam jurisdiction only in those instances where
it is not entitled to sovereign immunity as specified in sections
1605-1607 of the Act." '526 Central Bank moved to dismiss the action,
inter alia, "for (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; [and] (2) lack
of personal jurisdiction over Central Bank based upon sovereign im-
munity and the act of state doctrine." '527 According to the district
520. 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
521. Id. at 1965-66 (1983). The district court opinion appears at 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
522. 103 S. Ct. at 1966.
523. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330; 1332(a)(2)-(a)(4);
1391(f); 1441(d); and 1602-1611 (1976)). For further discussion of the history and provisions
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), see generally Kane, Suing Foreign
Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1982); Note, Minimum Contacts
Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 12 GA. J. INT'L & CoM.Ip. L. 211
(1982). See also Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La Came, 705 F.2d 250, 252-53 (7th
Cir. 1983) (brief discussion of development of FSIA).
524. 28 U.S.C. §1330 (1976). For the text of this statutory provision, see supra note 250.
525. 28 U.S.C. §§1608(a), (b), and (c) (Supp. 1983).
526. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1293.
527. Id. at 1288.
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction
court, Central Bank did not challenge personal jurisdiction because
of any constitutional defect but merely because Central Bank did not
come within the statutory grounds for assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion under the FSIA. The court of appeals characterized this as a
motion to dismiss "for lack of jurisdiction under FSIA."'' 28 This makes
analysis of the opinions difficult because the court makes no distinc-
tion between lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a nonwaivable defect
in the power of the court over the particular matter before it,52 9 and
lack of personal jurisdiction, a waivable defect in the authority of
the court to render a decision binding on the defendant. 30 While the
FSIA ties together subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdic-
tion in an unprecedented manner, the structure of section 2 of the
FSIA should require that the initial procedural inquiry be into sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. If subject matter jurisdiction exists, then, ac-
cording to the FSIA, personal jurisdiction also will exist so long as
process is served in the appropriate manner.
Central Bank first argued that a district court could not assert
authority, under the FSIA, over a "dispute between foreign entities"
involving a nonfederal question, an objection to the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court.13' The district court, the court of appeals,
and the Supreme Court each ruled that the FSIA by its language was
not limited to suits initiated by U.S. citizens or corporations. 32 The
Supreme Court rejected the argument that such an interpretation would
turn federal district courts into "small international courts of claims,"
noting that sovereign immunity from suits on commercial matters
would be granted to the defendant foreign state by the FSIA unless
the defendant had "some form of substantial contact with the United
States.'53
3
The district court determined that article III of the Constitution
528. Verlinden, 647 F.2d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1981).
529. See supra notes 3, 18 and 19.
530. See supra note 3.
531. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1288. The court of appeals framed the issue in the follow-
ing way:
This case, one of seven decided today involving the FSIA, presents a sharp issue
under the Act: may a foreign plaintiff sue a foreign state in a federal court for breach
of an agreement not governed by federal law?
647 F.2d at 322 (footnotes omitted).
532. 488 F. Supp. at 1292; 647 F.2d at 324; 103 S. Ct. at 1969-70. The district court
had noted that such broad reading of the language of the FSIA was necessary to effectuate
"the Congressional purpose of concentrating litigation against sovereign states in the federal
courts in order to aid the development of a uniform body of federal law governing assertions
of sovereign immunity." 488 F. Supp. at 1292.
533. 103 S. Ct. at 1969-70.
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would authorize subject matter jurisdiction over a suit by a foreign
or alien corporation against a foreign state,53 but, relying on its in-
terpretation of the FSIA, found that the matter before it did not come
within one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity provided by the
statute; the Court, therefore, dismissed the complaint "for lack of
personal jurisdiction. ' 5 35 The Supreme Court noted, in a footnote,
that conclusion by the district court also included a finding that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction:
Under the Act ... both statutory subject matter jurisdiction (other-
wise known as "competence") and personal jurisdiction turn on ap-
plication of the substantive provisions of the Act. . . . [1]f none
of the exceptions to sovereign immunity set forth in the Act applies,
the District Court lacks both statutory subject matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction. The District Court's conclusion that none
of the exceptions to the Act applied therefore signified an absence
of both competence and personal jurisdiction.136
The court of appeals did not reach the issue of whether the defen-
dant came within one of the stated exceptions of the FSIA to sovereign
immunity. Instead, after "concluding that both plaintiff and defen-
dant are within the class of parties contemplated by" the FSIA, 51"
the court of appeals addressed the question of whether the subject
matter jurisdiction granted district courts by the language of the FSIA
over suits by foreign (alien) plaintiffs against foreign states came within
the authority granted to lower federal courts by Article III of the
Constitution.5 38 The court of appeals considered and quickly dismissed
the possibility of constitutional authority under the diversity grant
of article III: "The phrase nowhere mentions a case between two
aliens. 5 39 After a more detailed analysis, the court of appeals con-
cluded that such authority also was not available under 28 U.S.C.
§133150 or the more broad "arising under" language of article 111.142
Therefore, "find[ing] federal courts to be without power to hear suits
such as the one before us," the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal
of Verlinden's complaint, but on a different ground-"th-at the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. 542
534. 488 F. Supp. at 1292.
535. Id. at 1302.
536. 103 S. Ct. at 1967 n.5.
537. 647 F.2d at 324.
538 Id. at 324-30.
539. Id. at 325.
540. Id. at 327.
541. Id. at 329.
542. Id. at 330.
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The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "the grant of jurisdic-
tion in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is consistent with the
Constitution," ' 43 and remanded to the court of appeals for its deter-
mination of whether the action fell within any of the exceptions to
sovereign immunity spelled out in the FSIA.54 If the court of ap-
peals would agree with the district court that no exception applied,
the case would not come within the congressional grant of the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in Section 2 of the FSIA and would be
dismissed. 5 The Supreme Court concluded: "If, on the other hand,
the Court of Appeals concludes that jurisdiction does not exist under
the statute, the action may then be .remanded to the District Court
for further proceedings.
54 6
The treatment by the Supreme Court of this case leaves in doubt
its position on the question of amenability standards in federal ques-
tion cases in general, of amenability standards in cases in which a
federal statute authorizes nationwide or worldwide service of process,
or even the amenability standards in cases arising under the FSIA,
5 47
an unusual federal statute purporting to prescribe circumstances in
which a federal court will have personal jurisdiction-satisfaction of
the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction plus proper service
of process pursuant to a particular federal statute.5 48 Lower federal
courts have required that if the FSIA criteria for personal jurisdic-
tion are satisfied, a separate due process analysis must be conducted
to determine the defendant's amenability to suit, therefore regarding
the FSIA criteria much as courts have regarded state long arm
statutes. 49 This additional analysis, as stated in one oft-cited Second
543. 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
544. Id.
545. Id. at 1974.
546. Id.
547. As one commentator noted in 1982: "The Court has not had the opportunity to ad-
dress the role of minimum contacts in international disputes under the FSIA. That task has
been left to the lower federal courts." Note, supra note 523, at 224. Verlinden provided the
Court with the opportunity, but the Court chose not to employ it.
548. See supra notes 524-26 and accompanying text.
549. See, e.g., Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d
1094, 1105 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("a finding of FSIA personal jurisdiction, which would rest
in part on a finding of non-immunity, must comport with the demands of due process"); Har-
ris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1352 (l1th Cir. 1982) (in
determining personal jurisdiction under the FSIA, "we must assess the exercise of authority
against the standards of due process"); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981) ("the [FSIA] cannot create personal jurisdiction
where the constitution forbids it"); Gibbons v. Udaras ne Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1116-17
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("statutory aspects of the Court's analysis of defendants' personal jurisdiction
argument are controlled by the FSIA .... [;] the Court must still determine whether an exercise
of the personal jurisdiction conferred by the FSIA is permissible under the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment").,See also Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
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Circuit opinion, is based on the premise that "the Act cannot create
506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (court examined contacts of the defendant with the forum,
concluding such contacts were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction under the FSIA).
Evidence also exists in the House Reports that accompanied the FSIA that Congress intended
judicial reliance on some sort of contacts analysis in determining personal jurisdiction ques-
tions under the FSIA:
For personal jurisdiction to exist under section 1330(b), the claim must first of all
be one over which the district courts have original jurisdiction under section 1330(a),
meaning a claim for which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. . . .These
immunity provisions, therefore, prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist before
our courts can exercise personal jurisdiction.
H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD.
NEws 6604, 6612. The immunity provisions referred to in the Congressional Report include
sections 1605(a)(2) and (3) of the FSIA, which provide, in pertinent part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case -
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside
the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue
and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such property is
owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that
agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States....
28 U.S.C. §§1605(a)(2), (3) (1976).
At least one court has taken the position that the above-quoted Congressional statement
did not "mean that the statutory standard for determining non-immunity is coextensive with
the due process standard governing personal jurisdiction, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson .. .; International Shoe v. Washington.... ." Maritime Int'l Nominees Establish-
ment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). The
court continued, in a footnote:
Of course, a finding of FSIA personal jurisdiction, which would rest in part on a
finding of non-immunity, must comport with the demands of due process, and Con-
gress intended that the Act satisfy those demands. . . .But the immunity determina-
tion involves considerations distinct from the issue of personal jurisdiction, and the
FSIA's interlocking provisions are most profitably analyzed when these distinctions
are kept in mind.
Id. at 1105 n.18 (citations omitted). On the other hand, the district court in Verlinden found
that the "substantive criteria [of the immunities provisions] were intended to embody the con-
stitutional requirements of due process, which may only be satisfied if there are sufficient con-
tacts between the litigant and the forum state." 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court made any reference to this aspect of the
district court opinion.
The legislative history is subject to at least two other interpretations. One might argue that
the FSIA includes not only statutory authority for service of process but also an amenability
standard built into the immunity provisions, sufficient contacts with the United States. Or,
on the other hand, the immunity provisions might be read as, in effect, a special long-arm
statute that prescribes those circumstances in which the government has authorized extrater-
ritorial service of process, and the validity of application of that statute to any particular defendant
still would be analyzed in terms of its constitutional validity under the fifth amendment due
process clause. If the last interpretation were accepted, one might argue thdt the immunity
provisions indicate the entity with regard to which any due process minimum contacts type
analysis would be conducted-the United States as a whole rather than any particular federal
district or the particular state in which the federal court is sitting.
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personal jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it."0 In deter-
mining whether such due process requirements are satisfied, some
courts have examined the defendant's contact with the United States55'
while others have required sufficient contacts with the state in which
the federal court is sitting 5 2 or even actual "presence" of the defen-
dant in the United States. 53 One court of appeals established a four
step approach to determine amenability: first, to what extent did the
defendant avail itself of the benefits and privileges of American laws;
second, to what extent could the defendant have foreseen the instiga-
tion of litigation in the United States; third, how inconvenient would
it be for the defendant to litigate in the United States; and fourth,
what interests would the United States have in hearing the case. 54
The Supreme Court opinion in Verlinden, as well as the opinions
of the district court and the court of appeals, were silent on the ques-
tion of whether a separate due process analysis would be required
if, on remand, the court of appeals found that the defendant was
550. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d
Cir. 1981). In its analysis of the FSIA, the court of appeals noted:
In structure, the F.S.I.A. is a marvel of compression. . . . [Il]t purports to provide
answers to three crucial questions in a suit against a foreign state: the availability
of sovereign immunity as a defense, the presence of subject matter jurisdiction over
the claim, and the propriety of personal jurisdiction over the defendant . . . This
economy of decision has come, however, at the price of considerable confusion in
the district courts.
Id. at 306. See also supra note 549.
551. See, e.g., Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1352-53
(lth Cir. 1982) (court applied International Shoe-World-Wide Volkswagen minimum con-
tacts analysis, but evaluated the defendant's contacts with the United States); Texas Trading,
647 F.2d at 314 (established four-step test for amenability, which test focused on the relation-
ship of the defendant to the United States, see infra note 554 and accompanying text); Gibbons
v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court announced that fifth
amendment applied, cited International Shoe for "minimum contacts" test, used the Texas
Trading four-step inquiry as a "guide [to] the Court's application of International Shoe's
minimum contacts test", and evaluated the defendant's contacts with the United States). See
also Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1105-06
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (court implied, in dictum, that in a due process analysis it would consider
the defendants' contacts with the United States).
552. See, e.g., Thomas P. Gozales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Production de Costa
Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 1980) (using California long-arm statute, court found defen-
dants' contacts with California insufficient to "qualify as purposeful activity invoking the benefits
and protections of the state"); Waukesha Engine Div., Dresser Americas, Inc. v. Banco Na-
cional de Fomento Cooperatino, 485 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (using Wisconsin long-arm
statute to support its holding, court denied jurisdiction where the defendant's direct contact
with the forum state amounted to a single inspection visit by bank officers).
553. See, e.g., East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383, 387-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no personal jurisdiction because no continuous and systematic relationship
with the forum and no physical presence within the forum); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453
F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (only contact with forum was oil shipments to the United
States and court ruled that embargo of shipments was not a sufficient contact).
554. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314.
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not entitled to sovereign immunity and that, therefore, federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction existed under the FSIA. The Supreme Court
also gave no clue as to the appropriate standard under which such
analysis would be conducted. The silence of the Court is surprising
particularly in light of the substantial number of lower federal court
cases in which some sort of separate due process analysis has been
employed;"5 its opinion could have provided an appropriate vehicle
for guiding the subsequent determinations of the lower courts. Perhaps,
however, the Court was reluctant to provide guidance on an issue
that might not arise.
In view of the silence by the Court on this issue, several inferences
are possible. First, one might conclude that the Supreme Court felt
that no due process inquiry would be required if the defendants
satisfied the statutory criteria for personal jurisdiction.1 6 Or, one might
hypothesize that the Court, always seemingly reluctant to address the
issue of amenability standards in federal courts,"' declined to raise
the issue and resolve it because the decision on remand might eliminate
the need to decide that issue. 58 Finally, one might argue, from its
references to the "United States contacts" requirements necessary for
exclusion from sovereign immunity,55 9 that the Supreme Court con-
sidered that some "minimum contacts" analysis had been programmed
into the statute regarding the subject matter jurisdiction question. 6
In sum, however, in its most recent opportunity to address the issue,
the Supreme Court seems to studiously have avoided any line of discus-
sion that might raise the question of federal amenability standards
in federal question cases.
555. See supra note 549.
556. The Court gave no directions to the district court in regard to this contingency, and
the opinion might be read as implying that satisfaction of statutory criteria was sufficient,
especially in circumstances in which the statute provided express authorization for assertion
of personal jurisdiction upon the satisfaction of certain criteria. The Court never has ruled
on the question of whether a separate amenability inquiry must be conducted in federal ques-
tion cases beyond the inquiry of whether process has been served properly. See supra notes
295-96 and accompanying text. The Court has, however, albeit impliedly, adopted an amenability
standard and analysis for diversity cases. See supra notes 480-81 and accompanying text. Those
cases, however, involved state rather than federal statues, and therefore, the fact that a special
due process analysis was required in such cases does not imply that such an analysis would
be essential in federal question cases in which service of process was made pursuant to a special
federal statute.
557. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
558. See supra notes 543-46 and accompanying text.
559. See supra note 549 and accompanying text.
560. See supra note 549. In fact, one might- view the FSIA as a legislative attempt to
codify all procedural aspects of a particular type of litigation, including the constitutional re-
quirement that the defendant be afforded due process of law.
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III. CATEGORIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL QUESTION CASES
A. Categorization of Federal Question Cases
To facilitate analysis of personal jurisdiction standards in federal
question cases, federal question cases may be categorized according
to the manner in which process is served. Service may be made: pur-
suant to the federal statute that authorizes nationwide or even
worldwide service of process as authorized by Rule 4(e);56' pursuant
to the wholly federal procedures authorized by Rules 4(d)(1) and
4(d)(3)562 and new Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii);563 "pursuant to the law of the
State in which the district court is held" as authorized by new Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(i);1 6 4 "in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in
which the district court is held" as authorized by former Rule 4(d)(7);565
and, upon a party not found within a state, "under the circumstances
and in the manner prescribed in [a long-arm statute]" of the state
in which the district court is held, as authorized by Rule 4(e). 66 Even
if a general uniform approach to the question of amenability stan-
dards in federal question cases would not be possible because of the
wide range of methods by which proper service of process may be
accomplished, one would hypothesize that a uniform approach would
have developed within each of the above-described categories of cases.
This, however, has not come to pass.5 67 The best way to become
familiar with the problem of nonuniformity and lack of definite stan-
dards and with the various approaches that courts have taken is to
consider separately each category of cases. Some federal question cases
do not fit neatly into this structured analysis, either because the method
of service utilized never is noted by the court or because the court
discusses more than one method for service; each of the former will
be considered in regard to the category into which the case would
most likely fit, and each of the latter will be considered in regard
to one category and noted in regard to the other category or categories
mentioned in the opinion.
561. See supra note 287 and accompanying text and infra notes 573-74 and accompanying
text.
562. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text and infra notes 799-809 and accom-
panying text.
563. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
564. See supra note 278 and accompanying text and infra notes 900-02 and accompanying
text.
565. See supra notes 279-86 and accompanying text and infra notes 893-913 and accompa-
nying text.
566. See supra note 288 and accompanying text and infra notes 1107-70 and accompany-
ing text.
567. See, e.g., infra notes 579-784, 810-87, 920-1038, and 1123-1316 and accompanying text.
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In the consideration of the question of personal jurisdiction in federal
question cases, several often conflicting realities must be kept in mind.
These realities must, to some extent, dictate result and rationale: (1)
federal district courts have always been organized territorially around
the territorial boundaries of the states in which the district courts were
held and any authorization for a federal district court to reach beyond
these territorial limitations has been viewed as an exceptional act re-
quiring some congressional authorization by statute or federal rule;,68
(2) the notions of sovereignty that early required such territorial restric-
tions on state courts cannot be applied sensibly to federal courts sitting
in federal question cases;5 69 (3) Congress, consistent with the Con-
stitution, could have authorized nationwide service of process for all
federal district courts;57 (4) Congress has not done so; " (5) Con-
gress, in statutes and the Federal Rules, has prescribed methods for
service of process in particular circumstances but has never explicitly
addressed the question of federal court amenability standards."
B. Analysis of Federal Question Cases Arising in the Various
Categories
1. Amenability Standards in Federal Question Cases in which
Special Federal Statutes Authorize Nationwide Service of Process
In areas of particular federal concern, Congress has enacted scores
of statutes that authorize that federal district court process reach
nationwide or even worldwide. 73 Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure authorizes service upon a pdrty not found or domiciled
in the state under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed
by a federal statute.5 74 Among these statutes, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 is unique in purporting to lay down those
circumstances in which the federal court will have personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant;175 the other federal statutes that authorize
extraterritorial service of process are silent on the question of per-
sonal jurisdiction. A few courts have asserted personal jurisdiction
over defendants solely on the authority of the federal statutes.17 6 Most
568. See supra notes 196-294 and accompanying text.
569. See supra notes 4 and 73 and accompanying text.
570. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
571. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
572. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
573. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
574. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
575. See supra note 524 and accompanying text.
576. See infra notes 579-682 and accompanying text.
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courts, as in the FSIA cases discussed above, 577 have ruled that the
federal statute may be utilized to obtain personal jurisdiction over
a nonpresent, nonconsenting defendant served pursuant to the statute
only if this would not violate some constitutional limitation on federal
court exercises of personal jurisdiction.578 Most courts agree that the
due process standard for federal question cases in which process is
served by the wholly federal means of a federal statute authorizing
nationwide or worldwide service of process should be the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. The greatest divergence occurs in this
area in the formulation and application of that standard.
Cases in Which Courts Have Not Required Separate
Amenability Analysis-Physical Power or Sovereignty Doctrine
Review of these various cases should begin with those in which
federal courts did not articulate or attempt to apply any genuine
amenability standards except, in some cases, presence or domicile
within the United States. In one pre-International Shoe opinion,
Eastman Kodak Company of New York v. Southern Photo Materials
Co.," 9 the Supreme Court faced the question of personal jurisdiction
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
over a defendant New York corporation that had been served with
process in New York pursuant to the service of process provisions
of Section 12 of the Clayton Act. 50 The plaintiff, Southern Photo
Materials Co., had alleged that the defendant, Eastman Kodak Com-
pany, in violation of antitrust laws, "had engaged in a combination
to monopolize the interstate trade in the United States in photographic
materials and supplies, and had monopolized the greater part of such
interstate trade." '' One issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was
"whether there was local jurisdiction or venue in the District Court.
S. . 2 under Section 12 of the Clayton Act. This section provided
that "any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against
a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof
it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found
577. See supra notes 549-54 and accompanying text.
578. See infra notes 687-784 and accompanying text.
579. 273 U.S. 359 (1926). For discussion of the International Shoe case and its progeny,
see supra notes 106-55 and accompanying text. Clearly, a case decided prior to International
Shoe would not include any reference to a "minimum contacts" test of amenability, many
variations of which have been tested by federal courts in later cases involving nationwide or
worldwide service of process statutes. See infra notes 687-784 and accompanying text.
580. Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at 367.
581. Id. at 368.
582. Id. at 369-70.
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or transacts business, and all process in such cases may be served
in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be
found." '83 After stating that the issue of "[w]hether or not the jurisdic-
tion of the District Court was rightly sustained. . .resolves itself into
a question whether the venue of the suit was properly laid in that
court," '584 the Supreme Court analyzed the facts of the case in light
of the elements necessary to establish venue. The Court concluded
that the defendant "was transacting business in that district, within
the meaning of Section 12 of the Clayton Act, in such sense as pro-
perly established the venue of the suit." '585 Without further analysis,
the Court held that the defendant "was duly brought before the court
by the service of process in the New York district. . .and that its
jurisdictional defenses were rightly overruled." '586 The Supreme Court
therefore found that if venue was satisfied and process had been served
properly, personal jurisdiction would be established. In other words,
personal jurisdiction flowed directly from the statute without the re-
quirement of any additional amenability analysis.
The result reached by the Supreme Court, of course, could be
ascribed to the fact that the case predated International Shoe. Subse-
quent to International Shoe, however, some federal courts have ap-
plied the Eastman Kodak approach to cases involving nationwide ser-
vice of process statutes.
Arpet, Ltd. v. Homans5" was a suit brought by an alien corpora-
tion to recover damages from several defendants under the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter refer-
red to as Securities Acts). The plaintiff entered into settlement
agreements with all but two individual defendants. These defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint, inter alia, for lack of venue and
personal jurisdiction. 8 Suit had been initiated in the Western District
of Pennsylvania, although both defendants were residents of New York
and each previously had little or no contact with Pennsylvania. 8 9 The
defendants alleged that the District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania lacked venue under the Securities Acts and, thus,
the statutory authority for service of process "in any other district
of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant
583. Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, §12, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §22 (1982)).
584. Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at 370. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that if
the requirements of venue were satisfied, personal jurisdiction could be obtained by the method
employed by the Georgia district court.
585. Id. at 374.
586. Id.
587. 390 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
588. Id. at 910.
589. Id.
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may be found"59 could not be utilized. Finding that venue was proper
under the 1934 Act, the court concluded:
Given the finding that venue properly lies in this district, the court
has personal jurisdiction over defendants. . .who were served pur-
suant to the nationwide service of process provisions of. . .the
Securities Act of 1933 and. . .the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.19'
The court did not indulge in any amenability analysis, apparently con-
cluding that the statute itself conferred personal jurisdiction.
Sohns v. Dahl, 92 a case instituted in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia and decided shortly after Arpet,
was similar to Arpet in several regards. In Sohns, the plaintiff brought
suit against the defendants, alleging violation of the Securities Acts,
common law fraud and deceit. The district court asserted subject matter
jurisdiction over the state law claims on a theory of pendent jurisdic-
tion. The defendants moved to dismiss, inter alia, on the grounds
of improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction because both in-
dividual defendants resided in Florida, not the Western District of
Virginia, and one defendant alleged that he had no contacts with the
Western District of Virginia.5 93 The court reviewed the law of federal
court venue, concluding that if venue could be established "under
the broader venue provision of the 1934 Act,"'5 94 venue also would
be established for the claims arising under the 1933 Act and for the
590. 15 U.S.C. §77v (1982) (Section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. §78aa
(1982) (Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Service of process pursuant to
these provisions is contingent upon proper venue being laid.
591. Arpet, 390 F. Supp. at 912. Two different conclusions might be drawn from this
judicial statement. The first would be that the defendants had based their motion to dismiss
on lack of venue and that their allegation of lack of personal jurisdiction was based solely
on the ground that the special service of process provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts would
be unavailable unless the venue provisions of those statutes had been satisfied. Thus, if the
court found venue proper, the defendants' personal jurisdiction objections had been resolved.
Such an interpretation is supported by the description by the court of the defendants' motions
to dismiss: "Defendants . . .have filed motions to dismiss claiming that venue does not pro-
perly lie in the Western District of Pennsylvania and, therefore, this court lacks in personam
jurisdiction." Id. at 910 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, the language of the court in denying the motions to dismiss might
be interpreted as presenting the conclusion of the court that venue permits service and proper
service establishes personal jurisdiction. This writer favors the second interpretation because
both the parties and the court apparently thought personal jurisdiction an automatic result
of proper application of the statute.
592. 392 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Va. 1975).
593. According to the opinion, while both defendants had moved to dismiss for lack of
venue and for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted, as well as to transfer
to a more convenient venue, only one defendant had moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Id. at 1212. Later in the opinion, however, the Court stated: "Defendants have
also filed a motion to quash service of process because of lack of in personam jurisdiction.
." Id. at 1217. Finally, the conclusion of the court in respect of personal jurisdiction in-
cluded both defendants. Id. at 1218.
594. Id. at 1214.
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pendent claims. 9 ' Accepting the plaintiff's concession that the defen-
dants were not "found" or "transacting business" in the Western
District of Virginia,596 the court found "that the acts and transactions
that plaintiff has alleged to have occurred in the Western District have
substantial relation to these alleged violations" of the Securities Acts, 97
thus coming within the venue requirements of Section 27 of the 1934
Act.59' In response to the defendants' "motion to quash service of
process because of lack of in personam jurisdiction," '99 the court
quoted the portion of Section 27 of the 1934 Act that permits, in
cases of proper venue, service of process "in any. . .district of which
the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be
found."6 ' The court concluded: "Since venue properly lies in this
district, this Court has in personam jurisdiction over the defendants
with the power to serve them properly outside the forum." ' 60 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed
a similar conclusory analysis in Hilgeman v. National Insurance Com-
pany of North America,6°2 decided two years after Arpet and Sohns.
The suit again involved alleged violations of federal securities acts
and process had been served, pursuant to Section 27 of the 1934 Act,
on two defendants who resided within the United States but outside
of Alabama, the state in which the suit was initiated and in which
the federal district court was sitting. The district court had found
service insufficient because neither defendant was "found or [was]
an inhabitant or transacts business in Alabama nor is the suit based
upon an offer or sale that took place in Alabama. ' 603 The court of
appeals disagreed on the grounds that "[s]ervice of process under the
595. Id.
596. Id. at 1215. See infra note 607.
597. 392 F. Supp. at 1216.
598. 15 U.S.C. §78aa (1976). See supra note 247.
599. 392 F. Supp. at 1217. See supra note 593.
600. 15 U.S.C. §78aa (1976). See supra note 247.
601. 392 F. Supp. at 1218. The court then found that this in personam jurisdiction also
extended to the pendent state law claims. Id.
602. 547 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Blackburn v. Goodwin, 608 F.2d 919, 921
(2d Cir. 1979) (court decided that Section 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28
U.S.C. §1391(e), did not apply in this case and never reached the issue "whether section 1391(e)
provides a district court with .. .nationwide in personam jurisdiction"); D.H . Blair & Co.
v. Art Emporium, Inc., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,152 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (court did not decide personal jurisdiction issue because case transferred to a more con-
venient forum in which all but one of the defendants were residents and to which the nonresi-
dent defendant had moved to transfer, but court implied, in Part III of its opinion, that per-
sonal jurisdiction over defendants served under Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 flowed directly from the statute); Bertozzi v. King Louie International, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
1166, 1171 (D.R.I. 1976) (court found "jurisdiction and venue are properly laid in this district
• ..under §27" of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and thus did not need to consider
questions as to whether defendants transacted business in the forum).
603. Hilgeman, 547 F.2d at 301 (quoting the district court opinion).
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1933 and 1934 Acts is nationwide. ." 604 and that "personal jurisdic-
tion. . . [is] governed by Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. . ." The court found that the defendants had satisfied
the requirements of Section 27 and concluded that "jurisdiction and
venue are proper." 6"6 Like the district courts in Arpet and Sohns,
the court of appeals in Hilgeman apparently concluded that the authori-
ty for nationwide service of process on a defendant also included the
power to extend personal jurisdiction over that defendant without any
consideration of constitutional requirements. Perhaps the judges found
that the defendant contacts required for a finding of venue were suf-
ficient to satisfy some defendant-contact due process requirement for
personal jurisdiction 6 7 and, therefore, since a case could not be heard
in the absence of venue, establishing venue also would satisfy any
contacts requirement.6"8 If the courts did come to such conclusions,
however, they did not explicate these determinations or illuminate their
cryptic findings of personal jurisdiction.
Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., °9 a class action suit against
multiple corporate and individual defendants alleging violations of the
Securities Acts, rules and regulations under the 1934 Act, as well as
common law fraud, was instituted in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and decided two years earlier
than Arpet and Sohns. Various defendants moved to dismiss on several
grounds including improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction.
As to venue, the district court found that the more restrictive venue
requirements of Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act were satisfied with regard
to the objecting defendants and therefore venue was satisfied with
respect to all claims."' The defendants who objected to personal
604. Id.
605. Id. (emphasis added)..
606. Id. at 302.
607. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 establishes venue for any suit under
the Act in any federal district "wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occur-
red . . .or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business." 15 U.S.C. §78aa (1976). Thus, a suit can be instituted properly only in federal districts
in which the defendants' conduct violating the securities laws actually occurred or had some
impact. This requirement would function to protect defendants from suits in federal districts
with which they had no contacts.
608. The problem with such an interpretation is that the traditional purpose served by
venue provisions is to establish a convenient place of trial in terms of evidence and the like.
In the case of special federal statutes such as the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the broad venue provi-
sions serve to ensure that the suit can be brought in a single forum. The venue provisions
might function as protections for the defendant from suits in inconvenient fora, but these pro-
visions were not designed to protect due process rights. Thus, if the court wanted to rely on
the protections built into the venue provisions, it would have to resolve the difficult question
of whether constitutional rights can be protected by effect rather than by intent.
609. 365 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
610. Id. at 786-87.
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jurisdiction had been "'served' with process beyond the borders of
Pennsylvania." 6 ' The court rejected all objections based on (1) a
defendant's nonresidence in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, (2)
a defendant's failure to "purposefully avail. . .himself of the privilege
of conducting activities within Pennsylvania," and (3) a defendant's
failure to be found in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania or to have
consented to service in that district. It declared that "[s]ince none
of the objecting defendants has asserted that he was neither an in-
habitant nor found in the district in which he was eventually 'served'
with process, this Court does not lack jurisdiction over the person
of any defendant on the basis of either grounds 1, 2, or 3. '"62 Regar-
ding the assertions by some defendants that they lacked "sufficient
minimum contacts with this district and, consequently, the maintenance
of the action. . .here will offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice,"6 ' 3 the court noted that since the United States
is a single jurisdiction, "Congress has the power to provide for the
reach of service of process to the outer limits of the reach of its
legislative power which, of course, is anywhere in the United States
or its territories."6 '4 Since Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act and Section
27 of the 1934 Act authorize nationwide service of process, the court
concluded that "[t]he issue here is not one of constitutional due pro-
cess. . .- 6. 5 Again, a district court faced with the nationwide ser-
vice provisions of the Securities Acts found that proper service pro-
vided the basis for personal jurisdiction without any additional
amenability tests. This court, however, unlike those in Arpet, Sohns,
and Hilgeman, dealt with the question of a minimum contacts
amenability standard, finding such standard inappropriate, essential-
ly for reasons of territorial sovereignty of the federal system.
The argument made in Kramer had been advanced by another district
court two years earlier in Stern v. Gobeloff,6"6 a suit brought in the
District of Maryland for violations of the Securities Acts. Defendants,
residents of New York served in New York pursuant to the nation-
wide service of process provisions of the Securities Acts, moved to
dismiss for lack of venue and personal jurisdiction. The court first




615. Id. The court found instead that the issue was "one of compliance with the statute
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. The court apparently was referring to the pro-
vision in Rule 4(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for service pursuant to a federal statute
in cases in which the defendant is not domiciled nor found in the state in which the federal
court is sitting.
616. 332 F. Supp. 909 (D. Md. 1971).
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noted a "fundamental principle of the Anglo-American law of jurisdic-
tion [that] a sovereignty has personal jurisdiction upon any defen-
dant within its territorial limits, and that it may exercise that jurisdic-
tion by any of its courts able to obtain service over the defendant." 6 '
The United States, it continued, was such a sovereign. In response
to the defendants' argument that they lacked sufficient "minimum
contacts with [the district of Maryland] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice," 6 '8 the court noted that the International Shoe approach
dealt only with state court power over nonpresent, nonconsenting
defendants "served out-of-state pursuant to a state long-arm statute"
while this "case. . .in no way deals with [such] power ... "9 The
court went on to distinguish cases in which service was made outside
the territorial United States, and concluded:
Absent the fairness considerations inherent in requiring a non-resident
foreigner to defend suits in the federal courts of the United States,
the weight of authority sustains the in personam jurisdiction of the
forum district where, venue requirements having been satisfied,
service is made in distant districts of which defendants are inhabitants
or where they are found. 611
Finally, as an afterthought, or as an amulet against reversal, the court
noted that, "[i]f the due process tests of International Shoe Com-
pany v. Washington are applicable to the case at bar," the defen-
dants had sufficient contacts with the District of Maryland to satisfy
those criteria.6 '
A position similar to that in Stern and Kramer was taken by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the oft-
cited case of Mariash v. Morrill,622 another suit in which the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had violated the provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Mariash was decided in 1974, before Arpet
and Sohns but after Kramer. Suit had been initiated in a federal district
court sitting in New York. The district court had dismissed for lack
617. Id. at 912 (quoting First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730,
736 (E.D. Tenn. 1962)).
618. 332 F. Supp. at 910.
619. Id. at 912-13.
620. Id. at 913.
621. Id. at 914. Thus, even though the court could have rested its decision on the ground
that the defendants satisfied a more strict standard, "minimum contacts with the federal district"
asserting jurisdiction, the court chose to rely on its sovereignty argument. Id.
622. 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974). See S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F.
Supp. 1114, 1122 (D. Mass. 1978) (in securities suit involving service on the defendants' at-
torney in the federal district seeking to assert jurisdiction, the court rejected the defendants'
argument that they lacked "minimum contacts" with the district, citing Mariash for the pro-
position that Section 27 provides for nationwide service of process).
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of personal jurisdiction over defendants who had been served in
Massachusetts, allegedly pursuant to Section 27 of the 1934 Act,
stating:
Section 27 is no more than a grant of subject matter jurisdiction
to the federal district courts-competence to hear a suit arising under
the Act-and a statement of the venue requirements to be followed
when such suits are brought. It does not deal with jurisdiction of
the persons named as defendants in a given case. 23
The court of appeals rejected this interpretation of Section 27 of the
1934 Act. The court recognized that "Congress, in providing for
nationwide service of process, remains subject to the constraints of
the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment, '112 4 but found that
the constitutional requirement would be satisfied so long as "the ser-
vice authorized by statute [is] reasonably calculated to inform the
defendant of the pendency of the proceedings in order that he may
take advantage of the opportunity to be heard in his defense." ' In
response to the defendants' argument that due process also requires
that the defendants have certain 'minimal contacts' with the State
which would exercise its jurisdiction, ' 626 the court of appeals asserted:
Mere statement of this contention reveals its fatal flaw: It is not
the State of New York but the United States "which would exercise
its jurisdiction. . . ." Here, the defendants reside within the ter-
ritorial boundaries of the United States, the "minimal contacts" re-
quired to justify the federal government's exercise of power over
[the defendants] are present. Indeed, the "minimal contacts" prin-
ciple does not, in our view, seem particularly relevant in evaluating
the constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction based on nation-
wide, but not extraterritorial, service of process. It is only the lat-
ter, quite simply, which even raises a question of the forum's power
to assert control over the defendant.6 27
In a footnote, the court of appeals distinguished .situations in which
a federal statute authorizes "worldwide" service of process and in
623. Mariash, 496 F.2d at 1142 (quoting district court opinion).
624. Id. at 1143.
625. Id. In other words, so long as service of process supplied notice that satisfied the
requirements established by the Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 399 U.S. 306 (1950), see supra note 511 and accompanying text, due process requirements
would be met. While adequate notice to the defendant of the pendency of the suit and an
opportunity to be heard in that suit are both essentials of the process due a defendant under
either the fourteenth or the fifth amendment, courts usually have required more before a court
constitutionally could assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Perhaps the "more" is
supplied here by the defendant's presence or domicile within the United States. See supra notes
4-5 and accompanying text.
626. Mariash, 496 F.2d at 1143 (quoting Appellees' Brief) (emphasis in quotation).
627. Id.
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which service, pursuant to the statute, is made outside the territory
of the United States. In those circumstances, the court recognized
that some minimum contacts analysis might be appropriate because
the forum, the United States, was seeking to assert authority over
a defendant located outside its territory.62 8 On the basis of territorial
sovereignty, therefore, the Second Circuit found that the nationwide
service of process provision of Section 27 of the 1934 Act provided
valid personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant provided he
was served according to the statute, in a manner calculated to notify
him of the pending litigation. No additional amenability test was re-
quired and the minimum contacts test specifically was rejected. Perhaps
an amenability standard is implicit in this analysis: presence or domicile
within the territory of the sovereign, the United States.629 Such an
analysis, however, leads to the conclusion that any statute authoriz-
ing nationwide service of process carries with it a grant of personal
jurisdiction because service can be made only if the defendant is pre-
sent or an inhabitant of the district in which process is served.
A result similar to that in Mariash was reached, in a case decided
five years later, by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Fitzsimmons v. Barton.63 ° In Fitzsimmons, an action for alleged viola-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, process had been served
on defendant in Oklahoma pursuant to the nationwide service of pro-
cess provisions of Section 27 of the 1934 Act. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois had dismissed the case for
lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant lacked
sufficient contacts with the state of Illinois to justify use of the Illinois
long-arm statute. 63' The court of appeals considered Illinois law in-
appropriate in light of the special service provisions of the 1934 Act.632
628. Id. at 1143 n.9.
629. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text and note 625. At least one commentator
has suggested construing Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as "providing for
presence as an amenability basis." Berger, supra note 191, at 291.
630. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979). See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Jim Walker Corp., 651
F.2d 251, 255-57 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting International Shoe analysis because "the district
court's jurisdiction is always potentially, and, in this case, actually co-extensive with the boun-
daries of the United States;" minimum contacts with the United States is required but service
within the United States satisfied that requirement).
631. 589 F.2d at 331-32.
632. Id. at 332. The court of appeals noted:
The district court apparently dismissed Barton from this suit in reliance on the
part of Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requiring that if no statute
of the United States provides for the manner of service, service is governed by the
law of the state in which the district court sits. Reference to Illinois law, however,
was inappropriate in this case. . . . Given the existence of [Section 27's] Congres-
sional authorization of nationwide service of process, Rule 4(e) provides that this
method of service is sufficient.
Id.
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The court noted substantial authority for the proposition that the
United States Constitution does not forbid Congress from enacting
nationwide service of process statutes with regard to particular classes
or types of cases.633 In responding to the defendant's objections that
he lacked sufficient contacts with the state of Illinois to satisfy the
fairness requirements of due process, the court argued that any fairness
standard "relates to the fairness of the exercise of power by a par-
ticular sovereign, not the fairness of imposing the burdens of litigating
in a distant forum. ' ' 63 The court concluded:
Here the sovereign is the United States, and there can be no ques-
tion but that the defendant, a resident citizen of the United States,
has sufficient contacts with the United States to support the fairness
of the exercise of jurisdiction over him by a United States court.63
The court refused to apply any "fairness test" that considered factors
such as "inconvenience to the defendant.1 636
Fitzsimmons was cited as support by the dissenting Supreme Court
justices in Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.6 37 In Leroy, an action
alleging certain violations of federal securities law by state officials,
the dissenters argued that "[o]nce it is determined that § 27 con-
templates venue. . .in the Northern District of Texas, the federal court
in that District also had personal jurisdiction over the Idaho defen-
dants, they having been served in a 'district. . .wher[e]. . .found,'
there being no objections to the manner of service of process, and
there being no restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the exer-
633. Id. at 333 n.3.
634. Id. at 333.
635. Id.
636. Id. at 334. The court described the five factor "fairness" test developed in Oxford
First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974), see infra notes
769-84 and accompanying text, but declined, on the following grounds, to adopt it:
the "fairness" measured by these factors does not relate to the fairness of the exer-
cise of power by a particular sovereign-the central concern of Shaffer and its
predecessors-but instead to the fairness of imposing the burdens of litigation on
a particular forum. As such, these factors are more appropriately used in applying
28 U.S.C. §1404(a), which embodies the non-jurisdictional doctrine of forum non
conveniens, and we therefore decline to import them into determination of the con-
stitutionality of exercises of personal jurisdiction.
Fitzsimmons, 589 F.2d at 334 (footnote omitted).
637. 443 U.S. 173, 187-92 (1979) (White, J. dissenting). Leroy involved a declaratory judg-
ment suit brought by a Texas-based corporation, Great Western United Corporation, against
certain Idaho officials charged with enforcing the Idaho corporate takeover law because the
officials had interfered with an attempted tender offer by Great Western to purchase shares
of stock in a company having substantial assets in Idaho. The plaintiff had sought a declara-
tion that the state law was invalid insofar as it purported to apply to interstate tender offers
to purchase stocks traded on a national exchange. The defendant Idaho officials resisted suit
on several grounds, including the grounds that the District Court for the Northern District
of Texas lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants and that venue could not be properly
laid in that court. Id.
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cise of jurisdiction by the United States over its residents . "638
But for the citation of Fitzsimmons, this position might be interpreted
as a restatement of the approach in Arpet, Sohns or Hilgeman.639
Instead, the dissent seemed to be approving the "presence in the United
States as sufficient contacts" test of Fitzsimmons. Leroy did not,
however, present any conclusive Supreme Court decision on the issue
of personal jurisdiction in federal question cases in which process is
served, pursuant to a federal nationwide service of process statute,
on a nonresident defendant found within the United States. The ma-
jority determined that venue could not be obtained under Section 27
and never reached the question of personal jurisdiction.61
Fitzsimmons, therefore, would validate all exercises of personal
jurisdiction by federal courts in cases in which service is made in the
United States on a resident or citizen of the United States pursuant
to a federal statute authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of
process. Although the Fitzsimmons court used a "contacts" analysis
to justify this result, the result flows directly from the statutory
authority to serve process within the United States. Whenever the ser-
vice of process requirements are properly met, the required contacts
would exist. In short, Fitzsimmons might be viewed as supporting
the proposition that when process is served in the United States pur-
suant to a statute such as Section 27 of the 1934 Act, the only separate
amenability standard required would be presence or domicile of the
defendant in the United States. As in the above discussion of Mariash,
however, such analysis results in automatic amenability or amena-
bility from the statute itself, because proper service would require
finding the defendant or his domicile in the place in which process
is served.
The final cases to be considered in this group, Driver v. Helms64'
and Briggs v. Goodwin,642 are particularly significant because they
culminated in a decision of the Supreme Court, Stafford v. Briggs.6"3
In Driver, a class action suit against twenty-five present or former
United States government officials in which the plaintiffs sought
damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of certain con-
stitutional rights, process had been served on defendants pursuant to
638. Id. at 191-92 (White, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
639. See supra notes 587-608 and accompanying text.
640. 443 U.S. at 182. In Colby v. Driver, 444 U.S. 527 (1980), see infra notes 665-74
and accompanying text, the Supreme Court again did not rule on this question, although the
dissent again utilized the Mariash and Fitzsimmons analysis.
641. 74 F.R.D. 382 (D. R.I. 1977).
642. 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D. D.C. 1974).
643. 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
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Section 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1391(e). This section provides that if the venue requirements of
Section 1391(e) are satisfied, "delivery of the summons and complaint
. . . .may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of
the district in which the action is brought. ' 644 Suit was instituted in
the federal district court for the district of Rhode Island, although
"none of the appellants reside[d] in or [had] substantial contacts with
Rhode Island. ' 615 The defendants asserted, inter alia, that the district
court lacked personal jurisdiction because "[Section] 1391(e) speaks
only to service of process, not to the exercise of personal
jurisdiction, ' 6 6 and exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case would
be unconstitutional because of the defendants' lack of contacts with
Rhode Island.6 47 The district court disagreed, citing Mariash and find-
ing that the applicable due process test was whether the manner of
process provided "notice calculated to inform the defendant of the
pendency of the suit."'6"4 The district court recognized that "[e]xtrater-
ritorial service of process must be based on necessary minimum con-
tacts to satisfy due process, ' ' 649 but based its analysis on its conclu-
sion that "nation wide service of process, when authorized by Con-
gress, is not extra-territorial at all." ' 650 Since service within the ter-
ritory of the United States was not extraterritorial, such service was
analogous to state court service within a state. State court service re-
quired only satisfaction of an adequate notice requirement in order
to subject the defendant to the personal jurisdiction of the court. 63'
The court of appeals concurred in the conclusion of the district
court that, at least in the case of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), when a federal
statute authorized nationwide service of process and such service had
adequately apprised the defendant of the pendency of the suit, no
additional test need be satisfied for the court to assert personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.652 In response to the appellants' arguments
that the broadened venue provisions of Section 1391(e) should apply
"only if the district in which the suit is brought can establish per-
sonal jurisdiction by some other mechanism ' 653 or that "even if [Sec-
tion] 1391(e) broadens personal jurisdiction, it would be unconstitu-
644. See supra note 248.
645. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 149 (Ist Cir. 1978).
646. 74 F.R.D. at 389.
647. Id. at 390.
648. Id. at 391.
649. Id. at 391 n.6.
650. Id. at 391.
651. Id. (citing Mariash).
652. 577 F.2d at 154-57.
653. Id. at 154.
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tional to apply it to individuals who lacked the minimum contacts
with the state in which the court sits that are required by International
Shoe Co. v. Washington. . .and its progeny," 6 ' the court of appeals
concluded that Congress had created nationwide service of process
which did not depend on the ability of the forum district to establish
personal jurisdiction. Moreover, any limitation on the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction in these cases "is not related to state boundaries. ' 6 55
Like the district court, the court of appeals rejected any minimum
contacts test relating to state boundaries because "[t]he circumspec-
tion of state court jurisdiction is a product of boundaries to states'
sovereignty [while t]he United States. . .does not lose its sovereignty
when a state's border is crossed. ' 6 56 The appellate court ruled that
the defendants were protected from the unfairness of having to de-
fend suits in federal districts "with which they have had no connec-
tion" by the transfer of venue provisions of Section 1404(a) of Title
28 of the United States Code. 57 The court, moreover, noted that "of-
ficers of the federal government are different from private defendants
because they can anticipate that their official acts may affect people
in every part of the United States. 6 58 Finally, the court recognized
that Congress is limited, by the fifth amendment due process clause,
in its authorizations of nationwide service of process, but only in terms
of whether the manner of service is "reasonably calculated to inform
the defendant of the pendency of the proceedings." Because "[s]uch
service is not extraterritorial for a court of the United States; therefore,
the minimum contacts analysis is not relevant.' '659 Alternatively, the
court suggested, in a footnote, that the United States as a sovereign
would have authority over anyone found within its borders and that
"even if we were to say that minimum contacts had to be establish-
ed, anyone found and served within the United States would have
sufficient contacts with the United States. '16  The court of appeals,
therefore, adopted the analysis in Mariash and Fitzsimmons.
The court of appeals tied together the positions of the courts in
some of the opinions discussed above and bolstered its own conclu-
sions by arguing facts peculiar to Driver. In short, the court of ap-
peals concluded that no separate amenability analysis was required:
(1) it rejected minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island as
654. Id. at 154-55.
655. Id. at 157.
656. Id. at 156.
657. Id. at 157.
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. Id. at 156 n.25.
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inappropriate in a federal context;66' (2) it rejected any fairness analysis
with respect to the particular federal district because of the protec-
tion inherent in the change of venue provision and the particular
character of the defendants to be served with process; 662 (3) while
refusing to require a minimum contacts test, it found the defendants'
"'presence" in the United States sufficient to satisfy any such
standard, 63 thus, in effect, equating any authorization for nation-
wide service with satisfaction of any due process requirement and
making the authorization for service alone sufficient to give the federal
court personal jurisdiction; and (4) it determined that the only real
due process question was whether the manner of service would satisfy
notice requirements,664 therefore accepting service that was procedurally
sufficient as satisfying due process. In other words, the court found
that if service properly was made pursuant to Section 1391(e), a federal
court would have personal jurisdiction over the defendant so served,
irrespective of the defendant's contacts with the federal district in which
the suit was instituted or his contacts with the state in which the federal
court was sitting. Service under the federal statute authorizing nation-
wide service of process in suits against federal officials gave the court
personal jurisdiction over those officials.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari under the name Colby v.
Driver65 and heard this case with a companion case, Stafford v. Briggs,
styled as Briggs v. Goodwin in the district court 66 and in the court
of appeals. 67 In Briggs, the plaintiffs had brought suit in the federal
district court for the District of Columbia against three Department
of Justice attorneys and an FBI agent, seeking declaratory relief and
damages for alleged violations of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs again relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), Section 2 of the Man-
damus and Venue Act of 1962. The district court ruled that venue
was improper and that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over some
of the defendants, residents of Florida. 6 8 The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding venue
proper because one of the defendant-appellees resided in the District
of Columbia. Moreover, the court of appeals found that Section
1391(e) provided personal jurisdiction without the requirement of
661. Id. at 156-57.
662. Id. at 157.
663. Id. at 156 n.25.
664. Id. at 157.
665. 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
666. 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D.D.C. 1974).
667. 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977).
668. Driver, 444 U.S. at 531.
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applying the International Shoe minimum contacts test or any require-
ment that the defendants have contacts with the federal district in
which the district court was sitting. '69
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court never reached the ques-
tion of amenability standards for personal jurisdiction. The Court
concluded that Section 1391(e) did not apply to actions for money
damages brought against government officials in their individual
capacities.6 71 In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan,
concluded that "[Section] 1391(e) means what it says, and that it thus
applies.. .to a suit for damages against a federal officer for his own
wrongdoing." ' 67' Justice Stewart then discussed "the petitioner's posi-
tion that a serious due process problem arises when the provisions
of § 1391(e) are taken to mean what they say, so as to permit a federal
district court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a federal officer
who lacks sufficient 'minimum contacts' with the State or district in
which the federal court sits." ' 672 First, Justice Stewart asserted that
Section 1391(e) not only governed venue and service of process, but
also conferred personal jurisdiction on the court. He argued "that,
as a general rule, service of process is the means by which a court
obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and... the petitioners
have failed to demonstrate that there was any defect in the means
by which service of process was effected. '6 73 Then, Justice Stewart
found that such exercises of personal jurisdiction under Section 1391(e)
would not be unconstitutional:
[D]ue process requires only certain minimum contacts between the
defendant and the sovereign that has created the court .... The issue
is not whether it is unfair to require a defendant to assume the
burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum, but rather whether
the court of a particular sovereign has power to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a named defendant. The cases before us involve
suits against residents of the United States in the courts of the United
States. No due process problem exists.
674
In sum, Justice Stewart found that proper service pursuant to Sec-
tion 1391(e) conferred personal jurisdiction that was appropriate con-
stitutionally so long as notice requirements were met. No separate
due process analysis would be required on any case by case basis;
the statute always would operate to pass constitutional muster.
669. Id. at 532.
670. Id. at 543-45.
671. Id. at 545-46.
672. Id. at 553.
673. Id. at 553 n.5.
674. Id. at 554.
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In these two cases, therefore, lower federal courts had concluded,
on essentially a sovereignty or power theory, that Section 1391(e),
which authorized nationwide service of process, gave a federal court
personal jurisdiction that was consistent with constitutional mandates
without any separate test of amenability by minimum contacts or
another standard. Moreover, the majority opinion of the United States
Supreme Court in Briggs did not take issue with that conclusion and
the dissenting opinion provided strong support for that position. No
recent Supreme Court decision, including the case of Verlinden v.
Central Bank of Nigeria,675 has expressed a view contrary to that of
Justice Stewart in Briggs.
A few federal courts merely have cited the existence of a federal
statute authorizing nationwide, or worldwide, service of process plus
proper service pursuant to the statute as providing the federal court
with personal jurisdiction over the defendant so served.' Most federal
courts that have rejected or ignored any "fairness" analysis as an
additional requirement for assertion of personal jurisdiction, however,
have justified the result on the basis of sovereignty. 77 The United
States, as a single jurisdiction acting through its federal courts, con-
stitutionally can assert jurisdiction over any defendant present or
domiciled within its borders if proper service, including adequate notice,
is made upon that defendant. The special federal statutes authorizing
nationwide service of process provide the vehicles by which this
authority is triggered. Some of these courts have labelled this as a
"contacts" analysis,678 because presence or domicile within the United
States is surely sufficient contact with the sovereign territory to satisfy
any fifth amendment due process requirement. The inevitable result
of the analysis, however, is the conclusion that proper service pur-
suant to such statutes renders the defendant amenable to jurisdiction
in the federal district in which the suit is brought.
None of these cases have involved service on aliens outside the
borders of the United States. Amenability in those circumstances,
according to the court of appeals in Mariash,619 could not be justified
on the territorial sovereignty theory because it would be extraterritorial
and comparable to state court service on a defendant located and
domiciled in other states. The Supreme Court has not made a specific
ruling on this issue, either in regard to service within the United States
675. 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983). See supra notes 520-60 and accompanying text.
676. See supra notes 587-608 and accompanying text.
677. See supra notes 609-75 and accompanying text.
678. See supra notes 622-36 and accompanying text.
679. See supra notes 622-29 and accompanying text.
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or to service in a foreign country. The approach in cases such as
Fitzsimmons and Mariash relies on a power theory of personal jurisdic-
tion, a theory that has been rejected increasingly by commentators
and the courts. 680 The result, however, makes sense in light of the
federal policy behind nationwide or worldwide service of process
statutes: to provide a federal forum, convenient to the plaintiff, in
which all defendants in the case can be joined.681 Such statutes have
been enacted by Congress in areas of particular federal concern and
reveal the abiding interest of the federal government in providing a
forum for resolution of these matters.682 Whether the result of these
cases, assertion of personal jurisdiction by a federal court over any
defendant properly served within the territory of the United States
pursuant to a federal nationwide or worldwide service of process
statute, can be incorporated into a practically sensible and doctrinally
sound personal jurisdiction theory for the federal courts in federal
question cases, will be discussed at the conclusion of the next section
of this article.
Cases in Which Courts Have Required Separate Amenability
Analysis- Variations on International Shoe in a National Context
While some federal question cases in which process was served pur-
suant to a federal statute authorizing nationwide or worldwide ser-
vice of process and in which courts have engaged in a separate
amenability analysis have involved nonalien defendants served within
the United States, 83 the majority have involved alien defendants served
outside the United States. 684 These results may flow from the analysis
680. See generally von Mehren, supra note 2, at 1178-79.
681. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. of New York v. Southern Photo Mat'l Co., 273 U.S.
359, 373-74 (1926) (Section 12 of the Clayton Act "supplements the remedial provision of the
Anti-Trust Act . . . by relieving the injured person from the necessity of resorting for the
redress of wrongs committed by a non-resident corporation, to a district, however distant, in
which it resides or may be found ... and enabling him to institute suit in a district, frequently
that of his own residence, in which the corporation in fact transacts business. . . ."); Texas
Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 315 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting House Judiciary
Committee, Jurisdiction of United States in Suits Against Foreign States, H.R. Rep. No. 1487,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6605) ("Con-
gress has passed the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] specifically to provide 'access to the
courts' "); Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 388 (D.R.I. 1977) (purpose of Congress in enac-
ting Section 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 was to eliminate obstacles to litigation
against federal officials and "to enable citizens to obtain relief against official wrongdoing
effectively, conveniently, economically, and fairly"); Clapp v. Stearns & Co., 229 F. Supp.
305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (policy of Section 27 of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was
"to provide a forum for suits involving multi-state frauds, no matter of how many states the
defendants are citizens").
682. See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
683. See infra notes 754-84 and accompanying text.
684. See infra notes 687-753 and accompanying text.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
in Mariash that service outside the United States is extraterritorial
and, therefore, analagous to service of process by a state court, pur-
suant to a state long-arm statute, beyond the borders of the state.
Some due process-amenability test, therefore, must be applied to deter-
mine whether such extension of power by the sovereign, the United
States, violates a defendant's due process rights."' Generally, when
process is served in a wholly federal manner, the due process clause
that must be satisfied is that of the fifth amendment. 686 How this
requirement is satisfied, however, has varied significantly from court
to court.
Several federal courts have analogized to the International Shoe
test, examining the defendant's contacts with the United States as a
whole to determine whether those contacts were sufficient to be
"minimum." In Alco Standard Corporation v. Benalal,687 for exam-
ple, an action brought in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania against certain alien individuals and
corporations for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission and for com-
mon law misrepresentation, the defendants had been served with pro-
cess outside the territory of the United States pursuant to the worldwide
service of process provisions of Section 27 of the 1934 Act.688 In
response to the defendants' attack on personal jurisdiction of the
district court, the court stated that under the fifth amendment, "citizens
of foreign countries are entitled to [the minimum contacts] standard
of protection" established in International Shoe, but that "[flor pur-
poses of jurisdiction . . . under the Securities and Exchange Act,
the relevant question asks what acts they have committed anywhere
in the United States since that Act is national in scope." 68 9 The court
concluded that the defendants "clearly had sufficient contacts with
the United States to satisfy the requirement of due process. ' 690 The
district court, therefore, treated Section 27 of the 1934 Act as a federal
long-arm statute and measured the constitutionality of its application
to the alien defendants in question by weighing their contacts with
the United States as a whole. This analysis is similar to International
685. See supra notes 624-29 and accompanying text.
686. See supra notes 329 and 497 and accompanying text.
687. 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
688. Id. at 19. For the text of the service of process provision of Section 27, see supra
note 249.
689. 345 F. Supp. at 24-25.
690. Id. at 25. The court made the quoted statement in regard to one particular set of
defendants. As to all defendants challenging personal jurisdiction, the court concluded: "[W]e
believe that all of these defendants have done sufficient acts in this Country so as to fall out-
side of. . . .[the Fifth Amendment's] protective limitations." Id.
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Shoe, which requires weighing of a defendant's contacts with the state
seeking to assert its jurisdiction over him.691 Some courts and com-
mentators have referred to such a jurisdictional test, which requires
weighing the defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole,
as a "national contacts" test or an "aggregation of national con-
tacts" test.692 Apparently, under the analysis by the court, the suit
could have been instituted in any federal district; the court, however,
did not consider inconvenience to the defendant in litigating in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania rather than another federal district.
Perhaps some limitation on the district might have been required if
the transaction had no relationship to the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, although the possibility of finding venue in such a district
would be remote. Some courts have suggested that any unfairness
caused by the plaintiff's choice of a federal forum inconvenient to
the defendant could be cured by a change of venue to a more conve-
nient forum. 693 Moreover, under the venue restrictions of many of
the special federal statutes, a federal court in which venue lay would
not be highly inconvenient for the defendant.6 94
691. See supra notes 106-55 and accompanying text. See also Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders
Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237-39 (court recognized that some jurisdictions had adopted a "minimum
contacts with the United States" test when, as here, the defendant was an alien served pur-
suant to a worldwide service of process statute, but refused to adopt or reject the test because
plaintiff had "failed to establish that [defendants had] sufficient contacts with the United States
as a whole").
692. Courts: See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237-38 (6th Cir.
1981) ("[t]his 'national contacts' or 'aggregate contacts' concept is based on the proposition
that a court's jurisdictional power . . . on federal questions must be examined in light of
the due process clause of the Fifth . . . Amendment"); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo
Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 (9th Cir. 1977) ("plaintiffs argue that where . . . the court
is to determine whether it has jurisdiction over an alien defendant who is being sued on a
claim arising under federal law, it may appropriately consider . . . the aggregate contacts of
the alien with the United States as a whole"); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann,
A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 663 (D.N.H. 1977) ("[t]his 'national contacts' theory has been con-
sidered by other courts"); Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722,
728 (D. Utah 1973) ("the court . . . may consider the aggregate presence of the defendants'
apparatus in the Untied States as a whole"). Commentators: See, e.g., Comment, National
Contacts, supra note 186, at 687 ("federal courts should be permitted to aggregate the national
contacts of alien defendants to determine in personam jurisdiction in federal question suits");
Note, supra note 21, at 475 ("inability of the current jurisdictional scheme to effectively ad-
dress [certain] situations . . . has motivated some courts to consider the aggregate contacts test").
693. See, e.g., supra notes 188, 226, 337, 354 and 657 and accompanying text and infra
note 880 and accompanying text.
694. Under section 27 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, for example, venue
is laid in any federal district "wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occur-
red .... or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business."
15 U.S.C. §78aa (1976). Thus, the defendant would not be able to argue unfair inconvenience
since the venue requirements relate to his contacts with the forum. Only in the case in which
venue is laid solely on the ground that the defendant had been "found" within the district
and the defendant's presence was transitory and unrelated to the claim might unfair inconve-
nience be alleged. No court, state or federal, has yet ruled that personal jurisdiction based
on even the most transitory presence is unconstitutional.
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Subsequent to the district court opinion in Alco, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit apparently followed a similar
analysis in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,6"
a suit brought against various defendants, including aliens, for viola-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 of the
Securities Exchange Commission. Alien defendants had been served
outside the territorial limits of the United States pursuant to the
worldwide service of process provisions of Section 27 of the 1934
Act.696 The plaintiffs had asserted, as an alternative source of per-
sonal jurisdiction over some of the defendants, various provisions of
the New York long-arm statute. The court of appeals, however, refused
to apply the New York statutes:
Since we hold that Congress meant § 27 to extend personal jurisdic-
tion to the full reach permitted by the due process clause, it is un-
necessary to discuss the applicability of the New York statutes, which
could reach no further.697
The court found that Congress had intended, by Section 27 of the
1934 Act, "to authorize service on a defendant who can be 'found'
only in a foreign country, and although the section does not deal
specifically with in personam jurisdiction, it is reasonable to infer that
Congress meant to assert personal jurisdiction over foreigners not pre-
sent in the United States to but, of course, not beyond the bounds
permitted by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. ' 698 The
court then cited Hanson and McGee as authority for the proposition
that a state can assert jurisdiction over nonpresent, nonresident defen-
dants only if they have contacts with the state. 699 The Second Circuit
examined the defendants' contacts with the Untied States to deter-
mine whether the federal court had personal jurisdiction.10 Although
the court never explicitly announced a test of "minimum contacts
with the United States," such a test actually was applied.
In several cases in which subject matter jurisdiction was based on
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) and service was
made on the defendants, foreign countries or instrumentalities of
foreign countries, outside the territory of the United States,' federal
695. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express
Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977) (dictum) ("aggregation of an alien's American contacts
may ... be proper when a federal statute authorizes worldwide service of process ... and,
therefore, the only constraint is fifth aiendment due process rather than statutory authorization").
696. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1339.
697. Id. at 1339.
698. Id. at 1340.
699. Id. at 1340-41.
700. Id. at 1341-44.
701. See supra notes 520-55 and accompanying text.
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courts have engaged in a "minimum contacts with the United Stateg"
due process analysis. This analysis is undertaken even though the FSIA
purports to provide for personal jurisdiction whenever subject matter
jurisdiction exists under the Act and process is served properly pur-
suant to Section 1608 of Title 28 of the United States Code.7"2 Prob-
ably the most well-known case adopting this position was Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,"3 a suit in-
itiated in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York alleging that the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its
central bank had breached a contract with the plaintiff for delivery
of cement. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined
that the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the FSIA had been
satisfied and that the defendants had been served properly under Sec-
tion 1608, thus satisfying the FSIA criteria for assertion of personal
jurisdiction.104 The Court continued, however, to analyze separately
the constitutionality, under the fifth amendment due process clause,
of asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendants.7 05 The court
engaged in a traditional International Shoe analysis, as modified by
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,7"6 using the United States
as a whole as "the relevant area in delineating contracts ' 70 7 and deter-
mining that "maintenance of the suit [would not] offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice'. '"708 After determining
that the defendants had contacts with the United States, the Second
Circuit decided whether these contacts were sufficient enough to be
"minimum" by making the "four separate inquiries" required by its
reading of World-Wide.70 9 The court resolved all inquiries in favor
of litigating in the United States and concluded that assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendants would be constitutional.7"0 Each
inquiry in its minimum contacts analysis focused only on the United
States and not on the particular federal district in which suit had
been brought.
The Texas Trading analysis for personal jurisdiction was applied
in a more recent FSIA decision, Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta,1
702. See supra notes 549-55 and accompanying text.
703. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). See also supra note 554 and accompanying text.
704. See supra note 550 and accompanying text.
705. 647 F.2d at 313-15.
706. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
707. 647 F.2d at 314.
708. Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 quoting, in
turn, Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463).
709. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314.
710. Id. at 315.
711. 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. After concluding that the FSIA requirements for personal
jurisdiction had been satisfied, the court noted that it "must still deter-
mine whether an exercise of the personal jurisdiction conferred by
the FSIA is permissible under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment." '712 As in Texas Trading, the "four inquiry" test was
applied to find sufficient contacts with the United States to satisfy
an International Shoe standard, and any factors that related to the
particular federal district in which the suit had been initiated were
not considered.
In another recent FSIA case, Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio
and Television,"' the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit also followed Texas Trading by requiring a separate due pro-
cess analysis on the issue of personal jurisdiction and by applying
a minimum contacts with the United States analysis.7" Apparently,
the trend in the lower federal courts in FSIA cases is to require not
only that the specific statutory requirements of the FSIA for personal
jurisdiction be met but that the assertion of jurisdiction be determined
constitutionally appropriate by an examination of the defendant's ag-
gregate contacts with the United States. As noted above,7" 6 however,
the Supreme Court has expressed no view on this issue although it
had the opportunity to do so.
In other cases in which defendant aliens were served pursuant to
special federal statutes, the federal courts seem to conduct a separate
fifth amendment due process analysis by applying the International
Shoe minimum contacts test to the defendant's contacts with the United
States, but the opinions are not as clear as those in Alco and Texas
Trading. In a recent case involving the service in the United States
by an Internal Revenue Service summons on an agent of the defen-
dant alien company, United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 7 the
United States District Court for the Central District of California found
that it constitutionally could assert personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. The court required a two-step analysis, determining first whether
the defendant came within the language of the federal statute authoriz-
712. Id. at 1117.
713. Id. at 1117-18.
714. 691 F.2d 1344 (l1th Cir. 1982).
715. Id. at 1352-53.
716. See supra notes 547-48 and accompanying text.
717. 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Calif. 1983). The federal statute provided, in pertinent part:
"If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear . . .the United States
district court for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction
by appropriate process to compel such attendance. . . ." 26 U.S.C. §7604(a) (1976) (emphasis
added).
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ing service of the summons and then it determined whether fifth
amendment constitutional limitations are respected by such an asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction." 8 The court went on to examine the
relationship of defendant corporation with the forum "citing World-
Wide Volkswagen as well as several lower federal court opinions that
had adopted the "minimum contacts with the United States"
approach. ' 9 Whether "the forum" refers to the state of California,
the central district of California (where the defendant's subsidiary cor-
poration was located), or the United States as a whole cannot be deter-
mined from the language of the court. The facts of the case create
the inference that the defendant would have sufficient contacts with
California or the Central District of California to satisfy any require-
ment of contacts with those territories." Therefore, the defendant's
contacts also would satisfy any requirement of contacts with the United
States as a whole since the contacts merely were centered in one part
of the country. The court, moreover, referred to the defendant's
activities as being "the sale of Toyota Japan's products to United
States consumers" by its California subsidiary' and, in a footnote,
referred to "aggregation of Toyota Japan's American contacts [as]
proper in this case," ' 722 thereby indicating that the court viewed the
United States as "the forum."
In other cases involving alien defendants served pursuant to
worldwide service of process statutes, federal courts have considered
similar tests in finding personal jurisdiction to be lacking. In Kramer
Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd. ,723 a suit for violation of the
antitrust laws in which service was made pursuant to the worldwide
service of process provisions of Section 22 of the Clayton Act, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that "we
recognize . . . that when a federal statute . . . authorizes worldwide
service of process, it may be proper to consider whether an alien defen-
dant's contacts with the entire United States provide adequate grounds
for asserting personal jurisdiction consistent with due process. ' 724 The
718. 561 F. Supp. at 356.
719. Id. at 359.
720. In a footnote, the court "noted that Toyota Japan enjoys significant benefits from
sales in California. ... [and] virtually all sales of Toyota Japan's products in the United States
are facilitated through Toyota U.S.A., which is headquartered in the Central District of Califor-
nia." Id. at 360 n.10.
721. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
722. Id. at 360 n.10 (emphasis added). In the footnote the court went on to establish
a basis for jurisdiction arising from the defendant's contacts with the state or federal district
"if an aggregation theory is not applied." Id. See supra note 720 and accompanying text.
723. 628 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1980).
724. Id. at 1177.
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court, however, did not adopt the "aggregation of contacts" approach,
finding that even under such a test the defendant's contacts would
have been insufficient to satisfy due process.72 Thus, while the Ninth
Circuit recognized the possibility that such a test might be appropriate
in some circumstances, it chose not to make any decision in this case
because insufficient grounds for assertion of personal jurisdiction
existed, even under what would be considered the most liberal test,
"minimum contacts with the United States."
In Wagman v. Astle,7 26 a suit against three Canadian defendants
for alleged violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 by
stock transactions which took place in Canada, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York found that it
did not have personal jurisdiction over the alien defendants. Even
though the defendants had been served in Canada pursuant to the
worldwide service of process provisions of Section 27 of the 1934 Act,
personal jurisdiction could not be obtained because "to assert jurisdic-
tion over them in this case would violate due process. ' 727 The court
concluded that the personal service in Canada had been invalid because
such service would lead to an unconstitutional assertion of personal
jurisdiction.728 In finding the exercise of personal jurisdiction un-
constitutional, the court cited Hanson, McGee and International Shoe
as outlining "[t]he general boundaries of due process in connection
with jurisdiction ' 729 and derived from those cases "a requirement of
some minimal connection between the defendant and the state en-
forcing liability, . . such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not
offend traditional notions of justice and fair play.' '730 Here, the court
apparently concluded, the entity "enforcing liability" would be the
United States, for the court noted that "[s]ince . . . the defendants
did not come within or do business in the United States, the basis
for personal jurisdiction must be the effects within the United States
of their acts in Canada."' 73' The court determined that the acts had
"no actual effect" in the United States and that it therefore could
not assert jurisdiction over the defendants without violating due
process.732
In Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of
725. Id. at 1178.
726. 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
727. Id. at 499.
728. Id. at 502.
729. Id. at 499-500.
730. Id. at 500.
731. Id. (emphasis added).
732. Id. at 502.
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Guinea,733 an FSIA case, the court found that the subject matter
jurisdiction requirements of the FSIA had not been satisfied.134 The
court, therefore, could not reach the personal jurisdiction issue because
the statutory prerequisites for personal jurisdiction, subject matter
jurisdiction coupled with proper service of process,73 5 had not been
established. The court cited Texas Trading and noted, however, "the
well-established principle that, in assessing personal jurisdiction under
either a constitutional due process standard or a statutory standard,
courts may look to the contacts between the forum and agents of
the defendant. ' 7 36 It discussed, moreover, the relationship between
the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the FSIA that protect,
by sovereign immunity, those defendants who lack sufficient contacts
with the United States and the personal jurisdiction requirements that
the defendant have sufficient contacts with the forum. 737 The court
continued: "[W]e do not understand this . . . to mean that the
statutory standard for determining non-immunity is coextensive with
the due process standard governing personal jurisdiction, see World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. . . ; International Shoe Co.
v. Washington .... ,,738 The court, therefore, seemed to recognize
that if subject matter jurisdiction had been found, a separate due
process analysis that examined the contacts of the defendant with the
United States would have been required.
Some federal courts facing the question of assertion of personal
jurisdiction over alien defendants served pursuant to federal statutes
authorizing worldwide service of process have applied more stringent
requirements than merely sufficient contacts with the United States
as a whole. Several courts that have upheld personal jurisdiction have
based their decisions on the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts
with the federal district in which the court is sitting or even, in at
least one case, on the defendant's contacts with the state in which
the federal court is sitting. In Travis v. Anthes Imperial Limited,7 39
a suit alleging violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
some of the defendants served were Canadians who had been served
in Canada under the authorization for worldwide service of process
of Section 27. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit found that the intent of Congress in enacting Section 27 was
733. 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
734. Id. at 1112.
735. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
736. 693 F.2d at 1105.
737. Id.
738. Id.
739. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
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"to extend personal jurisdiction to the full reach permitted by the
Due Process Clause [of the Fifth Amendment]." 7 ' The Court stated
the following as its due process "test": "[P]ersonal jurisdiction can
be acquired over the defendants who have acted within the district
or sufficiently caused foreseeable consequences there, by service of
process on them in Canada. See McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co..... "741 Thus, the Eighth Circuit settled on a form of Inter-
national Shoe test that required contacts with the federal district seeking
to assert jurisdiction. The facts of this case clearly would satisfy the
"minimum contacts with the United States" test, and the court might
have decided to apply the more restrictive state test because the facts
also could satisfy that test.712 No indication of such an analysis exists,
however, and the approach of the court gives no justification for the
decision to examine the defendant's contacts with the federal district
rather than with some other jurisdictional unit.
A similar result was reached by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio in the recent case of Jordan v.
Global Natural Resources, Inc.,"' a class action suit brought against
an alien corporation for alleged violations of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission.
Service had been made on a subsidiary of the defendant located in
New Jersey under the service provisions of Section 27 of the 1934
Act. 4 In response to the defendant's argument that the court lacked
personal jurisdiction, the court noted:
Personal jurisdiction under [Section 27] extends to the full reach per-
mitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
Thus, jurisdiction can be obtained over any defendant who has
minimum contacts with the forum such that maintenance of a suit
in that district does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.7 45
From this statement, whether the due process standard to be applied
is that of the fifth or that of the fourteenth amendment is unclear.
Apparently, however, "the forum" discussed is "the federal district"
in which the suit is brought. That conclusion partially is borne out
740. Id. at 529.
741. Id.
742. In some cases, courts adopt the most restrictive test that still will permit assertion
of personal jurisdiction, thus remaining far removed from the limits of due process.
743. 11982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,179 (S.D. Ohio 1983). See
also Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 749 (D. Md. 1968) (service
on alien defendants pursuant to Section 214 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.§80b-14 (1982); court considers defendants' contacts with the "country and with this district").
744. [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,179.
745. Id.
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by application of a minimum contacts test to the facts of the case:
We find that defendant has the minimum contacts necessary for this
Court to exercise its jurisdiction in this case. Not only did defen-
dant solicit proxy voters by letter and by advertisement in this district,
shares of defendant's stock are bought and sold in this district, from
which defendant derives substantial revenue. The alleged fraud in
this case was perpetrated almost entirely through the use of the mails
and the advertisements in national newspapers. We do not think it
is unfair or offends the notions of substantial justice to require defen-
dant to appear in this jurisdiction to answer the charges against it.7"6
While discussion of the mails and national newspapers as the vehicles
by which the defendant's alleged fraud was perpetrated does not
necessarily refer to a contact with the Southern District of Ohio, the
rest of the holding of the Court rests on contacts with the district.
In sum, the court clearly required a separate due process analysis and
strongly suggested by the language of its opinion that an examina-
tion of the defendant's contacts with the federal district in which the
suit had been brought must be made to determine whether those con-
tacts were sufficient to be "minimum contacts with the forum." Again,
perhaps the facts of the case suggested the analysis: since the defen-
dant had sufficient contacts with the federal district, why resort to
any "contacts with the United States" analysis?747
The final case to be examined involving alien defendants, Securities
& Exchange Commission v. VTR, Inc.,74 was an action against a
foreign bank and its sales agent for violations of the Securities Act
of 1933. Service had been made on the defendants outside the United
States pursuant to Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act.7"9 The defendants
objected to the mode of service as well as to personal jurisdiction.
The court found that the defendants had been properly served and
went on to decide whether "it is fair to assume jurisdiction.""75 Citing
Hanson, McGee, and International Shoe as establishing a test based
on "traditional notions of fair play," 75' the court concluded that asser-
tion of jurisdiction over the defendants was fair since "there clearly
was business transacted by the defendants within this state." '752 The
court, therefore, seemed to be applying the fourteenth amendment
standard developed in the cases cited. This approach would tie in with
746. Id. (emphasis added).
747. See supra note 742 and accompanying text.
748. 39 F.R.D. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
749. Id. at 20-21.
750. Id. at 21. For discussion of another "fairness" test, see infra notes 769-84 and
accompanying text.
751. 39 F.R.D. at 21.
752. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
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the rule that the authority of a federal court generally runs to the
borders of the state in which it is sitting." 3 If contacts are to be con-
sidered, therefore, then the area of contacts should at least be co-
extenstive with the ordinary process power of the court. Neither Travis,
Jordan, nor VTR considered this distinction and the use in VTR of
"state" as opposed to "district" was probably inadvertent. Clearly,
none of the courts that have applied a sub-United States minimum
contacts approach have provided explanations for their choices of
measuring fora or their reasons for not applying broader tests.
As noted above,"' many courts have dealt with the question of
personal service pursuant to a federal statute authorizing nationwide,
or worldwide, service of process upon a nonalien defendant served
in the United States as essentially a sovereignty question. A sovereign
can assert jurisdiction over anyone "found" within its borders and,
in these cases, the United States is the sovereign. Other courts have
employed a separate due process analysis based on a minimum con-
tacts test, but have not examined the defendant's contacts with the
United States, which would possibly lead directly into the sovereignty-
power argument, but instead have considered his contacts with the
federal district in which the federal court is held. This test is prob-
ably a less defensible approach because it is really the same type of
test which would be applied under the fourteenth amendment to a
state seeking to assert jurisdiction in the same circumstances. 7" On
the other hand, this approach eliminates arguments that the chosen
courtroom is substantially inconvenient to the defendant." 6 In Indian
Head Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corporation,7"' an antitrust action
was initiated in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York against a Massachusetts corporation that had
been served in Massachusetts under the worldwide service of process
provision of Section 12 of the Clayton Act. 758 After a lengthy con-
sideration of the venue provision of Section 12, the district court moved
to the question of whether exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
"is consistent with the principles of due process. ' 759 The court con-
753. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
754. See supra notes 573-682 and accompanying text.
755. Thus, a federal court hearing a federal question case would be reduced to deciding
when and if to open its doors in regard to a particular defendant by employing the same test
used by state courts but on a territorially smaller scale because not all federal districts are
coextensive with the borders of the states in which the federal courts sit. See supra note 341
and accompanying text.
756. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
757. 560 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
758. Id. at 730-31.
759. Id. at 733.
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cluded that the requirements of the Constitution had been satisfied:
[The defendant's] substantial and continuous activities within this
district are sufficient to support the conclusion that it has purposeful-
ly availed itself of the privilege of conducting its business within
this district, and has every reasonable basis to believe that it is sub-
ject to suit here, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.
•.. ; Hanson v. Denckla... ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
• . ; even with respect to actions which may not arise out of the
business which it has transacted in this district.""
Clearly the analysis by this court requires some concentration of con-
tacts in the federal district in which suit is brought, while the analyses in
cases like Alco and Texas Trading do not. Moreover, any standard
of minimum contacts with the United States would have been satisfied
by the facts of this case. What is interesting, however, is the applica-
tion by the court of its test without any real explanation and with
citation to cases involving state court extraterritorial assertions of
jurisdiction. Perhaps the explanation lies in the nature of the litiga-
tion, a suit against a nonalien corporation served with process within
the United States. Any analogy between state long-arm statutes and
federal statutes authorizing extraterritorial service breaks down because,
in regard to the United States, service in Massachusetts is service within
the territory of the sovereign. Clearly, no state needs to invoke its
long-arm statute if it can serve the defendant within its borders. If
a federal court chooses not to rely on a Mariash sovereignty analysis,"'
then it must choose some territory to be "the forum" in a minimum
contacts analysis, and the federal district is one possible choice. On
the other hand, the court merely might have found that the defen-
dant had substantial contacts with the federal district and, therefore,
that no contacts analysis on a grander scale would be required.7 61
As noted above, because no accepted federal fifth amendment stan-
dard exists,763 circumstances often seem to dictate the test upon which
a court bases its analysis.
Another variation of the "contacts with the federal district" analysis
of Indian Head appeared in I.A.M. National Pension Fund, Benefit
Plan A v. Wakefield Industries, Incorporated, Division of Capehart
Corp.,74 a suit brought to compel compliance with a Trust Agree-
ment executed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Service
had been made on the defendant corporation and on its president
760. Id.
761. See supra notes 622-29 and accompanying text.
762. See supra notes 742-47 and accompanying text.
763. See supra notes 446-47 and accompanying text.
764. 699 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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in the Southern District of New York pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section
1132(e)(2), ERISA. This statute provides:
Where an action under this subchapter is brought in a district court
of the United States, it may be brought in the district where the
plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a defen-
dant resides or may be found, and process may be served in any
other district where a defendant resides or may be found.'
The suit had been initiated in the District Court for the District of
Columbia because the Trust Agreement was administered there. The
defendant president argued that the federal court lacked jurisdiction
over him and that the corporation had been served "well outside the
territorial limits of a federal district court sitting in the District of
Columbia."I 6 The district court based its resolution of statutory in-
terpretation of Section 1132(e)(2) on a determination of whether asser-
tion of jurisdiction would violate "due process," without distinguishing
between the fourteenth amendment and fifth amendment due process
clauses: "for service of process on a corporation to be valid under
Section 1132(e)(2) corporate contacts with the district of service must
meet the International Shoe test." '767 According to the district court,
therefore, for the defendant corporation to be "found" in New York
for purposes of service of process, the corporation must have suffi-
cient contacts with the federal district in which process is served. While
the court relied on International Shoe, it did not consider anything
but the propriety of service, essentially ignoring the issue of the pro-
priety of the defendant being haled into court in the District of the
District of Columbia. This court seemed to misapprehend the due
process problem raised by the defendant. Even though the court relied
on International Shoe and a "contacts" analysis, the result only can
be justified, under the court analysis, on a power theory:768 personal
jurisdiction in the District of Columbia was proper if the federal district
in which service was made had power over the defendant, i.e., if the
defendant was "present" in that jurisdiction. The authority, thus,
for suit to be brought in the District of Columbia flows directly from
the statute. This case aptly illustrates the confusion that exists in the
area of personal jurisdiction in federal question cases. The court tries
to use a "contacts" analysis to bring the defendant within the statute
in the first place rather than to justify assertion of jurisdiction over
the defendant by a federal district different from the one in which
the defendant was served.
765. 29 U.S.C. §1132(e)(2).
766. 699 F.2d at 1256.
767. Id. at 1258 (emphasis added).
768. See supra notes 579 to 682 and accompanying text.
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, in Oxford First Corporation v. PNC Liquidating
769 -. AtCorp., purported to devise a special "fairness" test to determine
whether service of process on nonresident, nonalien shareholders of
a Philadelphia-based corporation pursuant to the nationwide service
of process provisions of Section 27 of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 violated the defendants' fifth amendment due process
rights. 770 After rejecting the defendants' arguments that venue and
service of process had been improper, the court extensively analyzed
the question of due process limitations on Congressional grants of
nationwide or worldwide service of process. The court examined all
relevant authority77 I and "reject[ed] the notion that there are no limita-
tions upon extraterritorial service of process under federal statutes
such as the securities acts" on the ground that "the existence of the
Fifth Amendment would indicate otherwise. ' ' 772 In the course of its
discussion, the court noted the "anomaly" of applying International
Shoe standards to situations like that before the court:
The anomaly here lies not only in overlooking the principle that the
United States may exercise personal jurisdiction over any defendant
within the United States, but also in limiting federal action by a
constitutional provision applicable only to state action. 773
The court, however, decided not to base its amenability test upon
notions of territoriality on one hand or applications of state stan-
dards on the other; it chose to formulate a special federal test based
on notions of "fairness." In devising this fairness test, the court noted:
[P]ractical considerations emanating from the realities of contem-
porary litigation ... are ... persuasive justification for upholding
the view that any constitutional due process limitations upon a federal
extraterritorial (nationwide) service of process statute must be broadly
defined.714
In its test, the court decided "to include the traditional procedural
due process notions as a part of a judicial fairness test, rather than
impose the International Shoe mandate of due process on federal
nationwide service of process statutes. ' 775 The fairness test con-
templated by the court would include the following:
769. 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
770. Id. at 203-05.
771. Id. at 198-201.
772. Id. at 201.
773. Id. at 199-200 (quoting First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp.
730, 737 (E.D. Tenn. 1962)).
774. Oxford, 372 F. Supp. at 201.
775. Id. at 203 (emphasis in original).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
First, a court should determine the extent of the defendant's con-
tacts with the place where the action was brought; i.e., the Inter-
national Shoe type criteria. Second, a court should weigh the in-
convenience to the defendant of having to defend in a jurisdiction
other than that of his residence or place of business. . . .Third,
the matter of judicial economy should be evaluated .. . .Fourth,
a court should consider the probable situs of the discovery pro-
ceedings in the case and the extent to which the discovery proceedings
will, in any event, take place outside the state of defendant's residence
or business. . . .Fifth, a court should examine the nature ...and
the extent of impact that defendant's activities have beyond the
borders of his state of residence or business.776
Upon application of this fifth amendment test, the court found that
"the fairness balance . . . point[s] strongly to upholding jurisdiction
here. 77
7
The "fairness" test devised by the Oxford court is significant in
several regards. First, while the court recognized that federal exer-
cises of jurisdiction pursuant to federal service of process statutes
should be measured differently from state court exercises of jurisdic-
tion, the court seemed to key its test on the "state of the defendant's
residence or place of business"; it referred to "state" in factors four
and five of its above-quoted test while otherwise generally referring
to "the place where the action was brought" or "jurisdicton." The
court did not, on one hand, rely on federal districts in its analysis
or, on the other hand, on the United States as a whole. In many
ways, moreover, the Oxford test resembles the "balancing of the con-
veniences" test that many state courts employed in deciding whether
the International Shoe minimum contacts test had been satisfied, 7 8
at least prior to the Supreme Court decision in World-Wide
Wolkswagen77' decided subsequent to Oxford. In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Supreme Court ruled that before any type of balan-
cing of factors might be employed, the court had to establish that
the defendant had some contacts with the forum state. The fifth fac-
tor, "nature of the regulated activity . . . and .. .extent of impact
. .beyond the borders of [the] state," seems geared to the special
federal purpose in authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of pro-
cess in regard to certain disputes arising out of that activity. 78 I This
factor is comparable to discussions as to whether the state long-arm
776. Id. 203-04 (emphasis in original).
777. Id. at 204.
778. See supra notes 106-44 and accompanying text.
779. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
780. See supra note 573 and accompanying text.
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statute that authorized the extraterritorial service of process was in-
tended to reach certain types of acts having consequences in the forum
state. A strong argument can be made that the Oxford court, in at-
tempting to formalize its fairness test, merely listed factors that many
state courts had included in International Shoe analyses.", Further,
Oxford may have anticipated the World-Wide "two-step" test for state
courts: (1) some defendant contacts with the forum state, and (2) balan-
cing conveniences to determine whether those contacts were sufficient
to be "minimum" for International Shoe purposes.78 2 This interpreta-
tion finds support in the following statement by the Oxford Court:
It is a close question whether these facts and the reasonable inferences
therefrom would meet the International Shoe standards of due pro-
cess, if that was the sole test. However, in view of the foregoing
discussion, we need not answer the question on International Shoe
terms alone. On this record we find that there were sufficient contacts
between the St. Claire defendants and this jurisdiction to support
the first criterion of the multifaceted fairness test that justifies in
personam jurisdiction here.7"3
Finally, the Oxford court has devised a test applicable only to nonalien
defendants. The court gave no clue as to how the test would change
if the defendant had no state of residence or business. One conclu-
sion might be that the "fairness" test of Oxford is no different in
effect from the "minimum contacts with the state in which the federal
court is sitting" test of VTR, except that VTR applied the test to
alien defendants. In short, Oxford, which at first glance appears to
create a new, fully federal test for personal jurisdiction in these federal
statute cases, in reality seems to apply International Shoe almost
without regard to the federal context.'
Summary and Analysis
Federal courts have varied greatly in treatment of the question of
amenability standards in federal question cases in which process has
been served pursuant to a federal statute authorizing nationwide or
worldwide service of process. Some courts, in effect, have determined
that when service is made within the United States, personal jurisdic-
tion flows automatically from the statute on a sovereignty theory.
785
781. See supra notes 106-44 and accompanying text.
782. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
783. 372 F. Supp. at 204 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
784. At least, the test is only useful in circumstances such as those posed by the case.
What Oxford offers is a well-written and reasoned alternative to the Mariash power approach,
see supra notes 622-29 and accompanying text, in regard to nonalien defendants.
785. See supra notes 573-682 and accompanying text.
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Other courts have required a separate due process analysis in similar
cases, applying some form of the International Shoe test-"minimum
contacts with the federal district ' 786 or "minimum contacts with the
state in which the federal court is sitting." '787 In cases in which the
defendant is an alien served outside the United States, all courts ad-
dressing this issue have required a separate amenability analysis, again
applying some form of the International Shoe test-"minimum con-
tacts with the United States as a whole," a "national contacts"
approach,788 "minimum contacts with the federal district in which
the suit is brought," '789 or "minimum contacts with the state in which
the federal court is sitting."79
Other approaches also have been suggested. One commentator has
noted that satisfaction of the venue requirements of certain federal
statutes authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of process
automatically would serve personal jurisdiction purposes because those
venue provisions require defendant-contact with the federal district
in which the court is sitting."' Other commentators have suggested
786. See supra notes 754-68 and accompanying text.
787. See supra notes 769-84 and accompanying text.
788. See supra notes 687-716 and accompanying text. See also notes 717-38 and accom-
panying text; Engineering & Equipment Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(in rem jurisdiction as authorized by Rule B(1) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty
and Maritime Claims is constitutional when the defendants whose property was being attached
had sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole).
789. See supra notes 739-47 and accompanying text.
790. See supra notes 748-53 and accompanying text. In some cases in which nationwide
or worldwide service of process might be authorized by statute, federal courts have not con-
sidered amenability under the particular statute but, instead, have applied state long-arm statutes
as authorized by former Rule 4(d)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 4(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (although court could have utilized nationwide service provisions of Section 12 of the
Clayton Act, the court applied the New York long-arm statute, finding personal jurisdiction
over the Florida defendants on the basis of the sufficiency of their contacts with the state
of New York); Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (court
discussed Section 12 of the Clayton Act only in regard to the question of venue; court used
Florida long-arm statute to find defendant amenable to suit). While Federal Rule 4 permits
a party to select among the approved methods of service so long as the factual requirements
of the particular method are satisfied, to rely on a state long-arm statute does not seem sensi-
ble except in cases in which state standards under the long-arm statute clearly are satisfied,
thus making the long-arm analysis uncomplicated. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
observed, in Hilgeman v. National Ins. Co. of Am., 547 F.2d 298, 301 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977):
We have been given no explanation of why, given the liberal nationwide service of
process provisions of the federal Securities Acts, particularly §27 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, . . .the plaintiff made use of the Alabama insurance statute
to effect service of process when the whole thrust of his action was that he held
a security rather than an insurance policy. Plaintiff obtained service of process on
the two non-corporate defendants under the federal statute.
rd.
791. Comment, Civil Procedure-Service of Process- "Fairness" Test Applied to Service
Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Despite Broad Authorization of Section 27, 15 U.S.C.
§78aa (1970). Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
7 RUrTGERs-C s. L. J. 158, 166 (1975).
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that federal courts should have worldwide service of process, with
the location of suit being controlled, by venue and forum nonconve-
niens/transfer provisions, to preclude unfairness to the defendant
caused by inconvenient location of trial.7 92
Clearly, no uniform approach has been adopted, even in this least
complicated federal question area in which service is made pursuant
to a special federal statute. To this writer, the only unifying test possi-
ble would be one of "minimum contacts with the United States,"
barring, of course, the legislative or judicial establishment of some
different wholly federal fifth amendment standard. In cases involv-
ing service within the United States, the defendant's presence in the
country would be a sufficient contact, especially since the purpose
envisioned by Congress in enacting these special statutes was to max-
imize the potential for providing federal fora for the vindication of
certain federally-created rights, fora which would be convenient to
the plaintiff involved. 93 This doctrine, however, would not befbased
on some notion of sovereignty, which has been rejected frequently
as a ground for personal jurisdiction in the state context, but rather
on a balancing test in which presence within the United States would
be such a heavy factor that only the most extreme hardship to the
defendant in litigating in the United States might outweigh the presence
factor. In the state court context, no factor has yet outweighed
presence, no matter how transitory, as a constitutionally proper basis
of personal jurisdiction. 94 Any intra-United States inconvenience could
be mitigated by transfer of venue provisions, but only when such
transfer would not undermine the Congressional purpose in enacting
the special service of process statute. Thus, in cases involving service
within the United States, the outer limits of due process would be
satisfied by presence in the country, and any more rigorous contacts
analysis generally would not be required.
In regard to defendants served outside the United States pursuant
to a federal statute authorizing worldwide service of process,
''minimum contacts with the country" again would satisfy any fifth
amendment requirement. To require sufficient contacts with either the
state in which the federal court is sitting or the particular federal
district seeking to assert personal jurisdiction is not required constitu-
tionally nor is it sound doctrinally. The former, the International Shoe
test, would create the admittedly anomalous situation of subjecting
792. ALl, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts §2374,
& 437-41 mem. (1969).
793. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
794. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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federal court personal jurisdiction in cases in which process is served
in a wholly federal manner to the same standard applied to state courts
under the fourteenth amendment.795 Moreover, because each state might
have its own interpretation of what is sufficient to satisfy due pro-
cess subject to Supreme Court decisions, the federal courts also would
have to decide whether to apply the standards of the particular states
in which they were sitting or apply some uniform federal test. The
"minimum contacts with the state" standard also would be subject
to further criticism. Since states vary greatly in size, one defendant,
who had acted in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and Rhode
Island but had not acted sufficiently in any state to have minimum
contacts therewith, could not be brought to justice in a federal court.
However, another defendant who had committed these same acts at
the most remote corners of Alaska, a greater land area, would be
subject to suit in a federal court because the accumulation of acts
would be sufficient to be minimum. Finally, a defendant might not
have sufficient contacts with any state to satisfy a minimum contacts
test, and, yet, he might have acted sufficiently to have minimum con-
tacts with the United States.79 Clearly, in these cases, the purpose
of the federal statute authorizing worldwide service of process would
be undermined if suit could not be maintained in any federal court
because the defendant's activities were scattered too thinly throughout
the country.
Some of the same criticisms could be levelled at the "minimum
contacts with the federal district" test. Again, a defendant whose
activities were spread thinly would not be amenable to suit although
he might have caused substantial effects in the United States. Moreover,
federal districts are never larger than the states in which the federal
courts are sitting, and they are often smaller. Thus, a "federal district
contacts" requirement would be, in some cases, more strict than that
required by straight application of the International Shoe "contacts
with the state" test, a result making no sense at all, especially since
Congress has authorized that federal process run at least to the borders
of the states in which the federal courts are held.797 A federal court
hearing purely federal business should not be more restricted than
a state court hearing the same matter.
795. Even in diversity cases, courts and commentators have noted this anomaly with ten-
sion. See supra note 488 and accompanying text. In the federal question context, many more
authorities have been disturbed by the doctrinal disharmony created. See, e.g., infra notes 878,
968, and 1132 and accompanying text.
796. Several courts and commentators have noted this possibility. See, e.g., infra notes 1030,
1083, 1267 and 1281 and accompanying text.
797. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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Apparently, no reason exists why the fifth amendment would not
be satisfied by a requirement of minimum contacts with the United
States. An examination of the cases in which personal jurisdiction
was upheld upon application of other amenability tests probably would
reveal that the defendant's contacts had been concentrated sufficient-
ly as to satisfy the more restrictive test of contacts with a particular
state or district. Therefore, the more liberal test of "minimum con-
tacts with the United States," or "national contacts," also would have
been satisfied. On the other hand, in cases in which personal jurisdic-
tion was denied upon application of other amenability standards, the
defendant's contacts, such as they were, probably had been concen-
trated in only one state or federal district, and, thus, the more liberal
test of "national contacts" also would not have been satisfied because
no other contacts could have been added to the insufficient local con-
tacts. In other words, a federal court might apply a localized con-
tacts analysis, not because the test established the outer limits of due
process, but because, on the facts of the case, local contacts were
determinative. That does not mean, however, that a uniform stan-
dard of minimum contacts with the United States should not be
developed. A more sensible analytic approach would be to begin with
an established standard, rather than selecting the standard by the facts
of the particular case. As noted above,798 moreover, any abuse by
plaintiffs of a "contacts with the United States" test by bringing suit
in a very remote or inconvenient federal district could be precluded,
by the venue requirements included in the federal statutes authoriz-
ing nationwide or worldwide service of process, by liberal change of
venue statutes, or by the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
2. Amenability Standards in Federal Question Cases in which
Process is Served in a Wholly Federal Manner Pursuant to Rules
4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Federal Rules 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) provide methods of service upon
individuals and corporations and other business entities, respectively. 799
Rule 4(d)(1) permits service by delivery to the defendant or by "leaving
copies . . . at his dwelling house or usual place of abode," a wholly
federal method of serving an individual defendant present within or
a resident of the state in which the federal court is sitting."' Federal
process ordinarily runs to the borders of the state in which the federal
798. See supra notes 188, 226, 337, 354, 657 and 693 and accompanying text.
799. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
800. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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court is sitting."' Rule 4(d)(3) permits service upon a business entity
by delivery, within the state, "to an officer . . . or to any other
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of pro-
cess," a wholly federal method of serving a defendant corporation
whose agent is present within the state in which the federal court
is sitting.8"' This provision presupposes that in most cases such an
agent will not be authorized to receive service of process unless the
defendant business entity has some relationship to the state in which
the federal court is sitting.8"3
Unlike the methods of service permitted by the special federal statutes
discussed above, the more general methods of 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) may
be utilized in any federal question case so long as the factual re-
quirements of the Federal Rule are satisfied. Service is more limited
in territorial scope, however, because Congress has not chosen to grant
federal courts across-the-board nationwide, or worldwide, service of
process, although such a statute would not be unconstitutional.10 In-
stead, Congress has decided to limit such statutory grants to areas
of particular federal concern. 0 5
Federal Rules 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) speak only to the manner of serving
process and not to the question of whether such service will lead to
801. Rule 4(f) provides, in pertinent part:
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits
of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a statute
of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). As described above, dozens of federal statutes authorize more extensive
service of process. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. Rule 4(f) itself authorizes a
limited service beyond the borders of the state, within 100 miles of the federal courthouse,
for "persons. . . .brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as additional parties to a
pending action or a counterclaim or crossclaim therein pursuant to Rule 19." FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(f). Rule 4, moreover, authorizes service pursuant to state long-arm statutes in some cir-
cumstances. See infra notes 897 and 1103-08 and accompanying text. Such service, therefore,
also would be "authorized . . . by these rules."
802. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
803. Such service still will be scrutinized as to due process requirements. See infra notes
806-87 and accompanying text. If the corporation has no contacts with the state in which the
federal court is sitting, the suit probably could not be maintained because of lack of personal
jurisdiction. See infra notes 823-71 and accompanying text. Or, if the court applies a "minimum
contacts with the United States" due process test for personal jurisdiction, as in First Flight
Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), the suit probably
would fail for lack of venue. See infra notes 872-87 and accompanying text.
804. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
805. See supra notes 205-50 and accompanying text. In som circumstances, courts have
found that Congress implicitly has authorized nationwide or worldwide service of process. See,
e.g., F.T.C. v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (third paragraph of section 9 of Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §49 (1976), impliedly authorized nationwide service of pro-
cess in proceedings to enforce investigative subpoena issued by F.T.C.). Cf. United States v.
Hill, 694 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court finds that section 645 of Department of Energy
Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §7255 (Supp. IV 1980) does not confer power of extraterritorial
service of process in Department of Energy subpoena enforcement proceedings).
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a constitutionally permissible assertion of personal jurisdiction. 0 Since
the method of service in these cases would be wholly federal, the
appropriate amenability standard should be the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. 7 Any reliance on state standards, except,
perhaps, by analogy, seems wholly misplaced. 08 Federal question cases
must be examined to determine how federal courts actually have dealt
with this issue, not a simple task because federal courts often do not
indicate clearly the subsection of Federal Rule 4 under which process
was served. This omission is indicative of the absence of uniform treat-
ment of the personal jurisdiction question; no formula has been
developed. 9
806. Unlike those cases in which service is made pursuant to a federal statute authorizing
nationwide and/or worldwide service and in which the courts have not engaged in any separate
amenability analysis either because the court felt that no separate analysis would be required
or the court felt that the standard had been "built into" the statute, see supra notes 579-682
and accompanying text, federal courts seem to assume that service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3)
cannot trigger federal court personal jurisdiction unless such assertion of jurisdiction would
satisfy the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See infra notes 817-87 and accompany-
ing text. When service is made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1), a separate due process analysis prob-
ably would not be employed because of the obvious sufficiency of the defendant's presence
and/or residence as a constitutionally appropriate basis for assertion of personal jurisdiction.
See infra notes 810-16 and accompanying text.
807. See supra notes 329 and 497 and accompanying text. One federal court has noted:
Comparatively recent decisions have held that federal courts considering questions
arising under the Constitution of the United States or federal statutes properly may
exercise jurisdiction limited only by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
. . .But in [those] . . . cases, the manner of serving process was provided for by
both federal rule and by state law. It was possible, therefore, to use Rule 4(d)(3)
to the exclusion of any procedures under state statutes, and to disregard their limita-
tions .... It is obvious that although a federal court may have a foreign corporation
within its territorial jurisdiction, the court may not have procedure available under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bring the corporation into court. Where no
agent is served in fact a federal court must look to the state statutory procedure.
A federal court is authorized to do this under Rule 4(d)(7). It follows that the ade-
quacy of service of process must be determined by that rule.
Hartley v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 379 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1967).
The problems created when process is served by some state method, as authorized by Rule
4(e) and (possibly) by former Rule 4(d)(7), will be discussed below. See infra notes 915-1038
and 1123-1316 and accompanying text.
808. See supra note 795 and accompanying text.
809. Many cases have been devoted to the development of a technique for determining
whether a state court properly can assert jurisdiction over a defendant. See supra notes 60-185
and accompanying text. The resulting test might be summarized in the following format: (1)
Was process served properly pursuant to the statute providing for service of process? (2) If
yes, did such service give the defendant adequate notice of the pendency of the suit against
him and has the defendant been afforded the opportunity to be heard in his own defense?
(3) If yes, did the state have the authority, under its long-arm statute, to serve process on
the defendant? (4) If yes, would assertion of personal jurisdiction over this defendant offend
his rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, i.e., (a) did the defendant
have any contacts with the state seeking to assert jurisdiction over the defendant, and (b) if
yes, were the defendant's contacts with the state sufficient to be considered "minimum con-
tacts" within the meaning of International Shoe and its progeny? No such basic structure of
analysis has been developed in federal court cases, although most federal courts follow the
state-developed analysis in regard to diversity cases, regardless of the manner in which process
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Very few amenability issues arise regarding service pursuant to Rule
4(d)(1). The explanation for this paucity of discussion is simple: ser-
vice under Rule 4(d)(1) is limited, at the time of service, to individuals
residing in or present in the state in which the federal court is sitting,
and, since no state court would be denied personal jurisdiction over
a defendant so served as long as the other procedural aspects of due
process-adequate notice and opportunity to be heard-had been
satisfied,"'0 a federal court surely would not be denied personal jurisdic-
tion. This is because a federal court is subject only to the restrictions
of the due process clause of the fifth rather than the fourteenth amend-
ment, restrictions that could not be more limiting than those on state
courts. In other words, presence and residence in a state always have
been considered sufficient bases for assertion of personal jurisdiction,
and federal courts should be entitled to assert jurisdiction on the basis
of presence or residence in the state in which the court is sitting.",
Even if some sort of "minimum contacts" analysis were applied,
presence or residence always would be sufficient contacts. 812 In re
Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litigation813 was one federal question case
in which a defendant, personally served in the state of Pennsylvania
in regard to a suit instituted in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, presumably pursuant to Rule
4(d)(1), resisted the exercise of court authority over him. Defendant
claimed he was immune from service of process because "[h]is sole
was served. See supra notes 376-492 and accompanying text. Perhaps this absence of technique
can be explained partly by the variety of options available for federal court service of process.
The more likely explanation, however, is that no series of cases has developed any fifth amend-
ment standard, resulting in an analytical "catch as catch can": use whatever analysis makes
sense in light of the facts of the case and the result that seems reasonable-minimum contacts
with the federal district, with the state, with the United States as a whole, or some new and
unique test. Most federal courts end up using some analogue of the International Shoe test,
probably because that test is already well-established in doctrine and practice and at this point,
the probability that the Supreme Court will step up and require some new and unique test
that does not require some sort of minimum contacts analysis seems unlikely. Even when a
court purports to be establishing such a test, the test can be folded neatly into the International
Shoe mold. See supra notes 769-84 and accompanying text.
810. See supra note 511 and accompanying text.
811. Congress has elected to relegate the arms of the federal system, the federal district
courts, to federal districts that are either territorially coextensive with the states in which the
federal courts are sitting, or are subsumed within the states with two or more federal districts
combining together to be territorially coextensive with one state. Congress further has provided
that the process of each federal district court reaches at least to the borders of the state in
which the federal court is sitting. See supra note 801 and accompanying text. Thus, the ordinary
service of process power of the federal court is coextensive with that of a state court and
any amenability analysis could be analogous to that regarding a state court serving a defendant
who is present in or a resident of the state.
812. See supra note 115 (discussing the traditional bases of personal jurisdiction-presence,
domicile, and residence-as contacts with the forum state).
813. 92 F.R.D. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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purpose for being in [Pennsylvania] (when he was hand-served with
process) was to testify in [a related] action." ' 4 The defendant and
the court both assumed that if the immunity from process were not
granted, the defendant would be amenable to suit in the federal court
even though "at all times subsequent to the filing of the complaint
in this particular action. . . . , (defendant) has neither resided in nor
conducted business in Pennsylvania.1815 His transitory presence at the
time of service would have been sufficient to subject him to the
authority of the federal court.8"6
In cases in which process is served on a corporation or other business
entity pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3), more difficult amenability questions
have arisen. These questions stem in large measure, from the fact
that a corporation, unlike an individual, lacks the capacity to be
"physically present" in a jurisdiction." ' Thus, since Rule 4(d)(3)
prescribes only a method for triggering the power of a federal court
when service is made on some corporate agent located within the state
in which the federal court is sitting, the court must decide whether
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the corporation would violate
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In First Flight Com-
pany v. National Carloading Corp.,"'s the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee described various judicial
responses to this problem:
There is ...a great deal of confusion as to just what the federal
law is in this regard. Aside from cases which purport to limit federal
court jurisdiction by state law [by the minimum contacts with the
state test under the fourteenth amendment], other cases are to be
814. Id. at 404.
815. Id.
816. The court noted that "[d]efendant's argument relates solely to the sufficiency of ser-
vice of process and it is not premised on any asserted lack of personal jurisdiction." Id. at
405. The court ultimately refused to grant the defendant the desired immunity "because service
could have been made upon him by certified mail pursuant to Pennsylvania's long-arm statute
and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7)." Id. at 404 (quoting Plaintiff's Memorandum). The
court noted:
The rationale underlying this particular rule of immunity is to ensure the efficient
administration of justice by encouraging the voluntary attendance of witnesses who
might otherwise be dissuaded from appearing in a jurisdiction for fear of being served
with process in an unrelated action.
Id. Since the defendant could have been served validly by another means, the court concluded
that the purpose of the doctrine would not be achieved by grant of immunity. Id. at 405.
The court recognized that an effective alternative method of service would be available,
although that method would depend, to some extent, on state law. In regard to other defen-
dants, the court analyzed their jurisdictional objections in terms of due process standards ap-
plicable to state long-arm statutes. See infra notes 1172-77 and accompanying text.
817. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing "presence" problem in regard
of state court jurisdiction).
818. 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
found which require as a prerequisite to the personal jurisdiction
of a federal court over a foreign corporation that the defendant be
"doing business" within the district in which the court is held because
the Fourteenth Amendment requires it, or because the Fifth Amend-
ment requires it, or because venue statutes require it, or because
the Court merely assumes that something requires it. Other courts
require "doing business" not within the district but within the state
in which the federal court sits, for equally diverse reasons. 819
As described below,820 the First Flight court, by "reference to fun-
damental principles and authorities," found "a rational and consis-
tent explanation of federal court personal jurisdiction" when process
is served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3). 8 2' The court developed a require-
ment of "minimum contacts with the United States" to satisfy the
fifth amendment due process clause.8 22
Before considering First Flight and its comprehensive treatment of
the question of federal court personal jurisdiction when process is
served, pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3), by a wholly federal method, some
other federal question cases that consider this issue should be examined
for comparison purposes. In Fraley v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway
Co.,823 a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) suit instituted in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania, service had been made on defendant Virginia corporation,
under Rule 4(d)(3), at an office maintained by the defendant in the
Western District of Pennsylvania. The district court had dismissed
the action on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the
defendant because the defendant was not "doing business" in the
Western District of Pennsylvania.2 4 The United States Court of Ap-
peals reversed and remanded on the following ground:
[T]he District Court erred in refusing to direct defendant to answer
plaintiff's interrogatories designed to elicit the range of operations
of defendant's offices in Pennsylvania. . . .[because t]he range of
activities of defendant's offices was critical to ascertaining whether
they were of sufficient dimension to constitute "minimum contacts"
or "doing business" in Pennsylvania, with consequential establish-
ment of in personam jurisdiction in the Western District of
Pennsylvania. 825
The court of appeals asserted that it was relying on federal law "in
819. Id. at 736.
820. See infra notes 872-84 and accompanying text.
821. 209 F. Supp. at 736.
822. Id. at 736-40. See infra notes 872-84 and accompanying text.
823. 397 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1968).
824. Id. at 2.
825. Id. at 3.
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction
determining the issue of in personam jurisdiction where the complaint
. . .asserts a federal right, and personal service . . .was made in
accordance with . . .Rule 4(d)(3)." 26 In this circumstance, however,
the court apparently found that "federal law" would be "minimum
contacts with the state," the same test that would apply to Penn-
sylvania state court assertions of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations.8 27 While its conclusion was based, in part, on an
erroneous understanding of the derivation of the International Shoe
standard, 2 8 the court also grounded its test on "basic principles of
fairness. ' s29 The test in Fraley is clearly no different from the test
for a state court and creates the anomaly of opening the doors of
a federal court in a federal question case in which service is made
in a wholly federal manner only to the extent that a state court in
similar circumstances would be permitted to open its doors.83 The
result, moreover, cannot be explained on the ground that "minimum
contacts with the state" is an acceptable test because its application
necessarily will result in the assertion of personal jurisdiction. 3' The
facts of Fraley might not satisfy the state standard but clearly might
satisfy a "minimum contacts with the United States" standard. 3 2 The
case may be explained on the ground that because the plaintiff himself
826. Id. at 4. Thus, the court limited its approach to cases in which service had been
made by some wholly federal manner.
827. The question before the court of appeals was whether the district court had erred
in refusing to require the defendant to answer interrogatories in regard to "the range of opera-
tions of defendant's offices in Pennsylvania" and the court of appeals noted that the scope
of these activities "was critical to ascertaining . . . 'minimum contacts' . . . in Pennsylvania."
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Thus, although the court of appeals quoted a test of minimum
contacts with the forum, it seemed to regard the State of Pennsylvania as the critical area
of concern. Id. Moreover, the court cited International Shoe as the source of its test. Id.
828. After citing International Shoe as the source of the "minimum contacts" test, the
court stated: "It must be noted that while the principles stated were announced by the Supreme
Court in diversity jurisdiction cases they are now generally regarded as applicable in cases
grounded on a federal claim." Id. at 3. International Shoe and its progeny were not diversity
cases but state court cases. See supra notes 106-55 and accompanying text. This error in regard
of the International Shoe test has been made by several other federal courts. See, e.g., De-
James v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Arthur Treacher's
Franchisee Litig., 92 F.R.D. 398, 408 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle,
A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 418 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Such a misconception provides further demonstra-
tion of the confusion in this area of the law.
829. Fraley, 397 F.2d at 3 (quoting Lone Star Package Car Co., Inc. v. Baltimore & O.R.
Co., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954).
830. See supra note 795 and accompanying text and infra notes 878, 968 and 1132 and
accompanying text.
831. See supra notes 742, 747 and 762 and accompanying text.
832. The defendant maintained some offices in Pennsylvania "for the purpose of soliciting
business," Fraley, 397 F.2d at 3 (quoting affidavit of defendant's corporate secretary), but
asserted that it had "no railroad lines or tracks nor [did] it operate any trains . .. in, on
or across the State of Pennsylvania." Id. Clearly, the defendant railroad company operated
trains and maintained railroad lines in other states; the plaintiff had been injured in West
Virginia where the defendant maintained railroad lines.
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sought to establish "minimum contacts with Pennsylvania," the court
keyed on that request. Again, as in many of the cases discussed above,
the circumstances of the case seemed to dictate the test applied because
no general federal approach had been devised.833
In Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen,834 a federal ques-
tion action instituted in the United States District Court for the District
of Puerto Rico under the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 8"
service had been made on the defendant Mexican Corporation, under
Rule 4(d)(3), by serving process on the manager of a Puerto Rican
franchise of the defendant.83 ' In response to the defendant's objec-
tion to personal jurisdiction, the court observed that federal court
assertions of personal jurisdiction in federal question cases were to
be "tested . . . by reference to the standards developed under the
[fifth amendment due process] clause''837 and proceeded to examine
the defendant's contacts with Puerto Rico, citing International Shoe
as the source of "[t]he basic standard." '838 While the court, therefore,
gave lip service to the need to apply federal standards, it applied the
same analysis that a state court would use. Again, the federal stan-
dard, when applied, looks, acts, tastes, and smells just like the state
standard.
In another federal question suit, service was made, apparently pur-
suant to Rule 4(d)(3),839 on a defendant alien corporation by personal
service on a wholly-owned subsidiary located in the Southern District
of New York. In United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries,84
the district court examined the defendant's relationship with the federal
district and concluded that "requiring [defendant] to defend here will
[not] work such an inconvenience as to result in a denial of due
process.""' The court cited International Shoe as the source of the
test applied to the defendant: "[The defendant] has taken advantage
of the opportunities offered here for its corporate activities; it has
received the benefit of the laws of the United States; it must expect
833. See supra notes 742, 747 and 762 and accompanying text.
834. 360 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1966).
835. 15 U.S.C. §§1221-1225 (1982).
836. 360 F.2d at 439.
837. Id. at 440 n.3.
838. Id. at 440.
839. The court did not cite the source of authority for serving the defendant corporation
by delivery to an "agent" located in the state in which the federal court was sitting, but also
did not cite any state rule or state long-arm statute. Thus, one can infer from the facts of
the case, which are consistent with the requirements of Rule 4(d)(3), that service was made
in the wholly federal fashion permitted thereby.
840. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
841. Id. at 511.
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to be required to answer for their breach." 8 '2 While the court did
not use specifically the term "minimum contacts," it clearly relied
on a state court test, but applied the test even more narrowly by
examining only the defendant's contacts with the federal district in
which the suit had been brought.843 In both Chemical Industries and
Rohlsen the courts may have applied the least broad standard necessary
to find personal jurisdiction; in each case the defendant's contacts
with the smaller entity were sufficient to support personal
jurisdiction.84 ' Rohisen and Chemical Industries differ, however,
because the former court purported to be applying some federal stan-
dard while the latter did not.
In a patent infringement suit, Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz
Apparatewerke,45 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois pursued two alternative analyses to determine
whether it had obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendant alien
corporation. Process was served, within Illinois, on the branch manager
of the defendant's exclusive American distributor of the defendant's
allegedly infringing devices, and a copy of the summons and com-
plaint was mailed to the defendant in Germany.8" The plaintiff first
asserted that personal jurisdiction had been obtained by service under
Rule 4(d)(3) on the defendant's agent.4 7 In a confusing opinion, the
court reversed the ordinary order of analysis, ruling that if the
distributor served was an agent of the defendant, then due process
would be satisfied because the defendant would have "sufficient
minimum contacts with Illinois so as to warrant in personam
jurisdiction. 84 8 If, however, the distributor served were "an indepen-
dent purchaser" of the defendant's product, then due process would
not be satisfied and service on the distributor would be insufficient. 49
According to the district court, therefore, if satisfaction of the re-
842. Id.
843. This case was decided only 6 years after International Shoe and before subsequent
cases "filled out" the International Shoe doctrine. Thus, the court understandably purported
to follow International Shoe but did not employ the talismanic phrase "minimum contacts".
This case is probably most significant because it demonstrates that federal courts were using
International Shoe, soon after it was decided, as a constitutional barometer, not only of the
fourteenth amendment, but of the fifth as well.
844. In Chemical Industries, the defendant's subsidiary was incorporated in the state and
maintained its office and conducted substantial activities in the federal district. 100 F. Supp.
at 511. In Rohisen, the defendant's franchisee maintained its office and conducted its activities
in Puerto Rico. 360 F.2d at 440-41.
845. 353 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975).
846. 353 F. Supp. at 494.
847. Id. at 494-95.
848. Id. at 494.
849. Id.
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quisites of Rule 4(d)(3) could be established, due process would be
satisfied.85 Although the court seemed to say that an International
Shoe test had been programmed into Rule 4(d)(3), the court might
have been careless in stating the issue. In this case, the distributor's
activities within Illinois were so substantial that the only determinative
question was whether the distributor was actually an agent of the defen-
dant. The court concluded that the distributor was not an agent of
the defendant and that the defendant therefore did "not have suffi-
cient minimum contacts with the State of Illinois to warrant this Court
exercising in personam jurisdiction over it." 85' Clearly, the court did
not conclude that any special amenability standards should be applied
in federal question cases; the court employed the International Shoe
test directly to the circumstances before it.
On the alternative basis asserted for personal jurisdiction, amenability
to service under the Illinois state long-arm statute as authorized by
Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules, the court found that the requirements
of the Illinois statute were not satisfied."5 2 The appellate court
decision, 53 which will be discussed below,1 4 considered only the Rule
4(e) prong of the district court decision. The court of appeals found
that the state statutory requirements had been met and that exercise
of personal jurisdiction would not offend the defendant's fifth amend-
ment due process rights.8"'
Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,856
a federal question case, involved the question of whether a United
States District Court sitting in Texas had personal jurisdiction over
a third party defendant, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. (B. & 0.),
a Maryland Corporation that had no permit to do business in Texas
and that did no business in Texas but maintained offices in Dallas
850. In Edwards v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 449 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D. Tex. 1978), the
district court found that because service had been made on some defendants pursuant to Rule
4(d)(3) no need existed to resort to the Texas long-arm statute in regard to those defendants.
As in Honeywell, the court seemed to find some due process standard built into Rule 4(d)(3):
In order for service to be effective under Rule 4(d)(3) in this case, the agent served must meet
the tests of a "managing agent." Id. at 1365-66. See infra note 1109 and accompanying text
(discussing service on one defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)). See also Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 424 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[g]iven the legislative authoriza-
tion [of Rule 4(d)(3)], and if plaintiffs can establish that [defendant] was carrying on 'con-
tinuous and systematic' activities in Nevada through [the entity served] as [the defendant's]
'general agent', we see no reason why [the defendant] itself should not be said to have been
present there and served at the time [the entity served] was served").
851. 353 F. Supp. at 494.
852. Id. at 495.
853. 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975).
854. See infra notes 1202-12 and accompanying text.
855. 509 F.2d at 1141-45.
856. 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954).
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and Houston. These offices were manned by B. & 0. freight represen-
tatives on whom personal service had been made. The district court
had dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over B. & 0. because
of the insufficiency of its contacts with the State of Texas and the
federal district. 8" Much like the district court in Honeywell, the court
of appeals in Lone Star stated the following as its jurisdictional rule
in 4(d)(3) cases:
If a corporation's business is so substantial as to render the cor-
poration amenable to suit in that state, its principal agent in charge
of activities within the state meets the test of a "managing agent".
• . .Hence, with the indicated assumption, service was authorized
under Rule 4(d)(3).858
The court then determined that the appropriate test of amenability
in a federal question case was not the test applied by the district court,
which might be determinative in diversity cases,85 9 but was one of
"basic principles of fairness. ' 8 60 The court cited several cases, in-
cluding International Shoe, recognizing that "in most of the cases
. . . the question has arisen as to constitutional limitations imposed
upon the states." ' 6" The court argued, however, that "the broad
statements of policy expressed, particularly in International Shoe
. . . seem to us to be extended also to cases where the jurisdiction
of the federal court depends upon federal law." 8 62 Without analysis
as to how the "fairness test" should be applied in general, or how
it would be applied to the case at hand, the court concluded: "[U]nder
the tests of fairness elaborated in the foregoing cases, the facts of
this case require that the district court exercise jurisdiction over the
B. & 0. .. '863
Earlier in its opinion, the court carefully had examined the scope of
857. The district court had ruled:
this Court does not have jurisdiction over [the B. & 0.].... a foreign corporation,
[because] it is not a resident or inhabitant of the State of Texas nor of this judicial
district, nor is it doing business in either said state or district of such nature as to
subject it to the jurisdiction of this Court in the instant case.
Id. at 149 (quoting district court opinion).
858. Id. at 152 (citation omitted).
859. Id. at 153.
860. Id. at 155. The failure of the court to use the term "minimum contacts" might come
from the fact that this case was decided only nine years after International Shoe and before
the International Shoe test had been explained in subsequent Supreme Court cases. See supra
notes 106-55 and accompanying text.
861. 212 F.2d at 155.
862. Id. The court, therefore, rejected the approach followed in diversity cases. See supra
text at note 859. The court settled on the test from which the diversity approach arose, seem-
ingly coming full circle, albeit sub silentio, to the "minimum contacts with the state" test
of International Shoe.
863. 212 F.2d at 155.
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the activities of the B. & 0. Texas freight representatives," 4 but the
court did not, in its conclusion, refer back to those facts particularly
as establishing a "fair" basis for personal jurisdiction. Thus, whether
the "fairness" of the exercise rested on the scope of the agent's
activities in Texas or in the particular federal district is unclear from
the opinion. What does seem clear, however, is that the court was
not adopting any national contacts approach: (1) it only examined
the defendant's activities in Texas, and (2) its analysis-amenability
to suit in state renders instate agent a "managing agent" for pur-
poses of service under Rule 4(d)(3)-leads to the conclusion that only
instate activities are significant. Although this case goes farther than
Honeywell by labelling its amenability standard as a "fairness test,"
the effect of the analyses in each case is really the same. To be sub-
ject to service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3), a corporation must carry on
sufficient activities in a state to be amenable to suit there. The court,
therefore, really is applying a "minimum contacts with the state" or
"federal district" test."6"
Unlike Lone Star, the question in Goldberg v. Mutual Readers
League, Inc. ,' 6 a federal question case, was whether the defendant
corporation had sufficient control over the business of the person
served, arguably not an employee of the defendant, to make him a
"managing agent" for purposes of service of process.1 67 Moreover,
the court separated, at least partially, the question of the amenability
to suit of the corporation from the question of the status of the in-
dividual served. In its conclusion, the court stated: "[W]e think [the
business of the person served] is sufficiently controlled by [the defen-
dant] and sufficiently necessary to [the defendant's] operations to
enable us to conclude that [the person served] is [the defendant's]
agent in Pennsylvania for the purpose of service of process on [the
defendant] and of exercising our jurisdiction over [the defendant]. 868
864. Id. at 149-51.
865. Thus, in cases like Honeywell, see supra notes 845-55 and accompanying text, Ag-
Tronic, see infra note 879, and Lone Star, which have made the question of propriety of ser-
vice under Rule 4(d)(3) depend on amenability in the state, this analysis has limited Rule 4(d)(3)
in an unintended way. Whether or not a defendant's agent is servable under 4(d)(3) should
depend on the agent's status in the defendant corporation and not the amenability to suit of
the corporation.
866. 195 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
867. Id. at 780. In this case, the defendant had argued that the person served was an
"independent contractor" rather than a "managing agent". Id. Clearly, the person served was
not directly in the employ of the defendant corporation as were the persons served in Lone Star.
868. Id. at 783 (emphasis added). After the court had found that the defendant's contacts
with Pennsylvania, through its "agent", were sufficient to make the defendant amenable to
suit in the federal court, the court ruled that, because the agent was "in charge of the local
business of a foreign corporation," he was a "managing agent" for purposes of Rule 4(d)(3).
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As to due process, the court purported to adopt the position that
a federal standard should be employed869 and to follow Lone Star
in establishing that standard.87 But the test that it devised was
articulated more completely than was that in Lone Star. The court
ruled:
We hold . . . that the limits of our jurisdiction in this case are to
be determined by looking to the "contacts" which [the defendant]
has with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; if they are substan-
tial enough to require [the defendant] to defend this lawsuit here
without violating traditional concepts of fairness and substantial
justice, we have the power to render a judgment for or against [the
defendant].87'"
Id. Unlike Lone Star, the court, therefore, did not base the agent's status for Rule 4(d)(3)
purposes on the corporate defendant's amenability to suit in the state. Instead, that determina-
tion was based on the agent's status in regard to the business of the defendant corporation
and conducted a separate due process analysis in regard to amenability.
869. Id. at 781. The court stated:
All counsel agree that the question of jurisdiction presented by the present motion
is a question to be determined by "Federal law." It has been previously stated that
the Court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action depends upon the Fair
Labor Standards Act; and the questions presented by the suit are questions arising
under a Federal statute. Therefore, we believe that Pennsylvania statutory law and
case law on the issue of the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts over foreign corpora-
tions have no bearing on this case. State law has been followed by Federal Courts
in diversity cases to determine the jurisdiction of the Federal Court over a foreign
corporation. Apparently, the Circuit Courts of Appeal are not in accord as to whether
state law should be determinative of a Federal Court's jurisdiction even in diversity
cases. However, it seems clear that "Federal law" should control the question of
our jurisdiction in this case. It is not so clear just what Federal law exists to guide
our determination.
Id. (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
870. Id. at 782-83 and n.10.
871. Id. at 783. Before reaching this conclusion, the court summarized the "Federal law"
on the question of personal jurisdiction, see supra note 869, in the following way:
We noted earlier that Federal cases applying state laws to resolve jurisdictional ques-
tions provide us with no Federal law. Technically, neither do the cases of Interna-
tional Shoe or McGee. Those cases set forth the limits to which a state could go
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in exercising jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations. Obviously, the Fourteenth Amendment has no effect
on the jurisdiction of Federal District Courts in cases arising under Federal law. The
Fifth Amendment contains a Due Process Clause, but its limitation on the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal District Courts over foreign corporations has never been clearly
stated. The result is that we are left at best with an anomalous body of "Federal
law" from which to discern the principles applicable to this case.
195 F. Supp. at 782 (footnotes omitted). After noting that the Federal Rules only provide
the manner in which service may be made and the geographical area within which such service
will be effective, the court continued:
In spite of the doubtful applicability of the formula of the International Shoe case
to questions of Federal jurisdiction, some Federal Courts have applied that formula
to cases where the jurisdiction of the Federal Court depended upon Federal law.
Although we have found no case decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit which deals with this problem, we think the reasoning of the Court
in the Lone Star Package Car Co. case is correct. . ..
Id. (footnote omitted).
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As its "federal standard," therefore, the court adopted a "minimum
contacts with the state" test, examining the activities of the defen-
dant's agent in the state in making that evaluation.
Finally, the discussion returns to the well-reasoned district court
opinion in First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp.,872 a federal
question suit brought in the Eastern District of Tennessee under various
sections of the Interstate Commerce Act873 for alleged damage to a
shipment of golf clubs. The defendant-carrier had filed a third-party
complaint against three other carriers. One of the third-party defen-
dants, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (Santa Fe),
moved to quash the service of process and dismiss the third-party
action as to itself upon the ground that "Santa Fe does no business
in Tennessee, and therefore is not subject to the jurisdiction of [the
district] court.""87 Santa Fe, a Kansas corporation that did not operate
or own any railroad lines in Tennessee, was not licensed to do business
in Tennessee, and did no business in Tennessee except to maintain
a single office staffed by two employees whose function was to solicit
business but to make no contracts, 8" had been served with process,
under Rule 4(d)(3), by service upon one of its two Tennessee
employees. 76 In response to the argument by Santa Fe that under
Tennessee law, Santa Fe would not be amenable to suit, the court
stated:*
Federal law defines the extent to which the states may go, under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in exercising
personal jurisdiction over foreign persons and corporations. But the
states need not go-and frequently do not go-as far as the Con-
stitution permits in authorizing their courts to exercise such
jurisdiction.
[The extent of the personal jurisdiction of the federal courts and
the sufficiency of service of process under 4(d)(3) is a matter governed
solely by federal rather than statelaw." 7
The court then considered the question of what would be an ap-
propriate federal standard:
One fundamental principle of the Anglo-American law of jurisdic-
tion is that a sovereignty has personal jurisdiction over any defen-
dant within its territorial limits, and that it may exercise that jurisdic-
tion by any of its courts able to obtain service upon the defendant.
872. 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
873. 49 U.S.C. §§ 20(11), (12) (1976).
874. 209 F. Supp. at 733.
875. Id.
876. Id.
877. Id. at 734, 736.
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This principle has long been applied to the states under the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case of corpora-
tions, the requirement of "presence" has given way to other stan-
dards such as consent to being sued within the state, "doing
business" within the state, and finally to the having of such
"minimum contacts with the state that the exercise of jurisdiction
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' " The basic principle, however, has remained unchanged.
What has frequently been overlooked is that this same basic prin-
ciple has long been applied to the United States itself, so that the
United States is deemed to have personal jurisdiction over any defen-
dant within the United States. Because of this oversight, and by
analogy to the application of the basic principle to the states, there
is a line of cases apparently denying the validity of an exercise of
personal jurisdiction by a federal court over a defendant present
within the United States unless the defendant is also present (or
"doing business," etc.) within the district in which the court is held.
In other words, the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment upon
state jurisdiction have been applied by these cases to federal jurisdic-
tion. The anomaly here lies not only in overlooking the principle
that the United States may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
defendant within the United States, but also in limiting federal ac-
tion by a constitutional provision applicable only to state action." 8
The court then discussed, with approval, the "conclusion" of Pro-
fessor Thomas F. Green, Jr. "that the test of United States jurisdic-
tion should be to the effect that the United States may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a corporation if the latter has such minimum
contacts with the United States that the exercise of jurisdiction does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. "879
878. Id. at 736-37.
879. Id. at 738 (citing Green, supra note 191). In DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc.,
654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981), a federal question case involving a suit by a longshoreman against
the Japanese corporation that had converted the vessel on which he was working at the time
of his injury, service had been made on the defendant corporation by the state long-arm statute
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). See infra notes 1123-41 and accompanying text (discussing
service pursuant to Rule 4(e)). In the course of its opinion, the court stated, in dictum:
We will accept for purposes of this appeal DeJames' position that if service can be
made by wholly federal means all of [defendant's] contacts with the United States
may be aggregated to support jurisdiction in the District of New Jersey, even if these
contacts are limited exclusively to Hawaii, to Alaska, or to a few states on the west
coast. As we noted earlier, the Fraley court stated that the fourteenth amendment
standards of due process announced in International Shoe and its progeny also apply
to cases grounded on a federal claim, which is governed by fifth amendment stan-
dards. . . .Even if this statement is not read to limit the jurisdictional inquiry to
contacts with the forum state, we are not sure that some geographic limit short of
the entire United States might not be incorporated into the "fairness" component
of the fifth amendment.
654 F.2d at 286 n.3 (citation omitted). The court found, however, that service had not been
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The court noted the various methods by which exercise of federal
court jurisdiction is restricted so as not to subject defendant corpora-
tions to the "inconvenience in defending federal court suits far from
their home offices and places of business:" 880 the limitation in Rule
4(f) that, as a general matter, effective federal court service of pro-
cess is limited to the boundaries of the state in which the court is
sitting;8 ' venue statutes that restrict, on convenience grounds, the
places in which a federal suit might be heard;882 and the change of
venue statute that permits the defendant to seek transfer of the suit
to a more convenient location.88 3 Applying the test, the court examined
the contacts of Santa Fe with the United States as a whole and found
those contacts sufficient to permit constitutional exercise of personal
jurisdiction by the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Tennessee. 8
4
First Flight was probably the first federal decision in which the court
discussed a national contacts approach, even in the context of service
pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3), and certainly was one of the few decisions
in which the court actually applied such a test. Subsequent decisions,
many involving service according to different methods available to federal
courts, have mentioned or discussed the national contacts approach, 85
made by a wholly federal means under Rule 4(d)(3). Id. at 286-90.
In Ag-Tronic, Inc. v. Frank Paviour Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393 (D. Neb. 1976), a federal ques-
tion suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendant's patent was invalid or that it was
not infringed by the plaintiff's product, the court rejected a national contacts test of amenability
when service had been made in accordance with the Nebraska long-arm statute pursuant to
former Rule 4(d)(7) or Rule 4(e). In reaching its conclusion, the court found that in this case,
"plaintiff's reliance upon contacts with the United States alone is misplaced." Id. at 400. The
court reasoned:
While it is true that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not
apply to federal action and the due process clause of the fifth amendment does,
the same minimal contacts test applicable under the fourteenth amendment is ap-
plicable under the fifth amendment, although national contacts may properly be con-
sidered under the fifth amendment. Sufficiency of service of process under Rule 4(d)(3)
is a matter governed solely by federal rather than state law. . . . [U]nless Congress
has provided for nationwide service of process, when the defendant is a foreign cor-
poration it must have an agent within the territorial limits of the State in which
the court sits, unless substituted service or extra-state service can be made. . . .when
a state statute so authorizes. . . .Under Nebraska's long-arm statute, plaintiff must
prove that defendant transacts business in the state.
Id. The court, therefore, recognized that a national contacts approach might be appropriate
in a Rule 4(d)(3) case but would not be appropriate in a former Rule 4(d)(7) case or a Rule
4(e) case. See infra notes 985-99 and accompanying text (discussing court treatment of the question
of service pursuant to former Rule 4(d)(7)).
880. 209 F. Supp. at 739.
881. Id.
882. Id. at 739-40.
883. Id. at 740.
884. Id.
885. See, e.g., supra cases discussed at notes 687-716 and infra cases discussed at notes
956-62, 973-1038, 1138-41, 1202-12, and 1244-1316.
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some even with approval. 86 Few, however, actually have relied on
the test. Most courts prefer to rest on some more restrictive test under
which jurisdiction also could be approved. 7
Summary and Analysis
In the context of service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1) or Rule 4(d)(3),
service in a wholly federal manner, only the national contacts ap-
proach makes any sense as a general test for federal court personal
jurisdiction. Cases under Rule 4(d)(1) will not be troublesome; if the
factual requirements that permit service are satisfied, then any
amenability standard would be satisfied and no serious inconvenience
that could not be remedied by a change of venue would occur. Cases
under Rule 4(d)(3) all could be resolved satisfactorily by the national
contacts approach outlined by the district court in First Flight.88 Any
other "minimum contacts" approach, such as "minimum contacts
with the state" or "with the federal district" would suffer from the
defects described above:889 federal court jurisdiction over purely federal
matters in which process had been served in a wholly federal manner
would be limited by the same standards, or more narrow ones, ap-
plicable in similar state cases, thus rendering irrelevant the argument
that federal courts are limited by the fifth amendment while state
courts are limited by the fourteenth amendment. Since federal district
boundaries, in the federal context, do not separate one sovereign from
another,89 and Congress has not indicated any desire to limit the
federal system to state lines, to limit federal court exercises of per-
sonal jurisdiction by standards developed for the states makes no sense.
So long as the defendant is served properly and has sufficient con-
tacts with the United States as a whole so that he fairly may be re-
quired to defend in the United States, any unfair interdistrict inconve-
nience can be remedied by change of venue.89 ' This approach would
provide a standardized context for determining personal jurisdiction
questions, at least when federal methods for service of process are
employed, and would permit federal courts to hear all of the cases
described above, as well as those cases in which the defendant's con-
tacts are scattered too thinly throughout the United States to satisfy
a "minimum contacts with the state" or "with the federal district"
886. See, e.g., supra cases discussed at notes 687-716 and infra cases discussed at notes
956-62, 973-1038, and 1244-1316.
887. See, e.g., infra cases discussed at notes 956-62, 973-1038, 1202-12, and 1244-68.
888. See supra notes 872-84 and accompanying text.
889. See supra notes 795-97 and accompanying text.
890. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
891. See supra notes 188, 226, 337, 354, 657, 693, and 880 and accompanying text.
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approach.892 The primary factor in favor of this approach would be
the standardization of federal question cases. Analysis would be dic-
tated by the standard rather than by the facts of the case.
3. Amenability standards in federal question cases in which
process was served "in the manner prescribed by the law of the
state in which the district court is held" pursuant to former
Rule 4(d)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and new
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i)
Although the Constitution does not preclude Congress from pro-
viding that the process of federal district courts reach nationwide or
worldwide in all cases,"' or, at least, in all federal question cases,
Congress has elected to exercise this authority only in limited cir-
cumstances by enacting particular statutes for that purpose. 94 In other
cases, federal process is limited by Rule 4(f) to the territorial boun-
daries of the state in which the federal court sits, subject to certain
limited exceptions,8 95 unless some federal rule permits a more exten-
sive authority.896 Many courts had read former Rule 4(d)(7) as supply-
ing authorization for service beyond state lines by providing, in per-
tinent part, that as to any individual or business entity defendant,
in addition to the power provided by Rules 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) and
that authorized by federal statutes, "it is also sufficient if the sum-
mons and complaint are served . . . in the manner prescribed by the
law of the state in which the district court is held." 8 97 Under the
1983 amendments to Rule 4, Rule 4(d)(7) was eliminated; it apparently
was replaced, in part, by present Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), which provides
that service may be made on any individual or business entity "pur-
suant to the law of the state in which the district court is held." 8 98
892. See supra notes 796 and accompanying text and infra notes 1030, 1083, 1267 and
1281 and accompanying text.
893. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
894. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
895. Rule 4(f) permits service on "persons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule
14, or as additional parties to a pending action or a counterclaim or cross-claim therein pur-
suant to Rule 19 ...at all places outside the state but within the United States that are
not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is commenced. FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(f).
896. Rule 4(f) provides that "when authorized by a statute of the United States or by
these rules, [process may be served] beyond the territorial limits of [the] state." FED. R. Cv.
P. 4(f).
897. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(d)(7). See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text; infra notes
898-911 and 1039-1102 and accompanying text (discussing former Rule 4(d)(7)); see also infra
notes 915-1038 and accompanying text (discussing federal question cases in which service was
made pursuant to former Rule 4(d)(7)).
898. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i); see supra notes 278-86 and accompanying text and in-
fra notes 1062-66 and 1094-1102 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i)).
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No cases yet have arisen under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), but many have been
decided under former Rule 4(d)(7), 899 which had been interpreted to
authorize federal courts to utilize the service of process statutes, in-
cluding long-arm statutes, of the states in which the federal courts
were sitting.9"' The possible significance of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) in regard
to the present rules of federal court personal jurisdiction, as well as
the significance of new Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), which provides a special
federal service by mail procedure for those defendants coming within
the classes referred to in Rules 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3), 90' will be discussed
below. 90 2
Rule 4(e) also authorizes federal courts to make service pursuant
to any state statute or rule providing for "service . . .upon a party
not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district
court is held." 9 3 Such service may be made, according to Rule 4(e),
under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute
or rule.90 4 Although this authorization to use state long-arm statutes
arguably was subsumed in the broader authority of former Rule 4(d)(7)
(as interpreted by some courts), Rule 4(e) differs from former Rule
4(d)(7) in that under Rule 4(e), service must be made "under the cir-
cumstances and in the manner prescribed" 95 in the state statute or
rule whereas under the language of former Rule 4(d)(7) service was
to be made merely "in the manner prescribed by the law of the
state." 9 6 Some have argued that this distinction is significant, in-
dicating that former Rule 4(d)(7) merely contemplated incorporation
into the federal court of the technique employed by state courts whereas
Rule 4(e) contemplates (and contemplated) incorporation into the
federal courts of both the technique and amenability standards im-
posed on state courts.90 7 Moreover, arguments can be made, after
the adoption of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and (ii), which arguably have the
effect of providing alternative methods for serving defendants who
might come within Rules 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) by using state methods
or service by mail, that former Rule 4(d)(7) was not intended to govern
899. See infra notes 915-1038 and accompanying text.
900. See infra note 909 and accompanying text.
901. See supra note 275 and accompanying text (discussing new Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)).
902. See infra notes 1065-66 and accompanying text.
903. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), see supra notes 278-86 and accompanying text and infra notes
904-13 and 1061-71 and accompanying text (comparing Rule 4(e) with former Rule 4(d)(7)).
904. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
905. Id.; see supra notes 284-88 and accompanying text and infra notes 1328-50 and ac-
companying text (discussing possible significance of this language).
906. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(d)(7) (1963).
907. See, e.g., Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1982); Black
v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 685 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977).
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circumstances in which a state long-arm statute would be employed.
Since Rule 4(e) speaks specifically to that issue, former Rule 4(d)(7)
may have applied only where a defendant already could be served
by a Rule 4(d)(1) or 4(d)(3) method. 08 In other words, one very plausi-
ble interpretation is that former Rule 4(d)(7), and present Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(i), provided only that if a defendant could be served under
Rule 4(d)(1) or 4(d)(3), and if the state provided an alternative techni-
que for achieving such service, then former Rule 4(d)(7), and present
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), allowed the state alternative to be used. Many federal
courts that have purported to use former Rule 4(d)(7) in regard to
service have not so interpreted the Rule; rather, they have cited former
Rule 4(d)(7) as authorizing service, pursuant to state long-arm statutes,
on parties "not an inhabitant of or found within the state." 910 To
understand the amenability standards developed in cases arising under
former Rule 4(d)(7), cases involving that rule must be discussed. These
cases will demonstrate the confusion occasioned by the juxtaposition
of Rules 4(d)(7) and 4(e)90 as well as the confusion concerning
amenability standards. 911 After evaluating former Rule 4(d)(7) cases,
this article will return to some of the particular interpretational ques-
tions mentioned above9 2 and then turn to Rule 4(e) cases.9 3
Clearly, when a federal court is adopting state law for a particular
purpose, a question arises as to what exactly "comes with" the state
law and must be used by the adopting court in order for the use
of the state law to be appropriate. In other words, is the federal court
908. Stanley v. Local 926 of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs of the AFL-CIO, 354
F. Supp. 1267, 1269-70 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See infra notes 1238-40 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing this aspect of Stanley). See also infra notes 1052-66 and accompanying text (arguing in
favor of narrow interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7)).
909. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express, 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977)
(see infra notes 974-84 and accompanying text); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann,
A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977) (see infra notes 1011-38 and accompanying text); Am-
burn v. Harold Forster Indus., Ltd., 423 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (see infra notes
1000-11 and accompanying text); Ag-Tronic Inc. v. Frank Paviour Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393 (D.
Neb. 1976) (see infra notes 985-99 and accompanying text); Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d
690 (5th Cir. 1966) (see infra notes 920-28 and accompanying text); Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas,
342 F. Supp. 546 (4th Cir. 1965) (see infra notes 964-71 and accompanying text); Finance Co.
of America v. Bankamerica Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895 (D. Md. 1980) (see infra notes 956-62
and accompanying text); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123 (D.N.H.
1975) (see infra note 929-35 and accompanying text); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1974) (see infra notes 944-55 and accompanying text); Keller
v. Clark Equip. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1350 (D. N. Dak. 1973) (see infra notes 936-43 and accom-
panying text); Bar's Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollack, 148 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Calif. 1957) (see
infra notes 915-19 and accompanying text).
910. See infra note 937 and notes 921, 975, 989, 1069 and 1164 and accompanying text
(discussing federal courts' confusion as to proper authority for use of state long-arm statutes).
911. See infra notes 920-1083 and accompanying text.
912. See infra notes 1039-71 and accompanying text.
913. See infra notes 1103-1355 and accompanying text.
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authorized to "pick and choose" the parts useful to it and discard
other facts, state interpretations and standards associated with the
law, or must the federal court adopt the state law "whole cloth"?
This is different from the question arising in diversity cases where
the majority of federal courts have ruled that even if a wholly federal
method of service of process is employed, exercises of personal jurisdic-
tion are to be measured by fourteenth amendment due process stan-
dards because the federal courts are functioning as state courts in
deciding state law questions. 914
In an early federal question case involving an action for copyright
and trademark infringement and unfair competition, Bar's Leaks
Western, Inc. v. Pollock, 5 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California considered the question of amenability
standards when process is served, under Rule 4(d)(7), pursuant to the
state long-arm statute. 916 The court noted:
It is not disputed that Rule 4(d)(7) ... sanctions service on a foreign
corporation by the method prescribed by the forum state law. There
is, however, no such unanimity of opinion on the question of whether
amenability to process is to be determined by applying state stan-
dards as they are limited by concepts of due process [under the four-
teenth amendment], or by applying federal "general law" concepts.
[W]here jurisdiction is based on "federal question" grounds
... there appears to be no justification for an acquiescence to state
standards and Fourteenth Amendment due process for the purposes
of deciding the issue of amenability of the foreign corporation to
process .... 117
After posing the dilemma facing federal courts, however, the court
hedged in stating any amenability test 1 s and refused to decide the
jurisdictional issue because it found that venue requirements would
914. See supra notes 376-492 and accompanying text (discussing amenability standards in
diversity cases).
915. 148 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
916. See supra note 3 (discussing California long-arm statute).
917. 148 F. Supp. at 712-13.
918. The court stated the jurisdictional issue as "whether a foreign corporation selling
its products to an independent distributor within a state and designating on the product label
that the independent distributor is a 'branch plant' has made itself available to process in the
federal court in that state." 148 F. Supp. at 713. The court did not describe any amenability
standard at all other than, in passing, a test of "substantial fairness," because it found no
need to resolve the personal jurisdiction question. The court concluded:
Although it might be consistent with considerations of substantial fairness and the
attendant safeguards of notice and opportunity to be heard, to hold that [defendant]
is amenable to the process of this Court, the question of jurisdiction becomes academic
when merged in the larger question of proper venue. . ..
Id.
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not be satisfied. 919 The case, however, serves as a good starting point
for this discussion because it states the issue-whether state or federal
amenability standards apply in federal question cases in which ser-
vice is made, under Rule 4(d)(7), pursuant to a state long-arm statute-
and presents the conclusion of one court that state standards should
not apply.
Most courts that have considered this question have applied state
standards, minimum contacts with the state in which the federal court
is sitting, for a number of reasons: (1) the state long-arm statute car-
ries with it state amenability standards; (2) while a federal standard
should be devised, none exists so the state standard must be applied
in absence of a federal test; (3) the state standard is applied by analogy;
(4) the state standard is applied because no federal statute authorizes
application of a different standard; (5) the state standard is applied
with apologies in regard to the anomaly created by basing federal
court authority on state court standards; and (6) the state standard
is applied without apology or explanation.
In Time, Inc. v. Manning,"' an action by a Louisiana citizen against
a New York corporation for damages arising from the defendant cor-
poration's publication of a copyrighted picture, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the defendant's contacts
with Louisiana to determine whether the defendant corporation, which
had been served under the Louisiana long-arm statute as authorized
by Rule 4(d)(7), 921 was amenable to suit in a federal district court
held in Louisiana. 922 While the court recognized that "the propriety
of service issuing from a federal court need not necessarily be tested
by the same yardstick as is the constitutional limitation upon service
of process from a state court, ' 923 the court argued that the state stan-
dard "provides a helpful and often-used guide-line. ' 9 24 While the court
gave lip-service to the possibility of a separate federal standard, it
919. Id. at 713-14. The court dismissed the action against the defendant for lack of venue,
thereby side-stepping the amenability standards question which it had posed earlier in the opinion.
920. 366 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966).
921. Id. at 693. The court cited Rule 4(e) as alternative authority for use of the state
long-arm statute. The language quoted by the court, however, only included the reference to
"the manner" of service under state law, which language appears in both 4(d)(7) and 4(e),
and omitted reference to "the circumstances" of service under state law, which language ap-
pears only in 4(e) and is a primary distinguishing feature between the provisions. Id.
922. The court cited the following as the two requirements for amenability under Rule
4(d)(7): "First, service must conform to state statutory standards. . . .Second, the foreign cor-
poration must have sufficient contacts with the state so that application of the state statute
will not offend due process. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington ... " 366 F.2d
at 693 (citations omitted).
923. 366 F.2d at 694.
924. Id.
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chose to rely on the time-honored International Shoe test. The result
in this case may have been precipitated by the fact that the court
never resolved the question whether the case was a federal question
case or a pure diversity suit;925 the court thus followed a personal
jurisdiction analysis which would be appropriate in a diversity case.926
The court, moreover, noted that the narrow test of International Shoe
was satisfied by the facts of the case, 927 thus possibly indicating an
expediency approach: if the narrow test was satisfied, why seek a dif-
ferent federal standard, especially where a finding of diversity jurisdic-
tion might require the more narrow analysis? 928
In Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc.,929 a federal ques-
tion suit instituted in the United States District Court for the District
of New Hampshire alleging violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
the Clayton Act, and the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act,
the defendant foreign corporation had been served with process, as
authorized by Rule 4(d)(7), pursuant to the New Hampshire long-
arm statute. 930 Except for its observation that Rule 4(d)(7) "authorizes
extraterritorial service under state law even when the claim arises under
federal law," 93 1 the court treated the jurisdictional question exactly
as would a New Hampshire court. First, the court noted that accord-
ing to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the New Hampshire
statute "is to be interpreted to the fullest extent permissible under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 93 2 Next, the
court applied two state-created principles, which apparently derived
from International Shoe, in guiding its assessment of the "jurisdic-
tional facts" and "jurisdictional contacts" '933 and concluded that on
925. The plaintiff had asserted that his claim was one arising under the laws of Louisiana
while the defendant "insist[ed] that the action [was] for infringement of the plaintiff's copyright.
." 366 F.2d at 693. The court did not decide this issue, stating that "[u]nder either view,
the district court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action." Id. (emphasis in original).
See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between diversity and federal
question subject matter jurisdiction).
926. See supra notes 376-492 and accompanying text (discussing development of amenability
standard for diversity cases).
927. 366 F.2d at 695.
928. See supra notes 742, 747, 762, and 831 and accompanying text (discussing practice
of basing jurisdictional standard adopted on the facts of the particular case).
929. 403 F. Supp. 123 (D.N.H. 1975).
930. Id. at 126, 133-34.
931. Id. at 133. The court did not address any amenability considerations which might
be peculiar to the federal courts; in the remainder of its analysis the court treated the case
exactly as if the case had arisen under state law.
932. Id. at 133.
933. The court quoted Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296, 319 A.2d 626, 628 (1974)
as providing the following guiding principles: "First, the exercise of jurisdiction has to be
reasonable from the standpoint of New Hampshire's interest in the litigation. Second, it has
to be consistent with principles of fair play and substantial justice." 403 F. Supp. at 134 (quoting
Leeper v. Leeper).
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the facts of this case, assertion of jurisdiction over other defendant
would not violate "judicial notions of fair play and substantial
justice." 934 Although the court never used the term "minimum con-
tacts," it followed the balancing procedure that a state court in 1975
would have followed to determine whether the defendant's contacts
with the state were sufficient to satisfy the fourteenth amendment. 93"
The court never dealt with the possibility of a separate fifth amend-
ment standard governing federal court assertions of personal jurisdic-
tion and seemed to assume that the state due process analysis was
part and parcel of the right of a federal court to serve process accord-
ing to state law.
Keller v. Clark Equipment Co.,936 a federal question suit against
an alien defendant corporation instituted in the United States District
Court for the District of North Dakota, was another Rule 4(d)(7)
suit in which the federal court dealt with the case exactly as if it
had arisen in state court, apparently finding that service pursuant to
state statute carried with it a state amenability test. 3 Keller was com-
plicated by some preliminary procedural maneuverings irrelevant to
the issue under discussion.93 The defendant alien corporation also
934. 403 F. Supp. at 134.
935. The court balanced a number of factors including the interest of New Hampshire
in the suit, see supra note 933, the reasonableness that the defendant should have anticipated
causing an effect in New Hampshire, 403 F. Supp. at 134, as well as "the right of New Hamp-
shire citizens to institute local suit in quest of injuries committed here," id., finding that such
a factor "is given heavy weight when contacts are weighted [sic] on the jurisdictional scale."
Id. (citation omitted). This type of balancing procedure, which focused less on the interests
of the defendant than on other factors, was rejected by the Supreme Court in World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), wherein the court stressed that a defendant
must have some contacts with the state seeking to assert jurisdiction before any minimum con-
tacts test could be satisfied. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text (discussing World-
Wide Volkswagen).
936. 367 F. Supp. 1350 (D. N.D. 1973).
937. See also United States Dental Institute v. American Association of Orthodontists,
396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975). In United States Dental Institute, a federal question suit
brought under the antitrust laws, the court treated the case exactly as if it had arisen under
state law, determining whether the defendants' conduct came within the Illinois long-arm statute
and applying a "minimum contact with the state" analysis on the due process issue. 397 F.
Supp. at 569-73. As authority for making service on the defendants by means of the Illinois
long-arm statute, the federal court cited and quoted both former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(c),
making no further reference to federal law. 396 F. Supp. at 569-70. The failure of the court
to distinguish between Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e), or rather, its reliance on both without deter-
mining whether one might be the more appropriate authority in the circumstances of this case
again underlines the basic uncertainty of courts as to the differences between the two rules.
See supra notes 910 and 921 and accompanying text and infra notes 989, 1069 and 1164 and
accompanying text.
938. As noted in the opinion:
On August 20, 1973, [the parent corporation and the defendant] moved this court to
stay the.., action pending the outcome of a declaratory judgment action ... filed in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, or alternatively
to transfer the above action to the Michigan court for consolidation.
The defendants' motion to stay or transfer has been rendered moot by an order
of the Michigan Court dated August 23, 1973. . . .Judge Engle determined that the
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had been served with process by service, in North Dakota, on the
defendant's parent corporation that was doing business in the state. 93 9
The defendant argued that the North Dakota long-arm statute was
irrelevant because service had been made within North Dakota. 94 0 The
court, however, seemed to consider service within the state on an
"agent" of the defendant for purposes of service under North Dakota
law to be permissible under Federal Rule 4(d)(7) (the federal court
was adopting the state equivalent of Rule 4(d)(3) for purposes of ser-
vice of process)94' while it still considered the North Dakota long-
arm statute in determining whether the defendant corporation was
amenable.to suit in the District of North Dakota. 942 The court did
not mention the possibility of any separate amenability standard, ruling
that amenability was to be measured by the International Shoe test
of "minimum contacts" and examining the facts to determine "whether
[defendant's] acts... in North Dakota were 'minimum contacts.' -9,3
It concluded that jurisdiction existed over the defendant corporation.
In Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc.,9" a federal ques-
tion suit instituted in the District of Delaware for trademark infr-
ingement and unfair competition, the defendant, a Pennsylvania cor-
poration which had its principal place of business in Colorado but
which marketed its product nationwide, had been served with federal
process pursuant to the Delaware long-arm statute as authorized by
Rule 4(d)(7).94 5 In responding to the defendant's motion to dismiss
significant contacts rested in North Dakota, whereupon the Michigan case was ordered
transferred to the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota,
Western Division. Subsequent to the transfer to North Dakota, the Plaintiffs ...
moved . . . for a change of venue from the Southwestern Division of North Dakota
to the Southeastern Division. This motion was granted on November 6, 1973, and
both cases are now venued with this Court.
367 F. Supp. at 1351-52.
939. Id. at 1352.
940. Id. at 1353.
941. Id. This analysis supports the author's suggestion that former Rule 4(d)(7) was not
intended to incorporate state long-arm statutes, but rather all state statutes regarding only the
manner of service of process in Rule 4(d)(1) and Rule 4(d)(3) circumstances. See supra note
908 and accompanying text and infra notes 1052-66 and accompanying text.
942. 367 F. Supp. at 1353-54.
943. Id.
944. 374 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1974).
945. According to the court:
Defendant has no office, warehouse or manufacturing facility in the State of
Delaware. Its principal place of business is located in Denver, Colorado, where it
manufactures and directs the marketing of its home cleaning products. . . .Defen-
dant markets its products nationally, both through its employees who solicit orders
from national chain stores and through commission brokers who solicit orders from
smaller, independent retailers. Through these marketing channels defendant's pro-
ducts are made readily available to consumers throughout Delaware.
No employee of defendant has entered Delaware to solicit sales. However, as a
result of employees' sales to large retailers defendant has shipped its products directly
into this state. . ..
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for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court stated, "Even though this
action arises under the laws of the United States, since service was
effected under Rule 4(d)(7). . . , amenability to service presents a
question of state law."19 6 In a footnote, the court distinguished cer-
tain cases that had held that federal common law should be applicable
in federal question cases, noting that those cases had involved service
under Rule 4(d)(3).917 The court concluded, "fain obviously different
situation obtains when, as here, service is made pursuant to a state
statute adopted under the terms of either Rule 4(d)(7) or 4(e). 948
After establishing that the defendant's conduct had come within the
provisions of the Delaware long-arm statute, the court turned to the
"constitutional issue" of "whether assertion by this Court of in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the defendant violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment." '49 Such characterization of this issue seems
curious in view of the insistence by the court that state law would
govern amenability and the fact that state law requires that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment not be violated."'
Moreover, while the court proposed a minimum contacts test based
on International Shoe and McGee,95" ' it felt the need to justify reliance
on the state-created test:
While the Supreme Court cases articulating the "minimum con-
tacts" test dealt with the reach of state court jurisdiction over the
person, the test has been held to be applicable to the district court
where jurisdiction is premised on a federal question. 2
In order to stimulate a demand for its products in Delaware and elsewhere, defen-
dant has advertised ... extensively. This advertising program includes advertisements
on national television, in magazines of national circulation and in newspapers with
a substantial Delaware circulation. It is undisputed that many thousands of these
commercial messages were intended to be and were received in Delaware.
Id. at 185-86 (footnote omitted).
946. Id. at 186-87.
947. Id. at 187 n.3. See also Hartley v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc.,
379 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1967) (court noted that recent decisions which indicate that "[e]ven
where the procedure for exercising ...jurisdiction is prescribed by state law, these courts
need not be bound by restrictions found in the state law" were all cases in which service was
made by a wholly federal method, Rule 4(d)(3)); First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp.,
209 F. Supp. 730, 735 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (while a national contacts approach was appropriate
in a Rule 4(d)(3) case when there was a "wholly federal method of service," court suggested,
but refused to decide, that when service was made under Rule 4(d)(7) which "adopts local
methods to some extent," the defendant "might argue that the validity of service made under
a state statute pursuant to Rule 4(d)(7) would be governed by state law"). See also supra notes
799-897 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 4(d)(3) cases).
948. 374 F. Supp. at 187 n.3.
949. Id. at 188.
950. See supra notes 60-185 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional standards in
state cases).
951. 374 F. Supp. at 188.
952. Id. at 188 n.4 (citing Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 397 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1968),
see also supra notes 823-33 and accompanying text).
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This assertion is quite startling, not only because it seems to con-
tradict the earlier statement by the court that state law should apply
directly to the amenability question, but also because, as authority
for the assertion, the court cited a case that it had earlier rejected
as inapplicable to the case at hand because service therein had been
made under Rule 4(d)(3). 913 The court resolved the "constitutional
issue" by assessing the defendant's contacts with the State of Delaware
and pronouncing these contacts "sufficient to meet [the] fundamen-
tal fairness standard" of International Shoe.9 4 In sum, the court
seemed confused as to whether the fourteenth amendment Interna-
tional Shoe test applied directly to amenability questions in Rule 4(d)(7)
cases or whether a fifth amendment standard would be appropriate
but that the fourteenth amendment test had been adopted as the fifth
amendment standard.955 In any event, while the court applied an In-
ternational Shoe analysis to the facts of the case, it seemed to sug-
gest that a 4(d)(7) case was not exactly the same as a state court case.
Other federal courts that have adopted a state-created standard for
amenability in Rule 4(d)(7) cases have done so after analysis that con-
sidered the possibility of a separate federal standard. In Finance Com-
pany of America v. Bankamerica Corporation,916 a federal question
suit alleging violation of the Lanham Act, which suit had been in-
itiated in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
the moving defendants had been served pursuant to the Maryland
long-arm statute as authorized by Rule 4(d)(7). The court reviewed
various positions on the question of amenability standards,957 noting
that while adoption of a state standard might make sense in diversity
cases because of "' the policy underlying the doctrine of intra-state
953. Compare 374 F. Supp. at 188 n.4 with 374 F. Supp. at 187 n.3.
954. Id. at 189.
955. See infra notes 956-62 and 1000-10 and accompanying text (discussing cases adopting
the former position) and notes 973-99 and accompanying text (discussing cases adopting the
latter position).
956. 493 F. Supp. 895 (D. Md. 1980).
957. The court stated:
The parties have assumed that state law governs the personal jurisdiction inquiry.
Although this appears to be the rule in this Circuit, .... it has not received universal
endorsements and therefore warrants some reexamination.
Congress has not provided for nationwide service of process. Rather, in cases
in which a defendant does not have an agent within the state, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7)
authorizes service of process in any manner authorized by the law of the state in
which the district court is located. But, as noted in an early case also arising under
the Lanham Act, the rule "sanctions service on a foreign corporation by the method
prescribed by the forum state law. There is, however, no such unanimity of opinion
on the question of whether amenability to process is to be determined by applying
state standards as they are limited by concepts of due process, or by applying federal
'general law' concepts .. .
Id. at 898 (citations omitted).
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uniformity,'. . . this policy is absent in federal question cases ' ""
and observing that "application of state standards in such cases
engenders the anomalous result 'that the jurisdiction of federal courts
dealing with federal questions will vary from state to state'." 9 9 After
citing cases in which a state standard had been "applied" and cases
in which a federal standard had been "adopted," 960 the court con-
cluded that "it would appear that . . . a federal standard would be
more sensible [; t]he venue statute would seem to provide adequate
safeguards against vexatious lawsuits." '9 6' Reluctantly, however, the
court felt compelled to follow precedent in the fourth circuit by
applying state law962 and applied the International Shoe test to find
that the defendant's contacts with the state of Maryland were suffi-
cient to satisfy due process. Clearly, facts which satisfy International
Shoe also would satisfy any fifth amendment standard.
The case cited in Finance Company of America as binding fourth
circuit precedent for application of a state standard in Rule 4(d)(7)
cases 96' was Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas,964 a federal question case
arising in admiralty. The defendant alien corporation, which had been
served under the "substituted service provisions" of the Maryland
long-arm statute, moved to quash service. In its opinion, the court
of appeals noted:
The jurisdiction of a court over a defendant foreign corporation
is tested in the federal courts by a motion attacking the service of
process. This indirect approach to questions of jurisdiction is
understandable in the federal courts since there is no statutory pro-
vision which informs the courts when foreign corporations "are
amenable to process so that in personam jurisdiction may be had
over them in diversity and most non-diversity suits." . . . Conse-
quently, federal judges attempting to fill this statutory void have
held that a federal court can obtain jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration only when it is constitutionally and statutorily permissible
to serve the corporation. 96-
958. Id. See also supra notes 376-492 and accompanying text (discussing amenability stan-
dards in diversity cases).
959. 493 F. Supp. at 898-99 (citations omitted).
960. Id. at 899. The different terminology used by the court-"applied" in the case of
state standards and "adopted" in the case of federal standards-may indicate judicial recogni-
tion that state standards were applicable because already well-developed whereas federal stan-
dards could only be "adopted" because no such standard had yet been developed. See supra
notes 476-77 and accompanying text (discussing lack of a genuine federal standard).
961. 493 F. Supp. at 899. See also supra notes 188, 226, 337, 354, 657, 693, 880, and
891 and accompanying text (discussing venue restrictions as a possible check under a national
contacts approach to federal court jurisdiction in federal question cases).
962. 493 F. Supp. at 899.
963. See supra note 962 and accompanying text.
964. 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965).
965. Id. at 548-49.
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The court noted the various problems attendant on using a state
method for service of process such as the difficulty of finding an
appropriate amenability standard and the anomalous result that,
because of differences among long-arm statutes, "[s]ome plaintiffs
will be unable to obtain service on foreign corporations while such
service would be available to similarly situated plaintiffs in federal
courts sitting in other states." '966 The court did not resolve this
anomaly, however, because it found that the defendant came within
the Maryland long-arm statute. 67 In determining the constitutional
question of amenability, the court faced "another anomaly-the Four-
teenth Amendment could operate to limit the jurisdiction of a federal
court deciding a federal question." '968 Again, however, the court was
spared from dealing with this problem; it found that "assertion of
jurisdiction by Maryland over the respondent would be well within
the state's constitutional power" '969 because the defendant satisfied the
International Shoe requirement .of minimum contacts with the state
of Maryland.9 70 While noting some of the conceptual difficulties
occasioned by applying a state test to federal courts in federal ques-
tion cases, the court refused to consider the possibility of a special
federal standard because the state standard, which would be more
strict than a federal standard, had been satisfied.9 71 This was the
rationale establishing the rule that the Finance Company of America
court felt compelled to follow. 972
Several recent federal cases have considered the propriety of a "na-
tional contacts" test for amenability even when service is made, as
authorized by Rule 4(d)(7), pursuant to a state long-arm statute.9 73
In Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co.,974 a trademark
infringement action in which the court of appeals considered whether
966. Id. at 549. See also Hartley v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 379
F.2d 354, 356 and n.2 (3d Cir. 1967) (court noted the anomaly but found that did not need
to resolve because the defendant's conduct did not come within the language of the Penn-
sylvania long-arm statute).
967. 342 F.2d at 549.
968. Id. at 554. See also supra notes 795 and 878 and accompanying text and infra note
1132 and accompanying text (discussing "anomaly" of limiting federal court jurisdiction by
standards applicable to state courts).
969. 342 F.2d at 554.
970. Id. at 554-58.
971. See supra notes 742, 747, 762, 831 and 928 and accompanying text (discussing selec-
tion of standards according to the facts of the case).
972. See supra note 962 and accompanying text.
973. See infra notes 974-1038 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 785, 798, 888-92
and accompanying text and infra notes 1039-1102 and 1320-58 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing, in other contexts, a national contacts test for assertion of personal jurisdiction).
974. 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977). See also supra note 850 (discussing analysis by Wells
Fargo court of standards applicable when service is made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3)).
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the defendant corporation had been served properly, pursuant to Rules
4(d)(7) and 4(e) 97s and the Nevada long-arm statute, the plaintiff had
asserted several grounds on which such service would be permissible
constitutionally. 976 While the court recognized that the fifth amend-
ment applies to federal question cases, it found no case suggesting
a distinction between the fifth and fourteenth amendments in regard
to amenability. 977 The court approved a test based on the defendant's
contacts with the state of Nevada, 97 but rejected any test based on
the aggregation of the defendant's United States contacts.979 On the
facts of this particular case, in which the defendant was a Liechtenstein-
based corporation and the federal forum would be either a district
court in California (where most contacts occurred) or a district court
in Nevada,98 the court of appeals noted that "[i]t might very well
be neither unfair nor unreasonable as a matter of due process to ag-
gregate the nonforum contacts." 98' The court continued, "What plain-
tiffs overlook, however, is that, not only must the requirements of
due process be met before a court can properly assert in personam
jurisdiction, but the exercise of jurisdiction must also be affirmatively
authorized by the legislature." 982 Finding no federal legislative authori-
ty permitting aggregation of a defendant's contacts with the United
975. The court quoted pertinent parts of former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e) and then stated:
"Thus, the federal district court of Nevada may, reading Rules 4(d)(7) & 4(e) together, also
service out-of-state defendants by availing itself of the in personam jurisdictional statutes of
Nevada." 556 F.2d at 414. The court did not, in any way, establish why it thought Rule 4(d)(7)
and 4(e) should be read together; most courts have used one or the other rule or have con-
sidered either sufficient to support federal court use of state long arm statutes. Again, this
statement indicates understandable judicial confusion as to the ways in which the two rules
differ, if at all, and the circumstances in which one should be used as opposed to the other.
See supra note 937 and notes 910 and 921 and accompanying text and infra notes 995, 989,
1069 and 1164 and accompanying text.
976. The plaintiffs had asserted that the defendant alien corporation was amenable to suit
in the district court sitting in Nevada because (I) the defendant had "minimum contacts" with
the State of Nevada, (2) the defendant had "minimum contacts" with the United States as
a whole, (3) the defendant, through its agent, had sufficient contacts with regard to either
of the above-described territories, and (4) the defendant was present in Nevada because its
agent was present in Nevada. 556 F.2d at 415-16.
977. Id. at 416 n.7. The court went on "to note that, in any event, International Shoe
and its progeny point the way" in regard to amenability. Id.
978. Id. at 415-16. The court was not deciding the jurisdictional question itself, but was
establishing guidelines by which the district court, on remand, would resolve the issue.
979. Id. at 416-19.
980. The defendant corporation had made two loans in California, which, if aggregated
with the defendant's Nevada contacts, would make the contacts being considered more substantial.
Id. at 416. Moreover, it appears that the plaintiffs were attempting to establish the right to
sue on the California-based matters in the Nevada district court. Id. In this way, an aggrega-
tion of national contacts test might also lead to the desirable result of avoiding multiple lawsuits
involving the same parties.
981. Id.
982. Id.
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States as a whole, 98 3 the court refused to adopt a national contacts
approach, at least in 4(d)(7) cases.98'
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, in
Ag-Tronic v. Frank Paviour Ltd.,9"' also refused to adopt a national
contacts test in a federal question suit in which service had been made
pursuant to a state long-arm statute. 98 6 The district court had refused
to assert jurisdiction over the defendant because it found that the
defendant had no contacts with the State of Nebraska and, therefore,
was not amenable to suit in a district court sitting in that state.
987
The plaintiff then urged the district court to reconsider the issue and
find amenability on the basis of the defendant's aggregate contacts
with the United States. 988 In response, the court first noted that the
983. The court noted:
If policy considerations do indeed dicate that an alien defendant's contacts with the
entire United States should be aggregated, and if the Constitution does not forbid
such a practice-at least where the plaintiff is suing in federal court on a federal
cause of action, the Federal Rules should be amended to authorize such a practice.
Such a step is, however, not ours to take.
Id. at 418 (citations omitted).
984. The court admitted that aggregation of national contacts might be proper where "a
federal statute authorizes world-wide service of process . . . and, therefore, the only relevant
constraint is the fifth amendment due process clause rather than statutory authorization." Id.
985. 70 F.R.D. 393 (D. Neb. 1976). See supra note 879 (discussing court's position when
service is made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3).
986. The plaintiff, a Nebraska corporation, had instituted this suit against the defendant,
a New Zealand partnership, for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, noninfringement,
or both. See 70 F.R.D. at 395.
987. The court stated:
In addition, the Court must dismiss this case for the reason that the defendant
Authority is not amenable to service of process under the Nebraska Long Arm Statute.
The relevant portion of the statute reads as follows:
(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly
or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's:
(a) Transacting any business in this state;
Amenability to extra-territorial personal jurisdiction is a question of due process.
A defendant must "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."' . . . This Court has previously held that Nebraska's Long Arm Statute
is as broad as the constitutional standard of due process.
[P]laintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the Authority
derived sufficient revenue from sales in Nebraska to justify its amenability to service
of process in this jurisdiction.
Id. at 398, 399 (citations omitted). Even though this statute has been interpreted as going to
the limits of due process, this decision, which was framed in terms of amenability, could also
be described as resting on simple statutory interpretation: the defendant's conduct did not come
within the language of the statute, so no due process analysis really was required. See infra
note 1010 and accompanying text. On the other hand, one might argue that whether or not
a defendant is found to be "transacting business" within the meaning of the statute depends
entirely upon whether such contacts satisfy a due process standard-here, minimum contacts
with the state in which the federal court is sitting.
988. 70 F.R.D. at 399-401 (Supplemental Memorandum). The plaintiff had argued "that
the aggregate contacts of defendant . . . with the United States as a whole are sufficient to
satisfy the fifth amendment and hence personal jurisdiction is present." Id. at 399-400.
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defendant had been "served with process pursuant to [Rule 4(d)(7)],
Rule 4(e) and the Nebraska long-arm statute." '989 Agreeing with the
plaintiff "that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
does not apply to federal action and the due process clause of the
fifth amendment does," 90 the court ruled, however, that "the same
minimal contacts test applicable under the fourteenth amendment is
applicable under the fifth amendment, although national contacts may
properly be considered under the fifth amendment."' 991 The court went
on to note circumstances in which sufficiency of service of process
"is a matter governed solely by federal rather than state law," such
as where Congress has provided for nationwide service of process or
process is served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3). 992 In this case, however,
no special federal authorization pertained; federal process therefore
was limited by Rule 4(f) to the borders of the State of Nebraska unless
extended, under Rule 4(d)(7), by some state statute. 993 Finding that
service could only be made properly under the Nebraska statute if
the defendant had been transacting business in Nebraska, 99 the court
refused to assert jurisdiction. The court noted, moreover, that "[tihis
requirement inheres whether the due process limitations are imposed
by the fourteenth amendment or the fifth amendment, as Rule 4(e)
requires service 'made under the circumstances . . prescribed in the
[state] statute or rule'. 99 5 While this case has been cited as rejecting
a national contacts analysis in Rule 4(d)(7) cases, it can be read, in-
Apparently, the plaintiff assumed that if due process were satisfied, then service on the defen-
dant would be appropriate.
989. Id. at 400. Again a court found difficulty in choosing between Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule
4(e). Later in its opinion, however, the court impliedly seemed to distinguish between 4(d)(7)
and 4(e), citing 4(d)(7) as supporting circumstances when "substituted service or extra-state
service can be made . . . when a state statute so authorizes," while citing 4(e) in connection
with fifth amendment limitations. Id. See supra note 937 and notes 910, 921 and 975 and
accompanying text and infra notes 1069 and 1164 and accompanying text (discussing problems
of distinguishing between the two statutory provisions).
990. 70 F.R.D. at 400.
991. Id.
992. Id. Apparently, the court considered these circumstances to be appropriate for the
use of a national contacts approach.
993. Id.
994. Id.
995. Id. (quoting Rule 4(e)). The court seemed to be saying that, even if some fifth amend-
ment standard would be satisfied by aggregating the defendant's national contacts, there is
no statutory authority for such exercise: the state long-arm was limited to defendants who
transact business in Nebraska (and defendant did not) and no federal statute applied in this
case. The court also seemed to imply that Rule 4(e) incorporated not only the state procedure
for service of process but also the state limitations on the use of those procedures (transacts
business in the state) by using the language "in the circumstances." Cf. Rule 4(d)(7), which
only requires that service be made "in the manner" prescribed by the state statute or rule.
See supra notes 278-86 and accompanying text and infra notes 904-13, 1061-71 and accom-
panying text (discussing possible distinctions between the two rules and the jurisdictional stan-
dards applicable thereto).
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stead, as simply holding that a defendant's conduct must come within
the language of the state long-arm statute before any amenability
analysis would be appropriate.996 Indeed, the decision in Wells Fargo99
can be read similarly: before the court sought statutory authority for
aggregation of national contacts, it already had concluded that no
state statute or rule would authorize such a procedure. 95 While both
courts thus refused to aggregate the defendant's national contacts,
neither based its ultimate holding on that refusal. Ag-Tronic is signifi-
cant, moreover, for analysis that seems to associate Rule 4(e) with
the fifth amendment while implying that Rule 4(e) incorporates not
only the manner of service permissible under the state statute but also
the circumstances in which such service could be made by a state
court. 999
The question of applicability of a national contacts test of
amenability in a 4(d)(7) case was squarely presented in Amburn v.
Harold Forster Industries, Ltd. ,I o0 a patent infringement and unfair
competition suit instituted in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs did not allege, nor did
any proof exist, that the defendants had any contacts with the state
of Michigan. 00 ' Instead, the plaintiffs contended:
[S]ince [the plaintiffs] are Michigan residents and citizens and have
been damaged by reason of defendants' sale or delivery of the in-
fringing products in [other] states ...and . ..since plaintiffs'
infringement claim is a federally created cause of action, Fifth
Amendment due process requirements can be met by aggregating
defendants' contacts in all 50 states and service of process may be
made under the Michigan long-arm statute ... 1002
In a well-reasoned opinion, the court concluded that, in federal ques-
tion cases, "the aggregate contacts test would seem the correct one;
'100 3
no unfairness would result from the sovereign, the United States, assert-
ing power over defendants, each of which had sufficient contacts within
the United States."0" The court, however, refused to assert personal
996. See infra note 1005 and accompanying text.
997. See supra notes 974-84 and accompanying text.
998. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 417 (9th Cir. 1977).
The court found that the Nevada long-arm statute did not include the California loans, thus
providing no statutory authority for considering those contacts. Without those contacts, the
defendant's acts in Nevada were insufficient to come within the Nevada long-arm statute. Id.
999. See'supra note 995 and accompanying text.
1000. 423 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
1001. Id. at 1303.
1002. Id.
1003. Id. at 1304.
1004. Id.
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jurisdiction over the defendants because there existed no statutory
"vehicle to serve defendants who have no contacts with the State of
Michigan."'' 00 5 According to the court, the state long-arm statute can
be used only within the limitations of the fourteenth amendment, and
the fourteenth amendment requires that the defendant have at least
one contact with the state. 00 6 Despite the authorization in Rule 4(d)(7)
for a federal court to use the Michigan long-arm statute, the court
noted:
It remains, however, a state statute and the power of the State of
Michigan is limited by the due process requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment. There must be some contact of a defendant with
Michigan. It must have invoked the benefits or protection of the
laws of the State of Michigan, if not directly at least indirectly
through an agent. .... I'll
After rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that other factors besides the
defendants' contacts with the State of Michigan could satisfy the four-
teenth amendment due process clause,00 8 the court concluded: "The
due process principles of International Shoe and its progeny control
the validity of service of process under a state's long-arm statute."'0" 9
Finding no contacts with the State of Michigan, the court determined
that service of process had not been valid. The court ruled, therefore,
that after a defendant in a federal question case had been served
validly, the constitutional propriety of a federal court asserting per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant was subject to the due process
restrictions of the fifth amendment. Since this merely would require
satisfaction of a national contacts test, the service itself, if made pur-
suant to a state long-arm statute, would be valid only if fourteenth
amendment limitations on the application of the statute were satisfied.
This leads to the conclusion that service must satisfy the stricter
"minimum contacts with the state" standard, and therefore any defen-
dant on whom service is properly made also will be amenable to suit
under a fifth amendment standard.'
1005. Id. at 1309.
1006. Id. at 1305, 1308.
1007. Id. at 1305.
1008. Id.
1009. Id. at 1308.
1010. Once the fourteenth amendment has been satisfied in regard to validity of service,
any less strict standard already has been satisfied and is, therefore, irrelevant. As in Wells
Fargo and Ag-Tronic, one might argue that the decision was again one of statutory interpreta-
tion: if the defendants had no contacts with the state, they could not come within the language
of the state long-arm statute. On the other hand, in state court cases such as World-Wide
Volkswagen, a state court thought that the defendant came within the state long-arm statute
and yet the court found that the defendant had no contacts with the state for purposes of
a fourteenth amendment due process analysis. "Contacts" can have different meanings de-
pending on whether the questions is due process or statutory interpretation.
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In Centronics Data Computer Corporation v. Mannesmann,
A.G.,'"" suit was instituted in the United States District Court for
the District of New Hampshire by a Delaware corporation with its
sole place of business in New Hampshire against a multinational alien
conglomerate headquartered in Germany. The case might be cited as
a federal question case in which the court, under former Rule 4(d)7),
adopted national contacts as the appropriate fifth amendment
amenability standard, at least in cases involving an alien corporate
defendant.'""2 The decision in this case, which involved alleged viola-
tions of the antitrust laws, interference with advantageous contrac-
tual relations, misappropriation of trade secrets, and defamation, can-
not be read, however, as a clear adoption of a national contacts ap-
proach. The court vascillates between discussion of requirements for
service of process under the New Hampshire long-arm provisions,
which involve constitutional analysis because they purportedly go to
the limits of due process under the fourteenth amendment, 0 1 3 and
discussion of amenability standards applicable to a federal court in
the circumstances of this case. As noted both above'114 and below, 01 s
determination of personal jurisdiction involves two distinct inquiries:
(1) whether the defendant's conduct comes within the statute which
purportedly authorizes service of process, and (2) if so, whether asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate his due
process rights under either the fifth or fourteenth amendments. When
consideration of these separate and separable issues is combined or
not distinguished by the court, the opinion can become quite confus-
ing and will lack the clarity to be of important precedential value.
In deciding whether it had jurisdiction over the defendant Man-
nesmann, the court first noted that "[tihe plaintiffs have availed
themselves of Rule 4(d)(3) and (7) by using the service provisions of
New Hampshire's long arm statutes."'0 1 6 Next, the court quoted the
1011. 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977).
1012. See Note, supra note 21, at 472 n.10.
1013. After quoting one of The New Hampshire long-arm provisions, the court noted that,
according to the interpretation of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, "It]his statute is
meant to extend jurisdiction to ... the full constitutional limit." 432 F. Supp. at 661 (citation
omitted). The "full constitutional limit" for a state long-arm statute would be the limit of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. A federal court, therefore, might have
to examine the outer limits of the fourteenth amendment to determine if a state long-arm statute
applies to a defendant served pursuant to former Rule 4(d)(7) or Rule 4(e). (The former rule
has been reenacted, in part, as Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). See supra notes 278-86 and accompanying
text.) See infra notes 1076-93 and 1341-49 and accompanying text (discussing this possibility
in greater detail).
1014. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
1015. See infra notes 1079-93 and 1341-49 and accompanying text.
1016. 432 F. Supp. at 661 (emphasis added). The reference of the court to Rule 4(d)(3)
is not for the purpose of discussing some alleged service, within the State of New Hampshire,
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New Hampshire "foreign corporation long-arm statute,"'' 17 which,
according to the court, "is meant to extend jurisdiction over foreign
corporations to the full constitutional limit." 0 '" Then the court went
on to set out its "game plan" for analysis of the personal jurisdic-
tion issue:
In my analysis of jurisdictional facts as they relate to the New
Hampshire statute, I am guided by two principles.
First, the exercise of jurisdiction has to be reasonable from the
standpoint of New Hampshire's interest in the litigation. Second,
it has to be consistent with principles of fair play and substantial
justice ...
In addition, the reach of the long arm statute may not be
extended beyond what is permitted by the Constitution of the United
States.' I9
The court seemed to establish a test that included not only con-
siderations of the requirements of the long-arm statute that purportedly
goes to the limits of the fourteenth amendment but also of an
amenability requirement established by the Constitution. After set-
ting out this test and without specifically addressing the applicability
of the long-arm statute to the facts before it, the court seemed to
consider immediately constitutional questions. It did not distinguish
between the fifth and fourteenth amendments, nor did it determine
under which amendment federal court amenability standards were
measured. Instead, without explanation, the court lumped the two
amendments together:
The factors to be weighed in determining whether the contacts in
a given case are sufficient to meet the requirements of fair play called
for by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments include the quantity of contacts, the nature of the contacts,
and the connection of the cause of action with those contacts .... In
addition, I must consider New Hampshire's interest in protecting its
citizens and whether that interest has been invoked here. .... 1020
upon an agent of the defendant as authorized by Rule 4(d)(3), but because former Rule 4(d)(7)
was applicable in regard to defendants "of any class referred to in . . .[Rule 4(d)(3)]," FED.
R. CIv. P. 4(d)(7) (1963), and Mannesmann, as a business entity, would be a Rule 4(d)(3)
defendant. See supra notes 802-03 and accompanying text.
1017. 432 F. Supp. at 661.
1018. Id; see supra note 1013 and accompanying text.
1019. 432 F. Supp. at 661-62 (quoting Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 403 F.
Supp. 123, 134 (D.N.H. 1975), which, in turn, quoted Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296,
319 A.2d 626, 628 (1974)).
1020. 432 F. Supp. at 662 (citations omitted). The court's "constitutional stew" analysis
is particular disheartening because this is a recent case that should be clarifying or establishing
important standards rather than obfuscating established doctrines. This opinion, moreover, has
been criticized because of the decision by the court to "toss in" a local concern factor, the
state "interest in protecting its citizens," in a case involving the vindication of an important
federal interest, violation of antitrust laws. See Note, supra note 121, at 471 n.10.
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The court went on to describe the "usual test" of the the "due pro-
cess requirements of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments as set
out in International Shoe ... and its progeny"'"021 as "the state must
have 'sufficient contacts' so that the maintenance of a suit locally
would not offend the 'traditional conception of fair play and substan-
tial justice.' '"I22 The court, which apparently through that this "con-
tacts of the state test" applied to both the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, examined "the sufficiency of the defendants' contacts with
the State"' 023 and concluded that the defendants' "physical contacts"
with the state-three visits by the defendants' agents at the request
of the plaintiff-" [did] not, in and of themselves, constitute suffi-
cient contacts with the State of New Hampshire on which to base
jurisdiction." 24 These contacts were held "not sufficient to meet the
fairness requirement"' 25 and the court concluded that, "[i]f state con-
tacts were the sole consideration, I would hold that they were not
sufficient to ground jurisdiction."'0 26 What the court actually was say-
ing remains unclear. It may have held that the defendants did not
come within the New Hampshire long-arm statute because some four-
teenth amendment fairness requirement had not been satisfied; alter-
natively, the court may have held that even if the defendants could
be served, the fifth amendment due process limitation on federal courts
would not be satisfied if measured by a test of "contacts with the
state." The remainder of the opinion is difficult to follow because
the significance of the holding is in doubt.
Next, without clarifying the significance of this consideration, the
court dealt with the plaintiff's contention "that, since the defendants
are alien, it is not their contacts with the State that should control,
but that their contacts with the country as a whole must be
1021. 432 F. Supp. at 662 (citation omitted). Nowhere in its opinion did the court explain
or support its implied assertion that International Shoe established a fifth amendment test of
due process. Moreover, in light of the description by the court of these standards as requiring
certain contacts with the state, see infra notes 1022-23 and accompanying text, the court would
seem to have lost any constitutional justification for its subsequent consideration of a "national
contacts" test. If the court thought that the fifth amendment standard was contacts with the
state and finds that the standard is not satisfied, how could it argue "national contacts?"
Perhaps this observation explains the refusal of the court to characterize "national contacts"
as a constitutional standard or, indeed, as anything more than a factor to be weighed in a
personal jurisdiction analysis. See infra notes 1027-28, 1033, and 1038 and accompanying text.
1022. 432 F. Supp. at 662 (quoting International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320
(1945) (emphasis added)). The court does not make clear with what entity the state must have
had contacts. Probably, in light of the consideration by the court of the defendant's contacts
with the state of New Hampshire, see infra notes 1023-26 and accompanying text, the court
merely misstated the rule.
1023. 432 F. Supp. at 662.
1024. Id.
1025. Id.
1026. Id. at 663.
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considered."'" 27 Still silent as to how a national contacts test would
be applied, the court then cited cases in which other federal courts
had discussed "national contacts" as a possible amenability standard
in federal question cases." 28 The court provided two reasons for adop-
tion of this approach: (1) if the defendant is an alien, the defendant
would be "no more inconvenienced by a trip to one state than
another;"" 29 and (2) if an alien has substantial contacts with the United
States as a whole but doesn't have "sufficient contacts with any state
so as to give that state jurisdiction," the defendant would escape suit
unless a federal court were allowed to base jurisdiction on an ag-
gregation of the defendant's contacts with the nation. 030 After
acknowledging that a national contacts test had "not yet been generally
accepted"' 0 3' and that while Congress could have enacted "a statute
stating that jurisdiction over aliens will be based on their contacts
with the nation as a whole," it had not done so,'0 32 the court
concluded:
But in this age of multinational conglomerates doing business on
an international scale, plaintiff's position has merit, and I specifically
rule that where an alien defendant is sued by an American plaintiff,
and where there is no particular inconvenience due to the specific
forum state, the fact that the defendant is an alien and that there
is no other forum in which to litigate the claim should be taken
into consideration for purposes of determining whether a finding
of jurisdiction meets the requisite constitutional standards of fair
play.'0 33
Assuming that the court, in its discussion of "national contacts,"
was considering a federal amenability standard for fifth amendment
1027. Id.
1028. Id. (citing Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1975) (supra notes 845-55 and accompanying text; infra notes 1202-12 and accompanying
text); Graham Eng'g Corp. v. Kemp Prods., Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (infra
notes 1244-50 and accompanying text); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287
(D. Conn. 1975) (infra notes 1269-83 and accompanying text); Gerber Scientific Instrument
v. Barr & Stroud, Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1238 (D. Conn. 1973); Engineered Sports Prods. v.
Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973) (infra notes 1264-68 and accompanying
text); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich 1973) (infra notes 1310-16
and accompanying text); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benala, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24-25 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (supra notes 687-94 and accompanying text); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire
& Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967)(infra notes 1251-63 and accompany-
ing text); First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736-37 (E.D. Tenn.
1962) (supra notes 872-84 and accompanying text); Ag-Tronic, Inc. v. Frank Paviour Ltd.,
70 F.R.D. 393 (D. Neb. 1976) (supra notes 985-99 and accompanying text)).
1029. 432 F. Supp. at 663.
1030. Id. at 664.
1031. Id.
1032. Id.
1033. Id. (footnote omitted).
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purposes, it did not adopt or approve such a standard. Rather, the
court merely agreed, in certain very limited circumstances, to "take
. . . into consideration" defendants' national contacts.
The court then discussed another basis on which jurisdiction is
claimed for New Hampshire."03 Personal jurisdiction might be found
under another New Hampshire long-arm provision that provided "[i]f
a foreign corporation commits a tort . in New Hampshire, such
acts shall be deemed doing business in New Hampshire ... .
The court found that the defendants' alleged conspiracy to interfere
with the plaintiff's New Hampshire business, if proved, would be a
tortious act committed in New Hampshire even though "the defen-
dants did not set foot in the State in order to commit the alleged
tort"'" 36 and forcefully argued that "[t]he traditional notions of justice
and fair play should not be used to extend a cloak of immunity over
deliberate torts merely because the defendant is an alien
corporation."'' 037 Instead of arguing that the defendants could be served
with process under the "tortious act" long-arm statute, and instead
of considering the constitutionality of that assertion of jurisdiction
by a federal court, however, the court abruptly concluded:
Based on the defendants' physical contacts with the State, their
substantial contacts with the country as a whole, and New Hamp-
shire's interest in protecting its corporate citizens injured as a result
of torts such as those alleged here, I find that this court has
jurisdiction. 1038
The court accepted that national contacts might play some part in
assertion of personal jurisdiction by a federal court but only as
something to add flavor to the jurisdictional stewpot. This tortuous
opinion cannot serve as precedent or persuasive authority for adop-
tion of national contacts as a federal amenability standard.
Summary and Analysis
The lack of any genuine analysis is probably the strongest unifying
factor in these cases in which courts have dealt with the question
of amenability standards when service is made, pursuant to former
Rule 4(d)(7), according to statute or rule of the state in which the
federal court is sitting. In each case, the court seemed to find in former
4(d)(7) the authority to invoke a state long-arm statute rather than,
1034. Id.
1035. Id. at 665 n.2 (quoting N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 300:14).
1036. Id. at 665-67.
1037. Id. at 668.
1038. Id.
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as suggested by this author, °3 9 merely the authority to invoke a state
statute for service of process on defendants already "present" in the
state. Some courts applied an amenability test of minimum contacts
with the state whose statute was being invoked without any justifica-
tion for such application.""0 Other courts recognized that a separate
federal standard might exist, but decided that it would not be applicable
when service is made pursuant to state statute'0 'I or decided that in
the context of the case such a determination was not necessary since
the narrower fourteenth amendment standard had been satisfied.'
04 2
Some courts went farther and agreed that a federal standard would
be required, but concluded that International Shoe "points the way"
to that standard.' 4 3 Still other courts concluded that a federal stan-
dard, such as minimum contacts with the United States, might be
an appropriate standard, but only if some statutory provision authoriz-
ed such aggregation. In other words, if a federal long-arm statute
existed that permitted service on any defendant having minimum con-
tacts with the United States, then a determination of the reach of
the fifth amendment would be made by considering whether the defen-
dant's contacts with the United States were sufficient so that "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice" would not be
offended.'0 44 This might be considered a "practical result." If a defen-
dant does not have sufficient contacts with the state in which the
federal court is sitting to satisfy a test of "minimum contacts with
the state," even though he has substantial contacts with the United
States as a whole, then the state long-arm statute cannot be employed
because that statute was drafted in contemplation of making service
upon defendants who had some relationship to the state. Most long-
1039. See supra note 1004 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 994-1014 and
accompanying text (arguing in favor of narrow interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7)).
1040. See, e.g., Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123 (D.N.H. 1975)
(see supra notes 929-35 and accompanying text); Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 367 F. Supp.
1350 (D.N.D. 1973) (see supra notes 936-43 and accompanying text).
1041. See, e.g., Finance Co. of Am. v. Bankamerica Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895 (D. Md.
1980) (see supra notes 956-62 and accompanying text); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1974) (see supra notes 944-55 and accompanying text).
1042. Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1965) (see supra notes 964-71
and accompanying text). See also Bar's Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollack, 148 F. Supp. 710 (N.D.
Cal. 1957) (refused to resolve questions as to federal amenability standard because venue not
satisfied) (see supra notes 915-19 and accompanying text).
1043. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. f966) (see supra notes 920-28
and accompanying text).
1044. See, e.g. Wells Fargo & Co., v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 566 F.2d 406 (9th Cir.
1977) (see supra notes 974-84 and accompanying text); Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., Ltd.,
423 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (see supra notes 1000-10 and accompanying text); Ag-
Tronic v. Frank Paviour Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393 (D. Neb. 1976) (see supra notes 985-99 and
accompanying text).
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arm statutes, by their terms, only allow service in situations where
the fourteenth amendment would not be violated by such service. In
other words, when states drafted long-arm statutes, they tried to limit
service of process to circumstances in which due process would not
be violated.'"4 5 No state long-arm statute, therefore, provides that ser-
vice may be made on a defendant who has had no contacts with the
state. When a federal court, however, is asked to assert personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who has sufficient "national contacts"
but insufficient "state contacts" to satisfy the fifth amendment and
fourteenth amendmeht due process clauses, respectively, the courts
argue that the state long-arm statute cannot be used because the fac-
tual prerequisites for using the statute cannot be satisfied. If these
prerequisites were satisfied, the defendant would have some contact
with the state. Courts, therefore, are left with a perfectly satisfactory
fifth amendment amenability standard, but with no way to use it
because service cannot be made pursuant to a state long-arm statute
if the factual prerequisites of the statute are not met. The result is,
according to the courts, a lack of statutory authority to serve
process.' 6 The lack of authority, however, comes from failure to
satisfy the prerequisites of the state statute being adopted and not
from absence of federal authorization. Analysis of these former Rule
4(d)(7) cases makes clear that each federal court considering the
amenability standard has applied, for one of several reasons, the test
of "minimum contacts with the state" in which the federal court is
sitting. The Centronics court merely threw in a national contacts
element to its consideration but did not rely on national contacts as
a test.'04 7
After reviewing all of the arguments presented, this writer concludes
that a separate federal amenability standard should have applied in
former Rule 4(d)(7) cases and that the appropriate fifth amendment
due process standard would be "minimum contacts with the United
States."'0 141 Such a standard would preclude the anomaly of deter-
mining federal court jurisdiction in federal question cases by a test
applicable to the state court system. °'0 9 This conclusion can be justified
1045. See supra notes 119 to 126 and accompanying text.
1046. See cases cited supra note 1044.
1047. Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977)
(see supra notes 1011-38 and accompanying text).
1048. See supra notes 348-51 and 367-74 and accompanying text (discussing development
of national contacts approach); notes 793-98 and 888-92 and accompanying text (discussing
applicability of national contacts approach where service is made by wholly federal methods).
1049. See supra notes 795, 878, 961, and 1132 and accompanying text (discussing this anoma-
ly). See also supra note 488 and accompanying text (discussing this anomaly in the context
of diversity cases).
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whether former Rule 4(d)(7) is interpreted narrowly, as urged by this
writer, as merely an authorization to use state methods of service in
cases involving defendants who also could be served pursuant to Rules
4(d)(1) or 4(d)(3),'150 or broadly, as interpreted by the courts, as an
authorization to use state long-arm statutes for service on defendants
who could not be reached under Rule 4(d)(1) or 4(d)(3).10 1'
Persuasive arguments can be made in support of the position that
former Rule 4(d)(7) merely authorized a federal court to employ a
state method of service in lieu of the federal methods prescribed by
Rules 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3). First, a person to be served under former
Rule 4(d)(7) was described as "a defendant of any class referred to
in paragraph (1) or (3) of this subdivision of this rule."' 52 Those
paragraphs define authorized methods for making service upon in-
dividuals present or residing in the state in which the federal district
court is sitting (4(d)(1))' °1 3 or upon business entities that have agents,
for service of process, located within the state in which the federal
district court is held (4(d)(3)).' 0 54 The methods provided in Rules 4(d)(1)
and 4(d)(3) only could be utilized on defendants present, residing,
or doing some sort of business within the state. The reference in former
Rule 4(d)(7) to defendants "of any class referred to in paragraphs
(1) or (3)" therefore can be read sensibly as limiting former Rule
4(d)(7) to defendants who might be served under Rules 4(d)(1) and
4(d)(3). Such an interpretation is reasonable in view of the specific
language in Rule 4(e) making that provision applicable to "service
: . . upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state
in which the district court is held."' 55 If Rule 4(e) covers situations
in which a defendant is not present, residing, or doing some sort of
business within the state, or defendants not servable by the methods
of 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3), then one could logically conclude that former
Rule 4(d)(7) was not intended to cover the same sorts of defendants
covered by Rule 4(e).' 05 6
The language in former Rule 4(d)(7) that authorized service "in
the manner prescribed by any statute of the United States or in the
1050. See infra notes 1067-68 and accompanying text.
1051. See infra notes 1076-90 and accompanying text.
1052. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7) (1963).
1053. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1). See supra notes 810-16 and accompanying text (discussing
Rule 4(d)(1) and cases arising thereunder).
1054. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3). See supra notes 817-87 and accompanying text (discussing
Rule 4(d)(3) and cases arising thereunder).
1055. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). See infra notes 1103-12 and accompanying text (discussing Rule
4(e)) and 1113-1285 and accompanying text (discussing cases arising under Rule 4(e)).
1056. Two provisions of the same rule usually do not overlap, especially when one of the
provisions, Rule 4(e), specifically deals with a particular type of case.
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manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district court
is held for service of process . . . upon any such defendant"'" 57 also
supports a narrow interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7). The difference
in scope between former Rule 4(d)(7), which authorizes service "in
the manner prescribed by" state or federal statutes, and Rule 4(e),
which provides for service "under the circumstances and in the man-
ner prescribed by" state or federal statutes, indicates both a recogni-
tion of the distinction between acceptable techniques of service (e.g.,
time, place and manner) and factual situations in which such techni-
ques might be employed ("circumstances"). The difference also reflects
a deliberate decision to limit former Rule 4(d)(7) merely to adoption
of techniques that are alternatives to those provided by Rules 4(d)(1)
and 4(d)(3).' °11 Congress should be credited with not only recogniz-
ing the difference between "manner" and "circumstances and man-
ner" but also with using each phrase deliberately, not inadvertently.
Since former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e) followed one another spatially,
Congress probably knew and deliberately intended the differences be-
tween the two provisions.
One might argue that reading former Rule 4(d)(7) as merely prescrib-
ing methods of service of process as alternatives to those already pro-
vided in Rules 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) would leave a statutory provision
with no real usefulness unless the methods of service were coupled
with circumstances in which those methods could be employed. Under
this argument, former Rule 4(d)(7) must have been intended to in-
clude factual circumstances tied to the state statutes, including state
long-arm statutes. This argument, however, can be countered. Former
Rule 4(d)(7) did include a description of the circumstances in which
the state and other federal methods were to be employed, circumstances
in which, under Rules 4(d)(1) or 4(d)(3), defendants were present,
residing, or doing some sort of business within the state in which
the federal court was sitting." 9 Such an interpretation also is sup-
ported by the concluding language of former Rule 4(d)(7) that the
state manner of service adopted would be that prescribed "for the
service . . .upon any such defendant in an action brought in the
courts of general jurisdiction of that state."''0 6 Again, the cir-
cumstances in which the rule could operate effectively would be those
that involved particular defendants who also could be served under
4(d)(1) or 4(d)(3).
1057. FED. R. CrV. P. 4(d)(7) (1963).
1058. See supra notes 273-75 and 799-809 and accompanying text (discussing Rules 4(d)(1)
and 4(d)(3)).
1059. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
1060. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7) (1963).
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A final argument in support of the narrow interpretation of former
Rule 4(d)(7) is that since Rule 4(e) effectively and specifically, by its
terms, deals with adoption of state and federal statutes in regard to
service on defendants outside the state in which the federal court is
sitting, both as to manner and circumstances of service, former Rule
4(d)(7) must have dealt with something else. That "something else"
would be providing an alternative method for serving defendants pre-
sent, residing, or doing some sort of business within the state; methods
provided in state and federal service of process statutes. Former Rule
4(d)(7), therefore, did not adopt, for federal court use, state long-
arm statutes and should not have been used in so many cases as
justification for federal courts using state long-arm statutes.' 0 6 1
Present Rule 4(d)(2)(C)(i), which replaced, in part, former Rule
4(d)(7),'0 62 also can be narrowly interpreted as prescribing methods
of service in 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) circumstances and as supporting a
narrow interpretation of both former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(i). Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) permits a federal court to serve pro-
cess "upon a defendant of any class referred to in [4(d)(1) or 4(d)(3)]
...pursuant to the law of the State . . 063 While this provision
does not refer specifically to "manner of service," the references to
4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) defendants again could be interpreted as limita-
tions on the circumstances in which the rule could be employed.1114
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), moreover, provides for an alternative federal method
of service on 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) defendants, service by first class
mail.'06 5 Finally, Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and (ii), which, together, apparently
have replaced Rule 4(d)(7), appear in a subsection of Rule 4 dealing
only with methods of service of process.' 0 66
1061. See supra cases cited in note 1044.
1062. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i) with FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7) (1963). See supra
notes 269 and 267 (providing texts of these provisions). Former Rule 4(d)(7) authorized service,
on 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) defendants, "in the manner" provided in any federal statute or statute
of the state in which the federal court was held. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) authorizes service, on 4(d)(l)
and 4(d)(3) defendants, "pursuant to" any statute of the state in which the federal court is
held. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), which authorizes an alternative federal method of service by mail,
see supra note 269 (providing text of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)), apparently has replaced that part
of former Rule 4(d)(7) that authorized use of other federal service of process statutes. The
only real differences between former Rule 4(d)(7) and present Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and (ii) appear
to be: (1) a change in the position of the provision so that it now appears in that part of
Rule 4 devoted to techniques of service, (2) replacement of the authorization in Rule 4(d)(7)
to use federal statutory methods of service other than those provided in 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3)
with a specific alternative federal method for service, and (3) a change in the language of
Rule 4(d)(7), which authorized service "in the manner" prescribed by state statute or rule,
to the language of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), which, more ambiguously, authorizes service "pursuant
to" state statute or rule.
1063. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i).
1064. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7) (1963). See supra notes 1059-60 and accompanying text.
1065. FED. R. CIrv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). See supra note 269 (providing text of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)).
1066. Former Rule 4(d)(7) appeared in subsection 4(d) of Rule 4, which subsection was
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In former Rule 4(d)(7) is interpreted in this narrow sense, then a
federal due process standard of "minimum contacts with the United
States" would be appropriate. The argument in favor of such a stan-
dard would be the same as in 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) cases'"67 because
the only difference between former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rules 4(d)(1) and
4(d)(3) is that a different method of service is being employed, a
method that must comport with due process by being reasonably
calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the pendency of suit
against him.' 68 Amenability questions, however, which depend on the
factual circumstances triggering the assertion by the court of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, should not differ from 4(d)(1) and
4(d)(3) cases.
Courts, however, while troubled by a juxtaposition of former Rule
4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e), 10 69 have cited former Rule 4(d)(7) as authority
for federal court use of state long-arm statutes." 70 That result can
be reached by reading the limitation to defendants "of any class refer-
red to" in Rules 4(d)(1) or 4(d)(3) as meaning only individuals (4(d)(1))
or business entities (4(d)(3)) and not including the circumstances in
which 4(d)(1) (presence or residence in the state) or 4(d)(3) (agent in
the state for service of process) are applicable. 1'0 ' While such an in-
terpretation of the words "of any class" is sensible, it does not resolve
other problems like the former Rule 4(d)(7) use of "manner" as
entitled "Summons: Personal Service." Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and (ii) appear in subsection 4(c)
of Rule 4, which subsection is entitled "Service." In the 1983 amendments to Rule 4, subsec-
tion 4(d) has been given a new title, "Summons and Complaint: Person to be Served," in-
dicating that subsection 4(d) now is devoted to defining who can be served (including the cir-
cumstances in which he must find himself in order to be served) while subsection 4(c) is devoted
to methods for accomplishing this service. Subsection 4(e), which has the title "Summons: Ser-
vice Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State," seems to be devoted to describing
the situations in which a nonpresent, nonconsenting defendant may be served with process.
1067. See supra notes 888-92 and accompanying text (discussing national contacts test in
4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) cases).
1068. See supra note 511 and accompanying text.
1069. Many courts have resolved their confusion as to which Rule authorizes use of state
long arm statutes by citing both former Rule 4(d)(7) and 4(e) and leaving it up to the reader
to decide on which provision the court is or should be relying. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co.
v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 414 (9th Cir. 1977) (see supra note 975 and accom-
panying text); Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1966) (supra note 921);
Ag-Tronic v. Frank Paviour Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393, 400 (D. Neb. 1976) (supra note 989 and
accompanying text); Conwed Corp. v. Nortene, S.A., 404 F. Supp. 497, 500-01 (D. Minn.
1975) (infra note 1164 and accompanying text); United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n
of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 569-70 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (supra note 937); Scott Paper Co.
v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184, 188 (D. Del. 1974) (supra text accompanying
note 949); Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 231 (D.N.J. 1966)
(infra note 1184). But see Stanley v. Local 926 of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs of
the AFL-CIO, 354 F. Supp. 1267, 1269-70 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (distinguishing between former
Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e)) (infra notes 1238-40 and accompanying text).
1070. See supra cases cited in note 909.
1071. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
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opposed to the Rule 4(e) use of "circumstances and manner," and
the existence of two apparently overlapping provisions, a statutory
wastage quite uncharacteristic of legislative bodies.
Because so many federal courts used former Rule 4(d)(7) to adopt
state long-arm statutes for service on defendants not present, residing,
or doing business within the states in which the federal courts were
sitting,0 72 however, a determination must be made as to whether a
broader interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7) precludes application
of a uniform federal amenability standard in federal question cases.
This discussion, moreover, necessarily will include examination of Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(i), to determine whether a uniform federal test can survive
in cases arising under this new rule that authorizes service "pursuant
to" state law, perhaps a more ambiguous grant than that of service
"in the manner" of state law as prescribed in former Rule 4(d)(7).' 0 73
This writer agrees with those courts and commentators who find
an anomaly in measuring federal court personal jurisdiction in federal
question cases by fourteenth amendment due process standards ap-
plicable to state courts. 1071 Although a federal standard could be derived
from, analogous to, or even identical with the standard applicable
to state courts, some separate federal fifth amendment due process
standard should be applicable to all federal question cases. The
development of such a standard would not eliminate the anomaly
caused by the nonuniformity of possible assertions of federal per-
sonal jurisdiction because state long-arm statutes are not uniform.
For example, a federal court sitting in a state with a liberal long-arm
statute might be able to assert jurisdiction over a defendant who, in
similar circumstances, might escape the personal jurisdiction of a
federal court sitting in a state with a less liberal long-arm statute., 07"
Nonuniformity will exist so long as federal courts rely on state statutes
for "permission" to serve process. The problem at which this discus-
sion is aimed is not procedural-uniformity of "permission" to serve
process is not the goal. Rather, if a federal court has obtained "per-
mission" to serve process because a particular defendant's conduct
comes within the state's long-arm statute, then the problem is whether
assertion by the court of personal jurisdiction will be measured by
some uniform fifth amendment amenability standard or whether the
assertion of jurisdiction will be subject to a fourteenth amendment
due process standard developed for state courts.
1072. See supra cases cited in note 909.
1073. See supra note 1062 (discussing changes from Rule 4(d)(7) to Rules 4(c)(2)C)(i) and (ii)).
1074. See supra notes 795, 878, 968 and 1132 and accompanying text.
1075. See supra note 966 and accompanying text.
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction
A separate fifth amendment standard clearly should be developed.
A broad standard that would not violate the fifth amendment would
be a "minimum contacts with the United States" standard, aggrega-
tion of the defendant's national contacts." 76 This test derives from
the fourteenth amendment standard of "minimum contacts with the
state,"1"77 which standard has been defined and developed carefully
over a number of years by a tremendous number of courts and
commentators. 78 An application of this test would require a federal
court wishing to serve a defendant with process by using a state long-
arm statute under former Rule 4(d)(7) to engage in the same type
of two step analysis that any court must use to determine whether
it could assert jurisdiction over the defendant:' 79 (1) Does a statute
authorize service on this defendant, i.e., does this defendant come
within the language of the statute authorizing service of process? (2)
Would assertion of jurisdiction over this defendant violate the defen-
dant's due process rights (here, his rights under the fifth amendment)?
In a former Rule 4(d)(7) case, these two enquiries could have been
kept entirely separate. The court first would have decided whether
the defendant to be served was one who came within the state long-
arm statute. If the potential defendant had an insufficient relation-
ship with the state to come within its long-arm statute, no matter
how narrow that statute might be, then jurisdiction could not be
asserted because service on the defendant would not be authorized
by statute.0 "0 Thus, all of the courts that refused to apply a national
contacts test to federal question cases because no statutory authority
existed really were faced with circumstances in which the defendant
could not be served with process since he was outside the scope of
the applicable state long-arm statute.'0 8 ' The courts should not have
reached the question of amenability because service of process had
not been authorized in these cases.
Once it were established that the defendant's conduct came within
the scope of the long arm statute, then the federal court, according
to former Rule 4(d)(7), would have been authorized to serve that defen-
dant "in the manner" prescribed by that state statute. Only then would
1076. See supra notes 793-98 and 888-92 and infra notes 1324-55 and accompanying text
(discussing national contacts test in various contexts).
1077. See supra notes 348-51 and 367-74 and accompanying text (discussing derivation of
national contacts test).
1078. See supra notes 70-185 and accompanying text (discussing historical development of
International Shoe test).
1079. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing proper analysis in long-arm cases).
1080. See supra note 120.
1081. See supra notes 977-1010 and accompanying text.
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the court turn to the question of amenability, applying the "minimum
contacts with the United States" test. In most cases either the facts
would satisfy the International Shoe test of "minimum contacts with
the state" or service could not be had at all; that is, most state long-
arm statutes require some substantial contact with the state before
the defendant would come within the scope of the statute, and, if
that conduct were established, a minimum contacts with the state test
also would be satisfied. This does not mean, however, that the nar-
rower International Shoe test should apply. Expediency should not
dictate the standard employed; the standard, instead, should define
the outer limits of personal jurisdiction. Any facts that satisfy the
International Shoe test also would satisfy the broader national con-
tacts test and some cases would arise in which the defendant had
done something that triggered the state long-arm statute but that would
not be a substantial enough contact with the state to satisfy the four-
teenth amendment. 82 Then, the court, properly having served the
defendant "in the manner" of the state long-arm statute, could have
aggregated the defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole
to determine whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over this defen-
dant would violate his fifth amendment rights. Such a test would allow
a federal court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose
substantial contacts were scattered so thinly throughout the United
States that no state court constitutionally could obtain personal jurisdic-
tion over him.1011
Use of a national contacts test in former Rule 4(d)(7) cases would
not only have been sensible, but would have allowed federal courts
to apply an amenability standard of their own to the facts of a par-
ticular case; courts would not have been forced to examine and ex-
trapolate from the facts a test satisfactory to the particular case." 84
In most circumstances, a defendant would not have been sued in a
1082. In cases in which the defendant's contacts within the United States were substantial
but his contacts with any particular state were small, such contact might trigger the use of
the long-arm statute without making such contacts sufficient to satisfy the fourteenth amend-
ment. Often a state court has purported to assert jurisdiction over a defendant served pursuant
to the state long-arm statute and a higher court has determined that the assertion of jurisdic-
tion would not be consistent with due process. The court then did not backtrack and say that
the defendant did not come within the long-arm statute because due process was not satisfied.
On the other hand, a long-arm statute arguably cannot be applied unless its application would
be constitutional. This would require that the constitutional analysis be conducted first to deter-
mine whether the long-arm statute could be used, or that the statutory interpretation be con-
ducted first with applicability of the statute being revoked by a subsequent judicial decision
that due process would not be satisfied.
1083. See supra note 1030 and accompanying text and infra notes 1267 and 1282 and
accompanying text (suggesting such a consideration).
1084. See supra notes 742, 747, 762, 831, 928, and 971 and accompanying text.
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highly inconvenient forum; the state long-arm statute would not have
permitted service on a defendant who had nothing to do with the
state.'"85 Venue restrictions also would have operated to limit the situs
of the suit IO 6 and change of venue provisions could have been utiliz-
ed in rare cases in which a defendant would have been highly in-
convenienced by the plaintiff's choice of forum. 8 "
If this approach had been adopted, some cases seemingly would
have required a federal court to engage in two separate due process
analyses. In those states like California and Rhode Island in which
the state long-arm statutes do not specify circumstances in which ser-
vice can be made on nonresident, nonpresent, nonconsenting defen-
dants but rather authorize service whenever the defendant has suffi-
cient contacts with the state so that the fourteenth amendment due
process clause would not be violated,' 88 the first step for a federal
court would entail determining whether the defendant had sufficient
contacts with the state so that the International Shoe test would have
been satisfied.' 8 9 If that test had been satisfied, then the court should
have determined amenability under the fifth amendment national con-
tacts approach. Since the fifth amendment test would be satisfied if
the fourteenth amendment test were satisfied, 10 90 however, the second
part of the analysis would not be necessary. This would create the
odd result that in cases in which the state long-arm statute is open-
ended and only limited by the constitution, the only cases a federal
court using the state long-arm could hear would be those that a state
court also could hear. Again, however, this would not be a reason
to reject a broad federal amenability standard for all federal ques-
tion cases. This only demonstrates that when a federal court must
serve process by a state long-arm statute, the state and federal stan-
dards usually would be satisfied.
On the other hand, a strong argument can be made that a dif-
ferent two-step analysis would have been required. The first question
would be whether the defendant could have been served under the
1085. The broadest long-arm statutes permit state courts to assert jurisdiction to the limits
of the constitution as defined by the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 3 (discussing such
long-arm statutes). The fourteenth amendment requires, however, that the defendant have suf-
ficient contacts with the state to satisfy "minimum contacts." -
10S6. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
1087. See supra notes 188 and 693 and accompanying text and infra notes 1310-16 and
accompanying text (discussing Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973)).
1088. See supra note 3.
1089. In a state court case, the question of applicability of the statute and amenability
to service collapse into a single inquiry because the statute only authorizes service when due
process is satisfied.
1090. See supra text following note 797.
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statute and the second would be whether assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion would have been constitutional by whatever standard applied to
the particular court, the fourteenth amendment to state courts deciding
state questions and the fifth amendment to federal courts deciding
federal questions. If the state had a long-arm statute that was written
to reach the limits of the Constitution, those limits would depend
on the court, the fourteenth amendment limitation on state courts,
and the fifth amendment limitation on federal courts." 9' Even though
the analysis would collapse into a single question, the question would
be whether the particular limitations of that court have been exceed-
ed. Under this possible analysis, federal courts would have broader
jurisdictional powers than state courts. The argument would be more
difficult to sustain in cases in which long-arm service is made under
Rule 4(e) because 4(e) is limited to service "under the circumstances"
as well as "in the manner" of the state long-arm statute. Some federal
courts have read this additional language to mean that the federal
court cannot use the state long-arm statute unless the state could con-
stitutionally do so. 92 This question will be discussed below." 93
Before moving to the final major group of cases to be examined,
those arising under Rule 4(e),1 94 this writer would like to examine
former Rule 4(d)(7) and compare it with the new rule, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i)
as well as with Rule 4(e), to determine whether a national contacts
test of amenability in federal courts will make sense under the new
rule. First, a significant distinction between former Rule 4(d)(7) and
Rule 4(e) must be emphasized. Former Rule 4(d)(7) authorized ser-
vice "in the manner" prescribed by state law while Rule 4(e) authorizes
service "under the circumstances and in the manner" prescribed by
state law.0 95 Some have argued that because of the additional re-
quirement in Rule 4(e), Rule 4(e) adopts not only the state long-arm
statute for purposes of service of process but also the state amenability
standard because the state long-arm statute cannot be used by a state
court in circumstances in which the state amenability standard is not
satisfied.0 96 Under the narrow interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7),
which this writer suggested above, 97 one might conclude, on the other
hand, that "under the circumstances" in Rule 4(e) refers only to fac-
tual circumstances of the case that would bring the defendant within
1091. See supra notes 329 and 497 and accompanying text.
1092. See, e.g., cases discussed infra at notes 1123-33, 1142-62, 1172-77, and 1190-1201.
1093. See infra notes 1329-49 and accompanying text.
1094. See infra notes 1103-1283 and accompanying text.
1095. See supra notes 903-07 and accompanying text.
1096. See, e.g., cases discussed infra at notes 1123-33, 1142-62, 1172-77, and 1190-1201.
1097. See supra notes 1052-61 and accompanying text.
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the long-arm statute." 98 Under either interpretation, however, former
Rule 4(d)(7) only referred to "manner" of service, thus permitting
a strong argument that the drafters of the federal rules did not in-
tend that former Rule 4(d)(7) incorporate any more into federal pro-
cedure than the techniques of service embodied in state long-arm
statutes and the factual requisites for application of those statutes.
New Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) is a little more ambiguous; it permits a federal
court to serve 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) defendants "pursuant to the law
of the State. ... '""'o Some evidence, however, points to an inter-
pretation of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) as a recodification of former Rule 4(d)(7)
as to using state methods for service of process. First, Rule 4(e) still
includes references to both the "circumstances and manner" of
service. 100 Second, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) is included in subsection (c) of
Rule 4, which subsection is entitled "Service," thereby indicating that
subdivisions of that subsection all deal with methods for service. H °I
All subdivisions of subsection 4(c), moreover, deal with technical re-
quirements for federal service of process and 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), the parallel
clause to 4(c)(2)(C)(i), describes a new federal method (by mail) for
serving process on 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) defendants. 102 Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i)
seemingly was intended to replace the portion of Rule 4(d)(7) that
authorized federal courts to use state law for service of process; no
substantial changes were intended. In fact, the section was moved
to a subsection dealing only with methods for service of process,
possibly to clarify that former Rule 4(d)(7) also dealt only with tech-
niques. Therefore, any amenability standard, like national contacts,
which makes sense in light of former Rule 4(d)(7) and the cases aris-
ing thereunder, will be equally sensible when the authorization for
use of the state statute is Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i).
In conclusion, this writer perceives nothing that recommends adop-
tion of state amenability standards as part and parcel of state statutes
for service of process under former Rule 4(d)(7) and present Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(i). Federal courts should determine and apply a uniform
amenability standard, if possible. The policy behind permitting federal
courts to use state long-arm statutes and state methods of service prob-
ably was to allow federal courts to do at least what courts of the
states in which they were sitting could do. One should not infer a
congressional desire, and, indeed, none has been documented, to limit
1098. See infra notes 1328-40 and accompanying text.
1099. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i). See supra note 1062.
1100. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
1101. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i). See also supra note 1062.
1102. See FED. R. Crv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). See also supra note 1062.
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federal courts to only what state courts could do under similar
circumstances.
4. Amenability standards in federal question cases in which pro-
cess was served, "'upon a party not an inhabitant of or found
within the state in which the district court is held, . . .under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by the law of the
state in which the district court is held pursuant to Rule 4(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Like the broader interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure," 3 Rule 4(e) allows a federal court to serve
process beyond the borders of the state in which the federal court
is sitting. According to its heading, Rule 4(e) provides authorized
methods for "service ... upon a party not an inhabitant of or found
within the state in which the district court is held."1 4 One method,
discussed above,""5 is service according to "a statute of the Untied
States [which] provides for service ...upon a party not an inhabi-
tant of or found within the state,""0116 that is, service pursuant to
a federal statute that authorizes nationwide or worldwide service of
process. Another method, considered below," ,07 is service "under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by a state statute that
"provides for service. . . upon a party not an inhabitant of or found
within the state."" 0 " Thus, Rule 4(e) authorizes a federal court io
adopt state long-arm statutes in certain circumstances.
A major issue arising in Rule 4(e) federal question cases, when the
federal court serves process under the long-arm statute of the state
in which it is sitting, is whether the amenability of a defendant to
federal court personal jurisdiction is measured by the fourteenth
amendment standard of minimum contacts with the state or by some
fifth amendment standard like minimum contacts with the nation.
Some courts and commentators argue that the provisions that service
be "under the circumstances .. .prescribed in the statute" requires
a fourteenth amendment amenability standard because the only cir-
cumstances under which a state court might serve a defendant validly
under its long-arm statute would be circumstances in which a four-
1103. See supra cases cited in note 909; see also supra notes 893-913 and accompanying text.
1104. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(e).
1105. See supra notes 683-798 and accompanying text.
1106. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(e).
1107. See infra notes 1123-1283 and accompanying text.
1108. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
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teenth amendment due process test is satisfied." 9 On the other hand,
the limitation to "the circumstances . ..prescribed in the statute"
might refer only to those factual circumstances that must be satisfied
in order for the defendant to come within the language of the state
long-arm statute;"' amenability would be a separate issue to be deter-
mined by some fifth amendment standard. Other courts do not con-
sider the specific language of Rule 4(e), applying instead a fourteenth
amendment standard as something that "comes with" the adopted
state long-arm statute."" But for the fourteenth amendment re-
quirements, this long-arm statute might have been drafted different-
ly. Still other courts, finding no statutory authority to support con-
sideration of the defendant's "national contacts," apply the Interna-
tional Shoe standard as "the only game in town.""' 2
While most courts that have considered the question have rejected
any national contacts test,"' 3 many have referred to the possibility
of applying national contacts in other federal question contexts." '
The Rule 4(e) cases discussed below have been divided, roughly, into
three categories: (1) those courts that applied a fourteenth amend-
ment minimum contacts test and found the defendant's contacts with
the state insufficient to support jurisdiction;' 15 (2) those courts that
applied a fourteenth amendment minimum contacts with the state test
and found the defendant's state contacts sufficient to support
1109. See infra cases cited at note 1318. See also Edwards v. Gulf Mississippi Marine Co.,
449 F. Supp. 1363, 1367-68 and n.2 (one defendant served pursuant to state long-arm statute
as authorized by Rule 4(e); court applies fourteenth amendment test to find personal jurisdic-
tion but suggests it might not have to consider limitations on state courts if service had been
under former Rule 4(d)(7) which doesn't include "under the circumstances" language). See
supra note 850 (discussing another aspect of Edwards case).
1110. See infra notes 1328-36 and accompanying text.
1111. See infra cases cited at note 1320.
1112. See infra cases cited at note 1319.
1113. See infra notes 1155-58, 1180-82, 1189, 1210, and 1215 and accompanying text.
1114. See, e.g., Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 1982); Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 156 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979); Brotherhood Cia Naviera S.A.
v. Zapata Marine Service, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 688, 691 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
1115. See infra notes 1123-82 and accompanying text. In many federal question cases in
which service is made pursuant to a state long-arm statute and an International Shoe test is
applied to find that the defendants had insufficient contacts with the state to support personal
jurisdiction, the courts do not cite any statute or rule authorizing service by the state long-arm.
See, e.g., Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1983);
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1981); Grevas v.
M/V Olympic Pegasus, 557 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1977); Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pac. RR Co.,
566 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Chattanooga Corp. v. Klinger, 528 F. Supp. 372 (E.D.
Tenn. 1981); In re Mid-AtI. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1981) (as
to some defendants); Harem-Christensen Corp. v. M.S. Frigo Harmony, 477 F. Supp. 694
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d
1515 (9th Cir. 1983) (court finds insufficient contacts between defendant and state but never
examines any long-arm statute); Gerber Scientific Inst. Co. v. Barr & Strould Ltd., 383 F.
Supp. 1238 (D. Conn. 1973) (same).
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jurisdiction; ' 1 6 and (3) those courts which have applied some
amenability test other than minimum contacts with the state.'" 7 The
first category of cases may include two types of cases: those in which
the defendant's contacts with the United States were no greater than
its contacts with the state in which the federal court was sitting, cases
which might turn on an argument that the court need not decide
whether a different federal amenability standard would be appropriate
because such standard also would not be satisfied;"' 8 and those in
which the defendant's contacts with the United States were greater
than its contacts with the state in which the federal court was sitting,
cases in which the court deliberately has decided to apply the nar-
rower state standard of amenability.'' The second category includes
cases in which some federal amenability standard would have been
satisfied but in which the court applied the state standard, either
because it believed the state standard was required, ' 2 0 or because,
since the state standard was satisfied, it did not have to consider any
broader federal standard ' 2 ' (if contacts with one state were sufficient,
then contacts with the United States would also be sufficient). The
third category includes only cases in which a federal court has adopted,
for use, a federal amenability standard like national contacts.' 122
Category 1. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc.""" was an ad-
miralty action for personal injuries sustained by a longshoreman while
working in a New Jersey port on board a vessel that had been con-
verted by the defendant Japanese corporation, Hitachi Shipbuilding
and Engineering Co., Ltd. DeJames often is cited" 4 because of the
1116. See infra notes 1183-1268 and accompanying text. In many federal question cases
in which service is made pursuant to a state long-arm statute and an International Shoe test
is applied to find the defendants had sufficient contacts with the state to support jurisdiction,
the courts do not cite any statute or rule authorizing service by the state long-arm. See, e.g.,
Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 693 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1982); Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d 991
(9th Cir. 1981); Martin v. Steubner, 652 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1981); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur
Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Party Ltd., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Greater
Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Public Service Company of New Hampshire, No. 83-0066
(D. Mass. May 25, 1983); Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Mid-Atl.
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1981) (some defendants); Holt v. Nissan
Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Vergaro v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines", 390
F. Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975); Honda Assoc., Inc. v. Nozawa Trading Co., 374 F. Supp.
886 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); H.K. Corp. v. Lauter, 336 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Scott v. Middle
East Airlines Co., S.A. 240 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
1117. See infra notes 1269-83 and accompanying text.
1118. See, e.g., infra notes 1150-52 and accompanying text.
1119. See, e.g., infra notes 1176-77 and 1181-82 and accompanying text.
1120. See, e.g., infra notes 1190-95 and 1213 and 1215 and accompanying text.
1121. See, e.g., infra notes 1209-11 and 1244-47 and accompanying text.
1122. See infra notes 1269-1316 and accompanying text.
1123. 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981).
1124. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 186, at 687 n.10; Note, supra note 121, at 476 n.30,
478.
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction
discussions of a national contacts amenability standard that occur in
the majority"25 and the dissenting" 26 opinions. Service had been made,
under Rule 4(e), pursuant to the New Jersey long-arm statute. The
majority, in considering whether the federal court had personal jurisdic-
tion over Hitachi, noted the applicability of the fifth amendment to
this question."127 The court stated, however, that "the principle an-
nounced in diversity cases such as International Shoe . . . and its
progeny is also applicable to nondiversity cases.""' 28 Since the court
erroneously characterized International Shoe and its progeny as "diver-
sity cases" rather than state court cases, ' 29 its reliance on Interna-
tional Shoe might derive from a desire to create uniformity among
federal court cases rather than a desire to adopt a test developed for
state court cases. This point was clarified, in part, when the court
expressed doubt as to whether, under a prior third circuit case, "the
fifth amendment requires a defendant to have minimum contacts with
the forum state, or whether ... the International Shoe test be applied
by analogy, so that a defendant need only have minimum contacts
with the United States as a whole."" 3  The court, therefore, was not
striving for federal uniformity but for some sensible fifth amendment
amenability standard. Finally, the court further limited its specula-
tion by noting:
In any event, even in nondiversity cases, if service of process
must be made pursuant to a state long-arm statute or rule
of court, the defendant's amenability to suit in federal district
court is limited by that statute or rule." 3'
While recognizing the appropriateness of measuring amenability by
some fifth amendment standard, the court concluded that use of the
state long-arm statute could limit amenability according to that statute.
The character of this limitation, as determined by this court, care-
fully was described and explained in the following paragraph:
The New Jersey long-arm rule is intended to extend as far as is
constitutionally permissible. In enacting its long-arm rule, the state
of New Jersey is limited by the due process constraints of the four-
1125. 654 F.2d at 283; see also 654 F.2d at 287-90 (discussing possibility of a national
contacts test if it could be established that the defendant had been validly served pursuant
to some federal law authorizing worldwide service of process).
1126. 654 F.2d at 292-93 (Gibbons, J. dissenting).
1127. Id. at 283.
1128. Id. (emphasis added).
1129. See supra notes 106-55 and accompanying text (discussing International Shoe and its
progeny). See also supra note 828 and accompanying text (citing other cases in which the same
erroneous statement was made).
1130. 654 F.2d at 283.
1131. Id.
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teenth amendment. Therefore, we believe that Hitachi's amenability
to suit in the District of New Jersey must be judged by fourteenth
amendment standards. We recognize that this creates an anomalous
situation because it results in a federal court in a nondiversity case
being limited by the due process restrictions imposed on the states
by the fourteenth amendment as opposed to those imposed on the
federal government by the fifth amendment. However, it would be
equally anomalous to utilize a state long-arm rule to authorize ser-
vice of process on a defendant in a manner that the state body
enacting the rule could not constitutionally authorize. The anomaly
of a federal court being limited by the requirements of the four-
teenth amendment in a nondiversity case where service must be made
pursuant to a state long-arm rule could be easily rectified by con-
gressional authorization of nationwide service of process for admiralty
cases. It is not within our province to create such authorization.""2
After considering the defendant's contacts with New Jersey and the
requirements of the New Jersey long-arm statute, which had been deter-
mined to reach the limits of due process, the court concluded that
Hitachi's contacts with New Jersey were "insufficient to support the
assertion of jurisdiction over Hitachi under the New Jersey long-arm
rule. ,,"1133
Judge Gibbons disagreed, finding in dissent that "Hitachi's rela-
tion to New Jersey satisfies the fourteenth amendment due process
concerns the Supreme Court enunciated in World- Wide Volkswagen
... ,,,'31 The dissent, moreover, took issue with the conclusion by
the majority that the fourteenth amendment should govern amenability
to suit in this situation." 3 The dissent argued:
The fourteenth amendment due process clause does not properly
apply in all its aspects to federal question claims. In International
Shoe.... the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test to deter-
mine the constitutionality of a state's assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over an out-of-state defendant. A state's exercise of jurisdic-
tion must comport with traditional notions of fundamental fairness,
and it must be consistent with the values of federalism embodied
in the fourteenth amendment. . . .When a court asserts personal
1132. Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
1133. Id. at 286. See also Elefteriou v. Tanker Archontissa, 443 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1971)
(court remands for decision as to whether plaintiff's claim, which would come within the state
long-arm statute, had been asserted in good faith; court poses the question as to whether,
if court adopts long-arm through Rule 4(e), it also adopts statutory limitations on scope of
long arm).
1134. 654 F.2d at 290 (citation omitted).
1135. Id. at 292. Judge Gibbons recognized that because of his conviction that fourteenth
amendment standards had been satisfied by the defendant's contacts with New Jersey, his con-
clusion as to the appropriate amenability test was "not crucial to the disposition of this case." Id.
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jurisdiction over a foreign defendant on the basis of a state law claim,
it must ensure that the forum state does not unduly encroach on
a sister state's interests. When a court, state or federal, adjudicates
a federal claim, the federalism issue is of no relevance, for the court
determines the parties' rights and liabilities under uniform, national
law. No state intrudes on another's interests. The only relevant in-
terest is the national one. Thus the applicable constitutional due pro-
cess provision should not be the fourteenth amendment, but the fifth
amendment.' 16
The dissent to this point had not parted company with the majority
opinion, which had recognized that "the fifth amendment determines
whether the district court has personal jurisdiction over Hitachi." ' 3 7
Next, the dissent described, as an appropriate fifth amendment test,
aggregation of the defendant's contacts with the United States.''" In
meeting the position of the majority that a federal court, using a
state statute for service of process, should be limited in the same way
that a state court using that statute would be limited, the dissent
argued:
[W]ere a state court adjudicating a federal claim, the relevant due
process standard should remain the fifth amendment. The nature
of the claim, not the identity of the court, should determine the
appropriate due process test. New Jersey has enacted a "constitu-
tional" long arm; its courts may assert personal jurisdiction to the
limits of the relevant due process clause. A federal court in a federal
question case referred under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)
to the New Jersey long arm thus must ask two questions: Would
assertion of personal jurisdiction violate the fifth amendment? and,
Has New Jersey placed any restriction on the constitutionally exer-
cisable scope of jurisdiction? The answer to the second question is
1136. Id. (citations omitted).
1137. Id. at 283.
1138. Judge Gibbons stated:
The fifth amendment requires only that the forum be a fair and reasonable place
at which to compel defendant's appearance, and that he have had notice and a
reasonable opportunity to be heard .... A defendant's national contacts enter into
the fifth amendment fairness analysis, for it would be unreasonable to subject to
suit in the United States a foreign national defendant who had but one fleeting con-
nection with this country. But it is not necessary, under the fifth amendment due
process clause, that that defendant's contacts relate primarily to the particular United
States location in which the claim arose. Thus, for example, it would not be unfair
under the fifth amendment to subject a foreign national shipper to suit in New Jersey
on the basis of an admiralty claim that arose in that state, even if the offending
ship was the only one ever to dock in New Jersey, and all of defendant's other ships
land in Texas. The hypothetical defendant has sufficient contacts with the United
States, and the availability of witnesses points to the District of New Jersey as the
most convenient forum for the litigation . . ..
Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
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no, and therefore when addressing a federal claim, the federal court,
or for that matter, a New Jersey court, need consider only the issue
of fifth amendment fairness in determining whether to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant.1 39
Judge Gibbons concluded:
[W]hile Rule 4(e) has the effect of converting a federal court into
a state court for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction, the
rule does not automatically make the fourteenth amendment the
guiding due process provision." '
Judge Gibbons's rather unique approach-consideration of the
amenability question, under whichever due process clause is applicable,
fifth or fourteenth, followed by examination of the long-arm statute
to determine whether it goes to the limits of due process has some
appeal and would work in cases in which a state has given its courts
all power permitted by the .Constitution. The general applicability of
this approach will be discussed below in the materials following the
discussion of particular cases."'
Other circuit courts also have reached the conclusion advanced by
the majority in DeJames-that the amenability standard in 4(e) federal
question cases involving use of state long-arm statutes would be
"minimum contacts with the state" in which the federal court is held.
In Kransco Manufacturing, Inc. v. Markwitz,"'42 a declaratory judg-
ment action to have a patent declared invalid or not infringed by
plaintiff's device, the Ninth Circuit considered the question of whether
a district court sitting in California had acquired personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, a West German citizen and resident, by ser-
vice outside the State of California. The court noted that the California
long-arm statute was coextensive with whatever would be consistent
under the fourteenth amendment, '4 3 and, without discussing the possi-
ble applicability of the fifth amendment, examined the defendant's
contacts with California to determine whether the district court had
obtained jurisdiction over the defendant.' ,' The court concluded that
the defendant's "forum contacts" were insufficient to permit asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction." 4 Although the court did not define
1139. Id. at 292-93.
1140. Id. at 293.
1141. See infra notes 1351-52 and accompanying text.
1142. 656 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981).
1143. 656 F.2d at 1377. See supra note 3 (discussing California long-arm statute). See also
infra notes 1346-49 and accompanying text (discussing a suggested fifth amendment analysis
in cases involving a California-type long arm).
1144. 656 F.2d at 1378.
1145. Id. at 1380. The court concluded that the International Shoe test of "fair play and
substantial justice" would be offended by "requir[ing] him to submit to the court's jurisdic-
tion." Id.
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"forum" as the State of California, inquiry was "limited to deter-
mining whether, consistent with due process, Markwitz's personal con-
tacts with California [were] sufficient to support an exercise of
... jurisdiction."" 6 The opinion does not reveal whether the defen-
dant had any contacts with other parts of the United States.
The Sixth Circuit faced a similar issue of personal jurisdiction in
a federal question case in which service had been made on the defen-
dant, pursuant to Rule 4(e), by use of the Michigan long-arm statute.
In Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp.," an action for violation of
antitrust laws, an alternative ground advanced by the plaintiff in sup-
port of personal jurisdiction was that the Michigan long-arm statute
gave the court authority over an alien defendant served outside of
Michigan. ' 48 In considering this question, the court noted the re-
quirements of the Michigan long-arm statute, judicial interpretations
that the long-arm went to the limits permitted by the fourteenth amend-
ment, and the due process requirement of "minimum contacts with
the forum state."' 49 The court did not distinguish between applicability
of the statute to the defendant and amenability standards, nor did
it mention the possibility of applying the fifth amendment. Instead,
the court examined the defendant's contacts with Michigan and con-
cluded that these were insufficient "contacts with Michigan to justify
an exercise of personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] by the District
Court."" 5 Although the court did recognize that a fifth amendment
standard might apply in federal question cases, it did so only while
discussing the alternative basis for personal jurisdiction-service under
Section 12 of the Clayton Act.'" 5' In the Section 12 portion of the
opinion, the court expressly found that if a national contacts test were
applied, the plaintiff had "failed to establish that [the defendant had]
sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole."" 52 Apparently,
the facts of this case would require the same result even if this court
had applied some fifth amendment standard while reviewing the ade-
quacy of service pursuant to the state long-arm statute.
In Burstein v. State Bar of California,'"" a recent suit instituted
in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
1146. Id. at 1379.
1147. 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1981). See also supra notes 691-92 and accompanying text
(discussing court's analysis of personal jurisdiction under §12 of the Clayton Act).
1148. 643 F.2d at 1236-37.
1149. Id. at 1236. The court cited International Shoe as the source of this list.
1150. Id. at 1237.
1151. Id. at 1237-40.
1152. Id. at 1239.
1153. 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
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a Louisiana resident who had failed the California bar examination
alleged that the State Bar of California had violated her constitu-
tional rights. The analysis by the Fifth Circuit of personal jurisdic-
tion over defendant Bar Association proceeded from its conclusion that
[t]he clear import of the 'under the circumstances' language [in Rule
4(e)], at least where the assertion of jurisdiction [as under 4(e)] and
not just the service of process depends on the state statute, is that
a federal court, even in a federal question case, can use a state long-
arm statute only to reach those parties whom a court of the state
could also reach under it."154
The Fifth Circuit distinguished some cases in which a national con-
tacts approach had been suggested, because service had been made
under Rule 4(d)(3) in a wholly federal manner"" under the first
sentence of Rule 4(e) pursuant to a federal statute authorizing na-
tionwide or worldwide service of process,"3 6 or under Rule 4(d)(7)
as instate service by a state method (since Rule 4(d)(7) did not have
any "under the circumstances" language)." 5 7 The court concluded that
in this, a 4(e) case in which no federal statute authorized nationwide
or worldwide service of process, "personal jurisdiction over the Bar
. . . is proper only if a Louisiana court could have asserted it.""' 3 8
The court examined the circumstances of this case in light of four-
teenth amendment limitations on state court jurisdiction"3 9 and con-
cluded "that the alleged actions of the Bar . . . have insufficient
relation to Louisiana to support the personal jurisdiction of a Loui-
siana state court."" 6  A federal court serving process according to
the state long-arm statute, therefore, also would lack personal
jurisdiction."'" In a footnote, the court limited its holding:
We stress that our holding is a statutory one. The analysis of the
statute, rule 4(e), requires us to apply the fourteenth amendment
restrictions on state court jurisdiction to this case. Absent the statute,
however, the only relevant constitutional provision would have been
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, since this case in-
volves a federal claim in federal court. 1 62
1154. Id. at 514. See also infra notes 1328-45 and accompanying text (discussing the
significance of the "under the circumstances" language).
1155. 693 F.2d at 515 (discussing Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212
F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954); see supra notes 856-65 and accompanying text).
1156. 693 F.2d at 515-16 (discussing Federal Trade Comm. v. Jim Walker Corp., 651 F.2d
251 (5th Cir. 1981), see supra note 597).
1157. 693 F.2d at 516 (discussing Terry v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 658 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982)).
1158. 693 F.2d at 517.
1159. Id. at 517-23.
1160. Id. at 523.
1161. Id.
1162. Id. n.16.
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The court did not, however, describe that fifth amendment standard.
The district courts also have denied jurisdiction in 4(e) cases on
the basis of the insufficiency of the defendant's contacts with the state
whose long-arm statute was used. In Conwed Corp. v. Nortene,
S.A.,'163 a federal question suit for a declaratory judgment instituted
in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, the
defendant alien corporation had been served, outside the United States,
pursuant to the Minnesota long-arm statute. After noting that such
a procedure was authorized under Rule 4(e) and (former) Rule
4(d)(7),164 the court stated that "constitutional limitations aside, the
reach of State long-arm statutes is a question of State law, to be
decided by the highest court of the State."" 65 According to state law,
the Minnesota long-arm statute, which was written in such a way as
to describe circumstances in which a Minnesota court would be
authorized to assert jurisdiction, was intended to go to the limits
of the constitution." 67 One ground on which the plaintiff asserted
that the defendants were subject to the Minnesota long-arm statute
was that the defendant had "transacted business" in Minnesota within
the meaning of the statute." 6 The court found that the defendant's
conduct would not come within the Minnesota long-arm statute but
that even if it did, "the due process clause would prohibit ...ap-
plication" of the state long-arm statute because the requirements of
International Shoe could not be satisfied.' "69 The court never returned
to the "constitutional limitations" that it had set aside, unless incor-
poration of the fourteenth amendment analysis into the statutory scope
discussion was intended to resolve amenability issues. The court ap-
parently never reached any question of federal court amenability
because the court decided that under the restrictions of the fourteenth
1163. 404 F. Supp. 497 (D. Minn. 1975).
1164. Id. at 500-01. As noted above, if former Rule 4(d)(7) is interpreted as permitting
federal courts to utilize state long arm statutes, federal courts become confused, between 4(d)(7)
and 4(e), as to the source of authority for this procedure. In such cases, the courts tend to
cite both provisions, without further explanation. See supra note 937 and notes 910, 921, 975,
989, and 1069 and accompanying text.
1165. 404 F. Supp. at 501 (emphasis added).
1166. Unlike the long-arm statutes of California, see supra note 3, and Pennsylvania, see
infra note 1173 and accompanying text, long-arm statutes that broadly authorize their courts
to do "everything not unconstitutional," states like Minnesota and New York, see supra note
3, have enacted statutes that specify the type of conduct, e.g., "commits a tortious act within
the state," which can be reached under the statute. When a state court provides that such
a statute "goes to the limits of the Constitution," it is not converting the statute into a California-
type authorization, but rather is saying that the statute is to be given broad interpretation
so that, within the particular categories of conduct reached by the statute, only the Constitu-
tion limits that reach.
1167. 404 F. Supp. at 501; see supra note 1166.
1168. 404 F. Supp. at 504-05.
1169. Id. at 504.
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amendment, a state court could not have used the long-arm statute
in the circumstances of this case. A federal court, therefore, also could
not use the provision under Rule 4(e)." 7 ° The result of this analysis,
however, is that a fourteenth amendment due process standard operates
to preclude a federal court from asserting personal jurisdiction." 7'
In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litigation,"7 2 a federal question
suit brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania by a franchisor, involved an alleged conspiracy to
violate antitrust laws and a breach of a franchise agreement. Some
of the defendants, nonresidents of Pennsylvania, had been served with
process outside the state pursuant to the Pennsylvania long-arm statute
as authorized by Rule 4(e). Again, the long-arm statute purported
to go to the limits of the fourteenth amendment. ' 73  Without
distinguishing between constitutional standards necessary to determine
the scope of the long-arm statute and those applicable to amenability
questions, the court said, in a footnote, that "the constitutional stan-
dards to be applied when examining questions of personal jurisdic-
tion are the same for the state and federal courts.""H7 The court
framed its analysis and conclusion in terms of the defendant's con-
tacts with "the forum," finding insufficient contact to satisfy the Inter-
national Shoe fairness doctrine. ' ' 75 The court, however, clearly was
applying the standard developed for state court cases, minimum con-
tact with the state: the court outlined the development of the Inter-
national Shoe test ' 7 6 and then examined only Pennsylvania contacts
under circumstances in which it was obvious that the defendants had
substantial contacts with other parts of the United States.'"7 7
In a more recent federal question case, Brotherhood Cia Naviera
S.A. v. Zapata Marine Service, Inc.,I ' the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania again faced the question of
1170. See infra notes 1328-45 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the
"under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e)).
1171. If the long arm cannot be used unless the fourteenth amendment is satisfied, then
a fourteenth amendment threshold test must be satisfied and would limit the federal court.
1172. 92 F.R.D. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also supra notes 813-16 and accompanying text
(discussing this case in regard to personal jurisdiction, under Rule 4(d)(1), over different
defendants).
1173. 92 F.R.D. at 408. The court noted, "Pennsylvania's long-arm statute . . . provides
for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over non-residents 'to the fullest extent allowed
under the Constitution of the United States' and may be based on the most minimum contact
with the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] allowed under the Constitution of the United States."
Id. (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5322(b) (Purdon 1981)).
1174. 92 F.R.D. at 408 n.6.
1175. Id. at 410.
1176. Id. at 408-09.
1177. Some of the defendants were large corporations incorporated in the United States
and doing business in other areas of the United States. See id. at 407 (describing defendants).
1178. 547 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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personal jurisdiction in a case in which the defendants, Texas and
Panamanian corporations, had been served with process, as authorized
by Rule 4(e), pursuant to the Pennsylvania long-arm statute." 79 In
a footnote, the court recognized the existence of a "national contacts
approach" to federal court personal jurisdiction but cited DeJames
as rejecting that approach "in the absence of express Congressional
authorization."' 8 0 Consequently, although the defendants had substan-
tial contacts with other areas of the United States,"' the court used
the fourteenth amendment test and, based on the defendants' con-
tacts with the state of Pennsylvania, found that the court lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction.""2
Category 2. In Japan Gas Lighter Association v. Ronson
Corporation,"83 a federal question suit for declaratory judgment that
the defendants' patent was invalid or that the plaintiff's device did
not infringe the defendants' patent, one _of the defendants, an alien
corporation that had been served, pursuant to Rule 4(e),"8 4 under
the New Jersey long-arm statute, moved to dismiss for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. The district court found that service under the state
long-arm rule "was proper as long as the State rule may constitu-
tionally be applied to the facts."" 8 " On this issue the court noted
that "[ijnsofar as due process is concerned, this Court's power to
assert jurisdiction in a Federal question matter is tested, technically
speaking, under the Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment." 1186
The court, however, asserted that "the clearest guidance on when such
jurisdiction is permissible is found in the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements on the corresponding power of State tribunals."" 87 After
discussing International Shoe, Hanson, and McGee, the court con-
cluded that the alien defendants' contacts with New Jersey were suf-
ficient to satisfy the tests established in those state court cases." 8
1179. 547 F. Supp. at 688-90.
1180. 547 F. Supp. at 691 n.3; see supra notes 1123-41 and accompanying text (discussing
the DeJames case).
1181. 547 F. Supp. at 691 n.3.
1182. Id. at 690-92. The court did not dismiss the case but transferred it, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1404(a), to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Id.
1183. 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966).
1184. The court noted that "Federal Rules 4(e) and [former] 4(f) authorize service outside
the State in which the District Court sits in any manner prescribed by State law." Id. This
is another example of a court, confused by the juxtaposition of two rules that seemed to it
to provide the same authority, citing both without deciding which actually authorizes use of
state law. See supra note 937, 910, 975, 989, 1069 and 1164 and accompanying text (discussing
other cases in which courts reacted in this manner). See also supra notes 1052-61 and accom-
panying text (suggesting an important distinction in the way these rules were intended to operate).
1185. 257 F. Supp. at 231.
1186. Id. at 232.
1187. Id.
1188. Id. at 232-36.
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In a footnote, however, the court questioned whether, "in a Federal
action such as this, the relevant 'affiliating circumstances' may not
include the ties which [the defendant] has with the United States
Federal system as a whole. .. ."1189 Since the court found sufficient
contacts with the state, it did not pursue this line of reasoning.
In Home v. Adolph Coors Co.,"" a recent federal question case
involving a claim for patent infringement brought in the District of
New Jersey against a Colorado corporation, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied International Shoe to the
question of the personal jurisdiction of the federal court. Service had
been made on the defendant, as authorized by Rule 4(e), pursuant
to the New Jersey long-arm statute."' The court noted that the statute
had been interpreted as going to the limits of due process" 92 and
concluded that its "inquiry present[ed] the question whether due pro-
cess [would] permit ... the district court to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over [the defendant]." ' ' 93 The court seemed to include a con-
stitutional element in its consideration of the applicability of the New
Jersey statute.'94 In other cases, this approach has led inexorably to
the application of the fourteenth amendment "minimum contacts with
the state" approach first announced in International Shoe.""
After posing the question of whether the Supreme Court, in In-
surance Corp. of Ireland,"196 had abandoned any sovereignty rationale
for limitation of state court jurisdiction, 197 the court observed that
this "intriguing question . . . need not be answered in this case"
because the case involved a federal question exclusively reserved to
federal courts." '  Moreover, the court said that "[t]he only constitu-
tional limitation on Congressional power to provide a forum is
whatever fairness to the defendant is required by the fifth
1189. Id. at 236 n.34. The ties to which the court referred were the defendant's patents.
The court continued, "Those ties, of course, do involve the interest of the Federal system
in vindicating its substantial law policies in this area." Id.
Japan Gas Lighter arose four years after the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee in First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Co., formulated and adopted
a national contacts approach in a 4(d)(3) case. See 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); supra
notes 872-87 and accompanying text. Japan Gas Lighter, which did not cite First Flight, was
one of the earlier cases to recognize the possibility of some national contacts approach to
amenability in federal question cases.
1190. 684 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1982).
1191. Id. at 257.
1192. Id.
1193. Id.
1194. See supra notes 1076-93 and infra notes 1328-49 and accompanying text (discussing
the possibility of such a threshold requirement).
1195. See supra notes 1123-33, 1142-52 and 1172-77 and accompanying text.
1196. See supra notes 156-77 and accompanying text.
1197. 684 F.2d at 259.
1198. Id.; see also supra note 19 (discussing subject matter areas in which federal courts
have been given exclusive subject matter jurisdiction).
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amendment." ' 199 No "fifth amendment fairness" test, however, was
formulated. The court held instead that when the defendant placed
its allegedly infringing product "in the stream of interstate commerce"
under circumstances in which the defendant should have known that
the plaintiff patent owner would be injured wherever he lived (New
Jersey) and, when some of the products actually reached New Jersey,
then "it cannot be said that requiring the alleged infringer to defend
in the forum chosen by the patent owner, which also happens to be
the patent owner's residence, so offends traditional notions of fairness
as to be a violation of due process and therefore unconstitutional."' 2
The court, therefore, ambiguously stated, in the context of the long-
arm requirements, that "due process" would determine personal
jurisdiction and then asserted that a fifth amendment fairness stan-
dard should govern in federal question cases that only arise in federal
courts. The court did not clarify whether this was the "due process"
by which to judge the applicability of the New Jersey long-arm statute
or a separate amenability standard to be applied after statutory ap-
plicability had been established. Next, however, the court considered
fairness to the defendant under the circumstances of this case, an
analysis which did not look any different from an examination of
the defendant's contacts with the State of New Jersey. (The court
examined the defendant's action outside New Jersey which caused in-
jury to the plaintiff within New Jersey.) This approach, then, really
was an application of the fourteenth amendment standard. Clearly,
the court did not weigh in its analysis the defendant's other substan-
tial contacts with the United States. 20 '
Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke2 °2 was another patent in-
fringement suit against an alien corporation. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois examined two alternative
bases for asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant: (1) ser-
vice in Illinois on an agent of the corporation under Rule 4(d)(3)
(discussed above) 120 3 and (2) service outside Illinois pursuant to the
Illinois long-arm statute. The district court confused the two ques-
tions, deciding that 4(d)(3) did not apply because defendant did "not
have sufficient minimum contacts with the State . . . to warrant
• ..exercising in personam jurisdiction . ,,120 Second, the court
1199. 684 F.2d at 259.
1200. Id. at 260.
1201. The court almost seemed to be interpreting a statute to decide whether the defendant
had "done enough" to come within the New Jersey long-arm statute. The court did not more
than a state court would have done if a state court had been authorized to hear such a case.
1202. 353 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Ill. 1972). See also supra notes 845-55 and accompanying text.
1203. See supra notes 845-55 and accompanying text.
1204. 353 F. Supp. at 495.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
found that the defendant's conduct did not come within the language
of the Illinois long-arm statute. 2 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed. 20 6 The appellate court held that the defendant's conduct
did fall within the Illinois long-arm statute, 20 7 finding that the
"activities engaged in by [the defendant] were sufficient to establish
minimum contacts with the state. . . , and that exercise of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to the . . .Illinois long-arm statute . . . would
not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."' 200 The
court of appeals never considered the applicability of Rule 4(d)(3).
The court of appeals distinguished between the statutory interpreta-
tion of the Illinois long-arm statute and the due process limitations
concerning the constitutionality of the assertion of jurisdiction. The
court did not include any constitutional analysis or references in its
consideration of the first issue. When deciding the second issue,
amenability, the Seventh Circuit did not find, as have courts that have
programmed a fourteenth amendment constitutional requirement in-
to the statutory interpretation question, that the amenability question
was moot.
The court recognized that International Shoe and its progeny
established restraints, under the fourteenth amendment, on "state
power." The Seventh Circuit noted, however, that "[iun this litiga-
tion ... a federally created right is at issue, and due process is prop-
erly a matter for examination in light of the Fifth Amendment rather
than the Fourteenth Amendment."'' 2 9 The court said, in a footnote,
that some courts had applied national contacts as the fifth amend-
ment due process standard but observed that "[w]e need not reach
such a broad conclusion here."' 210 This statement probably arose from
the determination by the court that a narrower test, minimum con-
tacts with the state, had been satisfied. The International Shoe test
was adopted based upon the following reasoning:
[Tihe International Shoe line of cases is [not] irrelevant to our
inquiry here. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is essen-
tially a recognition of the principles of justice and fundamental
fairness in a given set of circumstances . . . and, so viewed, on
the facts of this case, we can perceive no operative difference be-
tween the concept of due process as applied to the states and as
1205. Id.
1206. Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975).
1207. Id. at 1141-43.
1208. Id. at 1145.
1209. Id. at 1143.
1210. Id. n.2.
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applied to the federal government. This and other courts have reached
this result, explicitly or tacitly, and have applied the "minimum con-
tacts" standard to federal question cases in which in personam
jurisdiction was at issue, and we deem it appropriate to do so here.'2 '
The court then examined the circumstances of the case under the In-
ternational Shoe standard as it had then been interpreted' 2" and deter-
mined that assertion of personal jurisdiction would be constitutional.
In People of State of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,2" 3 a recent
suit brought under the federal common law of nuisance in which ser-
vice was made, under Rule 4(e), pursuant to the Illinois long-arm
statute, the Seventh Circuit again applied a current fourteenth amend-
ment test and concluded that defendant's contacts with the state of
Illinois made it fair and reasonable for the court to assert personal
jurisdiction.' 214 Again, the court divided the analysis into statutory
construction and amenability, and again the court kept constitutional
issues separate from its interpretation of the long-arm statute. In a
footnote, the court observed:
If Congress had chosen to authorize nationwide service of process,
no minimum contacts issue would be raised. ... Congress has not
done so and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) makes jurisdiction dependent on
the long-arm statute or rule of court of the state in which the district
court is held; therefore we are required to determine whether defen-
dants' contacts with Illinois are sufficient to support the exercise
of in personam jurisdiction.""
While the court seemed incorrect in stating that no minimum con-
tacts issue would be raised (at least, amenability would still be an
issue),'21 6 the Seventh Circuit clearly will continue to apply the four-
teenth amendment, in the absence of Congressional action, in 4(e)
cases involving use of state long-arm statutes.
In a more recent case, In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz off Coast
of France on March 16, 1978,1217 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its
1211. Id. at 1143 (citations and footnote omitted).
1212. The factors to be considered by a court in determining whether International Shoe
has been satisfied have changed as the doctrine developed. See supra notes 106-85 and accom-
panying text (discussing the historical development of the International Shoe test).
1213. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
1214. Id. at 156.
1215. Id. n.3 (citations omitted).
1216. In cases like Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979), see supra notes
630-36 and accompanying text, and Mariash v. Morill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974), see supra
notes 622-29 and accompanying text, where service is made pursuant to a nationwide service
of process statute, the only amenability standard might be "presence" where served. See supra
note 793 and accompanying text. However, a "contacts" analysis still is possible. See supra
note 794 and accompanying text. Moreover, service outside the Untied States pursuant to such
a statute clearly requires amenability analysis. See supra notes 795-96 and accompanying text.
1217. 699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1983).
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approach to the question of amenability standards in federal ques-
tion cases in which service is made, pursuant to Rule 4(e), by the
long-arm statute of the state in which the federal court is sitting. This
case involved a suit by French citizens, for damage caused by the
breakup of a supertanker off the coast of France, against, inter alia,
the builder of the ship, a Spanish company that had built the ship
in Spain.'2 8 The court again divided the analysis into two parts,
statutory and constitutional. First, it found that the defendant's con-
duct came within one of the provisions of the Illinois long-arm
statute. 2 9 Then, it turned to the question of "whether the Illinois
statute, so interpreted, violates due process."' 220 The court applied
Supreme Court cases involving fourteenth amendment limitations on
state courts, 22' finding that the defendant "had . . . a sufficient
presence within Illinois to satisfy the territorial notions that Volkswagen
brought back into due process analysis of personal jurisdiction."""
Although the Supreme Court has, subsequent to World-Wide
Volkswagen, disavowed any intention to reintroduce notions of
sovereignty or territoriality into state due process analysis,2 2 3 this
Seventh Circuit opinion is important because the court was applying,
to federal court amenability, the test it perceived as applicable to state
courts under the fourteenth amendment. The Seventh Circuit did not
mention the possibility that a standard different from that which had
developed under the fourteenth amendment should apply in federal
courts, nor did it discuss any other standard.
Federal district courts also have relied on standards established for
state courts and have applied variations on the International Shoe
test to federal question cases in which service was made outside the
state in which the federal court is held, as authorized by Rule 4(e),
1218. The defendant, Astilleros Espanoles, S.A., had contacts with the State of Illinois
in regard of the problem before the court. The court stated the following facts: "The contract
to build the Amoco Cadiz [the supertanker], was signed in Chicago in 1970 after extensive
negotiations, in Chicago and Spain, between Astilleros and Amoco. . . .The real purchaser
of the Amoco Cadiz was Standard Oil Company (Indiana), whose headquarters is in Chicago.
* . ." Id. at 914.
1219. Id. at 914-15.
1220. Id. at 915.
1221. Id. at 915-16. The court discussed International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945) (see supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text), Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958) (see supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text), and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (see supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text).
1222. 699 F.2d at 916. See supra note 148 accompanying text (discussing federalism and
sovereignty analysis in World-Wide). But see supra note 167 and 174-75 and accompanying
text (discussing effect of Insurance Corp. of Ireland on federalism basis of fourteenth amend-
ment standard).
1223. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 n.10 (1982). See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction
by using the state long-arm statute. In Crucible, Inc. v. Stora Kop-
parsbergs Bergslags AB,2" a patent infringement action initiated in
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania,
the defendant alien corporation, which "maintain[ed] no established
place of business in Pennsylvania,"' 225 had been served outside Penn-
sylvania "in the precise manner required by the Pennsylvania [Long-
Arm] Statute . . ."I226 The court noted that "the sole question
presented . .. is whether, in these circumstances, proper service of
process under the Pennsylvania Statute subjects the defendant to the
in personam jurisdiction of this court."'' 227 The court recited the ap-
plicable provisions of the long-arm statute,'22 noted that "the Penn-
sylvania Legislature clearly expressed its intention to extend in per-
sonam jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the fullest measure
permitted by federal due process standards,"' 229 and observed that
"[u]nder familiar doctrine, those constitutional standards are satisfied
by finding that the defendant corporation has certain 'minimum con-
tacts' with the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania],"23" the Interna-
tional Shoe test. The court did not clarify whether it included this
fourteenth amendment test as part of the statutory interpretation, i.e.,
the statute cannot be used unless a state court could use it constitu-
tionally, or whether this was the amenability standard to be applied
in federal courts. Finding the defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania
sufficient, the court asserted personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. 23'
In another recent case, Odriozola v. Superior Cosmetic Distributors,
Inc.,'232 the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico applied the International Shoe doctrine to resolve a question
of personal jurisdiction in a federal question case. Under Rule 4(e),
the Puerto Rico long-arm statute was held to apply.'233 The court
did not discuss constitutional doctrine; rather, it merely cited Inter-
1224. 403 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
1225. Id. at 10.
1226. Id.
1227. Id.
1228. Id. at 11.
1229. Id.
1230. Id.
1231. The opinion reveals that the defendant had contacts with other parts of the United
States. Id. at 11-13. The court did not have to consider any test other than "minimum contacts
with the state" (and it did not consider any) because the narrow International Shoe test had
been satisfied.
1232. 531 F. Supp. 1070 (D.P.R. 1982).
1233. Id. at 1073. The court argued that since the federal statute under which the suit had
been brought did "not provide an independent basis for personal jurisdiction, we must look
to the law of the state in which the action was brought. Rule 4(e) FRCP." Id.
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national Shoe and World- Wide Volkswagen and examined the defen-
dant's contacts with Puerto Rico, 23 ' finding them sufficient to sup-
port jurisdiction. 2" The defendant objecting to personal jurisdiction,
a New York-based corporation, 236 clearly had substantial contacts with
other parts of the United States. The court, however, seemed content
to consider only local contacts.
In Stanley v. Local 926 of the International Union of Operating
Engineers of the AFL-CIO,237 a civil rights class action brought against
an international union located in Washington, D.C., the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia distinguished be-
tween the incorporation of state law that was permissible under former
Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e). While Rule 4(d)(7) "incorporates all state
methods" of service upon 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) defendants, the court
argued that 4(d)(7) was limited, by Rule 4(f), "to the territorial limits
of the state in which the district court is held, unless some federal
statute or rule authorizes extra-territorial service."' 238 Rule 4(e) is such
a rule, permitting extra-territorial service by state long arm statute
or rule.' 239 The court, therefore, concluded that since no federal statute
authorized service outside Georgia, then it must consider the Georgia
long-arm statute as incorporated into the Federal Rules by Rule 4(e). 240
The Georgia statute would apply, the court found, "if the assertion
of personal jurisdiction over the International was constitutionally
permissible."' 124' The court went on to apply the traditional fourteenth
amendment "minimum contacts with the state" approach and found
that the test had been satisfied.' 24  It did not specify whether con-
sideration of the constitutional issue was for purposes of applying
the statute or for purposes of establishing federal court amenability.
In a footnote, however, the court seemed to indicate that it was ap-
plying an amenability standard. The existence of a national contacts
approach for federal question cases was recognized but rejected on
the ground "that the terms of Rule 4(e) dictate a test based on minimal
contacts with the forum state."' 24 3
1234. Id. at 1073-74.
1235. Id. at 1073-76.
1236. Id. at 1072.
1237. 354 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
1238. Id. at 1269-70. See also supra notes 1052-66 and accompanying text (discussing
possibility of limiting former Rule 4(d)(7) to service within the state).
1239. 354 F. Supp. at 1270.
1240. Id.
1241. Id. at 1271.
1242. Id.
1243. Id. at 1271 n.3.
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Some district courts in Rule 4(e) cases have been more sympathetic
to a national contacts test, but have declined to adopt the standard,
finding such action unnecessary on the facts of their particular cases.
In Graham Engineering Corp. v. Kemp Products Ltd.,2 4 for exam-
ple, a patent litigation brought in the Northern District of Ohio by
a Pennsylvania corporation against, inter alia, a Canadian corpora-
tion, the court acknowledged that a national contacts test had been
applied to amenability in federal question cases. 245 The court expressed
doubt as to the applicability of such a standard without some statutory
authority therefor, 2" but declined to resolve the question because
"it is clear that .. .jurisdiction is available [under state law]."" 247
Instead, the doing-business-in-Ohio provision of the Ohio long-arm
statute, which supposedly was limited only by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, was applied. The court admitted that
"technically it is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth . ..Amend-
ment that requires construction" in this federal question case'24 8 but
resolved this difficulty by noting that those courts holding that "federal
law should govern the area ...have opined that the Fifth Amend-
ment standard is more liberal."' 2 9 The conclusion by the court,
therefore, that the defendant had sufficient contacts with Ohio to
satisfy the fourteenth amendment'25 also would satisfy any fifth
amendment standard.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
considered a national contacts test for federal court personal jurisdic-
tion in federal question cases in Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General
Tire & Rubber Co,'25' an antitrust action against, inter alia, an alien
manufacturer. Service had not been made on the defendant pursuant
to a federal statute authorizing worldwide service of process but "pur-
suant to Rule 4(d)(7) and (e) ...which provides that summons may
be served upon a foreign corporation in the manner prescribed by
the law of the state in which the district court sits."' 252 The court
seemed reluctant to choose between former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e)
as authority for use of the Ohio long-arm statute;'253 moreover, the
1244. 418 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
1245. Id. at 919 n.3.
1246. Id.
1247. Id.
1248. Id. at 920 n.6.
1249. Id.
1250. Id. at 920-22.
1251. 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
1252. Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
1253. See also supra notes 937, 910, 921, 975, 989, 1069, 1166, and 1186 and accompany-
ing text (discussing judicial difficulty in distinguishing between the functions of former Rule
4(d)(7) and those of Rule 4(e)).
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court used the words "in the manner" which appear in both former
4(d)(7) and 4(e). 214 In a later portion of the opinion, however, the
court relied on Rule 4(e) and its particular "under the circumstances"
language in refusing to apply what it considered to be the proper
test for federal court personal jurisdiction-contacts with the United
States as a whole.' 25 This writer, therefore, has read Edward J.
Moriarty as a Rule 4(e) case because the purported limiting language
in Rule 4(e) provided a pivotol point in the court's analysis.
The court made a strong argument for a separate federal amenability
test, stating that in other federal question cases which purported to
apply a "'federal' test of jurisdiction ... the Court invariably winds
up looking at the contacts of the foreign corporation with the state,
rather than with the United States. . . ,a misconception of the
'federal' test as we appl[y] it .. ."256 The court began analysis by
positing that a federal standard should apply in cases like the one
at bar:
It is our opinion that a federal district court may acquire jurisdic-
tion over the person of a defendant incorporated under the laws
of a foreign country without regard to contacts of the corporation
with the state where the court sits. This is especially true in a case
where the cause of action rests upon a federally-created right, such
as this one, and where national uniformity in enforcing that right
should be the true guideline.'2 57
Making an argument that appeared in cases involving federal statutes
authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of process, the court
continued:
[I]n our view, the judicial jurisdiction over the person of the defen-
dant does not relate to the geographical power of the particular court
which is hearing the controversy, but to the power of the unit of
government of which that court is a part. The limitations of the
concept of personal jurisdiction are a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective forums. Thus, as applied
to the states, the constitutional test for personal jurisdiction involves
a determination as to whether the defendant has certain minimal
contacts with the forum state, such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice ...
1254. See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text (discussing former Rule 4(d)(7) and
notes 287-88 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 4(e)). On the other hand, this might be
interpreted as selection of former Rule 4(d)(7), which included only the "in the manner" language,
rather than Rule 4(e), which included the entire phrase "under the circumstances and in the
manner."
1255. 289 F. Supp. at 390.
1256. Id. at 390 n.2.
1257. Id. at 389.
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By the same token, we feel that the appropriate inquiry to be made
in a federal court where the suit is based upon a federally created
right is whether the defendant has certain minimal contacts with the
United States, so as to satisfy due process requirements under the
Fifth Amendment.""
After arguing in favor of a fifth amendment federal standard,
minimum contacts with the United States as a whole, the court never-
theless declined to apply that standard; "this course has not been
left open to us by the federal rules or statutes. . . .[because] neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has provided statute or rule whereby
substituted service may be made upon an alien corporation having
certain minimum contacts with the United States.""'25 The court in-
terpreted the "under the circumstances" language of Rule 4(e) "to
mean that when service is made pursuant to a state long-arm statute,
it is only proper when the corporation served meets the qualifications
for service set out in the statute."' 260 This construction also would
not seem to require application of a fourteenth amendment test.
126
'
After examining not only the question of whether the defendant's
conduct came within the meaning of the Ohio long-arm statute but
also the sufficiency of those contacts with the state of Ohio, the court
concluded that those standards had been satisfied. 262 Clearly preferr-
ing a national contacts approach, the court felt constrained to use
the "contacts with the state" test. "[T]he lack of means to pursue
the proper course leaves room for no other result,"' 1263 the court noted.
Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp.,26" a patent infr-
ingement suit in which the defendant alien corporation had been served
with process, as authorized by Rule 4(e), under the Utah long-arm
statute, is often cited as a case favorable to the national contacts
approach. 265 First, the court concluded that the defendants were sub-
ject to suit under the Utah long-arm statute because each had suffi-
cient contacts with Utah to satisfy the fourteenth amendment limita-
1258. Id. at 390.
1259. Id.
1260. Id.
1261. But see supra note 1109 and accompanying text and infra notes 1341-50 and accom-
panying text (discussing interpretation that "under the circumstances" language limits federal
court use of the state long-arm statute to only those circumstances in which a state court could
constitutionally use the long-arm statute). -
1262. 289 F. Supp. at 390-91.
1263. Id. at 390 n.2.
1264. 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973).
1265. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416-17 (9th
Cir. 1977) (supra notes 974-84 and accompanying text); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd.,
397 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D. Conn. 1975) (infra notes 1269-83 and accompanying text); Note,
supra note 121, at 476.
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tion on that provision.'2 6 Next, the court approved, in the cir-
cumstances of this case, evaluation of the defendant's national contacts:
[W]here, as here, suit is brought against alien defendants, the court
properly may consider the aggregate presence of the defendants' ap-
paratus in the United States as a whole. Due process or traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice should not immunize an
alien defendant from suit in the United States simply because each
state makes up only a fraction of the substantial nationwide market
for the offending product.' 267
The conclusion by the court, however, did not mention the fifth
amendment or national contacts:
The court has carefully reviewed each of the arguments and
materials presented and concludes that the present suit is encom-
passed by Utah's long-arm statute and is not offensive to the Four-
teenth Amendment. 268
Whether the court "threw in" national contacts to bolster its four-
teenth amendment analysis or whether it saw a fifth amendment
national contacts approach as an alternative holding remains unclear.
The concluding paragraph, however, clearly robs this case of any bin-
ding precedential value in favor of national contacts as a general federal
amenability standard.
Category 3. This category really includes only one federal question
case in which service was made, pursuant to Rule 4(e), under a state
long-arm statute: Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Limited,'269 a patent
action by a Connecticut corporation against a Great Britain corpora-
tion. The defendant did not "contest [plaintiff's] claim that the Con-
necticut corporate long-arm statute . . . provides a basis for service
of process on it""'27 under Rule 4(e) and Rule 4(i)(1)(D), which pro-
vides methods of service outside the United States,' 27 ' but only that
"the application of the statute to it is unconstitutional.' 27 2 Whether
the defendant was arguing that the statute could not be applied to
it because the fourteenth amendment would not permit a state court
to assert jurisdiction over the defendant,' 273 or whether the defen-
dant was arguing that some fifth amendment amenability standard
imposed on federal courts had not been satisfied is unclear.' 2" The
1266. 362 F. Supp. at 725-28.
1267. Id. at 728.
1268. Id. at 729.
1269. 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975).
1270. Id. at 288.
1271. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i); see supra note 269 (text of Rule 4(i)).
1272. 397 F. Supp. at 288.
1273. See infra note 1321 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of 4(e) cases).
1274. See infra note 1322 and accompanying text.
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defendant did argue that its contacts with Connecticut were insuffi-
cient to satisfy the International Shoe test, 275 but this argument might
have furthered either position.
The court also did not reveal to which of these questions it applied
a due process analysis. Since, however, the court concluded that a
fifth amendment standard applied to the question,'276 it either was
discussing amenability directly or was assuming (or concluding) that
each assertion of personal jurisdiction is entitled to only one due pro-
cess analysis, regardless of how service was made, a fourteenth amend-
ment analysis for a state court and a fifth amendment analysis for
a federal court. Assessing the importance of International Shoe in
a footnote, the court said:
International Shoe applied the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in determining the limits of state court in personam
jurisdiction over non-residents. Because subject-matter jurisdiction
in the present action is conferred by federal law, the sufficiency of
Spembly's contacts, whether with the State of Connecticut or with
the United States, must be tested against the Fifth Amendment.
Although the Fifth Amendment test is sometimes expressed in more
general "fairness" terms, International Shoe and subsequent cases
provide the basis for the fairness test, and the analysis is substan-
tially similar2."
Later, the court considered the -constitutional test applicable to those
counts of the complaint that arose under federal law:
[Ilt is not necessary to decide whether [the defendant's] contracts
[sic] with Connecticut are alone sufficient to satisfy the demands
of the Constitution. When a federal court is asked to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over an alien defendant sued on a claim arising
out of federal law, jurisdiction may appropriately be determined on
the basis of the alien's aggregated contacts with the United States
as a whole, regardless of whether the contacts with the state in which
the district court sits would be sufficient if considered alone.
... If the defendant's contacts with the United States are sufficient
to satisfy the fairness standard of the Fifth Amendment, . . .then
the only limitation on place of trial would be the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.1z11
Discussing cases that had considered a national contacts approach,'279
1275. 397 F. Supp. at 288.
1276. Id. n.3.
1277. Id.
1278. Id. at 290.
1279. Id. at 290-92 (discussing Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co.,
289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967)) (supra notes 1251-63 and accompanying text); Engineered
Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973) (supra notes 1264-68
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the court noted at least two important reasons for adopting the test
in cases involving alien defendants: the national contacts test would
allow suit in a federal district court in those situations in which the
defendant had substantial but thinly-scattered contacts throughout the
United States,' 280 and, in terms of convenience to the defendant, an
alien defendant which had contacts throughout the United States but
which was incorporated and had its place of business in another coun-
try would have "no reason based on fairness to prefer any one par-
ticular district to any other. .... ,'ll' On the other hand, the court
observed, "[w]hen a defendant is a citizen of the United States, there
are very real differences in convenience between litigating in a state
where it does business or resides, and one in which it has only in-
significant contacts. ... I'll Using its announced fifth amendment
test of national contacts, the court found that the defendant was
amenable to suit in the federal district court.' 283 The court did not
discuss the applicability of a state standard based on grounds raised
by other courts: the use of the state long-arm statute or the "under
the circumstances" language of Rule 4(e). In support of its national
contacts test, moreover, the court discussed cases in which service
had been made by wholly federal methods when the court had adopted
a national contacts test, as well as cases involving use of state long-
arm statutes when the court had not adopted expressly a national
contacts test. This case, therefore, is not entirely persuasive as authority
for the adoption of a national contacts approach in a 4(e) case in-
volving service of process pursuant to a state long-arm statute.
Several other federal courts recently have adopted a national con-
tacts test for personal jurisdiction in federal question cases, but these
cases do not fit neatly into the category of cases being considered
in this section. Although they clearly did not employ a wholly federal
method of service of process, these courts do not specify what part
of Rule 4 was used to effect service. 128 4 These probably are 4(e) cases
and thus are discussed here as related to Cryomedics.
and accompanying text); First Flight Co. v. National Caroloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730
(E.D. Tenn. 1962) (supra notes 872-84 and accompanying text).
1280. 397 F. Supp. at 291 (quoting Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362
F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973)).
1281. 397 F. Supp. at 292.
1282. Id.
1283. Id.
1284. See, e.g., Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 560 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (infra
notes 1285-1301 and accompanying text); Coats Company, Inc. v. Vulcan Equip. Co. Ltd.,
459 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (infra notes 1302-09 and accompanying text); Holt v. Klosters
Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (infra notes 1310-16 and accompanying text).
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In a very recent case, Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer,x285 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania treated
the national contacts approach as established, citing Cryomedics as
authority.'28 6 This result could not be predicted from prior cases in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Third Circuit,' 217 and
Cryomedics, a case decided by the District of Connecticut, certainly
would not bind the Third Circuit on this issue. Daetwyler involved
an action for patent infringement by a New York corporation against
an alien defendant. The defendant objected to the personal jurisdic-
tion of the district court, claiming that "he [had] never been to Penn-
sylvania and had never done business in Pennsylvania."' 281 Plaintiff
urged that the court could assert jurisdiction based on the defendant's
contacts with the United States outside Pennsylvania: the defendant
shipped the allegedly infringing devices to two United States com-
panies that sold the devices in the United States, and the defendant
advertised "in trade publications distributed throughout the United
States." 289
The plaintiff had urged that the defendant came within the "trans-
acting business" part of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute. 290 Citing
Cryomedics, the court responded that "[b]ecause this case presents
a federal question, however, the issue whether jurisdiction may be
asserted over defendant must be determined by reference to federal
law.' '1 29 ' The court did not discuss or allude to statutory authority,
state or federal, for service on the defendant, but immediately began
to examine the defendant's contacts with PennsylVania, concluding
that "[w]ere jurisdiction over defendant to be tested solely by his con-
tacts with Pennsylvania, one would be hard pressed, on these facts,
to find contacts sufficient to satisfy Fifth Amendment standards."1 292
Quoting the reasons advanced in Cryomedics for the appropriateness
of a national contacts test, the court adopted a national contacts stan-
dard, finding the defendant amenable to suit.' 293
1285. 560 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (memorandum opinion).
1286. Id. at 870.
1287. See infra note 1300 and accompanying text.
1288. 560 F. Supp. at 870.
1289. Id.
1290. Id. at 870.
1291. Id.
1292. Id.
1293. Id. at 870-71 (citing Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D.
Conn 1975) (contacts with United States) (supra notes 1271-85 and accompanying text); 397
F. Supp. at 291 (territory with which to measure contacts is entire unit, that is, the United
States); Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973)
(national contacts important where defendant's contacts too thinly scattered to permit suit in
any particular state) (supra notes 1264-68 and accompanying text); Centronics Data Computer
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This wholehearted espousal by the court of the national contacts
test has little precedential value. Service could not have been made
on the defendant by a wholly federal method because (a) no federal
statute authorizes nationwide or worldwide service of process in patent
cases,' 29 (b) the defendant was not present or residing in Pennsylvania
as required by Rule 4(d)(l),129 and (c) service was not made within
Pennsylvania upon some agent of the defendant as authorized by Rule
4(d)(3).1296 Service, therefore, could have been made, as authorized
by Rule 4(e) and perhaps, former Rule 4(d)(7), only by using the Penn-
sylvania long-arm statute. That statute, however, expressly goes to
the limits of the fourteenth amendment,'297 and the court said that
the defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania probably would be insuf-
ficient to satisfy this standard.' 298 The court might have found that
when a state long-arm statute expressly purports to permit service
whenever constitutional, then a defendant may be served with pro-
cess so long as the appropriate due process standard, fifth amend-
ment for federal courts and fourteenth amendment for state courts,
is satisfied. 299 The statutory interpretation and due process questions
would be analyzed at the same time; the statute would only apply
if due process were satisfied. The court, however, was silent as to
manner of service of process, and the analysis suggested above can-
not be inferred from the opinion. Moreover, the court cited Cryomedics
as authority, but ignored opinions of Eastern District of Pennsylvania
and the Third Circuit rejecting a national contacts test in the absence
of statutory authority.'300 Finally, in Cryomedics, the defendant did
not argue that he could not be served under the Connecticut long-
arm statute, and the court interpreted this as a waiver of any non-
constitutional objection to service.' 30' The Cryomedics court, therefore,
did not have to determine whether any circumstances could arise in
which service would be appropriate pursuant to the terms of the Con-
necticut long-arm statute and the "in the circumstances" language
Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977) (convenience factor for alien defen-
dant usually not affected by location of suit) (supra notes 1011-38 and accompanying text)).
1294. See supra note 247 and accompanying text; see also Graham Eng'g Corp. v. Kemp
Prods. Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915, 919-20 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
1295. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
1296. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
1297. See supra note 1173.
1298. See supra note 1292 and accompanying text.
1299. See infra notes 1348-49 and accompanying text (discussing this possible analysis in
certain 4(e) cases).
1300. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283 (supra notes
1123-41 and accompanying text); Brotherhood Cia Naviera S.A. v. Zapata Marine Service,
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 688, 691 n.3 (supra notes 1180-84 and accompanying text).
1301. See supra notes 1270-72 and accompanying text.
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of Rule 4(e), but in which only a national contacts test could be
satisfied.
In a 1978 case, Coats Company, Inc. v. Vulcan Equipment Com-
pany Ltd.,32 the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois adopted Cryomedics. The district court said that "[s]ince
the Seventh Circuit did not, when given the opportunity to do so,
expressly question or reject the validity of that holding, Honeywell,
Inc. v. Metz Apparatswerks [sic], . . .this court feels compelled under
the circumstances to follow the reasoning of [Cryomedics].' ' 33 The
question before the district court was whether the federal district court
sitting in Iowa, to which this patent infringement action had been
transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a), 3 °4 had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant alien corporation at the time the suit
had been instituted in the Northern District of Illinois. If the defen-
dant was not, at that time, subject to the personal jurisdiction of
the federal court sitting in Iowa, then the case, according to the ex-
press terms of Section 1404(a), could not be transferred there. 3 5 The
requirement was purely technical because six days after the plaintiff
had commenced his patent infringement action in the Northern District
of Illinois, the defendant in the Illinois action brought a declaratory
judgment suit for invalidity and noninfringement against the plaintiff
in the Southern District of Iowa.' 3 6 In these circumstances, the court
applied Cryomedics, holding that since the defendant's "contacts with
the United States were sufficient in quality and nature to satisfy this
standard ... the courts of the Southern District of Iowa would have
been able to validly assert personal jurisdiction over [the defendant]
on [the date the suit in the Northern District of Illinois was
initiated]."' 30 7 The court refused to read Cryomedics narrowly as re-
quiring that some of the contacts with the United States had to be
with the place of trial. 30 8
The precedential value of Coats is unclear in light of recent Seventh
Circuit opinions.' 30 9 The problem with Coats was that the court merely
1302. 459 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. II1. 1978).
1303. Id. at 659 (citation omitted). See supra notes 1269-83 and accompanying text (discussing
Cryomedics) and notes 1202-12 and accompanying text (discussing Honeywell).
1304. 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1976) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought." Id.
1305. 459 F. Supp. at 659.
1306. Id. at 656.
1307. Id. at 659.
1308. Id. at 659-60.
1309. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz off Coast of France, 699 F.2d 909 (7th
Cir. 1983) (applies "contacts with state" test) (supra notes 1217-23 and accompanying text);
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979) (applies "contacts with state" test)
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had to satisfy technical requirements since the defendant, by bringing
a declaratory judgment suit, had subsequently waived any objection
to the personal jurisdiction of the federal court sitting in Iowa. Coats,
moreover, arises out of unusual circumstances, a decision to change
venue to a forum selected by the defendant. Finally, no information
exists as to the authority, either in the federal court in Iowa or the
federal court in Illinois, for service of process on the defendant alien
corporation.
Another national contacts suit that was concerned partly with
transfer of venue was Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 1310 an admiralty
action instituted in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Michigan against an alien corporation. The authority for
service upon the defendant again was unstated; the court observed
that "[d]efendant, as well as plaintiff, relies upon the Michigan jurisdic-
tional statutes and case law . . . " but rejected that reference to state
law because "this is not a diversity case and accordingly, the prin-
ciples of Erie . ..do not apply.""'3 " Without further consideration
of the question of service, which, in many cases has dictated analysis,
the court immediately considered the question of the constitutionality
of asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The court noted
that the question arose under the fifth amendment and that the ap-
propriate test "where the suit is based upon a federally created right
is whether the defendant has certain minimal contacts with the United
States, so as to satisfy due process requirements under the Fifth
Amendment." 31 2 Finding that defendant had substantial contacts with
other parts of the United States, the court held that it had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant."313
The district court recognized that this exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion might be limited by the federal rules or by federal statutes. No
limitations, such as the authority for service of process were considered,
however, because "[d]efendant's motion to dismiss challenge[d] this
court's power to render an in personam judgment only.' ' 3'4 The court
asserted, "All other objections which the defendant may have raised
. . . have been waived."' 3' The impact of this case is unclear,
(supra notes 1213-16 and accompanying text); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509
F.2d 1137, 1143 n.2 (recognizes national contacts test but finds it "need not reach such a
broad conclusion here") (supra notes 1202-12 and accompanying text).
1310. 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
1311. Id. at 356.
1312. Id. at 356-57.
1313. Id. at 358.
1314. Id. at 357-58.
1315. Id. at 358.
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therefore, since the court might have decided differently had it not
viewed Holt as involving a pure federal amenability question not tied
in any way to the authorization for service of process. Subsequent
to the jurisdictional decision, the court granted the defendant's motion
for a change of venue to the place in the United States with which
the defendant had the bulk of its contacts. 3 16 This illustrates that
change of venue statutes, if liberally applied, can mitigate any in-
convenience the defendant suffers from application of a national con-
tacts test of personal jurisdiction.
Summary and Analysis
The above-described cases 3 7 indicate that judicial resistance to adop-
tion of a federal amenability standard, like national contacts, is most
pronounced in Rule 4(e) cases. In some cases, this seems to arise from
the language of Rule 4(e), which permits service only "under the cir-
cumstances" of the state long-arm statute being adopted. 3 "8 In other
cases, courts have been persuaded by lack of federal authority for
aggregation of national contacts; 31 9 absent statutory authority, the
federal courts believe they are limited to using the state statutes as
would state courts when fourteenth amendment standards are satisfied.
Still other courts, in arguments that subsume, to some extent, the
positions described directly above, simply maintain that when a federal
court adopts a state statute, the court cannot pick and choose the
parts of state law that it wishes to adopt, but must take the whole
package, including limiting standards that would apply to state courts
using the statute.'320 In some cases, courts combine amenability and
1316. Id. at 359. See supra notes 188, 226, 337, 354, 657, 693, 880, 891, and 1086 and
accompanying text (discussing use of change of venue statutes to preclude forum inconvenient
to defendant).
1317. See supra notes 1103-1316 and accompanying text.
1318. See, e.g., Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1982) (see supra
notes 1153-62 and accompanying text); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber
Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (supra notes 1251-63 and accompanying text);
see also Conwed Corp. v. Nortene, S.A., 404 F. Supp. 497 (D. Minn. 1975) (supra notes 1163-71
and accompanying text).
1319. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 1981)
(supra notes 1123-33 and accompanying text); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151,
156 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979) (supra notes 1213-16 and accompanying text); Brotherhood Cia Naviera
S.A. v. Zapata Marine Serv., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 688, 691 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (supra notes
1178-84 and accompanying text); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co.,
289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (supra notes 1251-63 and accompanying text); see
also Graham Eng'g Corp. v. Kemp Prods. Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915, 919 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1976)
(supra notes 1244-50 and accompanying text).
1320. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz off Coast of France on March 16, 1978,
699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1983) (supra notes 1217-23 and accompanying text); Kransco Mfg.,
Inc. v. Markwitz, 656 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981) (supra notes 1142-46 and accompanying text);
Odriozola v. Superior Cosmetic Distrib., Inc., 531 F. Supp. 1070 (D.P.R. 1982) (supra notes
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statutory construction analyses so that the application of a fourteenth
amendment standard is required,' 32 ' while other courts simply refuse
to consider a federal standard because the state standard, admittedly
narrower, has been satisfied by the facts of their particular cases."322
Moreover, those few courts adopting a federal amenability standard
of contacts with the United States have done so in questionable
circumstances. 323 They have: made ambiguous references to national
contacts; relied on cases from other jurisdictions while other courts
in their own jurisdiction have rejected national contacts; adopted
national contacts in cases in which other procedural objections have
been waived, allowing courts to avoid national contacts analysis in
the context of Rule 4(e) service of process.
After considering all of the judicial positions and arguments, this
writer concludes that a federal amenability standard of minimum con-
tacts with the United States, national contacts or aggregation of na-
tional contacts, can be applied rationally and successfully in federal
question cases in which process has been served, pursuant to Rule
4(e), under the long-arm statute of the state in which the federal court
is sitting, as well as in all other federal question cases discussed
above.'324 First, applicability of such a standard would meet the clear
need for an independent fifth amendment standard that would pro-
1232-36 and accompanying text); Stanley v. Local 926 of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs
of the AFL-CIO, 354 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (supra notes 1237-43 and accompanying
text); see also Home v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1982) (supra notes 1190-1201
and accompanying text).
1321. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1981) (supra
notes 1147-52 and accompanying text); In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litig., 92 F.R.D.
398 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (supra notes 1172-77 and accompanying text); Conwed Corp. v. Nortene,
S.A., 404 F. Supp. 497 (D. Minn. 1975) (supra notes 1163-71 and accompanying text); Cruci-
ble, Inc. v. Stora Kipparsbergs Bergslags AB, 403 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (supra notes
1224-31 and accompanying text).
1322. See, e.g., Honeywell v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975)
(supra notes 1206-12 and accompanying text); Graham Eng'g Corp. v. Kemp Prods. Ltd., 418
F. Supp. 915, 919 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (supra notes 1244-50 and accompanying text); Japan
Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 236 (D.N.J. 1966) (supra notes 1183-89
and accompanying text).
1323. See Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 560 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (supra notes
1285-1301 and accompanying text); Coats Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Co., Ltd., 459 F. Supp. 654
(N.D. I1. 1978) (supra notes 1302-09 and accompanying text); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly,
Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975) (supra notes 1269-83 and accompanying text); Engineered
Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973) (supra notes 1264-68
and accompanying text); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973)
(supra notes 1310-16 and accompanying text).
1324. See supra notes 785-98 and accompanying text (suggesting national contacts approach
in which process is served in a wholly federal manner pursuant to a federal statute authorizing
nationwide or worldwide service of process), notes 888-92 and accompanying text (suggesting
national contacts approach in which process is served in a wholly federal manner pursuant
to Rules 4(d)(1) and 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), and notes 1039-1102
and accompanying text (suggesting national contacts approach in which process is served, pur-
suant to former Rule 4(d)(7) and present Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), according to state statute).
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mote uniformity among federal courts in federal question cases, at
least on the question of the constitutional test to be applied. Second,
the national contacts standard is rational because it relates directly
to the United States, the sovereign that is seeking to assert jurisdic-
tion over the defendant. Third, the structure of the test, examination
of the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts with the sovereign seeking
to assert jurisdiction, parallels the test devised for state courts after
careful and extended judicial consideration. The test, moreover, while
not promoting total uniformity am6ng federal courts, would eliminate
the anomaly of basing federal court personal jurisdiction, purported-
ly limited only by the fifth amendment, on tests applicable to the
state courts. Lack of uniformity still will exist because of the many
different ways in which a federal court, under Rule 4, is authorized
to serve process.
The national contacts test also could create additional uniformity
of analysis in that the test could be applied to both alien and nonalien
defendants. Although federal courts often have drawn a distinction
between alien and nonalien defendants, with the national contacts ap-
proach being favored more in regard to alien defendants because they
would not be "present" in any particular location in the United States,
such a distinction is not mandated. While alien defendants generally
would not be more inconvenienced by suit in one federal forum than
another, whereas a nonalien defendant probably would have a place
in the United States where most of its activities would be concen-
trated, any substantial inconvenience of place of trial for nonalien
defendants would be prevented by venue rules and change of venue
provisions."" The same types of provisions, as well as the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, would protect alien defendants from abusive
inconvenience occasioned by a national contacts approach.' 326
Moreover, the basis of any fifth amendment amenability standard
would be fairness to the defendant; fairness does not require that
a suit be maintained in the location most convenient to the defen-
dant, but only that the defendant not be inconvenienced unfairly. In
sum, a national contacts approach could be applied to a United States
corporation having few or no contacts with the location of the federal
court seeking to assert jurisdiction just as it could to an alien cor-
poration in similar circumstances. A United States corporation with
substantial contacts in one state is analogous to a foreign corpora-
1325. See supra notes 188, 326, 337, 354, 657, 693, 880, 891, 1086, and 1316 and accom-
panying text.
1326. See supra note 1278 and accompanying text.
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tion with concentrated activity in a single state, and therefore, a na-
tional contacts standard should apply in both instances.
Before the benefits of a uniform federal standard of amenability-
national contacts-can be achieved, however, this writer must deal
with the particular problems of such a standard in Rule 4(e) cases.
First, the refusal of some courts to consider any federal standard,
because the admittedly narrower state standard of minimum contacts
with the state had been satisfied, provides no impediment to the adop-
tion of the broader federal standard. This is not a circumstance in
which each case must be decided on the narrowest possible grounds.
Moreover, adoption of a broad, uniform federal standard of national
contacts would produce desirable results. Courts, for example, would
begin their jurisdictional analyses with a statement of the standard,
followed by an application of that standard to the facts of the case,
instead of selecting a jurisdictional standard that provides the desired
result in light of the facts of the particular case. 327
A national contacts amenability standard also should not be pre-
cluded by the Rule 4(e) language which prescribes that service be made
"under the circumstances and in the manner" prescribed by the state
long-arm statute. First, as in former Rule 4(d)(7) cases, a narrow in-
terpretation for the words "under the circumstances" in Rule 4(e)
is possible. 328 One might argue that these words merely limit service
to those defendants who come within the language of the state long-
arm statute. Most long-arm statutes prescribe both the factual cir-
cumstances in which the long-arm statute might be used and the
method for achieving such service of process. 329 The words "under
the circumstances" in Rule 4(e), therefore, might apply merely to the
factual requisites necessary to trigger the state long-arm statute, i.e.,
is this a defendant whose behavior comes within the language of the
long-arm statute? This would parallel the narrow reading of former
Rule 4(d)(7) that suggests the circumstances in which state methods
of service can be adopted pursuant to former Rule 4(d)(7) are those
in which the defendants fit the particular descriptions of Rule 4(d)(1)
or Rule 4(d)(3). 33 ° Such an analysis would work admirably in cir-
cumstances in that state long-arm statutes specify the kinds of behavior
which the statute is intended to reach. 33' (Statutes providing merely that
1327. See supra notes 742, 747, 762, 831, 928, 971, 1084, 1210 and 1246 and accompanying
text.
1328. See supra notes 1052-61 and accompanying text (discussing narrow interpretation of
Rule 4(d)(7)).
1329. See, e.g., supra note 120.
1330. See supra notes 1052-55 and accompanying text.
1331. See supra note 120.
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the state courts can assert jurisdiction "whenever constitutional" will
be discussed separately below.)'332 Under this narrow interpretation,
therefore, constitutional analysis would not be appropriate until it
is determined that the defendant's conduct falls within the long-arm
statute. At that point, the court would consider the question of whether
assertion of jurisdiction over such a defendant would violate his con-
stitutional rights to due process. The applicable standard, however,
would be the due process clause of the fifth, rather than the four-
teenth, amendment and that standard would be minimum contacts
with the United States. One might argue that, if the defendant's con-
duct comes within the state long-arm statute, he surely would satisfy
a minimum contacts with the state standard and, thus, a broader
federal test would be superfluous. This argument presumes, however,
that every time a defendant comes within a state long-arm statute,
he has had sufficient contacts with the state to satisfy the fourteenth
amendment test developed from International Shoe. That clearly is
not the case. A defendant might, for example, come within the
language of a long-arm statute that permits service on any defendant
who commits a tortious act outside the state causing consequences
within the state.'333 If this single act were the defendant's only con-
tact with the state in question, a court might find that the fourteenth
amendment would not permit a state court to assert jurisdiction over
this defendant. In fact, the facts of World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson'33" were similar to this hypothetical, and the result was a
refusal to allow the state court to assert personal jurisdiction.'335 If
a federal court, on the other hand, in a federal question case (assume,
for example, that the tort was a federal common law nuisance as
in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee'336), were permitted to determine con-
stitutionality by aggregating the defendant's contacts with the United
States rather than with the state in which it was sitting, the contacts
might be sufficient to permit assertion of personal jurisdiction.
Some still might argue that the above analysis is fallatious because
such a long-arm statute would be unconstitutional on its face, or
because a state court could not serve process pursuant to the statute
if assertion of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional. As to the first
argument, although a long-arm statute might lead to service on an
individual over whom a court could not constitutionally assert jurisdic-
1332. See infra notes 1346-49 and accompanying text.
1333. See supra note 120.
1334. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
1335. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text (discussing World-Wide).
1336. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979); See supra notes 1212-15 and accompanying text.
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tion, that does not mean that the statute itself will be found
unconstitutional.' 337 Obviously, if a statute were written in such a way
as to lead to unconstitutional results in a substantial percentage of
cases, a court might determine that the statute was unconstitutional
on its face.' 338 Those statutes, however, which usually lead to con-
stitutional assertions of jurisdiction, would not be invalidated if asser-
tion of jurisdiction over a particular defendant were unconstitutional;
the court merely would decide that the application of the statute in
that particular situation would not lead to a constitutional assertion
of personal jurisdiction.
As to the second argument, that a state long-arm statute cannot
be used if assertion of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional and thus
a federal court could not use it unless the fourteenth amendment were
satisfied, jurisdictional analysis is not conducted in this fashion.
Whether the defendant comes within the language of the statute for
service of process is the first question the court should reach to avoid
unnecessary determinations of constitutional issues. 33 9 Only after the
long-arm statute is held to apply to the defendant should the court
turn to the question of the constitutionality of assertion of jurisdic-
tion over this defendant. If the court then finds that due process would
be violated, it refuses to assert jurisdiction. The court does not,
however, circle back and obliterate service because of the unconstitu-
tional result. A determination merely is made that the second criterion
for personal jurisdiction, satisfaction of a due process standard, is
not met. Consideration of cases in which state court assertions of
jurisdiction were found to be unconstitutional prove this assertion. 0
Most courts do not adopt a narrow interpretation of the "under
the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e). They argue, however, that
these words limit federal court use of a state long-arm statute to only
those circumstances in which the state court actually could assert
jurisdiction over the defendant, that is, only if both the statutory and
constitutional (fourteenth amendment) tests are met. 13 4' This inter-
pretation apparently requires that the federal court use a fourteenth
1337. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (supra notcs
145-55 and accompanying text) (application of Oklahoma long-arm statute led to unconstitu-
tional results in this particular case but statute not invalidated); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978) (supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text) (application of California long-arm
statute led to unconstitutional results in this particular case but statute not invalidated); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1957) (supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text) (application of
Florida long-arm statute led to unconstitutional results in this particular case but statute not
invalidated).
1338. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219 (1977); see also supra note 3.
1339. See supra note 120.
1340. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1337.
1341. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1318.
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amendment amenability standard. One way of solving the problem,
however, is to argue that in those cases, satisfaction of a separate
amenability standard would not be important; all of the analysis would
occur in the statutory interpretation. If a state court could not assert
jurisdiction because the fourteenth amendment would not be satisfied,
then the federal court could not assert jurisdiction, not because some
federal amenability standard had not been satisfied, but because the
federal court would have no authority to serve process if the state
long-arm statute could not be used. The federal court, therefore, would
not be adopting a fourteenth amendment amenability standard by
which to measure its jurisdiction, but would be deciding only that
the amenability issue is irrelevant. The court would be using the four-
teenth amendment only on the question of whether the court is
authorized to use the state statute in the first place. The problem
with this analysis, however, is that if the state statute were found
to be applicable, any federal amenability standard again would be
irrelevant because the state standard already had been satisfied. While
the analysis is technically correct, therefore, it does not lead to a
satisfying solution to the underlying conceptual difficulty raised by
a broad interpretation of the "under the circumstances" language of
Rule 4(e).
A more persuasive argument, however, can be made in opposition
to the position that the "under the circumstances" language of Rule
4(e) only permits a federal court to assert its power over a particular
defendant if a state court actually could do so. Some federal ques-
tion subject matters are in areas that have been exclusively reserved
to the federal courts.'3 2 A state court could not, for example, assert
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a patent litigation, regardless
of the location of that defendant.'3 3 Yet, the very federal courts argu-
ing that the "under the circumstances" language of Rule 4(e) limits
them to situations in which state courts could validly use their long-
arm statutes to reach the defendant fail to recognize that a state court
could not use its long-arm statute on that defendant. Federal courts
use state long-arms to reach defendants in actions involving questions
exclusively reserved to federal courts.'"' Unless federal courts,
1342. See supra note 19.
1343. See supra note 19.
1344. See, e.g., Conwed Corp. v. Nortene, S.A., 404 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1975) (supra
1163-71 and accompanying text) (declaratory judgment in patent action); Edward J. Moriarty
& Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (supra notes
1251-63 and accompanying text) (antitrust action). See also Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684
F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1982) (supra notes 1190-1201 and accompanying text) (patent action); Kransco
Mfg., Inc. v. Markwitz, 656 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981) (supra notes 1142-46 and accompanying
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therefore, are willing to eschew use of state long-arm statutes in areas
of subject matter jurisdiction reserved exclusively to federal courts,
they cannot maintain that the "under the circumstances" language
in Rule 4(e) limits them to cases in which state courts could act validly.
Since no federal statute authorizes nationwide or worldwide service
in patent cases,' 34 ' moreover, jurisdiction would be limited severely
if state long-arm statutes could not be used "under circumstances"
in which state courts could not use those same statutes.
Adoption and use of a federal national contacts amenability stan-
dard seems more problematic when the state long-arm statute merely
purports to permit jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with
the Constitution of . . . the United States" (California)'3 6 or "to
the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States
. . . [including] the most minimum contact with [this state] allowed
under the Constitution of the United States" (Pennsylvania). 341 The
first type of statute is not as difficult as the second. The former only
specifies that assertions of jurisdiction be consistent with "the Con-
stitution" without specifying by which due process clause this ques-
tion should be measured; the latter, by its express reference to
minimum contacts with the state, seems to tie authorized exercises
of jurisdiction to the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In regard to either type of statute, a fourteenth amendment
due process examination arguably has been programmed directly into
the statute; that is, the statute can be used only in those circumstances
in which the fourteenth amendment would not be violated by asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. If that is the case,
a fifth amendment national contacts standard would be irrelevant and
useless, because for the defendant to come within the state long-arm
statute, the narrower fourteenth amendment standard would have to
be satisfied. This argument might be countered by the assertion that
the existence and scope of a uniform fifth amendment test should
text) (declaratory judgment in patent action); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d
280 (3d Cir. 1981) (supra notes 1123-41 and accompanying text) (admiralty action); Chrysler
Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1299 (6th Cir. 1981) (supra notes 1147-52 and accompanying
text) (antitrust action); Honeywell v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975) (supra
notes 1206-12 and accompanying text) (patent action); Brotherhood Cia Naviera S.A. v. Zapata
Marine Svc., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (supra notes 1178-84 and accompanying
text) (admiralty action); Crucible, Inc. v. Stora Kopporsbergs Bergslags AB, 403 F. Supp. 9
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (supra notes 1224-31 and accompanying text) (patent action); Japan Gas Lighter
Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966) (supra notes 1183-89 and accompany-
ing text) (patent action).
1345. See supra note 19.
1346. See supra note 120.
1347. See supra note 1173 and accompanying text; see also supra note 115 (Rhode Island
long-arm statute).
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not depend on the test being determinative in every federal question
case in which it arises. This response, while acceptable, is not satisfy-
ing intellectually and, moreover, would lead to a seemingly anomalous
result: in cases in which a state, by tying its long-arm jurisdiction
directly to the constitutional limits on that jurisdiction, sought to give
its courts the broadest permissible personal jurisdiction, a federal court
employing that long-arm statute also would be limited by the four-
teenth amendment; however, in cases in which the state long-arm
statute specified the circumstances in which its courts were to have
jurisdiction, a federal court, under the above reasoning, only would
be limited by the fifth amendment. From this, one might conclude
that for the sake of consistent analysis, a fourteenth amendment stan-
dard must be implicit in all state long-arm statutes and that therefore,
a federal court would never get past the statutory construction phase
of its analysis without having satisfied the fourteenth amendment.
Another conclusion, however, one more consistent with the fact
that a federal court can employ state long-arm statutes in cases that
state courts could not hear348 and that, thus, would never be subject
to a fourteenth amendment test, is possible and is urged strongly
herein. First, in regard to statutes that merely permit state courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction "whenever constitutional," the limita-
tion is sensibly read as referring to whichever due process clause ap-
plied to the particular court hearing the case, the fourteenth amend-
ment to state courts and the fifth amendment to federal courts. The
long-arm statute need not be interpreted as incorporating, as part of
the prerequisites for use of the statute, a fourteenth amendment test.
The statute should be read, instead, as requiring satisfaction of the
applicable due process test. As argued above, moreover, the defen-
dant first must be served with process before a court, even under
a California-type statute, would be faced with the question of due
process. Even if the court subsequently decides that due process would
not be satisfied, it does not reach back and retroactively invalidate
service of process, but merely denies jurisdiction on the ground of
unconstitutionality. 1 349
When a state statute goes further, providing that state courts are
limited to constitutional exercises of jurisdiction "based on the most
minimum contacts with the state," a national contacts test still would
be useful and applicable. Since the reference to "minimum contacts
with the state" is a legislative effort to program the International
1348. See supra note 1344 and accompanying text.
1349. See supra note 1337 and accompanying text.
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Shoe test directly into the long-arm statute, one might argue that the
language is surplusage; the limitation to constitutional assertions of
jurisdiction includes the appropriate test for such assertions. Therefore,
a federal court still would apply a fifth amendment national contacts
test because the fifth amendment defines the outer limits of federal
court assertions of personal jurisdiction. Moreover, the due process
standard applicable to the particular court using the statute, fifth
amendment for federal courts deciding federal questions and four-
teenth amendment for state courts deciding state questions, arguably
determines the quantum of state contacts sufficient to be the "most
minimum" permitted by the constitution. In the case of federal courts,
if a fifth amendment national contacts test would require no contacts
with the state in which the federal court was sitting, then the
"minimum contacts with the state" requirement of the statute always
would be satisfied. The question of personal jurisdiction then would
turn on whether sufficient national contacts existed to satisfy the fifth
amendment. Following this analysis, federal courts using state long-
arm statutes would have the broadest reach in states that have the
broadest long-arm statutes, a sensible result.
Some courts have not argued that the "under the circumstances"
language of Rule 4(e) limits federal courts using state long-arm statutes
only to circumstances in which the state court validly could assert
jurisdiction. They reach the same conclusion by maintaining, instead,
that when Rule 4(e) adopts a state long-arm statute, it adopts
everything that is "part and parcel" of the statute, including due pro-
cess limitations on the use of the statute.'"" The above analysis also
deals with this position. Due process, as a limitation on the court,
is not peculiar only to the question of personal jurisdiction. Due pro-
cess clings to the court, not the statute. State long-arm statutes clear-
ly were drafted with an eye toward fourteenth amendment limitations;
it did not, however, actually become part of the statute. So long as
the question of personal jurisdiction includes two inquiries-statutory
authority and satisfaction of constitutional requirements-the inquiries
are separate, and the second is not part and parcel of the first.
Another analytical means of supporting the application of a fifth
amendment national contacts test in all Rule 4(e) cases derives from
the dissenting opinion in DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc.1351
In that case, Judge Gibbons maintained that the nature of the claim,
rather than the nature of the court, should determine which due pro-
1350. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1320.
1351. 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981); see supra notes 1134-41 and accompanying text.
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cess clause should be applied on the amenability issue.' 352 Implicit
in this position is the argument that each exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion is entitled to only one due process analysis. Thus, a federal court,
as part of its statutory construction, would not consider fourteenth
amendment limitations for service and then apply a fifth amendment
standard to amenability. To facilitate this process, the due process
issues might be analyzed first in any case in which the usual order
of analysis would create confusion. This would be useful particularly
in cases in which the state long-arm statute is pinned to constitu-
tional limitations. Therefore, the court first would decide whether the
case could proceed under the applicable due process standard before
looking at the state long-arm statute to determine whether the state
had limited such exercises of personal jurisdiction.
This author agrees with the one-case-one-due-process-analysis, but
disagrees with Judge Gibbons' assertion that the nature of the ques-
tion, rather than the court, should determine the applicable due pro-
cess test. If all personal jurisdiction precedent could be eliminated,
and the courts and Congress could begin with a clean slate, his ap-
proach might be sensible. At this point, however, state courts clearly
are limited by the fourteenth amendment, whether the courts are
deciding state questions or federal questions. Moreover, if the four-
teenth amendment standard is based, in any part, on federalism,'
35 3
that factor remains the same regardless of the type of question being
decided. This author believes, instead, that the nature of the court
should determine the applicable amenability standard and that a
uniform fifth amendment standard should apply to all cases heard
in federal courts, diversity cases as well as federal question cases. This
conclusion is sensible in light of the historical bases for these courts
as well as their function as parts of particular judicial systems.
Before concluding this section, the author must deal with those
courts that would embrace a national contacts approach only if federal
legislation provided authority.'3 4 These courts fall prey to the error
of failing to separate the issues of service of process and amenability
to suit. When a state court asserts jurisdiction over a nonpresent defen-
dant, it serves process on the defendant pursuant to a state long-arm
statute. The constitutionality of any assertion of jurisdiction is then
determined by examining the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts
with the forum state, a test that is not prescribed in any statute. When
a federal court asserts jurisdiction, it also must satisfy two criteria:
1352. See supra note 1139 and accompanying text.
1353. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
1354. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1319.
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some statutory authority to serve process and satisfaction of a fifth
amendment due process test. In cases arising under Rule 4(e), the
federal court must rely on a state long-arm statute to satisfy the first
criterion-4(e) authorizes the federal court to use the state statute.
The court, however, does not require statutory authority to engage
in the due process analysis. Some courts, those that adopt the posi-
tion that national contacts cannot be embraced without a federal statute
authorizing the test, note that Congress could have provided for
nationwide service for federal courts in all cases, or, at least, in all
federal question cases. Since Congress has not chosen to do so,
however, but has, on the contrary, through Rule 4(0, generally limited
federal court authority to the boundaries of the states in which the
federal courts are sitting, these courts reason that Congress has limited
federal court personal jurisdiction and has not permitted a test based
on national contacts. This argument, however, fails to separate
statutory authority to serve process from the analysis by which a court
determines constitutionality. While federal courts, lacking a general
federal long-arm statute, must, in some circumstances, rely on state
long-arm statutes for service of process, such reliance is authorized
by federal rule (4(e)). Federal authority exists, therefore, for utiliza-
tion of such statutes. The other part of the amenability analysis, con-
stitutionality, is not regulated by statute in state or federal courts.
The national contacts test, therefore, need not be sanctioned
legislatively before it can become a measure of the constitutionality
of assertion by a federal court of personal jurisdiction.
In sum, strong arguments can be made that even in federal ques-
tion cases in which federal courts serve process, as authorized by Rule
4(e), pursuant to the long-arm statutes of the states in which they
are sitting, federal courts should adopt a uniform federal amenability
standard of minimum contacts with the United States. The benefits
of a uniform federal standard have been described above. 3 5 Federal
courts should determine their personal jurisdiction by some well-
defined, rational test, rather than by the ad hoc system used at present.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over a period spanning more than a century, courts have been in-
volved in fashioning an amenability standard for state courts. This
standard, which is often referred to as "minimum contacts with the
state," has grown and developed over time. During this period,
1355. See supra text following note 1324, text accompanying notes 1324-26, and text following
note 1326.
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however, state courts always have been aware that the constitutionality
of their exercises of personal jurisdiction was to be measured by this
standard that derived from the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Federal courts never have been in such an enviable position.
Although most authorities have agreed that the constitutionality of
federal court exercises of personal jurisdiction should be limited only
by the due process clause of the fifth amendment, no all-encompassing
federal standard ever has been developed. This failure is attributable
to many causes: federal courts, under diversity subject matter jurisdic-
tion, must handle many of the same sorts of cases as are handled
by state courts;'3 6 the federalism-independent sovereign question did
not exist in the federal system as a motivating force for amenability
standards; the historical development of the federal court system did
not proceed in a direct manner; 357 under Rule 4, federal courts have
many different methods for serving process and obtaining jurisdic-
tion over defendants; 358 by the time the federal system was well in
gear, the state standard had become reasonably well-defined; the federal
courts were organized territorially inside state borders, thus making
the adoption of the well-developed state standards particularly tempt-
ing; in many cases, the narrower state standard is satisfied, thereby
making the quest for a federal standard seem unimportant. These
factors have combined to create the present system in which federal
court amenability standards seem to be devised on an ad hoc basis,
depending on the facts of the particular case or the manner in which
service has been made.
Some definitive answer has been reached in diversity cases, with
the Supreme Court in the recent case of Insurance Corporation of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee359 impliedly accepting
the position of Second Circuit'36 in Arrowsmith v. United Press
International36 ' that federal courts in diversity cases should use the
amenability standards of the states in which they are sitting. The result
in Arrowsmith probably derived partly from a misreading of the re-
quirements of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and partly from the lack of
1356. When the question of amenability standards in diversity cases was addressed, therefore,
a natural response was to rely on the state standard. See supra notes 376-492 and accompany-
ing text (discussing amenability standards in diversity cases).
1357. See supra notes 196-272 and accompanying text (discussing historical development
of the federal court system).
1358. See supra notes 273-94 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 4).
1359. 456 U.S. 694 (1982); see supra notes 156-82 and accompanying text.
1360. See supra note 481 and accompanying text; see also supra note 482 and accompany-
ing text.
1361. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); see supra notes 453-77 and accompanying text.
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any genuine federal standard.'362 This writer disagrees with the result
in Arrowsmith, both when service of process is made by a wholly
federal method and when service is made, as authorized by Rule 4(e),
and perhaps, by former Rule 4(d)(7), by using the state long-arm
statute. Federal court personal jurisdiction should not turn on a stan-
dard developed for state courts. After all, although the situation ad-
mittedly is not completely analogous, when state courts decide federal
questions state courts still use fourteenth amendment amenability
standards.
The law in the area of federal question jurisdiction remains un-
settled, with choice of amenability standard depending in part on the
manner in which service is made and in part on the exigencies of
the circumstances of the case. Without any well-developed federal stan-
dard to which to turn, federal courts have often adopted the state
standard, which "worked out fine" in the circumstances of the case.
The federal courts could take a lesson from state courts: the state
court amenability standard is constant, regardless of how process is
served in the particular case. The answer to the problem of lack of
uniformity caused by the diversities of Rule 4 perhaps would be to
formulate a federal long-arm statute, but not to use different due
process standards for different methods of service of process.
The answer to the present problem of devising an appropriate fifth
amendment due process standard applicable in all federal question
cases would be the adoption of the "national contacts" test. As argued
above, this standard can be applied whether process is served by a
wholly federal method or by a state method that has been incorporated
into federal law by Rule 4(e), and perhaps by former Rule
4(d)(7)-present Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). The standard is sensible in that
it relates directly to the sovereign seeking to assert jurisdiction, the
United States, derives from and is analogous to the well-developed
state standard, and precludes unfairness to the defendant because of
venue and transfer of venue provisions and the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. This standard would provide the proper basis for
the analysis of an amenability problem in a federal question case
because the court could begin an opinion by stating the amenability
standard. Adoption of a uniform federal standard also would eliminate
the anomaly created when federal courts, deciding federal questions,
base amenability decisions on state standards. Finally, the question
of federal court jurisdiction would receive the same careful treatment
as has been accorded state court jurisdiction.
1362. See supra notes 453-77 and accompanying text.
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While this writer strongly urges the adoption of a uniform federal
amenability standard, minimum contacts with the United States, several
factors seem to militate against the establishment and adoption of
such a standard. First, the Supreme Court, in Insurance Corp. of
Ireland, apparently has approved the use of state amenability stan-
dards in diversity cases. Second, when recently provided with the
opportunity, in Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria,'363 to discuss
amenability standards in federal question cases, the Supreme Court
ducked the issue completely.'3 6 Third, because the state standard is
so well-developed, federal courts tend to rely on it whenever possi-
ble; short of legislation mandating a particular uniform federal stan-
dard or a Supreme Court ruling to that effect, both of which are
highly unlikely, federal courts probably will continue this reliance.
Fourth, the trend in federal courts seems to be to reject national con-
tacts, except in cases involving service on aliens pursuant to federal
statutes authorizing worldwide service of process. Fifth, the majority
of cases that have adopted national contacts have done so in poorly
reasoned opinions that would be of little value as precedent. Sixth,
recent amendments in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
reveal no intent to create a single uniform federal method for service
of process. The only real hope for action, therefore, would be a well-
reasoned Supreme Court decision embracing national contacts as the
federal amenability standard, a federal International Shoe opinion.
Barring such a decision, the area of amenability standards in federal
questions cases probably will remain as described above, a patchwork
of amenability standards derived from various sources for a variety
of reasons.
1363. 51 U.S.L.W. 4567 (May 23, 1983); see supra notes 520-55 and accompanying text.
1364. See supra text following note 554.
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